M. Aurelius Antoninus

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THE MEDITATIONS OF *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus* THE ROMAN EMPEROR, Concerning HIMSELF.

Treating of a Natural Man's Happineſs: Wherein it conſiſteth, and of the Means to attain unto it.

Tranſlated out of the Original *GREEK*; With *NOTES*: By *MERIC CASAUBON*, D.D.

The Fifth Edition.

To which is Added,

The LIFE of *ANTONINUS*: *WITH SOME* Select REMARKS upon the Whole.

By Monſieur and Madam Dacier.

Never before in Engliſh.

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THE PREFACE

THE greateſt Part of Mankind have generally a very ill Opinion of Philoſophy: They imagine that it conſiſts only in Diſcourſe and Diſputation; whereas in Reality it is neither a Sport, nor a Science made up of Vanity and Oſtentation, but it is the Profeſſion of a thing very Grave and Serious, which is Wiſdom; and to act well, is to be a good Philoſopher.

From hence it is evident, That there is nothing but Morality which can deſerve this Name, ſince that alone gives Rules for the management of Human Life. But what is this Morality?

If we follow the common Opinions, we ſhall find almoſt as many different Morals as there are different Men: For that is often called Morality which is only Uſe, Cuſtom or Conceit; And it happens to this Science as to the Sacrifices of the Pagans, who when they had not ſuch Victims as were acceptable to their Gods, they called ſome other things by the ſame Names, and made them ſupply their Places; ſo Men having loſt the Truth, give the plauſible Name of it to their own Imaginations and Fancies.

Now it is neceſſary, in the firſt Place to get rid of this Error, and to ſeparate that which is Doubtful and Uncertain, from that which is conſtant, and always the ſame.

If then we have the leaſt Recourſe to Reaſon, it will be very eaſie to ſee that true Morality ought to be an unvariable Rule, which follows neither our Prejudices nor our Humours. It can then be nothing elſe but the diſplaying of Truths, which are conformable to the Eternal Truth, that is to ſay, to the Law of God; and by conſequence the Law of God is that fix'd and indiviſible Point from whence we ought to view that which is called Morality, if we would know either its Beauties or it's Defects.

According

According to this Principle one may immediately conceive, That Morality is the Daughter of Religion; That they march Hand in Hand, and that the Perfection of the one is the Meaſure likewiſe of the others Perfection. There is then no perfect Morality to be ſought for but in Chriſtianity: But ſince it has pleaſed God in all Ages to diſcover himſelf to Men, there can be nothing more Profitable, nor more Pleaſant than to know to what degree he has been pleaſed to communicate himſelf to thoſe who were at the greateſt diſtance from his Covenants.

We do not well know what was the Morality of the Heathens before the Time of Pythagoras, *and the* Wiſe Men *of* Greece, *for we have no Remains of that Antiquity: But that little which is preſerved of the Writings and Maxims of thoſe Philoſophers informs us, That in their Time, which was very near that of* Solomon, *Morality did for the moſt part conſiſt in Dark Sentences and Proverbs, which might indeed make Men Wiſe, or lead them to the Practice of their Duty, but which could not explain to them Fundamental Truths, ſo as they might have a diſtinct Idea of them; for a Proverb ſeldom contains either a Definition or an Inference.*

From the Time of Pythagoras *to that of* Socrates, *there is no great Appearance that Morality was much improved. Almoſt all the Philoſophers applied themſelves to the Knowledge of Numbers, to Natural Philoſophy, or to the diſcovery of the Cauſes of what ever happen'd in the Heavens.*

Socrates *was the firſt, who knowing that that which is tranſacted without us, does not at all concern us, and is rather for our Curioſity than Profit, applied himſelf more particularly to the Study of Morality, and reduced it to a better Method; for before him the Heathens had but confuſed Idea's of God, of Law and of Juſtice: He diſperſed this maſs of Darkneſs, and ſtruck out ſuch a Light as ſhines through ſucceeding Ages. He diſcovered that Sub-ordination which is in Nature, and ſhewed Men the Path that they muſt tread to become truly Happy. Were one to judge of* Socrates *by the Truths which he knew, one would not be content to ſay, That he was a great Philoſopher, but one would be almoſt ſo far byaſſed as to affirm, That he was a Prophet, and that God had revealed Myſteries to him which in theſe latter Times were to receive their Accompliſhment.*

This

This Doctrin of his being more conformable to Truth and Juſtice than any which had appear'd before, made Men run in Troops to this new Light; but becauſe they were not all equally able to endure its Brightneſs, a great many more were dazled by it, than enlightned; and this Philoſophy had much the ſame Fate with the true Religion, for it was torn into almoſt as many Sects, as there were Men who endeavoured to explain it. This is the Original of all thoſe different Sects of Philoſophy which ſince that time have reigned in the World; they all would have Socrates *for their Leader, as all Hereſies would make God himſelf the Author of them.*

Among all theſe Philoſophers, the Stoicks *kept neareſt to the ſentiments of* Socrates, *and were the faithful Depoſitaries of his Wiſdom and Vertue. If they have added ſome Severity and Harſhneſs to their Maſters opinions, it was not ſo much the effect of a fierce and cruel Humour, as a thing which Prudence ſuggeſted to them: For being ſenſible of the Weakneſs which is natural to Man, they often puſht his Duty farther than Nature is able to go, that ſo whilſt he uſes his utmoſt endeavours to follow their Precepts, he might at leaſt continue in the mid way, as we*

force a Tree to the oppoſite ſide, when we would have it loſe that bent which it has by Nature. It is true, that after the School of the Stoicks *was founded, there aroſe the Scholars of* Zeno, *who taking the Opinions of theſe great Men too near to the Letter, fell into ſuch Abſurdities, as made them be jeſted on and deſpiſed by underſtanding Men. But theſe ridiculous Philoſophers do no more deſerve the Name of* Stoicks, *than ſuch Men do the Title of Followers of the Prophets and Apoſtles, who interpreting the Writings of theſe Divine Men too groſly, wreſt them to a ſenſe quite contrary to the Spirit of* God, *and the Faith of the Church.*

To make this more plain, let us propoſe ſome Examples of thoſe abſurd Explications, which theſe ignorant Diſciples have given to the wiſe Precepts of their Maſters.

When Zeno *ſaid that all Sins were equal, he would cure Men of that pernicious Opinion, which others too often hold; That provided they abſtain from the Commiſſion of great Crimes, it is not neceſſary that they ſhould keep ſuch a Guard againſt ſmall Offences; and he would perſuade them that the leaſt Sin becomes incurable when it is neglected; and that God who is*

Purity

Purity it ſelf finds nothing in us but what deſerves Death, unleſs we diſarm his Juſtice by Satisfaction, and Repentance. But then comes Chryſippus, *and he taking this Precept in the groſſeſt Senſe, affirms, That there is no difference at all between ſtealing a Cabbage out of a Garden, and committing Sacrilege; between killing a Capon, and cutting ones Father's Throat, and would have both Actions receive the ſame Puniſhment: Now this is ſo far from holding Men in, that it gives them the Reins, and lets them run to the utmoſt exceſſes.*

When he ſaid, A Wiſe Man ought to be without Compaſſion, his Deſign was to be ſo underſtood, That a Wiſe Man does not limit thoſe real Succours which he owes his Neighbour, to a meer Tenderneſs, but that he endeavours to help him without any emotion or Trouble: But Chryſippus *from this Precept takes occaſion to break all the Bonds of Society, and to tread under Foot that Pity which is one of the moſt Eſſential Characters of the Deity.*

When he ſaid, That a Wiſe Man muſt expect all things from himſelf, his End was to let us know, That our true Happineſs cannot depend upon anothers Acti-

ons, and to expose the Ease and Idleness of those, who, giving themselves wholly up to Providence, expect every thing from God Almighty, without ever endeavouring to obtain his Favour by their Labour and Good Works: Besides, seeing he taught, That the Soul was a part of God, and God himself; this Precept, That Men ought to expect every thing from themselves, signified nothing else, but that they ought to expect all from God, who guides them. But a Scholar of his, as Ignorant as Proud, poisons this Precept, and draws thence this pernicious Consequence, That the Wise Man is above even God himself, and is the Author of his own Happiness, independently of that Supreme Being which made him.

It is much the same thing, in several other Passages which have been made use of in all Ages, to render the Stoick Philosophy *Suspected and Odious. It is not that it is Perfect, or that we would defend it in every particular. We have already said, That Perfection is to be look'd for only in Christianity: And we have often in this Work encountred those Errors into which the* Stoicks *have fallen. We say only that there is no Morality which comes nearer to the Morality*

of

of Jesus Christ, than that of these Philosophers; and this the Fathers of the Church have themselves acknowledged.

But some say, The Morality of the *Stoicks* contains no Precept that obliges us to the Love of God.

It never begs his Assistance to be able to obey him.

It does not advise Men to hate themselves.

It does not maintain, That Man is at the same time the most Excellent, and the most miserable of all Creatures.

It does not teach Humility.

It takes no notice, That the attributing all to our selves, and setting our selves above all, is a Sin natural to us; it obliges us not to resist it; and never thinks of prescribing any Remedies for it.

These are the Objections which one of the Learnedest Men of our Age has made, or rather intended to make, against the Stoicks, *and all the* Heathen Philosophers. *But if God had given him leave to finish his Work, he would undoubtedly have corrected this Draught; the*

Reading

Reading of Antoninus *would let him have known that God had not left so good Men in so profound a Darkness.*

This wise Emperour confirms the necessity of Loving God, by asserting that of liking whatever he sends, how troublesome soever it may appear to us, and making Mans Happiness to consist in nothing else but the being in Gods favour.

He not only teaches that we ought to beg Gods Assistance in order to serve him, but he acknowleges likewise a power of God which acts in us, performs all our good Actions, and stirs up our good Desires, and shews us that it is God who hinders all those Opportunities which we might have of falling into Sin, or else gives us Strength to resist it.

He teaches us above all things to hate our Body which is the source of Sin, and which resists the Spirit, and would have us look upon it as a Prison, which hinders us from having a more immediate Communication with God. The true Religion does not command us to hate our selves after any other manner.

He proves in several places that Man is the most excellent of all Creatures, because of his Original, and of those Perfections which God has been pleased to communicate

municate to him; but at the ſame time he is the moſt miſerable becauſe of his Vices, which make him loſe all theſe Advantages, and render him a Slave, by ſeparating him from God.

As for what concerns Humility, ſome People are not content to ſay that the Stoicks *never knew what it was; but they add that this Vertue was inconſiſtent with thoſe other Vertues of which they made Profeſſion. When one would lay a Charge of this nature to Philoſophers, it is requiſite we ſhould know the very Foundation of their Principles, and ſuch Conſequences as may naturally be drawn from thence. It is true that neither the Academians nor the* Stoicks, *have ever had a Word which properly ſignifies that which we call* Humility; *but if this Vertue conſiſts in knowing Man's inconſiderableneſs in reſpect of God, in believing that he is the Author of all good and that he can do no ill; and in teaching that there is no true being but God, and that all other Things are vile, tranſitory, momentary, and ſubject to Corruption, then they did know it, and the Books of* Antoninus *are full of it.*

The laſt Objection is not leſs unjuſt: For Antoninus *has very ſoundly proved after*

after his Master Socrates, *that the self-love which makes a Man break the Bands of Society and retire from other Men, and act as one distinct from the whole, is a Rebellion against God, and a disobedience to the most ancient Law in the World, which commands, that Things less perfect should be for those that are more perfect, and that those which are most perfect should be for one another, which is the only Foundation of Piety and Justice. He exhorts us to resist this unhappy inclination of a corrupted Soul, by convincing us that the first and chiefest Property of Man is to love his Neighbour, and by letting us see that whilst we look upon our selves simply as distinct from the whole and not as one of its Members, we can never love our Neighbours with all our Hearts, and can never have that true and solid Pleasure in doing good, which results from the consideration of being all one Body; and at last he prescribes an excellent Remedy against this Disease, which is the love of God, of which the love of our Neighbour is not only the true Mark, but the Accomplishment and Perfection.*

Since then we have undertaken to defend the Morality of the Stoicks *against the*

Ob-

Objections of this great Man, we muſt not forget his Cenſure upon one of the Principles which they eſtabliſh, That ſince the Deſire of Glory can make any thing to be undertaken, the Deſire of Juſtice may do ſo too. *He maintains, That there is nothing more Vain and Falſe than this way of Reaſoning,* Thoſe, *ſays he,* are Fits of an Ague which Sound Health can never imitate.

He would ſay undoubtedly, That Reaſon cannot do what Paſſion does, becauſe the Effects of Paſſions depend upon Violent and Involuntary Motions, which Reaſon cannot ſtir up at its Pleaſure: And this is true of Reaſon when alone; but Reaſon, when ſuſtained and aided by Grace, is ſtronger than the moſt violent Paſſion, and ſuch was the Reaſon of the Martyrs. This Criticiſm then of this Learned Man is wholly uſeleſs, and the Stoicks *Argument is moſt Sound, moſt True, and Agreeable to that of S.* Paul, I can do all things through Chriſt, that ſtrengtheneth me. Phil. 4. 13.

The Faults which are juſtly to be found with the Stoicks, *are,* The Believing a Multitude of Gods: Teaching that the Soul was a part of the Divinity: Knowing nothing of Original Sin, and the Fatal

Fatal Conſequences of it: Maintaining that a Wiſe Man is ſo much at his own Diſpoſal as to kill himſelf when he thinks convenient.

Excepting theſe Errors, and ſome few others that are no longer dangerous, there is nothing more perfect than their Maxims; and next to the Holy Scriptures there is nothing more worthy any Men's Peruſal, that would follow Juſtice, and make a True Uſe of their Reaſon.

We have nothing of the Stoicks *but the Works of* Seneca, *ſo much of* Epictetus *as* Arrian *has preſerved, and the Books of* Antoninus. *But this laſt is almoſt as far above the other two, for the Beauty of his Writing, as he was in his Birth and Fortune.* Seneca *has mixt the Vertues of the Ancient* Stoicks *with all the Pride of their Diſciples:* Epictetus *is more Plain, Solid and Pure; but he had no great Proſpects, no extent of Soul, no Elevation.* Antoninus *had all theſe Qualities, and his Mind was Vaſter and Larger than his Empire. He was not content to receive, and fully to explain the Precepts of his Maſter, but he has often corrected them, and has given them new Force by that Ingenuous and Natural Turn with which he propoſes them,*

them, or by ſome new Diſcoveries that he has added to them.

He acknowledges, That our Soul is not a Light to it's ſelf, and that it ſees nothing but with that Light, with which it pleaſes God to enlighten it. *He explains all its Proprieties, and teaches us*, That it can be more viſible than the Body, and can alone enjoy ſuch Fruits as it brings forth.

He ſtrongly demonſtrates, That Juſtice is not the Daughter of Convenience, *as ſome Philoſophers have believed*, but that it depends immediately upon God, and is as Ancient as his Wiſdom.

He ſhews, That Charity is a Vertue, the moſt convenient and proper to Man, and that there is no true Good that is not profitable to Society.

He lets us ſee, That all the Miſchiefs which happen in the World, are ſo far from hurting the Law, that they are only the Accompliſhment of it, and ſerve for Inſtruments either of God's Goodneſs or his Juſtice.

He proves, That true Strength, and true Courage are to be found no where, but in good Nature and Bounty.

He forces our Consent to this most important Truth, That a Lie, though involuntary, is a Fault; and that the Ignorance, which occasions its commission, is no ways excusable, because it proceeds only from a Neglect of such Helps as God has given us; that we have voluntarily put our selves into such a Condition, as not to be able to discern Truth from Falshood.

There would be no end if one should collect all those excellent Maxims which Antoninus *has established, and draw thence all those Consequences which would truly and unavoidably follow them. The Reader may do it himself, and we shall be glad if our Remarks may assist him. For Example, when* Antoninus *tells us*, That at the same Time one may be a Divine Man, and yet a Man unknown to all the World; *Who would not draw this Consequence from thence, That Fame, Glory and Splendor are not always the True Characters of Divinity? And who will admire them at the Obscurity of Jesus Christ, which was so great, that Historians, who often take up little Particularities, and who strive to forget nothing that is considerable, have scarce took notice of him?*

When

When he advances this Truth, That Man cannot find his Happineſs in the Sciences or in Reaſoning, it is eaſie to make this Reflection, That the Sciences and Reaſoning may bring us to the knowledge of God; but that they can never make us know Jeſus Chriſt both God and Man, nor diſtinguiſh the real Greatneſs of our Saviour, from his ſeeming Baſeneſs; this can only be ſeen by Faith. There is nothing then but Faith that can ſave, according to the Principles of Antoninus.

All the other Precepts which this Philoſopher has delivered, are no leſs admirable or of leſs uſe: And it may be affirmed that no Perſon has laid down better Methods of living well, and diſcharging thoſe Obligations we ſtand bound in, to God, to our Neighbour, and to our Selves; and whatever he teaches us upon theſe points is conformable to the Rules of the true Religion.

The true Religion teaches us that we muſt always ſubmit to God, and be perſuaded that he does nothing but what is juſt. It commands us to ſtrive with our Paſſions, to purge our Soul from all Vices, that we may become acceptable to God, who can endure nothing that is impure. Antoninus *does the ſame.*

The True Religion endeavours to make

us ſee our own Vanity, as well as that of all Earthly Things, and to convince us that true Greatneſs does not conſiſt in Glory, in Birth or Empire, but in Juſtice. Antoninus *does the ſame thing.*

The True Religion teaches us to Pray for all Men, to do good to our Enemies, and to follow the Example of God, who every day ſends his Succours to the Ingrateful, and makes his Sun to riſe upon the Juſt and the Unjuſt. Antoninus *teaches the ſame, and all that he ſays upon it might become an Evangelift.*

The True Religion exhorts us not to paſs raſh Cenſures upon others, and to deſpiſe thoſe paſt upon our ſelves; to bear patiently with our Neighbours Infirmities, and when Charity requires it, to reprove him with Modeſty; to fling off all dependance upon the World, that our reliance may be only upon God; to avoid all idle Diſcourſe, and the vain Buſineſs of this World, that we may be imployed in that which is fit for us, and which God requires of us, and to be always content with our Condition. Antoninus *exhorts us to the ſame.*

In ſhort, Antoninus *has ſhewed us as well as the True Religion,* That God's Yoke is lighter and more eaſie to be born, than that which our Paſſions impoſe upon us.

Be-

Beſides theſe univerſal Maxims that are common to the World, Antoninus *has ſome that are peculiar to Kings, to whom Morality is much more neceſſary than to private Perſons, for they are Men, and they govern Men; and as it is God himſelf that has given them this Light, we may dare to ſay that the true Religion teaches nothing in this Matter, that can be more perfect. He makes Princes ſee that though they ſhould conquer all the Earth, and unite in their own Perſons whatſoever Men call great, yet if they are Unjuſt, and make themſelves Slaves to another Man's Ignorance, that they become very little People; and for this very Reaſon he places* Alexander, Cæſar *and* Pompey, *below three Philoſophers who were, as one might ſay, the very Sport of the People. Since Wiſdom dwells in the Council of the Wiſe, he adviſes them to undertake nothing without the adviſe of underſtanding Perſons, and after a long and mature Deliberation. He remonſtrates to them that they ought never to look upon that thing as uſeful, which will one day force them to break their Words, and that inſtead of making Religion a Slave to Politicks they are obliged to make Policy humbly ſubmit it ſelf to Religion.*

He lays it plainly before their Eyes, That they are not ſet over their People to oppreſs, but to preſerve and defend them: *He proves to them,* That Reaſon of State and their particular Intereſt require them to protect the Sciences; *for the more the People are inſtructed in them, ſo much the more may they reſpect Obedience and Fidelity from them.*

Since Philoſophy ought to contain Precepts not only for thoſe wiſe Men who deſign heartily to be inſtructed, but for thoſe ſenſeleſs Men alſo, who endeavour to ſtifle their Reaſon, and to give themſelves up to their Paſſions without fear or remorſe, Antoninus *not content to prove the Being of a God to Libertines and Atheiſts, ſhews them farther, that though they could bring themſelves to be perſuaded that there is none, yet that they would find no true and ſolid Happineſs in the attainment of their Wiſhes, and ſo he forces out of their very laſt Intrenchment, all thoſe miſerable People who to rid themſelves of the Authority of Religion, treat it as thing of Human Invention; for he ſhews them plainly by this Principle, that they gain nothing by it, ſince Nature alone and Reaſon require no leſs Wiſdom and Moderation, than Chriſtianity; and that 'tis neceſſary for them either*

either to renounce their being Men, and to deſcend into the Rank of Beaſts, or they muſt live according to thoſe true Rules which Reaſon dictates, and which can never be oppoſite to thoſe of Religion.

If the Reading of a Treatiſe of Tullies *which was properly only an Exhortation to the Study of Philoſophy, made ſo great an Impreſſion upon St.* Auſtin's *Mind, that he had immediately new Proſpects, and new Thoughts; and made him addreſs himſelf to God in Prayers very different from thoſe he uſed before, ſo that deſpiſing the vain hopes of this World, he had no love but for the unfading Beauties of true Wiſdom; what may we not expect from the Reading of* Antonines *his Reflections which fix ſuch Important Truths ſo clearly, and which ſearch the moſt hidden Receſſes of the Heart, to root out thence Pride, Affectation and Luſt, the fatal ſources of all our Sins, and which encounter all our Paſſions by Reaſon, as Religion does by Authority?*

This very Book might render us ſo Pious and ſo Juſt, that we ſhould have but one Step more to make, to become true Chriſtians, if we on our part would bring only Patience and Readineſs to be taught; but unhappily enough for us theſe Truths make no more Impreſſion upon our Minds,

than Objects do upon a Looking-Glass, the Image is expressed upon it to the utmost Exactness, but as soon as the Objects pass away there is nothing left, and the Glass remains empty.

However it is not one Man that instructs another; Socrates *and* Plato *with all their Wisdom and Eloquence, could bring but a few understanding Men, and those naturally devout, to the adoring of one only God. All that* David, Solomon *and the Prophets, have said concerning him, to give some Glimpse of him to the Heathen, has been to little purpose. It was necessary that one who was both God and Man, should cure the Blindness of Mens Hearts, and subdue that Self-conceit that is natural to them, and which resists the clearest Proofs, and the most evident Demonstrations.*

Without this Help we know that all these Treasures of Wisdom will be useless. Even those who will read these Reflections with the greatest Pleasure and understand them best, will reap no farther Profit from them, nor use them towards the arrival at the Knowledge of the Truth. For if we may use that Thought of Plato's *which St.* Austin *has so well apply'd, since they turn their back*

back to the light of Heaven, they ſhall only look upon the Book which is enlightned from thence, but they themſelves ſhall remain in Darkneſs.

But we muſt not queſtion the Deſigns of Providence; its our Duty to labour without ceaſing after that which is good and uſeful. It was this which made us at laſt reſolve upon the Tranſlation of Antoninus *his Reflections, and to add ſome Remarks, which may render the Reading of them more eaſie (and if we may preſume to ſay it) more pleaſant.*

We found no ſmall Difficulties in this Deſign, the Stile of the Stoicks *is harſh, obſcure, and proportion'd to few Mens Capacities. For fear of unneceſſary Words, they dont always uſe ſo many as are needful; and provided, they can give a force to what they ſay, they often neglect perſpicuity. This obſcurity which was common to all the Sect, is ſtill greater in this Emperors Reflections, for he often expreſſes himſelf by halves, becauſe he wrote only for himſelf.*

Beſides, there were ſeveral places corrupted, and a great many others whoſe ſenſe was very dark, becauſe ſometimes two Paragraphs were unluckily confounded into one, or one divided into two.

If we add these Difficulties to those which arise from the matter which is often very much abstracted, and which Antoninus *has made more so by the Sublimity of his flights, People will soon agree that it was no easie Task to accomplish, and will be more ready to excuse the Faults which we may have committed.*

We have not forgot to give the Translation that perspicuity which is wanting to the Original, so that each Paragraph may be as a Picture, on which from whatever side you look it will be still in full sight, always representing his true Thoughts. If we have not absolutely compass'd our Design, we may be at least so bold as to promise, that there will be neither many Obscurities, nor much trouble found in the Reading of it.

As for the Remarks, we have only proposed to our selves to explain the Text without discussing any Criticism. Criticism is needless and out of its Place, when one treats of Morality: Our Design all along has been to make this Book a Book of Piety. To this End when Antoninus *his Maxims are entirely true, which they cannot be without being Christian, we confirm them by the Authority of Religion, and endeavour to make some Christians blush, to see themselves at this Time of Day less convinced*

of

of theſe Truths, than the very Heathens.

When they are falſe, as coming from his Mouth, but true from ours, as when he ſays, That we have a God that dwells in our Hearts, and who is as ſacred there as in a Temple; *We confute the Error of that Senſe which he puts upon it by Teaching, That the Soul is a God, and a part of the Divinity, and we ſhew the Ground for that which we give, by ſaying, That it is the Work of God, and that the Holy Spirit dwells there, to the end that we may be his Spiritual Temples.*

When his Maxims are true in one Senſe, and at the ſame Time will bear another that is more true, and of greater Importance, we lay down both, as in this remarkable Paſſage, where he ſays, That it is a Shame that the Soul ſhould be foiled where the Body is not. *And in this other, where he teaches,* That when one has loſt the Remembrance of his Sins, it is to no purpoſe to live.

When they contain an obſcure Truth, which has a mixture of Doubt, or Falſhood, as when he ſpeaks of the Reſurrection of the Dead, and of the Immortality and Nature of the Soul, we endeavour to help this Truth to ariſe from this Darkneſs, and we call in the Light

Light of the True Religion to our Aſſiſtance.

When they contain ſome Example of a profound Humility, and of a ſweetneſs of Temper that may improve and inſtruct us, we heighten it as much as we can poſſibly: As when he ſays, That all his Life, is but one continual Service which he owes his Subjects; *and when* he thanks the Earth for furniſhing him ſo liberally with thoſe things he ſtood in need of; *and acknowledges himſelf,* almoſt unworthy to tread upon it, ſince he has a thouſand ways abuſed thoſe Benefits which ſhe has beſtowed upon him.

Laſtly, when they are abſolutely falſe, we ſhew the Falſity of them, and endeavour to make this uſe of thoſe Miſtakes; That the contrary Truths appear the brighter.

We were no longer diffident of the Conduct we ſhould obſerve in publiſhing the Heathan Authors, when we ſaw our ſelves ſupported by the Authority of a very knowing Man, whoſe Piety edifies us, and whoſe Learned Works inſtruct us. For in the Second Part of The Education of a Prince, *he ſet us this Pattern, and ſhewed us, That the only good Method of making theſe Books become Chriſtian, was by the manner of explaining them.*

It

It is a perpetual Truth, That Vertue does not conſiſt in Perſuaſion but in Action, and that to be a true Philoſopher it is not ſufficient only to ſpeak, but there muſt be Action: As to be a good Magiſtrate it is not enough to know the Law, but it muſt be put in practice. We thought therefore, that the ſureſt way to make theſe Maxims become uſeful, was to joyn to them the Life of Antoninus: *For we ſhall ſee there, That he wrote nothing but what he himſelf followed, and that his Precepts, which ſprang from his Practice, and not from bare Speculation, may properly be ſaid to be Living Precepts.*

One of the Ancients has ſaid, That the moſt pleaſing Sight to God, was to ſee a vertuous Man ſtriving againſt ill Fortune. *But there ſtill remains another much rarer, and without compariſon far more agreeable to him, 'tis to ſee that we have the happineſs at preſent to behold a great King reſiſting his own good Fortune, and vanquiſhing thoſe Obſtacles which might make his own Grandeur oppoſe his generous Deſigns. Let a Philoſopher be never ſo wiſe we are apt to think, That he does not trample on the Pleaſures and Pomps of the World, but for want of Power to attain them; and that he ſeeks his Revenge on Fortune by*

deſ-

despising her, as Men rail at the Ladys by whom they can never be beloved. It is not so with a King, who since he can do every thing, there can be nothing more admirable, and finer than to see his Power regulated by his Justice, and indeed he has need of a greater Measure of Vertue than Private Persons. Hence it is that Antoninus *ought to be placed above all the Ancient Philosophers, we should place him even above* Socrates, *if* Socrates *by sealing that Truth with his Death, which he maintained during his Life, had not filled up that vast Distance which was between his Quality and that of an Emperor; for a Man's Vertue is not measured by Sallies and Efforts which may often arise from bad Principles, but 'tis measured according to the generality of his Actions. The whole Life is but sufficient to make a good Man, and it is the last Breath that compleats him.*

We have the Life of Antoninus *made by a* Spaniard, *who would persuade us,* That he translated it out of *Greek. It is an amazing thing, and such as one would be scarce believed, if one did not see it, that upon so grave and serious a Subject, and so full of good Instructions as the Life of this Emperour, there should be a Man so ignorant, so vain, and so insen-*

sible

ſible as to diſregard Truth, and to have recourſe to Lies and Fictions: And at laſt to what Lies and to what Fictions! There can be nothing worſe contrived or more Childiſh; Antoninus is abſolutely diſguiſed. If here and there there may happen to be ſome Truth, 'tis like a little bit of Gold in a vaſt abyſs of Sand. To give a true Idea of this Book there needs no more to be ſaid, than that the Author never heard ſpeak of Antoninus his Reflections, for he has not one ſingle Word concerning them in his whole Book.

We thought it not our Duty to take any thing from this Author that is not to be found in others, and therefore we advance nothing but what Antoninus has wrote concerning himſelf, or what other Hiſtorians have informed us concerning his Actions, or what we our ſelves have drawn from ſuch Monuments as have preſerved the Memory of them.

This great Man wrote his own Life, that it might ſerve for an Inſtruction to his Son. If we had it at preſent, we might be ſure of having a true Portraiture of this Prince, for he was not diſpoſed to flatter himſelf, as may be ſeen in ſome Paſſages of his Works: But Fortune envies us this Happineſs; nay ſhe would not ſuffer

that

that even that which good Historians have wrote concerning it, should come entire to our Hands. What we have, may pass for Memoirs, which are far from exact, very imperfect, and not pursued. For they leave us almost wholly in Ignorance of what happened from his Birth to his Advancement to the Empire, and only tell us in gross his most memorable Actions, and the most considerable events of his Reign. However these Remains are very precious, and great helps may be drawn thence towards the forming of a good Prince.

We have nothing more to do but to answer the Criticism of some unquiet Spirits, who find that Antoninus *uses too many Repetitions in his Reflections. What an unhappy Niceness have these Men! Repetitions offend them, but their own Relapses never hurt them. We must therefore pray them to remember that one of the essential Differences that is between Books made for Diversion, and those which are made for Instruction, is that in the former, Repetitions are faulty, and therefore are carefully avoided; because the Mind not being able to rest contented with that which has been said before, seeks continually for some new Thing to satisfie it; and in this Space there is no entertaining it but by flattering*

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ing its Curiosity, which alone can hinder it from recollecting to self, and blushing at its vain Employment. But in Books made for our Amendment and to teach us Things good and honest, Repetitions are so far from being faulty that they are necessary; for besides our falling continually into the same Faults, and so having often need of Reproof, our Passions have taken so deep Root in our Hearts, that 'tis not possible to raise them thence at the first onset, but they must be attack'd with several Encounters. It is the same thing with the Diseases of the Soul, as with those of the Body. Both in one Case and t'other the Sick Man would be as ridiculous as incurable, if he would not use the same Medicines the second time, because they did not at first restore him perfectly to his Health. Besides, when one is about the Explication of Truths that are either obscure, or hard to be digested, because of the Aversion we bear to any thing that may contradict or vex us, these Repetitions serve admirably to make us understand that which had escaped us, or to render that more familiar to us, which at first might seem too severe. In short, those that we find in Antoninus, *are not troublesome, as Repetitions use*

uſe generally to be, for they have almoſt always ſome new Air by the turn, or by the new Light that ſhines in them, ſo that it is ſurprizing, that without any care taken of his Terms, Antoninus *ſhould ſo often ſay the ſame Things with ſo admirable a Variety.*

THE

THE LIFE OF Marcus Aurelius Antoninus,

Dedicated to the

Lord *De HARLAY*,

Chief Preſident.

My Lord,

THE Tranſlation, and the Life of *Antoninus* were not only undertaken at your Deſire, but were likewiſe begun and finiſhed at that Pleaſant Seat, which your Lordſhip's Goodneſs ſometimes permits us to enjoy, and whither your Lordſhip

goes not so much to ease your self of the Labours, that attend the Administration of Justice, as to continue them. Suffer us then, my Lord to pay the first and justest part of our Duty, which is our Acknowledgment, and receive these Fruits of it that do so lawfully belong to you. We can wish nothing more to our Advantage than that they may not be unfit to be presented to your Lordship, and that they may be no Disgrace to the Place which produced them. It is said, That *Egypt* brings forth a great many Good things among a great many Bad, but *Mesnil Park* has this Advantage, that nothing grows there but what is Excellent; and those things which prosper best there, since they were improv'd by the Great Chancellor *De Bellieure*, and since you have taken Care of them, are the Fruits of Reason and Wisdom. It is extreme good Fortune to us to have composed this Work in so fine a Place, where we continually beheld Examples of all *Antoninus* his Precepts. No Man knew better than this Prince the true Duties of great Employments, nor could teach better how to discharge them without Reproach. To understand what he has writ, there is nothing else to be done

done but to ſtudy what you do, and this Study has often forced us to admire the Happineſs of thoſe who lie hid in the Retirement of a Private Life; they are good enough, if they keep a Watch over themſelves, and regulate their own Deſires: But to a Chief Miniſter how many things are indiſpenſably neceſſary! A profound Knowledge, burthened with nothing that is unuſeful; a way of Speech that's ſound and natural, full of Vigour, Nobleneſs and Truth; an indefatigable Application, that can cloſe with all things; a Greatneſs and Conſtancy of Mind, void of all Pride and Self-conceit; ſuch a Love for the Publick, as is always in a Readineſs to ſacrifice every thing to it; a Gravity full of Plainneſs and Modeſty; a Diſpoſition ſo unbyaſs'd, that nothing can ſtagger it; and a Good Nature, that as it is far from Rigor, is likewiſe ſo from Weakneſs.

Theſe are the Qualities which they muſt have who would diſcharge the Duties of ſuch a Station as yours, and make a good uſe of their Authority. Juſtice cannot ſubſiſt without them, and they all are in your Lordſhip.

Antoninus exhorts us to have the Vertues of our Contemporaries always in

our View, and assures us, There are no Pictures that are more entertaining or useful. Should we follow this Rule, my Lord, we should need only to consider your Behaviour, and your Actions, they alone would furnish us with an admirable Variety of these Rare Pieces which always instructing some, and being Patterns to others, would continually afford us new Delights: And indeed what Prospect can be more pleasant or instructive than that of a Man; who convinced that Ambition is an Injustice, has never sought after the greatest Dignities; who being content to discharge his Duty in an Employment, whose Lustre he increases, has thought of nothing else but proceeding from one good Action to another, ever since he was called, by the Wisest of Princes, to preside over the most August Parliament, and has risen to that Honour which his Ancestors so worthily enjoy'd? What ought sooner to attract our Eyes than a Man, who applies all his Thoughts and Actions to the Publick Good, and who does not make use of his Authority to domineer over his Prince's Subjects, but looks on it as a farther Engagement to be continually watchful for an Opportunity to serve them?

them? It would not be eaſie for us to ſtop here, my Lord, if we did not remember, That Juſtice, which is the Mother of all Vertues, and is your Lordſhip's peculiar Character, becauſe it is that which makes a good and a great Man, ſuſtains its ſelf with its own good Actions, and expects no other Reward: However juſt your Praiſes may be, you will find that they will ſcarce agree with thoſe Reflections which *Antoninus* has made upon the Vanity of all Praiſes in general, and which make equally againſt thoſe that receive, and thoſe that give them. We have nothing to ſay now, but concerning the Life of this Emperor. But here my Lord, we muſt beſeech you, not to bring hither that exquiſite Reliſh, that Nice and Delicate Judgment which makes you immediately perceive all the Beauties and all the Faults that are in Works of this Nature; to diſmiſs all thoſe Idea's that you have gained from the Writings of the Ancients, which you ſo much delight in; but above all to forget the infinite Graces of *Plutarch*, which never appear ſo fair and ſo inimitable as when we would ſtrive to come up to them.

THE *Roman* Empire, under the Triumvirate, under *Nero* and *Domitian*, had experienced all the diſmal Effects of the Rage and Cruelty of the moſt unjuſt Tyrants, and under *Auguſtus*, *Veſpaſian*, *Trajan*, *Adrian* and *Antoninus Pius* it taſted all the ſweet Fruits of the Juſtice, Clemency and Goodneſs of the beſt of Princes. It ſeems then in theſe two Conditions to have had an exact Model both of Vertues and Vices. But God, who gives a People Kings according as he would raiſe or depreſs them, ſhewed that the Vertues of the former *Cæſars* were but rude Scratches of thoſe which ſhined in *Marcus Aurelius*. It may indeed be ſaid, That Providence proportioned the Wiſdom of this Prince to the Plagues with which he would afflict his Reign. *Rome* never ſaw its ſelf aſſaulted with ſo many Storms, and nothing elſe could have preſerved it but the Wiſdom of this Emperour. Let not thoſe who read this Life expect to find there the Intrigues of Court, or the Sineneſſes of Policy, it is the Reign of a Prince that was a Philoſopher, that is to ſay, of a Prince adorned with Plain-dealing, Truth, Religion and Modeſty, and whoſe Will was always ſubmitted to Reaſon and Juſtice. The

The Family of *Marcus Aurelius* was one of the greateſt and moſt Noble in all *Italy*. By his Fathers Side, who was *Annius Verus*, he was deſcended from *Numa*: His great Grand-Father was Pretor and Senator, and his Grandfather was thrice Conſul and Governour of *Rome*. His Father died in his Pretorſhip, and left two Children *Annia Corniſicia* and *Annius Verus*, who is the ſame Man as *Marcus Aurelius*, whoſe Aunt *Annia Galezia Fauſtina* was married to the Emperour *Antoninus Pius*. This is all that we know of the Family of *Marcus Aurelius* by his Father's Side. His Mother *Domitia Calvilla Lucilla*, was deſcended from a Prince of the *Salantines*, ſhe was the Daughter of *Calviſius Tullus*, who had been twice Conſul, and Grand Daughter to *Catilius Severus*, who had likewiſe been twice Conſul, and Governour of *Rome*.

Marcus Aurelius was born at *Rome*, upon *Mount Celius*, on the twenty fifth of *April*, in the ſecond Conſulſhip of his Mother's Father, and was named *Catilius Severus*; *Adrian* afterwards called him *Annius Veriſſimus*, making ſome Alluſion to the Love which he bore to Verity. But when he came to be a Man, he took the Name of his own Houſe, and was *A.Ch.* 121.

called *Annius Verus*, till being adopted into the *Aurelian Family* by *Antoninus Pius*, he had likewise the Name of his adoptive Father, and was called *Marcus Aurelius*. He lost his own Father when he was very young, and was bred up in his Grand Father's Family, who was so nice in his Education, that as soon as ever he came from under the Ladies Care, he provided him a Governour compleatly vertuous, and whose Merits were universally known, and chose him out such Masters as were every way the most accomplished: *Euphorio* taught him to Read, *Geminus*, an excellent Comedian, instructed him how to Speak, and *Andro* was pitch'd on to teach him Musick and Geometry: His Master in the Greek Tongue was *Alexander*, for the Latin he had *Trosius Aper*, *Pollio*, and *Eutychius Proculus* an *African*. He learn'd the Grecian Oratory from *Annius Marcus*, *Canenius Ceter*, and *Herod*; And the Latin from *Cornelius Fronto*. But being of a true manly Spirit, and loving nothing more than Truth, he did not trouble himself long with these sort of Studies, he soon proceeded on to a Science more exalted, and more useful, and applyed himself wholly to the *Stoick* Philosophy. To this

this End he had with him *Sextus Cheronenſis Plutarch*'s Grandſon, *Junius Ruſticus*, *Claudius Maximus*, *Cinna Catulus*, who were the moſt famous *Stoicks* of that Age: He had likewiſe a great Peripatetick Philoſopher called *Claudius Severus*.

He conſtantly preſerved all that due Regard for his Maſters, which they could poſſibly expect from a Prince who knew very well how much their Labours had deſerved; and his Acknowledgments proceeded ſo far, that he raiſed Statues to *Fronto* and *Ruſticus*; and promoted the ſame *Ruſticus* and *Proculus* to the Conſulſhip, and this latter not being very Rich, he himſelf defrayed all the Charges of that Office, and always honoured *Ruſticus* ſo far, as to ſalute him before the Captain of his Guards. He went farther yet; and conſidering, that things liable to decay are no ſufficient Recompence for ſolid Good, that is to ſay, for thoſe Vertues which the Precepts of theſe Great Men had either bred or improved in him, he reſolved, That the Publick ſhould be informed how much he owed to their Cares, and upon this account he began thoſe admirable Reflections which he has left us. An extraordinary piece

of Gratitude, which he had no Example for, and which no one since has imitated. When Men are endued with any Vertues, it is natural for them to imagine that they acquired 'em themselves; and they would think the better part, and indeed the whole Grace of them was lost, if they should confess that they were owing to another Man's Instructions. *Marcus Aurelius* was a professed Enemy to this Self-love, and always had a Veneration for his Masters as for his Gods; for after their Deaths he made them Golden Statues, which he placed among those of his Houshold Gods, he often visited their Tombs, offered Sacrifices at them, and strowed them with all sorts of Flowers.

Since all the Advantage of Philosophy redounds to those that practise it, one may very well affirm, That this Science is not compleat in Princes, except it be accompanied with Justice, whose Effects tend always to the Publick Good. *Marcus Aurelius* did not neglect so important a Science, which is the source of all Prosperity in a Commonwealth. He took a great deal of Pains to improve himself in it, for he studied the Laws under *L. Volusius Mecianus*, the most able Lawyer of those Times.

In

In his very Infancy he gain'd the good Will of *Adrian*, who would always have him near him, and who made him a Roman Knight at ſix years old, an Honour which had never been done to one of that Age.

It being then the Cuſtom for young Perſons of Quality to paſs through the Prieſthood, before they were advanced to other Employments; at eight years old he was made a *Salio*, that is, a Prieſt of *Mars*. He was very far from acquitting himſelf of this Employment, as young People generally do in thoſe Offices which they look upon only as Steps to higher Preferments, to which they ſee that they ſhall be unavoidably advanced; for he diſcharg'd all the Duties of his Office with as much Exactneſs and Diligence, as they could have done who had made it the utmoſt limit of their Ambition. He was made Controuler of the Muſick, and Chief of that Order. And as for all thoſe who either came into, or left that Society, he received and diſmiſt them, without ever having the Sacred Forms read to him, for he knew them all by Heart: For it was one of his Maxims, To do nothing but with the niceſt Accuracy, or as

as he used to say, Without the Rules of Art.

It was during his continuance in this Office, that he received the first Omen of his Advancement to the Empire; for when all the Priests, according to the Custom, threw their Garlands of Flowers upon a little Bed where the Image of *Mars* was laid, that which *Marcus Aurelius* threw, fell as exactly upon the Head of the Statue as if some hand had plac'd it there, whereas it belong'd only to the Emperor to Crown it.

At fifteen years old he took the Habit, that was to shew him to be a Man, and by *Adrian*'s Order he was contracted to the Daughter of *L. Cejonius Commodus*; some small time after he was intrusted with the Government of *Rome*, whilst the Consuls went to Mount *Alba* to Celebrate the *Latin* Feasts. He acquitted himself of this Employment as well as the gravest Magistrates could have done, and kept the Emperor's Table with a great deal of Grandeur and Prudence.

He gave to his Sister *Annia Cornificia*, who was married to *Numidius Quadratus*, all the Goods that came to him by Inheritance from his Father, and permitted his Mother likewise to give her all

the

ſhe had, that, as he ſaid, her Husband might have nothing to reproach her with.

He had ſome Inclination to Painting, which he practis'd under *Diognetus*, who was at the ſame time both a great Painter and a great Philoſopher.

He very much admir'd Wreſtling, Racing, Tennis and Hunting; which he did not look upon as Diverſions only, but as thoſe Innocent helps which Nature has ordained for the Preſervation of our Health: For he was of the ſame Opinion with *Socrates* and *Ariſtippus*, That the exerciſe of the Body, is no improper means for the attaining of Vertue.

Before his Travails and continual Buſineſs had alter'd his Conſtitution, one might often ſee him at the Chace, attacking the fierceſt Bores all alone, and coming off with Honour.

But the delight which he took in Philoſophy exceeded all his others. This Paſſion was ſo ſtrong in him from his very Infancy, that at twelve years old, he was got into the Habit of the Stoicks, practiſed all their Auſterities, lay upon the Ground without his Cloak, ſo that his Mother had all the difficulty in the World to perſuade him to lye upon a woodden Bed,

Bed, covered with one only Skin. Nature had framed him to be the Reſtorer of the *Stoick* Philoſophy, which had always been the moſt faithful Preſerver of Vertue: For he had ſo much Conſtancy and Gravity, that from his very Childhood neither Grief nor Joy could make any Change in his Countenance. But this Gravity was not at all Troubleſome to his Friends, or to thoſe about him: For it was as much without Moroſeneſs, as his Wiſdom was without Pride, and his Complaiſance without Meanneſs.

Adrian having loſt *Ceionius Commodus*, who was his adopted Son, look'd for one to ſupply his Place, and ſoon caſt his Eyes upon *Marcus Aurelius*; but finding him too young, for he was not yet eighteen, he adopted *Antoninus Pius*, upon condition that he would adopt *Marcus Aurelius*, and *L. Verus*, the Son of him
A. D. 139. that was dead. So *Marcus Aurelius* was adopted at eighteen Years old.

He dreamt over Night, that his Shoulders and Hands were of Ivory, and that, when he tryed to carry great Burthens with them, he found them ſtronger than ordinary.

The

The News of his Adoption did only afflict him, and when his Servants ask'd him why ſo great an Honour ſhould make him ſo Melancholy, he diſcourſed with them a long Time concerning thoſe Evils which are the inſeparable Companions of Power.

Some Days after his Adoption, *Adrian* went to the Senate, and demanded a Diſpenſation for his Age, that he might be admitted to the Office of Queſtor. This was the laſt Favour which he received from this Emperour, who died ſoon after at *Baiæ*. *Marcus Aurelius* made a magnificent Funeral for him, which was followed by a Fight of Gladiators.

After the Death of *Adrian*, *Antoninus Pius* diſannulled the Marriage which *Marcus Aurelius*, in Obedience to his Prince, had contracted with the Daughter of *Lucius Commodus*, and profered him his own Daughter *Fauſtina*, whom he had contracted to *Verus*, that was not as yet of an Age fit for Marriage, and having thus deſigned him for his Son-in-law, he immediately from being Queſtor raiſed him to the Conſulſhip, which was a thing unuſual, gave him the Title of *Cæſar*, made him Colonel of one of the ſix Regiments of Horſe, aſſiſted A.D. 140.

at

at thoſe Publick Games which he and his Collegues ſet forth, aſſociated him, though againſt his Will, in all the Imperial Honours, and received him into the College of the High Prieſts by a Decree of the Senate.

Marcus Aurelius being loaded with all theſe Honours, which he had been far from ſeeking after, and being obliged to aſſiſt at all the Councils, that he might one Day become able to govern alone, had a greater Paſſion than ever for Philoſophy, upon which he beſtowed all the Time that he could poſſibly ſteal from Buſineſs. The Emperour *Antoninus Pius* did not a little contribute to the furtherance of theſe Deſires which he had for the Study of Wiſdom; for he not only engaged him ſtill more and more by his own Example, but he made *Appollonius* the *Chalcidian*, a famous *Stoick* Philoſopher, come to him from *Athens*, and his Converſation was of no ſmall Profit to the Young Prince.

There is one Particular which muſt not be omitted, ſince it ſhews the true Characters of the Philoſopher and the Emperour. When *Appollonius* was arrived at *Rome*, *Antoninus Pius* ſent him Word, *That as ſoon as he would come,*

his

his Scholar ſhould be delivered to him. The *Stoick* returned anſwer, *That it was the Scholar's Duty to find out his Maſter, and not the Maſter to go to the Scholar.* This Anſwer was brought to the Emperour, who ſaid ſmilingly, *It ſeems it was leſs Trouble to* Appollonius *to come from* Athens *to* Rome *than it would be to come from his Inn to the Palace,* and ſo ſent *Marcus Aurelius* to him.

It was about this Time that the Prince loſt his Governour: He was ſo concerned at his Death, that forgetting his uſual Steddineſs and Conſtancy, he could not refrain from Tears; and when the Courtiers made their Reflections upon it, the Emperour ſaid to them, *Give him Leave to be a Man, for neither Philoſophy nor Empire, can root out the Paſſions.*

He married *Fauſtina* two Years after his ſecond Conſulſhip. This Princeſs was very beautiful, but her Humor was too gay to make any Husband happy; ſhe followed her Mother's Example, and little regarding the Young Prince's Wiſdom, ſhe ſought for more agreeable Company, that would not undervalue all thoſe Graces which ſhe was Miſtreſs of. *Marcus Aurelius* had one Daughter by her the firſt Year after his Marriage, *A.D.* 147.

and at the ſame Time was honoured with the Tribunal Power, and the Title of Proconſul, which uſed generally to be united to the Imperial Majeſty.

To all theſe Dignities the Senate added another Honour, which was invented for *Auguſtus*, and which ſucceeding Ages had mightily augmented.

All the Decrees of the Senate were made upon the Report of the Conſul that preſided, and he alone had the Right of Reporting. The Conſuls parted with this their Right in favour of *Auguſtus*, to whom, by a ſolemn Decree they gave the Right of making one Report every Day that the Senate aſſembled, that is to ſay, upon each of thoſe Days he might propoſe to the Senate ſome one Buſineſs, what he pleaſed, and of what Nature ſoever. But when Flattery has once made Men part with their Privileges, it is difficult for them to keep any Meaſures, and to know where to ſtop. Whereas *Auguſtus* made only one Report, other Emperours had afterwards the Power granted them of making ſome three, ſome four, others five, and this laſt Privilege was that which at preſent was given to *Marcus Aurelius*: A Privilege of ſo great Power, and ſo vaſt an extent, that that alone was

was sufficient to render the Assembling of the Senate wholly useless.

Marcus Aurelius did not make use of this Authority, for the rendring himself more absolute, but imployed it to the Preservation of the Liberty, and the Publick Happiness of the People.

Nor did he ever make any ill use of that Credit which he had with the Emperour, who preferred no Man but upon his Recommendation, for he always took Care to mention no Men but such as were fit for the Places that he would obtain for them. As his Honours increased, so his Deference to the Emperour became greater: He paid him the same Respect, that might have been expected from a Private Man; and the Love which he bore him seemed to augment daily, for in twenty Years Time that he lived in the Palace, he never left him, nor lay abroad any more than two Nights.

This constant Attendance, and all these Marks of Tenderness touched *Antoninus* so nearly, that he would never give the least Ear to those who endeavoured to raise Suspicions in him against *Marcus Aurelius*, and to make him doubt of the Sincerity of his Affection. One

Day, one of his Courtiers walking with him in a Garden, and seeing *Lucilla*, the Mother of *Marcus Aurelius*, upon her Knees before an Image of *Apollo* in a by Place, said to him in his Ear, *What can you think* Lucilla *asks this God for so heartily? She prays him, That you may die and her Son be Emperour.* This Speech, which under a Tyrant would have been fatal both to the Mother and the Son, was not at all minded by the Emperour, who was too well assured of the Faith and Honesty of *Marcus Aurelius*, to believe any thing that might be to his Disadvantage. This Union between these two Princes continued entire and perfect till the Death of *Antoninus*, who falling sick at *Lorium*, and finding himself beyond all Hopes of Recovery, ordered his Friends, the Captains of his Guards, and his principal Officers, to come to him, and afore them all he confirmed his Adoption of *Marcus Aurelius*, and named him his only Successor, without ever mentioning *Verus*; and when the Tribune came for Orders, the Word which he gave him was *equanimity*, as much as to say, That he had now nothing more to desire, since he left such a Successor to the Empire, and immediately he

he commanded, That the Golden Statue of Fortune (which as a faithful Pledge of the Publick Happineſs, ſtood always in the Emperour's Chamber) ſhould be removed from his own Apartment, to that of *Marcus Aurelius*.

After the Death of this Prince the Senate obliged *Marcus Aurelius* to take the Government upon him. But the firſt Mark of the New Emperours Authority was the making *Lucius Verus* his Companion in it. He gave him the Tribunal Power, named him Emperour, and would reign joyntly with him. This was the firſt Time that *Rome* ſaw its ſelf governed by two Sovereigns; which was a ſurpriſing Spectacle to a City, that had ſeen almoſt all the Blood of her Citizens ſhed in chooſing of a Maſter. *A.D.* 161.

The 6th of *April* he had r igned one Month alone.

The ſame day *Marcus Aurelius* took the Name of *Antonius*, and gave it to his Collegue, making him marry his Daughter *Lucilla*; and the better to teſtifie their joy for this Marriage, and their union, they ſetled a conſiderable Fund for the entertainment of new Citizens, who were very numerous. When the two Emperors came from the Senate they went together to view the Regi-

ments of Guards, and gave each Soldier five hundred Crowns, and to the Officers in the same proportion. After this they prepared for their Fathers Funeral, whom they buried in *Adrian's* Tomb. They ordained Feasts to make the Mourning more solemn; and afterwards, according to Custom, proceeded to his Consecration, which was after this manner: There was an Image made of Wax which resembled the dead Emperor, this was plac'd upon an Ivory Bed rais'd very high, and covered with Cloth of Gold, and was set at the entrance of the Palace: Upon the left hand were all the Senators in black; on the right, the Ladies of the first Quality all in plain white Habits, without Jewels or any other Trimming. This lasted for seven days, during which time Physicians came in and out, as though they had been to visit the sick Man, and every time they said he grew worse, and that he would certainly die. At last when they had declared that he was dead, the noblest and youngest of the Senators and Roman Knights, carried the Bed upon their Shoulders through the *Via Sacra*, and set it in the midst of that place, where the Magistrates used to lay down their

Offices.

Offices. On each ſide of the place were two Scaffolds, on the one was a Company of young Boys, on the other of young Maids, all Children of the firſt Quality, who ſang Hymns and Songs in Honour to the Dead, in the moſt mournful Notes that could be. Theſe Songs ended, the Senators and Knights took up the Bed again, and carried it out of the City to the Field of *Mars*, in the midſt of which there was a Structure of Wood in the form of a Pyramid, with ſeveral Stories. The firſt Story was ſquare, and was a ſort of a little Chamber fill'd with all ſorts of combuſtible Matter, and garniſhed on the out-ſide with Cloth of Gold, Ivory Statues, and fine Pictures: The ſecond was of the ſame Figure, though ſomething leſs, having the ſame Ornaments, and this only difference, that the four ſides of it were open. Upon this there was a third ſtill leſs, and upon that a fourth, and ſo on a great many other Stories, ſtill growing leſs in proportion, till the laſt ended in a point. The Bed and the Statue were plac'd in the ſecond Story, which was fill'd with ſweet Flowers and Plants, and all manner of Gums and Spices; Cities, Nations and private Perſons ſtriving by their

Preſents who ſhould do moſt Honour to their deceaſed Emperor. The Roman Knights rode Races on Horſeback round this Pyramid in good order, marching to the ſound of ſeveral warlike Inſtruments; to this there ſucceeded Races of Chariots, in which were ſeated young People clothed in Robes bordered with Purple, with Maſques on, that repreſented to the Life the Faces of the moſt famous Captains and greateſt Emperors.

Theſe Races ended, his Succeſſors in the Empire came to the Pile, and ſet fire to it with Torches, the Conſuls, Senators and Knights did the ſame, each to their own ſide. All was in a Flame in a moment, and at the ſame time from the top of the pile, flew an Eagle which was preſently out of ſight. The People believ'd that it was that Eagle, which carried the Emperors Soul to Heaven; and from that moment they paid him the ſame worſhip, that they did to the Immortal Gods.

After this Ceremony the two Emperors made each of them a Funeral Oration upon their Father, ordain'd that he ſhould have a High-Prieſt, whom they choſe from his own Family; inſtituted

to

to his Honour a College of Prieſts, whom they call'd *Aurelians*; and concluded theſe Solemnities with a fight of Gladiators.

Antoninus had no ſooner finiſhed this Apotheoſie of his Father, but he found himſelf troubled with an infinite number of Petitions which were continually preſented him by the Pagan Prieſts, the Philoſophers, and even by the Governors of ſome Provinces, to obtain leave of him to perſecute the Chriſtians, who by the Clemency of *Adrian* and *Antoninus Pius*, had for a long time been defended from their Perſecutions. This Emperor who was no leſs an Enemy to Violence and Injuſtice than his Father and his Grand-Father, and who beſides this, reſolving to govern after their Maxims, withſtood this blind Rage very vigouroufly; and that the Chriſtians in the remote Provinces might be preſerv'd ſafe from danger, he wrote to the general Aſſembly of *Aſia* held this year at *Epheſus*, this admirable Letter which *Euſebius* has preſerved for us.

I am

I am perſuaded that the Gods will take care that the Chriſtians ſhall not be able to hide themſelves from their Eyes: It is more their Intereſt than yours, to puniſh thoſe who refuſe to acknowledge them. Thoſe Perſecutions which you have rais'd againſt them as impious Perſons, ſerve to no other end but to confirm them more in their own Opinions; and ſince they believe that they die for their God, ought not Death to ſeem as agreeable to them as their Life? By this means it is that they are always Conquerors, chuſing rather to die than ſubmit to your Orders. As for the Earthquakes which have happen'd and which happen ſtill, it is fit to adviſe you to make a ſerious and juſt compariſon of the condition that you and they are in upon ſuch Accidents: The Confidence they have in God increaſes ſtill, as their danger grows greater; but as for you, you loſe your Courage immediately: They humble themſelves them more profoundly before God; but as for you, you are ſo Ignorant, and ſo Blind, that not content to have forgat all your Gods, and the Worſhip that you ow the Immortal God, that you perſecute, and purſue even to death, thoſe Chriſtians that ſerve and adore him. The Governors of ſeveral Pro-

vinces

vinces have often wrote upon the occasion of those of this Sect, to our Father of Immortal Memory; who has always return'd this Answer, That they should create 'em no trouble, unless they were convicted of any Design against the State. I therefore, conforming my self to his Maxims, have given the same Answer to them, that have writ to me about it; and if any one continues to disturb them upon pretence that they are Christians, I command that the Accused, though acknowledged to be Christians, be absolv'd, and their Accusers punish'd. This Letter was publish'd at *Ephesus* in the common Temple of *Asia*.

This Order was obey'd, and Peace and Quiet reign'd through the whole Empire, and the beginning of this Government was as easie and as happy, as if the Soul of *Antoninus Pius* had past to his Children. Though in the mean time there was nothing more opposite, than the Humours and Inclinations of these two Princes.

Marcus Antoninus was Constant and Modest, Grave and Complaisant, Mild and Just, as Indulgent to others, as severe to himself, not inclin'd to vain glory, unalterable in his delights, which he

he never form'd without having thought well, being never led aside by any Humour or Passion; an Enemy to Informers; Pious without Affectation; Moderate in all things; always of an even Temper, always Master of himself, always submitting to Reason, incapable of Dissimulation; always upon his guard against the Love of himself; never either Impatient or Unquiet; very ready to pardon the greatest Faults when they only regarded himself, and inexorable, when extream necessity, that is to say, the Interest of the publick, forced him to punish them. He gave the same Laws to all the World, and let his Subjects live in perfect Liberty; whatever he did, the good of the State was always in his Eye, and never his own Pleasure, nor his Interest, nor his particular Glory: In short, having no other design but to do good to Men, and to be obedient to God he always followed Justice, and never spoke any thing but Truth.

Lucius Verus had none of these Qualities, he was Passionate, and Dissolute, and the greatest of his Vertues was, that he had none of those Horrible Vices which make a Lawful Prince become a True Tyrant. But this Disparity of Humours

did

did not appear in the first Years; the the Respect which he could not but have for his Brother and his Obligations to him, forced him to hide this Vicious Temper, whilst he was near him. He seemed as though he would wholly conform himself to his Manners, and imitate the Prudence of his Life; he behaved himself so upon all occasions that one would have said, That *Marcus Antoninus* alone was Emperour; for *Verus* paid him the same deference, or rather the same Submission that a Lieutenant would have had for a Proconsul, or the Governour of a Province for the Emperour himself. But it is a difficult thing for Vice to be long kept in, this Constraint serves only to provoke it, and this young Prince did not let slip the first Opportunity which Chance offered him of making it apparent.

Commodus came into the World about the latter end of the first Year of *Antoninus* his Reign. The Birth of this Prince, whose life seems to have been a Dishonour to Nature, was signalized by the most horrible Disasters. The *Tiber* began these Publick Calamities by an Inundation, which overwhelmed great part of *Rome*, bore along with it a multitude of

of Cattle, ruin'd all the Country, and caused an extreme Famine. The two Emperours soon remedied these Evils by distributing every where such Succours as were needful. This Inundation was followed by Earthquakes, Burning of Cities and a general Infection of the Air, which immediately produced an infinite number of Insects, who wasted all that the Floods had spared, and the whole World resounded with the noise of Wars, which broke out almost at the same Time. The *Parthians*, under the Conduct of their King *Volageſus*, surprized the *Roman* Army that was in *Armenia*, cut it in Pieces, and came into *Syria*, and drove thence *Attilius Cornelianus*, who was the Governour of it. The *Catti* ravaged *Germany*, and the Country of the *Griſons* with Fire and Sword, and the *Britains* began to revolt.

Calpurnius Agricola was sent against the *Britains*, *Aufidius Victorinus* against the *Catti*, and the *Parthian* Expedition was reserved for *Verus*, who parted some few Days after.

Marcus Antoninus, who was obliged in Prudence, and by the Neceſſity of Affairs to remain at *Rome*, accompanied the Prince to *Coſma*, did him all

forts

ſorts of Honours, and made his Friends and principal Officers attend him, either becauſe by this Means he would ſecure himſelf of his Conduct, or elſe had no other Deſign but to render the young Prince's Court more Magnificent; or laſtly, which is moſt probable, That he might lay a Reſtraint upon him, and by ſome Remains of Modeſty repel or correct thoſe bad Inclinations which he ſaw in him. But all this Precaution was to no purpoſe: *Verus*, who was weary of conſtraining himſelf, made no account of thoſe Friends which *Antoninus* had ſent with him. As ſoon as he had loſt Sight of him, and being no longer with-held by Reſpect or Fear, but could purſue his own Humour, he forgot the Defeat of the *Roman* Legions, and conſidered no longer that *Syria* was in a likelihood of Revolting, but plunged himſelf into all manner of the moſt Infamous Debauches, and that to ſuch Exceſs, that he fell dangerouſly ill at *Canuſium*. This News was brought to *Rome* juſt upon *Antoninus* his Return thither; who immediately went back to ſee him: But before his Departure, in a full Senate he made Vows, which he religiouſly perform'd, when he return'd and knew that *Verus* was embark'd.

The

The Sickneſs which the young Prince had at *Canuſium* did not at all amend him, he continued his Debauches upon his March, and he was no ſooner in *Syria* but he totally forgot it at *Daphne*, one of the Suburbs of *Antioch*, the entrance of which place, was as it were, prohibited to all honeſt People, ſince the goodneſs of its Air, the beauty of its Woods, its Flowers, and its Fountains had made the very Throne of impurity be ſeated there. *Verus* added to the Debauchery of this place, by ſuch Exceſſes as were unknown to its Inhabitants, though the moſt profligate People upon Earth.

A.D. 163, 164, 165. In the mean time his Lieutenants made War againſt the *Parthians* with good Succeſs. *Statius Priſcus* took *Artaxata*; *Caſſius* and *Martius Verus* put *Vologeſus* to flight, took *Seleucia*, burnt and ſackt *Babylon* and *Æſiphon*, and ras'd the Magnificent Palace of the *Parthians*. Their Troops which had gain'd ſo great Victories, and had defeated Armies of five hundred thouſand Men, in their return were forc'd to encounter Sickneſs and Hunger, which ſwept away more than half of them: *Caſſius* brought back but a ſmall part of his Army into *Syria*. But this

this did not hinder *Verus*, who was exalted with his Victories, from taking the lofty Title of *Conquerour of* Armenia *and the* Parthians, as if he had juſtly acquired it in the midſt of his Pleaſures.

During all this, *Marcus Antoninus*, who feigned himſelf ignorant of theſe Debauches, thought the ſureſt way to retrieve him was to get him married. He therefore without Delay commits to his Siſter's Care, his Daughter *Lucilla*, who was one of the fineſt Princeſſes in the World, made her go for *Syria*, and bore her Company as far as *Brunduſium*: Some ſay that he reſolved to have carried her himſelf to *Verus*, but that he was put off of that by the Reports which were ſpread, That he went into *Syria* only to attribute to himſelf the Honour of finiſhing this War. Before he parted from *Brunduſium* he ſaw the Princeſs imbark, and wrote to the Proconſuls, and to the Governours of the Provinces, to forbid their going to meet her, or making ſuch Solemnities for her Reception as were uſual upon thoſe occaſions, which ſerved to no other end, as he ſaid, but to have People crowded.

Verus, who believed that *Marcus Antoninus* brought his Daughter himſelf, and

was afraid left he might come to the Knowledge of his Diſorders, went to receive him at *Epheſus*, from whence he went again ſome few Days after the Celebration of his Marriage, and returned to *Antioch* with his Empreſs, who ſoon led a Life there very little different from her Husband's, and very agreeable to the Examples which her Mother *Fauſtina* had given her.

A.D. 167, 168. When *Verus* had ſet a King over the *Armenians*, and entirely ſubdued the *Parthians*, he returned to *Rome* to partake of the Honour of a Triumph with *Marcus Antoninus*. His Return was thought to be Fatal to the Empire, for he carried the Plague into all the Places through which he paſs'd. The beginning of this Plague was remarkable, and they ſay, That at the Sacking of *Babylon* the Soldiers that went into *Apollo*'s Temple to pillage it, in a Place under Ground found a little Golden Coffer, which was no ſooner opened, but there came out an infected Air, which ſpread it ſelf even to *Gaul*, and carried Mortality all-a-long with it. But there is more probability that it was a Conſequence of thoſe Diſeaſes by which *Caſſius*'s Army ſuffered in his Return from his Defeat of the *Parthians*.

Much

Much about this Time the *Germans* revolted, and made an irruption into *Italy*, where they ravaged all that came in their way. *Pertinax*, a Man of known Valour, but whoſe Enemies had made his Fidelity be ſuſpected, and who by all the Aſſiſtance of his Friends could riſe no higher than to be Commander of ſome Auxiliary Troops, was choſen, contrary to the Expectations of the Court, with his beſt Friend *Claudius Pompeianus*, to go and withſtand this Torrent, which threatned *Rome*. *Antoninus* made them both his Lieutenants, that they might ſhare the Honour of this Expedition with him. *Pertinax*, who knew the Value of this Favour and Truſt, forgot nothing that might make the Emperour have no reaſon to repent of them, and gave evident Marks of his Faithfulneſs, his Experience, and his Courage. They attacked their Enemies briskly, who ſtood their Ground, and fought with a great deal of Reſolution: The Fight was long and obſtinate, but at laſt they were cut in Pieces, and among the Dead were found ſeveral Women armed, who had been ſlain fighting near their Husbands, and their Children. How great ſoever this Victory might be, and whatſoever

He that was afterwards Emperour.

Pleaſure the Emperour might take in it, he was nevertheleſs able to give a Repulſe to this Victorious Army. When they prayed him to increaſe their Pay, he anſwered them, That to give them Mony for this Happy Succeſs, was to be liberal to them at the Expence of the Blood of their Kindred and their Parents, concerning whom he was to give an account to God, who is the only Judge of Princes: And that in whatſoever Danger he might be, he would always have ſo much Reſolution and Wiſdom, that neither Fear nor Compliance ſhould ever oblige him to paſs the Bounds of the exacteſt Juſtice. He was proclaimed *Imperator* the fifth Time, the Victories of *Verus* having gained him that Title four Times before. The Night before the Fight, they brought a Spy to his Tent, who was taken in the Camp: The Emperor would have ask'd him ſome Queſtions, but he told him: *I am ſo cold that I cannot ſpeak, therefore if you would know any thing from me, order firſt that they give me a Coat, if you have ever a one.* *Antoninus* was not angry at his Boldneſs, but did as he deſired.

There happened an Action of a Soldier, which muſt not be forgotten; he being upon

upon the Guard one Night, on the Bank of the *Danube*, and hearing the Voice of ſome *Roman* Soldiers from the other Side, ſwam through the River in his Armour, delivered his Comerades, and brought them back the ſame way into the Camp.

In the Year following another War was raiſed, more dangerous than theſe that were ended: The *Marcomanni* and the *Quadi*, a Warlike People, took Arms and terrified all the *Romans*, who ſaw that they were but in a bad Condition to reſiſt ſo powerful an Enemy, whilſt the Plague raged both in the Cities and Country, and filled almoſt all Places with Heaps of the Dead. The Emperour was the only Man that did not deſpair of the Protection of Heaven: His firſt Care was to appeaſe it by Sacrifices; He made Proceſſions round about the City; the Images of the Gods were ſerved and adored upon their Beds for ſeven Days: And leſt that Service, which was moſt pleaſing to them, might chance to be forgot, he made uſe of ſtrange Rites, and to this purpoſe made Prieſts and Sacrificers come from all Parts. But that which is more aſtoniſhing is, That he re-eſtabliſhed the Ceremonies of *Iſis*,

which had been prohibited in the Time of *Auguſtus*, and made no Scruple to adore a Goddeſs that had her Temple beat down in the Reign of *Tiberius*, her Ornaments burnt, her Prieſts murdered, and her Image thrown into *Tiber*.

There were ſo many Victims ſlain upon this Occaſion, that ſome merry People, who could not forbear their Jeſts even in the Time of a publick Calamity, ſaid openly, That if the Emperour returned Victorious, he would find no Oxen left in all his Empire.

When he had performed his Devotions he departed, and carried *Verus* along with him, who would much rather have ſtaid behind at *Rome*, to run on in his Debaucheries, which *Antoninus* would have hindred. The two Emperours therefore took both of them the Way of *Aquileia*; they were no ſooner arrived there, but they marched againſt the *Marcomanni*, who were encamped not far off, beat them out of their Trenches, and made a great Slaughter of them. *Furius Victorinus*, Captain of the Guards, was ſlain in the Battle, with a great many of the beſt Troops. This did not hinder the two Emperours from continuing their Attacks with a great deal of Vigour;

Vigour; they preſſed upon the Enemy ſo forceably, that at laſt they broke through their Army: The greateſt part of their Allies drew off their Troops, ſlew the Authors of the Revolt, and deſired a Truce. *Verus* content with theſe Conditions, and ſighing after the Pleaſures of *Rome*, urged *Antoninus* to agree to their Requeſt, and to return back: *What greater Advantage can you hope for*, ſaid he, *than that which they offer you? Would you reduce your Enemies to Deſpair, and force them to know our Weakneſs? Let us make our Advantage of their Ignorance and Fear, and let them rather think of Retreating than Revenge.* But *Antoninus* repreſented to him, that there was no heed to be given to the offers of theſe Barbarians; that they in Appearance only returned to their Duty, to avoid the Storm which was pouring down upon them; that uſe was to be made of their Diſorder, and that no Time ſhould be given them to Rally again, when the *Roman* Army ſhould be more harraſs'd, and immediately ordered the Troops to march.

The two Emperors paſs'd the *Alps*, purſued the Enemy, overcame them in ſeveral Encounters, defeated them en-

tirely, and came back without any conſiderable loſs. Winter was now far advanced, and they had made a Reſolution of ſtaying at *Aquileia* till the end of it, but the Plague oblig'd them to part thence with ſome of their Troops. In this Journey *Verus* was ſtruck with an Apoplexy near *Altinum*, whither they carried him, and where he died; his Body was brought to *Rome* by *Antoninus*, who did his laſt Office to him after the ſame manner that he had done it to his Father, and ſeemed not much troubled at his being made a God: Nay, it was but juſt that he ſhould not be ſorry for his death; and this would not have miſ-become that Wiſdom he made Profeſſion of, and that tenderneſs which he had for his People. But that which an Hiſtorian adds, That he ſhew'd his ſatisfaction publickly to the Senate, is not at all probable, and deſerves no Credit. He ſays that the Emperor inſinuated, *That the War againſt the* Parthians *had never been ſo happily ended but by his Counſels*, and declared, *That being no longer now to divide the Soveraigney, with a Man ſunk in his Debaucheries, he would begin a new Reign.* *Antoninus* was too Modeſt, and too Prudent to ſpeak thus;

and

and this neither correſponds with his Maxims, nor with that Portraiture of *Verus*, that he gives us in his firſt Book; nor indeed with the very ſubject of his Diſcourſe, which was to thank the Senate for having ordered the Conſecration of *Verus*. His Enemies no doubt, ſpread this Report to put ſome colour upon the Calumner, of the Emperor's having diſcovered that *Verus* had reſolved to poiſon him, and therefore would be before-hand and poiſon him firſt, or got his Phyſician to kill him by letting him Blood; a ſuſpicion of this Nature could never fall upon *Marcus Antoninus*, and therefore the greater part lay it to *Fauſtina*'s charge, and ſay this Princeſs out of vexation that *Verus* had diſcovered the Intrigues he had with her to *Lucilla*, reveng'd his Treachery by Poiſon. But the moſt general Opinion, is, That his death was *Lucilla*'s handy-work, who not being able to endure that Paſſion which *Verus* had for his own Siſter *Fabia*, and being leſs jealous of her Husbands love, than of her Siſter in Law's power, who with an Inſolence equal to her Crime, abus'd the Credit ſhe had with her Brother, and treated the young Empreſs with ſcorn, choſe rather

rather to let her vengeance fall upon him than her Rival; for she gues'd from the Haughtiness of her Humour, that the greatest punishment she could have, was to throw her on a suddain from that pitch of Grandeur she had rais'd her self to by her Incest, and reduce her to a private condition, in which, being destitute of all support, she could no longer pretend to be equal to the Daughter and Widow of an Emperor.

After the Consecration of *Verus*, *Antoninus* fearing lest those Freemen who had govern'd this Prince in *Syria*, and who had been the Ministers to his Debaucheries, should carry a worse Plague to *Rome*, than that whose dismal effects it then felt, bethought himself of sending them from Court, but in such a way as might not be publickly injurious to his Brother's Memory, he dispers'd them all, giving them considerable Charges, which under the specious name of Rewards, were nothing else but a true and honourable Exile: He kept none but *Electus*, whom he was better assured of.

The Licence and Disorder of these Wars stir'd up the rage of the *Pagans*, who forgetting the Emperor's Orders began

began to perſecute the Chriſtians in the remote Provinces. St. *Polycarp* was the firſt Victim ſacrificed to their Fury, and the then Flames of his Funeral Pile were the Signal which rekindled the Perſecution in *Gaul* and *Aſia*. It is pretended that *Antoninus* himſelf agreed to it, for the Governor of *Gaul* having wrote to him to know what he would order concerning ſome Chriſtian Priſoners, he anſwer'd, *That he ſhould only let thoſe die that confeſt, and releaſe the others.* But his intent was not that they ſhould condemn thoſe to death who confeſt they were Chriſtians, it was only that they ſhould ſlay thoſe who could not deny the Crimes they were accus'd of. For the Magiſtrates and Officers ſeeing that the only means to ſuppreſs them and to gain upon the Emperor was to make their Innocence ſuſpected, had accus'd them of the moſt horrid Crimes, which were ſet down at large in their Petitions, to which they had joyn'd the Depoſitions of ſome Slaves, who frightned by their Threatnings, and work'd over by their Promiſes, had in their Torments confeſs'd whatever they would have them. So this Order grounded upon a falſe Suggeſtion, and conceiv'd in general

general Terms, was explain'd according to their own fancy, and was taken in a ſenſe that gave the full Reins to their Fury. Have not the Governors of Provinces, the Officers of the Army, and other Magiſtrates abus'd their power in the Provinces, under the very beſt of Princes, and yet their Violences and Injuſtice ought not to be imputed to the Orders of their Emperors? Let us on the one ſide conſider the Circumſtances of time and place; and on the other the Character of *Antoninus*, his Charity, his Juſtice, and his Conſtancy, and we ſhall never think that he authoriz'd this Perſecution after having ſo long prohibited it; and that he would authorize it when he reign'd alone, and whilſt a Plague and War exhauſted the whole Empire. How will this pretended Perſecution be made agree, with this Maxim of the Emperor, That thoſe who are deprived of the Truth, are ſo unwillingly, and therefore deſerve our pity, and not our Hate? There is laſtly, one ſure evidence that *Antoninus* did not perſecute the Chriſtians, for the Blood of one ſingle Martyr was not ſpilt within the Walls of *Rome* during his whole Reign.

Before

Before her year of Mourning for *Verus* was out, *Antoninus* married his Daughter *Lucilla* to *Claudius Pompeianus*, who was ſomething old and the Son of a plain Knight, but he had all the qualities that might make a Man conſiderable, Fidelity, Honeſty, Courage, the ancient Gravity, Experience, and that which is not always the companion of Merit, a very great Reputation. This made the Emperor preſer him to thoſe that were more noble, for he lookt after nothing but Vertue which he plac'd infinitely above Birth and Riches. The young Empreſs and her Mother were not much pleas'd at this Match; but *Antoninus* having preſerv'd to his Daughter all the marks of her former Grandeur, they ſoon comforted one another. *Fauſtina* thought her Daughter loſt nothing becauſe ſhe kept the rank of Empreſs; and *Lucilla* that had a mind to live after her own Fancy, found ſome pleaſure in the conſideration of having married a Slave rather than a Husband. *A. D.* 170.

After this Marriage *Antoninus* freed from any farther care of his Daughter, went to end the War with the *Marcomanni*, who joyning with the *Quadi*, the *Sarmatians* and the *Vandals* and other *A. D.* 170.

ther Nations, were become fiercer and more formidable than before. The Wars againſt *Hannibal* and the *Cimbri* never appeared more terrible. The Emperor had much the diſadvantage in the firſt Fights; for 'tis probable that it was during this War he loſt that conſiderable Battel, which he was afraid would have been followed with the loſs of *Aquileia*, which happened after this manner.

Alexander the falſe Prophet, whoſe Life is wrote by *Lucian*, was then in ſo great Reputation that he was lookt upon as a God. He had the Impudence to ſend the Emperor this Oracle:

† Two Lions. *Send two of* Cybele's † *Slaves, much* Indian *Spice,*
To Danube's *God a grateful Sacrifice;*
This Price buys Conqueſt, with the large Increaſe,
And the ſweet Bleſſings of Eternal Peace.

Antoninus obey'd this Oracle out of Superſtition, or to encreaſe the Order which this promiſe had rais'd in his Soldiers: They threw into the River two Lions with abundance of Flowers, Herbs, and Spices. The Lions no ſooner croſt the

the *Danube*, but they were knockt on the head by the Enemies. Then Battle being given, the *Romans* were ſo ill handled that they loſt more than twenty thouſand Men, and the *Barbarians* purſued them even to *Aquileia*, which they had taken, if the Emperor had not rallied his Troops. This Affront which they had receiv'd, rous'd their Courage; they beat their Enemies, and at laſt drove them into *Pannonia*.

Whilſt he was taken up with this War, the Moors ravaged *Spain*, and the Shepherds of *Egypt*, who were then a kind of Banditti, took Arms, and under the Conduct of a Prieſt call'd *Iſidore*, a ſtout Fellow, ſurpriſed a Roman Garriſon. For being diſguiſed in their Wives Clothes, they made as if they would put ſome Mony into the Hands of the Officer of the place. This Officer being too credulous was catcht by this Trick, and had his Throat cut with all his Garriſon. Puft up with this firſt Succeſs they ſacrificed a Priſoner, and over his reeking Bowels, which they afterwards eat, confirmed their Rebellion by an Oath, and promiſed never to deſert. After this they beat the Romans ſeveral times, and had taken *Alexandria*, if *Antoninus*

Some Hiſtorians place this *Egyptian* War two Years ſooner in 168.

ninus had not recalled *Caſſius* from *Aſia*, where he then commanded, and ſent him againſt theſe *Shepherds*. *Caſſius* had not Strength enough to attack theſe Barbarians, who were very numerous, and fought like Mad-men, and had a Leader of prodigious Courage; but he was ſo happy as to ſow Diviſion in their Camp, and knew ſo well how to make his Uſe of their Diſorders, that he diſperſed and defeated them.

The Moors had not much better Treatment in *Spain*, the Emperours Lieutenants ſlew a great many of them, and put the reſt to Flight.

In the mean time *Antoninus* was reſiſting the Northern Rebels, whom he ſo tired by the continual Advantages that he had daily over them, that he forced them to take ſuch Conditions as he would impoſe upon them; and then returned to *Rome*, where he celebrated the *Decennalia* according to Cuſtom, and made ſuch Vows as were uſual on thoſe Occaſions.

During the Peace he applyed himſelf entirely to the correcting ſuch Faults as he found in his Laws and Policy. That thoſe who were Free-born, might have it in their Power to prove it, he ordained,

ed, *That each* Roman *Citizen ſhould go to the Treaſury in the Temple of* Saturn, *where the Publick Records were kept, to tell what Children were born to them:* And he eſtabliſh'd Notaries to keep Regiſters of all Births in the Provinces.

He wiſely prohibited, *That no Enquiry ſhould be made after the State and Condition of People Dead, after five Year.* And leſt Crimes ſhould go unpuniſh'd, and Private Men ſhould ſuffer by the Delays which the Feſtivals might bring to their Proceſs, after the Example of *Auguſtus*, he increaſed the Number of Court Days, ſo that there were two hundred and thirty: By which he did two very good Things at the ſame Time, for he took from the People ſeveral Opportunities, that they would elſe have had both of Idleneſs and Debauchery.

He provided for the Security of Pupils, by conſtituting a Pretor, who was call'd *Tutelaris*, becauſe he appointed Tutors, and becauſe all Buſineſs concerning Guardianſhips were under his Cognizance. He reformed that Law which ordered Curators to be given to Minors only, in caſe of Madneſs or Extravagance, and had them given to all Minors, without Exception. *Lætoria.*

He always took so much Care to hinder Unlawful Marriages, and such as were within the prohibited Degrees, That he dissolved that of a Lady of Quality, who had been married to her Uncle several Years, but he Legitimated her Children.

The Rescript which he sent her by one of his Servants is still remaining; 'tis wrote in the Name of *Verus* and *Antoninus*, and deserves to be set down in this Place.

WE are concerned that you should have lived so long with your Uncle, and have had so many Children by him; But then we consider, That the Match was made by your Grand-Mother, when you were too young to be throughly informed of our Customs and Laws. These Reasons make us confirm the present Condition of your Children, which you have had by this Marriage contracted above forty Years ago, and so Legitimate them, as though they had been born in Lawful Wedlock.

He moderated the Publick Expences, and lessened the number of Shews and Sports, that his Subjects might not give themselves

themſelves up too much to ſuch Idle Diverſions, and ruine themſelves by ſuch Extravagant and Unneceſſary Charges, whence there often aroſe mortal Enmities between the beſt Families. He likewiſe retrenched the Salary of the Comedians.

He took great Care of maintaining the Streets and High-ways. He reformed all the Abuſes of Sales and Uſury. He extreamly mitigated that Law, by which Strangers, who had any Legacy or Inheritance, were to pay the twenty fifth Penny, though this Law had already been moderated by *Trajan*. He ordained, *That Children ſhould ſucceed their Mothers, who died inteſtate.*

He reformed that Ordinance, which, that it might engage ſuch as were not originally *Italians*, and yet ſought for Imployments at *Rome*, to look upon that City and *Italy* as their own Country, obliged them to have the third part of their Effects in *Italy*; *Antoninus* was contented with a fourth.

He did the Senate all the Honours he could think of; for he not only remitted a great many Cauſes to them, which might have been judged in his own Council; but he let them judge Sove-

reignly, and without Appeal. He generally reserved the Office of *Edile* and *Tribune* for such of that Order as were poor, and whose Poverty came not by their own Fault. He received none into their Body but with the Consent of all the Senate, and after strict Enquiry. When any of their Lives were concerned, he took all imaginable Care to be throughly instructed in the Business, and then reported it to the Senate, and would not suffer the Knights to assist at the Tryal of such Causes. He was never absent from their Assembly, when he could possibly be there, though he had nothing to report to them: When he had any Report to make, he would take the Pains of coming, even out of the Country. The greatest part of the Governours and Officers that he placed over Cities, he took from among the Senators; and he was perswaded, as well as *Augustus*, That whatever a Prince does to increase the Honour and Dignity of his Magistrates, heightens his own Power, and establishes his own Authority, which neither ought nor can be founded upon any thing but Justice. What he did to the Senate did not at all hinder him from extending his Bounty to the other Orders

ders of Magiſtrates, and indeed to all Private Perſons. No Perſon of any Condition whatſoever, appeared to him unworthy of his Care, which he took even of the Gladiators and Rope-Dancers; for he commanded, That the firſt ſhould fight only with Foyls, or Swords without Points; and under the latter he ordered Quilts and Feather-Beds to be laid, to prevent the Danger of their Fall; but afterwards for a long Time they uſed to hang up Nets and Sheets.

He made very ſevere Laws, to hinder any Violence that might be done to the Sanctity of Sepulchres. He ordained likewiſe, That the Poor ſhould be Buried at the Publick Charge. But this here is a particular Mark of his Indulgence; A Company of Thieves deſigning to commit their Robberies in *Rome*, their Captain, to gain an Opportunity, thought of getting upon a Wild Fig-tree, that grew in the Field of *Mars*, and entertaining the People for ſome Time with ſeveral Predictions, he told them, That the ſame Day that they ſhould ſee him fall from that Fig-Tree, and be changed into a Stork, that Fire ſhould fall from Heaven, and conſume the World. The Common People, who are always Cre-

dulous and Superſtitious, received this Prophecy with Amazement and Reſpect: They ran every Day in vaſt Numbers to this Fig-Tree, whilſt the Comrades of this Prophet made their own Advantage of their Credulity and Abſence. At laſt the Day of ſo expected and terrible a Metamorphoſis being come, the Impoſtor fell from the Tree, and in his Fall let go a Stork, which he had in his Lap, and was quickly loſt in the Crowd. The People aſtoniſhed at this Miracle, and thinking that they already ſaw Heaven on Fire, filled all *Rome* with Tumult and Confuſion. The Emperour informed of this Adventure, made the Prophet be brought to him, and when he had got the Truth out of him, upon Promiſe of Pardon, he only laughed, and kept his Word with him.

He endeavoured by all means to correct the Diſorders of Women and Young People, without knowing it was his Private Intereſt to do ſo. For he was wholly ignorant of *Fauſtina*'s Irregularities, as appears by the Letters he wrote her a little before his Death; and there is no Probability that if he had known them, he would have wink'd at rather than reform'd them. He was incapable

of

of ſo baſe an Indulgence which the Laws would have puniſh'd in a Private Perſon. Nevertheleſs an Hiſtorian relates, That he one Day anſwered ſome People, who would have had him divorce *Fauſtina* for her ill Conduct, *Then her Portion muſt be returned her*; and this Expreſſion pleaſed a great many People.

There is nothing one ought to fear more than the oppoſing of ones Private Opinion to a General Conſent and Publick Approbation: But ſince it is related but by one Hiſtorian, and he ſuch an Hiſtorian as is not much to be commended for his Faithfulneſs, his Judgment or his Exactneſs, one may very well think that this Expreſſion does not ow ſo much of its Succeſs to its own Merit as to the ſmall Reflection that was made on it when People firſt received it. And indeed, though the Empire had really been *Fauſtina*'s Dowry, as it muſt be ſuppoſed to be, to bring off this Hiſtorian; yet this Anſwer had nevertheleſs been inſipid, and not becoming *Antoninus*, who was not capable of gaining the Empire of the World by ſuch a Baſeneſs: But it is ſo far from being true that the Empire was *Fauſtina*'s Dowry, that this Prince was deſtined to it independently from

this Marriage, and that *Adrian*, when he adopted him, oblig'd him to be contracted to the Daughter of *Lucius Commodus*.

The Jeſt which the Comedians made before him upon the Name of *Tertullus*, who was *Fauſtina*'s Gallant, proves nothing, for *Antoninus* might interpret that of others rather than himſelf.

There was a Play acted, in which one Actor asked another, *What the Lady's Gallant's Name was*: He, as ſtudying for it, anſwered, *Tullus, Tullus, Tullus*; the firſt impatient to know the True Name, was urgent with him, ſaying, *What do you ſay?* the other replyed again; *Why I have told you* Tertullus: Which is as much as to ſay, *I have told you three Times* Tullus; *and therefore I have told you* Tertullus.

Adrian had before prohibited the going in a Coach, Litter, or on Horſe-back in any Town; *Antoninus* renewed this Prohibition, under expreſs Penalties: For he could not endure that that ſhould be employed to an ordinary Uſe which *Cæſar* and *Auguſtus* uſed only in their Triumphs, or upon ſome Days of extraordinary Solemnity.

He was perſuaded, That one of the greateſt Miſchiefs which Princes could do, was to put the Magiſtracy into ſuch Hands as were unfit for it; and taking all imaginable Precaution, leſt he might fall into this Misfortune, he, without any

any Trouble, refuſed whatever was injuſtly requeſted of him. A Man of very ill Reputation having beg'd an Employment of him, and received this Anſwer, *Clear your ſelf firſt of the ill Reports that go about of you*; without Heſitation replyed, *I ſee Pretors that are not honeſter Men than my ſelf.* The Emperor was not at all offended with this Liberty, he endeavoured only to give no more occaſion for ſuch Reflections.

When he found People ſerviceable to the Publick, he gave them always ſuch Commendations as they deſerved, and made uſe of them in ſuch Stations as they had ſo well diſcharged; and uſed to ſay, *That it was not in a Prince's Power to make his Subjects ſuch as he would have them; but it was in his Power to make good uſe of their Service, by imploying them in ſuch Buſineſs as they underſtood.* No Conſideration could hinder him from treating each Man according to his Deſerts, and the good Qualities he found in him. Never Prince loved more to enrich his Friends; he raiſed ſome to the chiefeſt Dignities; and to ſuch whoſe Courſe of Life would not permit them to come into Offices and

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Imployments, he loaded them with Preſents, and gave them ſuch Penſions as might make them eaſie in thoſe Stations where their want of Ambition had left them: But at the ſame time he took very great Care not to beſtow theſe Penſions upon ſuch as were not uſeful to the Publick; for he retained this wiſe Maxim of his Father *Antoninus Pius*, who ſaid, That there is nothing more Shameful and Injuſt, than to ſuffer the Publick to be devoured by ſuch People, who will contribute nothing by their Labours towards the enriching of it. The Poor had never Recourſe to him in vain; and he took ſo much Pleaſure in Relieving them, that he looked upon it as one of the greateſt Happineſſes of his Life, that he never wanted wherewith to do it, and he thanked God for it with all his Heart.

In the puniſhment of Crimes he mitigated ſuch Penalties as were ordained by the Laws; he was ſo exact in doing Juſtice, eſpecially in Criminal Cauſes, that one day he ſeverely repremanded a Pretor, who had paſs'd a wrong Sentence upon ſome Perſons of Quality and condemned them with too much haſte; he obliged him to review the Proceſs and told him, That it is the leaſt thing which a Magi-

a Magiſtrate who is appointed to do Juſtice to the People, can do, to hear the Accuſed with Patience, eſpecially when they are of Quality. Another Prætor having behaved himſelf ill, and that upon an important Concern, the Emperor inſtead of turning him out of his Office, was content to transfer all his Authority and Juriſdiction to the other Prætor for ſome time. In ſhort, he endeavoured by all ways to keep Men from doing ill; and to make them do good, he rewarded their good Actions, and conceal'd their bad as much as he could poſſibly by his Indulgence, or corrected them by ſuch Puniſhments as were rather uſeful to to them than rigorous.

As no Action of a Prince is ever indifferent but does either a great deal of good or harm; ſo the value which *Antoninus* had for Philoſophy, might have been hurtful to the *Romans*; for it immediately rais'd up abundance of Philoſophers, who to taſt their Prince's Bounty took the Habit of Philoſophers without their Vertues; ſo that they were not only a charge to private Perſons, but to the Publick. The Emperor put a ſtop to this diſorder as ſoon as he perceived it, for he granted not his Favours and

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Immunities to such as were Philosophers in name only, but to such as were so in effect, and who after a constant practice of all Vertues had deserved, rather than chosen that Title.

He said often that an Emperor should never do any thing carelesly, or in haste, and that the smallest oversight, might occasion his being blam'd in greater matters. He gave the Lawyers who were to plead before him, as much time as they would require; for he thought it Imprudence and Rashness to prescribe a certain time to Causes whose extent and importance were unknown, especially since Patience is a part of Justice; and that it is better to let a Lawyer say such things as are unnecessary, than to hinder him from producing any thing that is material.

He examined the smallest Affairs with as much care and exactness as the greatest; being persuaded of this Truth, That Justice being all entire throughout, that there is nothing that regards it but what is great: So that he often employed ten or twelve days about the same business, often sat in Council till night, and never went out of the Senate till the Consul, according to Custom, dismist

diſmiſt the Aſſembly and pronounced theſe Words, *We detain you no longer.* And that which makes this Aſſiduity and Patience the more remarkable, was, that he was ſo Infirm, that he could not endure the leaſt Cold, nor make but a light Meal, which was always at Night; in the Day he only took a little Treacle for his Stomach. But nothing could hinder him from doing what he thought his duty to his Subjects, and diſcharging all thoſe Obligations which he uſed to ſay were neceſſarily incumbent upon a Lawgiver and a King.

He would have thought it an Impiety to have flung away one Minute upon things frivolous and unprofitable; even that Time which he out of complaiſance beſtowed upon the ſeeing Shows and Plays was never entirely loſt, for he always read or wrote ſomething. In his Travails and Expeditions, in the midſt of the moſt difficult Affairs, he always made his advantage of that Time which other Men generally loſe in Relaxation or Diverſions; for he continually employ'd it in recollecting with himſelf, and demanding an exact account of his Conduct, his Thoughts, and his Intentions, and that admirable Work which he

has

has left us as owing to his Laborious Care. The date of the two first Books informs us, That one was wrote at *Carnuntum*, the other at his Camp in the Country of the *Quadi*, during the most cruel War that *Antoninus* was ever ingaged in. Time so well manag'd produc'd several other Works which are now lost. The Commentaries of his Life, which he left for the Instruction of his Sons, are those whose loss ought to be the most regretted.

He was throughly persuaded that the strength of a State consists in a wise Council; wherefore he never undertook any thing, though of never so small Importance, either in War or Peace, without consulting not only his ordinary Council, but those who had the Reputation of being most able, whom he chose out of the Court, the City, and the Senate: and being very far from the false Ambition of drawing others over to his Opinion, he was very glad to submit to theirs, and would always say, *It is much more reasonable that I should follow the Counsel of so many great People who are my Friends, than that so many great People should follow mine.* And that he might remove that fatal prejudice which

is ſo common, That it is mean to alter ones Counſels, he has made this important Truth one of his Maxims, *That a Man is no leſs free when he ſubmits to other Peoples Counſel, than when he continues obſtinate in his own Opinion; and that this Change is the pure effect of his Wit and Judgment.*

He was a Religious Obſerver of his Word; and that he might never hearken to the falſe Reaſons of thoſe Politicians who maintain, That a wiſe and able Prince is not oblig'd to keep it when it interferes with his Intereſt, and that he may uſe it as an allurement to draw the People he gives it to, into his ſnare, he eſtabliſh'd this Maxim, which deſerves to be remark'd by all Princes, and is worthy of our Admiration: *Take heed leſt you look upon that thing as uſeful, which will one day force you to break your Word.*

He often as neceſſity requir'd, chang'd the State of the Government of Provinces, taking to himſelf ſome of them which were govern'd in the Name of the Senate and the People by Proconſuls; and giving them in Exchange ſome of his own which were under Præ Pretors and Lieutenants; that is, he gave the People,

People, according to the wiſe Maxim of *Auguſtus*, ſuch Provinces where he had nothing to fear, and took ſuch to himſelf as he had a mind to be ſecure of.

He informed himſelf punctually of what was ſaid of him, not to puniſh thoſe who ſpoke with too much Freedom, but to know what they approv'd or diſapprov'd in his Conduct, that he might reap this benefit from the publick Cenſure, That he might correct what was amiſs; and from his Praiſes, That he might continue in doing well. Whenever ill was ſpoken of him, or he was accus'd of ſome Vice that he was not guilty of, he anſwered his Accuſers either by Letters, or word of Mouth, not ſo much to juſtifie himſelf as to diſcourſe and inform them.

He would never accept thoſe lofty Titles which had been given to other Princes, nor would he ſuffer Temples and Altars to be erected to him, knowing that 'tis Vertue only that makes Princes equal to Gods, and not Voices and Flattery of the People; and that a King who rules with Juſtice, has all the World for his Temple and all good Men for his Prieſts and Miniſters.

The *Marcomanni*, who deſigned only to lay the Emperor aſleep by their Submiſſion, and ſend him farther that they might make advantage of his Abſence, took Arms with greater fury than before. They were ſo much the more terrible, becauſe they had drawn over to their ſide all the People from *Illyrium* to the fartheſt parts of *Gaul*. The Emperor who ſaw his Army waſted by the Plague, and ſuch loſſes as they had ſuſtained in ſeveral Encounters, and his Treaſure entirely exhauſted by ſo many Wars, found himſelf in ſuch Difficulties, as he had never till then experienced. He remedied the firſt of theſe Misfortunes by liſting the Gladiators, the Banditti of *Dalmatia* and *Dardania*, and the Slaves, which had not been done ſince the ſecond *Prunick* War. But one thing which ſeems very remarkable is, that the *Roman* could not endure that the Emperor ſhould ſecure their repoſe, at the expence of their pleaſures. They demanded back their Gladiators, and in all the Streets one might hear ſeditious Perſons inſolently murmuring, *Does the Emperor think then of making us all Philoſophers, that he takes away all our Shows and Sports?* *Antoninus* was not

mov'd at it, for he underſtood the Temper of the People, and knew that the ſame Man that they look upon to day as a Savage Beaſt, they ſhall to morrow honour as a God, if he always follows Reaſon as his Guide.

It was not eaſie for ſuch a Prince as *Antoninus* to help the ill condition which the Treaſury was in. The moſt proper Expedient that occurr'd to him, and the readieſt to make ſuch Funds as were neceſſary, was to follow the Example of *Nerva* and *Trajan*, and to ſell the Moveables that belonged to the Empire. But becauſe it was not permitted to private Perſons to have Moveables ſo magnificent as the Emperour, and to be ſerv'd in Gold or Silver; to make the Sale more eaſie *Antoninus* was obliged to grant this Permiſſion to Perſons of Quality: So a Sale followed of every thing that was moſt Pretious, and there were ſold his Jewels, his Pictures, his Tapiſtry, his Veſſels, and Gold and Silver Plate, his Chryſtals, his Furniture, the Empreſs's Cloths that were of Silk, and Cloth of Gold, and the Pearls which were found, to a great Number, in *Adrians* Cabinet. The *Romans*, who had no Mony to Succour ſo good a Prince, in a War, where-

in

in they were as much intereſted as himſelf, did not want it to buy theſe fine Things. This Sale laſted two Months, and raiſed ſo conſiderable a Fund, that the Emperor had wherewithal abundantly to defray all the Expences of the War. At his Return he let them know, it was his Pleaſure, That they ſhould reſtore them at the ſame Price they had bought them, but he uſed no Conſtraint to thoſe who had a mind to keep them.

Before his Departure he loſt his ſecond Son *Verus Cæſar*, about ſeven Years old, who died of an Impoſtume in his Ear, which the Phyſicians launced too ſoon. He bore this Loſs with a great deal of Courage, forbad that the Feaſts of *Jupiter* which hapned then, ſhould be put off by publick Mourning. He himſelf comforted the Phyſicians, and made them Preſents: He contented himſelf with raiſing Statues to his Son, and ordering his Statue of Gold to be carried in ſtate into the *Circus* during the Sports there, and to have his Name inſerted in the Poem of the *Salians*: After this he ſought for ſuch Conſolation as became him; in his Care of the Publick, fell to his Buſineſs, beg'd the Aſſiſtance of the Gods by

Prayers and Sacrifices, and marched againſt the Enemy.

This Expedition was longer, and more dangerous than his others. The Emperor arriving at *Carnuntum*, where he made his Rendevous, paſſed the *Danube* by a Bridge of Boats; at the Head of his Troops, attacked the Enemy, and got the better of them in ſeveral Encounters, burnt their Barns and Houſes, and received ſeveral of the chief of the Allies, who aſtoniſhed at the Suddenneſs of his Victories, came in to ſubmit themſelves.

One Day as he himſelf was looking for a Foord along the Bank of a River, that not only hindred his Paſſage, but was a Defence to the Barbarians, the Enemies Slingers, who were on the other ſide, poured a great quantity of Stones upon him, which had overwhelmed him, if the Soldiers had not covered him with their Bucklers. This Inſult ſtirred up the Soldiers more than before, they furiouſly paſſed the River, fell in upon the Enemy, and made a great Slaughter of them. The Emperor went afterwards to view the Field, not to ſee the Marks of his Victory, and to feed his Eyes with ſo hideous and cruel a Spectacle, but to

ſhed

ſhed Tears of Compaſſion for the Miſery of Men, and to ſave thoſe who were in a condition to receive Succour; and before he continued his March, he ſacrificed upon the ſame Place.

The *Quadi* judging rightly, that they ſhould be purſued, had left ſeveral Companies of Archers covered with ſome Horſe, as if it were to skirmiſh with the *Romans*, and to ſeem to diſpute the Paſſage with them. The *Romans* marched upon this occaſion with more Bravery than Conduct, a thing uſual after good Succeſs: They attacked theſe Archers briskly who, according to their Orders, ran away; and by their haſty Flight drew them unawares among dry and barren Mountains, where they were ſhut in on every Side. They not knowing yet the Danger they were in, and thinking their Courage could overcome any thing, continued fighting ſtoutly, notwithſtanding the Diſadvantage of the Place: This made more of them be ſlain than of the Enemy, who would not put that to Chance which they expected from Delay, and therefore inſtead of attacking, ſtood only upon their Defence: The *Romans* could not comprehend the Reaſons of this Conduct, till the exceſſive

Heat that was between these Mountains, Weariness, Wounds and Thirst had entirely confounded them. They knew then, but too late, that they could neither Fight nor Retreat, and that they must either die the most cruel Death, or become a Prey to their Enemies. In this Extremity where Rage and Despair were but Melancholy Comforts, *Antonius* more concerned at their Miseries than his own, ran through all their Ranks and endeavoured, in vain, to raise their Hopes, by performing of Sacrifices, which they no longer now confided in. When the Sun had exhausted all their Strengh, then were the Enemies in a readiness to attack them. Having therefore no Expectations either from their own Courage, from Fortune, or their Gods, they looked upon themselves as Victims, to be slain immediately. Nothing was to be heard from every Side but Cries and Groans, and nothing seen but Marks of the most horrible Desolation; when all on a suddain, the Clouds coming on began to thicken and overcast the Sun, and to discharge abundance of Rain into the Camp: The Poor Soldiers, who were more like Ghosts than Men, and had not Strength to subsist, took new

Courage

Courage at the Sight of thoſe Showers, which they could not expect, and believing they fell faſter in Places that were at ſome Diſtance from them, run to get into the Place which their Companions had quitted, and all with an equal eagerneſs held their Mouths, their Helmets, and their Bucklers up to Heaven.

Whilſt they thought of nothing but quenching their Thirſt, and their whole Camp was in diſorder, the Barbarians would not let ſo fair an Opportunity eſcape 'em, but attack'd them on every Side. The *Romans* fought, and yet continued drinking, ſo that the moſt part ſwallowed the Blood which ran from their Wounds, and was mingled with the Water which they had catch'd.

But this Succour which Heaven ſent, would have been uſeleſs to them, and nothing could have defended them from the Fury of their Enemies, if by good Fortune, which was more ſurprizing than what had already happened, the ſame Clouds that ſent down ſo kind a Shower upon the *Romans*, had not diſcharg'd a terrible Storm of Hail, accompanied with Fire and Thunder againſt the Barbarians. So whilſt the former refreſhed themſelves and quenched their

Thirſt with Eaſe, the others were conſumed by a Fire, which nothing could extinguiſh. 'Tis reported, That if this Fire by chance fell upon the *Romans*, it had no effect; whereas the Rain which hapned to light upon the Barbarians increaſed their Fire, ſo that they ſought for Water in the midſt of Waters: They add, That ſeveral wounded themſelves very deeply, that their Blood might quench the Fire which devoured them; and that ſeveral others rendred themſelves to the *Romans* with their Wives and Children, to have their Share in this Miraculous Shower, which brought Safety only to ſuch as declared in their Favour. Whilſt *Antoninus* received thoſe graciouſly who yielded themſelves up to him, his Soldiers rather enraged at the Affront they had received, than remembring the Danger they had eſcaped, cut in Pieces all that reſiſted them, put the reſt to Flight, and took a great many Priſoners.

There are divers Reports about this Deliverance; ſome ſay the Emperor upon this occaſion employed an *Egyptian* Magician called *Arnuphis*, whom he brought with him, and who raiſed this Storm by his Enchantments. For what could hinder

hinder, but that among ſo many Pagans beſotted with their Superſtitions and Follies, there muſt be a great many who would attribute the Honour of this Miracle to their own Religion and their Gods? But this is ſoon confuted, becauſe *Marcus Antoninus* tells us himſelf, in his firſt Book, *That he had no Commerce with Quacks and Enchantors; and that he believed nothing that they ſaid about the Conjuration of Spirits, or any other Enchantments of that Nature.*

Others inclined more favourably to the Emperor, as being Witneſſes of his Piety and Vertue, and attribute this Succour to his Prayers. They report that he ſaid, lifting up his Hands to Heaven: *Lord, who art the Giver of Life, I implore thy Help, and I lift up theſe Hands to thee that have never ſhed the Blood of any Perſon.*

The Care which the Pagans took to attribute all the Glory of ſo ſtrange and extraordinary event to themſelves, ſerves at leaſt to prove the Truth of it: But this Truth is farther confirmed, by all thoſe Monuments which can moſt ſecurely convey the Memory of Men's Actions down to Poſterity. Without any Fear then of being blamed for being too credulous,

dulous, or for endeavouring to support the Christian Religion by Error or a Lye, Foundations that it has always been a Stranger to, we shall affirm, That there is no good Reason to reject the Testimony of them who have written at the same Time, That the Captain of the Guards having advertised the Emperor, That God denyed nothing to the Christians, abundance of whom were in the Legion of *Melitene*, a City of *Capadocia*, and that he ought to try if their Prayers could procure that Deliverance which he could not otherwise expect: The Emperor ordered they should be called together; and they all at the same Time did with Success invoke the only True God, whom the Thunder and Winds obey, and who had delivered their Fathers from a multitude of as pressing Dangers.

Antoninus upon this wrote to the Senate, in favour of the Christians, and ordered those to be punished with Death who accused them; a convincing Proof that he thought this Assistance which was sent him from Heaven was owing to their Prayers. *Tertullian* and other Authors mention this Letter; but it too openly overthrows the Pretentions of the Pagans,

Pagans not to have been ſuppreſſed. 'Tis only to the Spirit of Lying and Falſhood, that the loſs of a Letter ſo honourable to the Chriſtians ought ever to be imputed. That which we find in the Works of St. *Juſtin Martyr* is plainly counterfeit, and *Antoninus*'s true Letter was no longer remaining a great while before the time of *Euſebius*.

The Emperor never wrote to the Senate but in Latin.

They that have written that this Legion of *Melitene* was call'd the Thundring Legion becauſe of this Miracle, are very much deceived. The Thundring Legion was formed by *Auguſtus*, and that Name was given them becauſe of the Thunder-bolt that they bore on their Bucklers.

The *Roman* Army then gave *Antoninus* the Title of *Imperator* the ſeventh time, who contrary to Cuſtom received it, without expecting that it ſhould be decreed him by the Senate: The Empreſs *Fauſtina* likewiſe was honoured with the Title of *Mother of Armies*.

A. D. 174.

Mater Caſtrorum.

The Night after ſo ſucceſsful a day *Antoninus* drew his Troops from ſo diſadvantagious a place, and ſeiz'd on the beſt Poſts, where he fortified himſelf. He after ſome days ſpent in the refreſhment of his Army, having by his Spies gain'd

gain'd ſure Information of the march and poſture of the Enemy, held a Council, and put himſelf in order to purſue them. He found them encamp'd beyond a River between ſome Villages that ſurrounded their Camp. The Army paſs'd the River in ſpight of the Reſiſtance made by the Slingers and Archers, and charg'd the Barbarians briskly, who having ſuſtain'd the firſt Attack, and loſt their beſt Men, ran all away. The *Romans* made a horrible Slaughter of them; the Field was cover'd with Dead, and the Emperor's greateſt trouble at this time was to ſtop the fury of the Soldier, who gaining this Revenge, forgot all his Labours. A great many Priſoners were taken, and ſeveral Kings, with their Wives and Childen loaden with Chains were brought to *Antoninus*.

After this Victory the Emperor led his Army towards the River *Granua*, which ſeparates the *Quadi* from the *Jazygian Sarmatians*, who are the moſt Warlike of all the Barbarians, and put himſelf in a poſture of paſſing it. Behind this River was another, and the *Sarmatians* had poſſeſt themſelves of the ground between them both. The Thundring Legion was commanded firſt;

They

They paſſed over a Bridge of Boats, overthrew the *Sarmatians* who diſputed their paſſage, and who for the moſt part were either ſlain or drown'd, and fix'd their Standard upon the Bank of the ſecond River. In the mean time the whole Army paſs'd, and *Antoninus* having ſacrificed, mark't out his Camp between the two Rivers, and ordered Works to be thrown up. The Barbarians amaz'd at this, ſent Embaſſadors to him, but their Propoſals not ſeeming reaſonable, *Antoninus* commanded to ſound a Charge and lead on his Troops to Battle. The Thundring Legion were the firſt that paſſed the ſecond River in the Emperors ſight, and fell with ſuch vehemence upon the *Jazygian* Horſe, that they totally routed them. Then they ravag'd the whole Country, and brought away a great Booty of Men and Cattel. The Inhabitants of all the places round about, ſent to make their Submiſſions to *Antoninus*, and to beg peace of him: He received all their Hoſtages, and upon adviſe given him that the chief of the Country held Councils, according to the cuſtom of theſe Barbarians, in ſome remote and by places, he advanced with ſuch diligence, that he ſurprized them

them before they had any knowledge of his March. The Barbarians ſurprized at ſo unexpected an Arrival, and more in admiration than fear, threw themſelves at his Feet. The Emperor ſent them to his Camp, and with his beſt Troops proceeded to attack their Army, which lay encamped between a Moraſs covered with Reeds and a Forreſt. The Fight was obſtinate, and the *Romans* were ſo furious upon this occaſion, that after having broke in pieces the *Sarmatians*, ſlain abundance of them, took a multitude of Priſoners, fir'd all the Country; they ſtill ran on with Torches to look for thoſe who had hid themſelves in the Marſhes and the Woods. *Antoninus* on this occaſion did a thing which ought to be a greater Honour to him at this day than his Victory, he went himſelf into the Woods and among the Reeds, to ſave theſe Wretches, whom he adviſed to try his Clemency, by rendring themſelves to him.

All theſe advantages did not put an end to the War, there was a more compleat Victory wanting ſtill to finiſh it. But it was difficult to gain it over theſe Barbarians, who never fighting with all their Forces, reſerved ſtill ſome Recruits

to

to make head againſt the Enemy. *Antoninus* who ſaw the Seaſon began to be bad, forgot nothing that might make him come quickly to an end with theſe People: Wherefore not minding theſe Deputies that were ſent him from all Parts, to amuſe him rather than ſubmit themſelves, he reſolved to penetrate thoſe very places where they had aſſembled their greateſt force, and carried all their Goods. This Enterprize was the more dangerous, becauſe he had a long March to make, ſeveral difficult places to croſs; his Troops had been continually harras'd by the Barbarians, and could march but ſlowly for fear of ſome Ambuſcade, or engaging to diſadvantage in an unknown Country. But at laſt all theſe difficulties were happily ſurmounted; *Antoninus* arrived at the place where the *Sarmatians* were fortified between the *Danube*, which was frozen and a great Wood, and having deliberated after what manner he ſhould attack 'em, he puts his Troops in order for Battle. The Barbarians did ſo too. The Charge was ſounded, the *Romans* threw their Javelins and poured in upon the Enemy, who received them with a great deal of Courage. The Fight was

long

long and bloody. The *Romans* aſham'd to find ſuch reſiſtance, redoubled their Efforts, and preſs'd ſo forcibly upon the *Sarmatian* Horſe, that at laſt they turn'd their Backs, and got upon the *Danube*. The Emperor's Foot got thither at the ſame time. The Fight began again more ſharp than it was before, the Enemies hoping that the *Romans* who were not ſo much accuſtomed as themſelves to fight upon the Ice, and who could hardly keep upon their Legs, much leſs ſtand firm, rallied and fell upon them on all ſides. *Antoninus*'s Infantry was ſtaggred at the firſt Shock, and had been entirely loſt, if they had not made a new uſe of their Bucklers; they put them upon the Ice to keep one foot ſteddy. By this means ſtanding firm they made head againſt their Enemies, and taking hold of their Horſes Bridles and throwing themſelves with fury upon their Bucklers and Lances, came in ſo cloſe to 'em, that they threw them from their Horſe. For theſe Barbarians being lightly armed could not reſiſt the *Romans* who had heavy Armour. Of this vaſt number of *Sarmatians*, but a ſmall Party eſcaped, who retir'd into Forts that were in their Intrenchments, or ſav'd themſelves

ſelves in the Forreſt. The Emperor concerned not himſelf with the purſuit of thoſe Runaways, but caus'd the Forts to be attacked, which were carried notwithſtanding the vigorous Reſiſtance of the Enemy, who defended them as their laſt Refuge.

After this Victory *Antoninus* put his Troops into Winter Quarters, and went himſelf to *Syrminum*, which was the neareſt and moſt convenient place for him. During his ſtay there he received the Complaints which *Demoſtratus* and *Proxagoras* brought him in behalf of the *Athenians* againſt *Herod*, and thoſe which *Herod* made againſt theſe Envoys. They accuſed *Herod* of Injuſtice and Tyranny, and upon that Tie which was between him and *Verus*, they would make him paſs for an Accomplice in the pretended Conſpiracy, that that Prince had of poiſoning *Antoninus*. *Herod* accuſed *Demoſtratus* and *Proxagoras* of having ſtir'd the People up againſt him. *Herod*'s Enemies were ſecretly upheld by the *Quintilians*, who commanded in *Greece*, and had a great deal of Credit there, and who ſought an occaſion of being revenged of *Herod*, who ſpeaking of the Honours which *Antoninus* had heaped

He was the famous Rhetorician who had been Maſter to *Marcus Antoninus* and *Verus*.

upon 'em and making an Alluſion to their Country, for they were originally of *Troas*, had ſaid, Homer's Jupiter *is not to be endured for loving the* Trojans *ſo well.* This Speech was more hurtful to its Author, than to thoſe it was level'd againſt. The Protection of the *Quintilians* was not unſerviceable to *Demoſtratus* and *Proxagoras.*

The Emperor and Empreſs gave them Audience ſeveral times, and treated them with that diſtinction that *Herod* took notice of it, and no longer doubted that *Antoninus* favoured the *Athenians* out of complaiſance to *Fauſtina* and one of his Daughters, who intereſted themſelves for them. One Morning then ſurrounded with Jealouſie, and his Grief being freſh for an Accident that had happened to him, two fair Slaves whom he called his Daughters being killed by Thunder, he was ſo diſturb'd that full of rage he went to the Emperor, and in an extream Paſſion told him inſolently, *Theſe then are the great Rewards which I muſt have for my Converſation with* Verus *whom you ſent me to: Call you this Juſtice, to ſacrifice me to the Paſſion of a Woman and a Girl?* The Captain of the Guards put himſelf in a poſture of ſtopping

ping or killing him, but *Antoninus* hindred him, and without the leaſt Emotion or change of Countenance, turned to the *Athenians*, and told him, *You have nothing to do, but to plead your Cauſe, though* Herod *at preſent is not in the Humour to hear you.* *Demoſtratus* ſpoke with ſo much vehemence, that he drew Tears from the Emperor, who turn'd all his Anger againſt the Freemen of *Herod*, whom he found moſt faulty, and yet puniſht them according to his Cuſtom, with a great deal of Moderation. He entirely remitted the puniſhment that was to be inflicted on the Father of thoſe two Maids that were kill'd by the Thunder, and ſaid, He had ſuffered enough already by the Grief which ſuch a loſs muſt cauſe him.

They who have writ that *Herod* was baniſh'd into *Epirus*, have without doubt took for a Baniſhment that long Stay which a Sickneſs obliged him to make at *Oricum*, in his Return from *Pannonia*. But how can this Baniſhment agree with a Letter which *Herod* wrote to the Emperor ſome time after; in which he complains, That he no longer did him the Honour of writing to him, and asks him, *What was now become of that Time when he*

received three Courriers in a Day from him? Nay, how does it agree with *Antoninus*'s Anſwer, which calls him *Friend*, and after having ſpoke a Word or two about Winter-quarters, condoled with him upon the Loſs of his Wife, and mentioned his ill Health, proceeds, *I deſire with all my Heart you may be well, and that you would not doubt of the Continuance of my Good Will to you, and that you would not think I have done any injuſtice to you in puniſhing ſome guilty Perſons, whom nevertheleſs I have treated more favourably than they deſerve. I deſire you to be no longer troubled; and if I have offended you in any other thing, or given you the leaſt Diſturbance, demand Juſtice of me in the Temple of the Great* Minerva *at* Athens, *at the Myſteries of the Initiations, for in the greateſt Heat of the War my utmoſt Deſires were to be initiated there. God grant that you may perform the Ceremony of it.* One does not write thus to a Man that one has baniſhed.

The Spring was no ſooner come, but *Antoninus*, who would afford the Barbarians no Time to gather new Forces, took the Field, to prevent them. He paſs'd the *Danube* and fought the Enemy ſeveral Times; who at laſt deſpairing to be able

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to reſiſt a Commander who joyned Diligence and Watchfulneſs to Courage and Providence, ſent to offer him Hoſtages, and beg Peace. He was wholly taken up in anſwering their Embaſſadors, and receiving ſeveral Kings that came to do him Homage. The King of the *Sarmatians* alone reſtored him a hundred thouſand Priſoners, that he had taken from the *Romans*; and gave him eight thouſand of his Men, the beſt part of which were ſent againſt the *Britains*. The Emperor impoſed upon theſe People Conditions more or leſs hard, as he found their Inclinations to revolt, and they were all ready to ſubmit to what he ſhould pleaſe to command; ſo that the Lands of the *Marcommanni*, the *Quadi* and the *Sarmatians* had been made Provinces of the Empire, if the News of *Caſſius*'s Revolt, *A.D.* 165. who had proclaimed himſelf Emperor in *Syria*, had not come juſt at that Moment. The News ſurpriſed the Emperor, and raiſed the Courage of the Barbarians, who taking hold of this occaſion, and being always more concerned for their Liberty than their Word, obliged *Antoninus* to remit great part of the Impoſitions he had charged upon them, and to make new Treaties of Peace, far leſs advan-

tagious to him than those which they had ſworn to; and this without Doubt was the Reaſon why he did not, as was uſual, ſpecifie the Conditions of this Peace, in the Letter which he wrote to the Senate to give an account of his Conduct.

The Deſign of ſeizing the Empire was never put in Practice by a Man, who was more able than *Caſſius* to have accompliſh'd it, for he had all the Qualities requiſite to it. The Victories he had gain'd in *Armenia*, *Arabia* and *Egypt*, had got him the Eſteem and Love of the Soldiers; he had Boldneſs and Reſolution, he was Patient in Labour and Diſſolute in his Pleaſures; Prodigal of his own, and Covetous of other Mens; he knew his Times to be Mild and Severe, Religious and Impious; and taking Pains to ſettle his Inclinations, which tended naturally to Policy and Diſſimulations, he acquired a marvelous Addreſs in hiding thoſe Vices that were in him, and making thoſe Vertues appear which he was not poſſeſs'd of. It was he that reſtored the Ancient Diſcipline of the Army, and he was ſo ſevere and exact in it, that he never pardoned the leaſt Fault, and called himſelf a ſecond *Marius*.

He

He made thoſe Soldiers dye without Quarter who took any thing by Violence, in the Places where they were in Garriſon. When he commanded the Army in *Germany*, ſome Auxiliary Companies having upon the Bank of the *Danube* ſurpriſed a Body of the *Sarmatians* very much in diſorder, attacked it and cut it in Pieces: But *Caſſius* inſtead of rewarding the Captains of theſe Companies, crucified them all, ſaying, They ought not to fight without Order, for how did they know whether there were no Ambuſcades there, and whether they might not expoſe the *Roman* Arms to a very great Affront? This Cruelty raiſed a furious Mutiny in the Army. *Caſſius*, who heard the Noiſe of the Soldiers, ran naked from the Place where he was Exerciſing himſelf, and Addreſſing himſelf to the boldeſt of them, and with a ſteddy Voice and threatning Countenance cryed, *Kill your General, if you dare, and add a Crime to your Diſobedience.* This Boldneſs frighted the Soldiers, who never fear but when they ſee they are not feared, and made the Enemies loſe much of their Courage, who thought an Army, in which ſo rigorous and exact a Diſcipline was kept, as to puniſh even them that had conquered,

muſt be Invincible, and therefore ſought for nothing more than a Peace. *Caſſius* was likewiſe the firſt that cut off the Hands or elſe Ham-ſtring'd Deſerters, and forbad the Soldiers to carry any other Proviſions, but Lard, Bisket and Vinegar. He himſelf made a Review of his Soldiers every Week, inſpected their Arms and Cloaths, and exerciſed them; for he ſaid, *It was a Shame that Wreſtlers and Gladiators ſhould be exerciſed, and not Soldiers, who find Labours much more ſupportable when they are accuſtomed to them.* Above all things he would ſuffer no Superfluity or Delicacy among them; and when he found any one in thoſe Faults, he made him encamp all the Winter. This Severity of his Diſcipline made *Antoninus* gave him thoſe Legions which had been debauch'd in *Syria* during *Verus*'s Expedition: And here's the Letter which the Emperor wrote upon this occaſion to one of his Lieutenants.

I *Have given* Caſſius *thoſe Legions which the Debaucheries of* Syria *and* Daphne *had quite ſpoiled, and who were found by* Ceſonius, Vectilianus *drowned, as it were, in their hot Baths. I believe you will approve*

prove of my Conduct, eſpecially you know-ing Caſſius *to be a Man that has the Severity and Diſcipline which belonged anciently to the* Caſſii; *for it is by that alone that Soldiers can be governed. You know the famous Verſe of an excellent Poet:* The Ancient Diſcipline and the Ancient Severity are the only Supports of Empire. *See only that there are no Proviſions wanting to my Army, and if I know* Caſſius *well, I can aſſure you they will not be flung away.* Ennius.

The Anſwer which this Lieutenant made the Emperor, affords us ſtill more Knowledge both of the Behaviour and Reputation of *Caſſius:* 'Twas thus,

YOU have done very well in giving the Syrian *Legions to* Caſſius; *for nothing is more neceſſary for Soldiers debauch'd with the* Grecian *Delicacies, than a General who is ſomewhat ſevere: He will have ſoon laid aſide their hot Baths, and thrown away their Flowers and Eſſences that they perfume themſelves with. Proviſions are ready for the Army, nothing is wanting under a good Captain, for then little is required and little ſpent.*

This

This *Caſſius*, whoſe Manners were ſo ſevere, was nevertheleſs a *Syrian*, the Son of that *Heliodorus*, who for his great skill in Rhetorick, came to be Secretary to *Adrian*, and afterwards Governor of *Egypt*.

But Fortune, which cannot change the quality of a Mans Birth, yet often makes him have a deſire to diſguiſe it. *Caſſius* no ſooner found himſelf in a conſiderable Poſt, but he reſolved to paſs for a Deſcendent of the Ancient *Caſſius*, who conſpired againſt *Caſar*: For the agreement of Names is often more than two thirds of the Proof. After having founded his Pedigree upon this agreement, he was reſolved to Eſtabliſh and Confirm it, by imitating the Man from whom he ſaid he was Deſcended, and like him he had a ſecret hatred of the very name of Emperor, and would ſay, *There was nothing more inſupportable than this name, which could never be extinct, for He that went to ſuppreſs it, ſtill reviv'd it*; and like him, he pretended to re-eſtabliſh the Ancient Common-wealth: *Let the Gods only favour the Right Side*, would he ordinarily ſay, *and the* Caſſii *will ſtill reſtore the Common-wealth to all its Authority*. This hatred, ſtrengthned by an unmeaſurable

meaſurable Ambition, and flattered by the Prediction of ſome Fortune-tellers, who are never wanting in ſuch encounters, deſigned to have broke out in the Reign of *Antoninus Pius*. *Caſſius*, though he was then very young, had conſpired againſt him; but *Heliodorus*, a very Grave and Wiſe Man, ſtifled the Conſpiracy in its Birth, hoping his Son would grow wiſer and amend with time. *Caſſius*, during his Fathers Life, ſeem'd to make good uſe of his Advice, but this conſtrain only rous'd his Paſſion, which became at laſt ſo ſtrong, that he could no longer conceal it. The Emperor *Verus* was the firſt that perceived it in his Expedition to *Syria*; and fond of this opportunity of ruining a Man, whoſe great Exploits had rais'd his Jealouſie, wrote to *Antoninus* about it after this manner.

CAſſius *aſpires to the Empire, as it has appeared to me, and as it was long ago apparent in the Reign of my Grandfather, your Father. I would deſire you therefore to let him be obſerved; whatever we do diſpleaſes him, and he heaps up vaſt Riches: He Jeſts openly at your Love of your Studies, and calls you an old crabbed Philoſopher, and me a little Debauchee.*

See

See then what you have to do; for my own part I bear no hatred to him; but take good heed leſt you and your Children ſuffer one Day, for having permitted ſuch a Man to continue in your Army, whom the Soldiers hear with Delight, and ſee with Pleaſure.

Antoninus imputing this Accuſation to *Verus*'s Jealouſie, or to ſome private Pique, anſwered him thus.

I Have read your Letter, which is more becoming a Fearful and a Suſpicious Man than an Emperor, and which is a Reproach to our Government. If the Gods have decreed to give the Empire to Caſſius, *it is not in our Power to hinder it: You know this Expreſſion of your Grandfather* Adrian, No Body ever ſlew his Succeſſor; *but if it is againſt the Will of the Gods that he aſpires to the Empire, he will be his own Ruin, without any Neceſſity of our being Cruel. Beſides, it is not eaſie to proceed againſt a Man whom no Body accuſes, and who, as you ſay, is ſo well beloved by the Soldiers. Nay, in Caſes of Treaſon, the Publick almoſt always believe, That Injuſtice is done to thoſe very Men who are palpably convicted of it. Have*

you

you forgot what Adrian *uſed to ſay upon this occaſion?* There is nothing more unhappy than the Condition of Princes; for it is never believed that there is a Deſign againſt them till they are found to be aſſaſſinated. Domitian *was the firſt Author of ſo good a Sentence, but I chuſe rather to quote* Adrian *for it, becauſe the Words of Tyrants don't carry ſuch Weight and Authority with them as thoſe of good Princes. Let* Caſſius *then follow his own Way and Cuſtom, eſpecially ſeeing he is a great Commander, ſtrict, brave, and uſeful to the State. And whereas your Letter would inſinuate that his death alone can ſecure my Children; let my Children periſh if* Caſſius *deſerves to be beloved more than they, and if it is more expedient for the Publick that* Caſſius *live, than the Children of* Antoninus.

The Event ſhewed the Emperor that *Verus* had made a true judgment concerning the deſigns of *Caſſius*, and knew him better than he did: But it is common for Vertue always to judge favourably of others.

The Love which the People bore to *Antoninus* made it harder for *Caſſius* to accompliſh his Deſigns, and whatever reliance

reliance he might have upon the People of *Egypt* and *Syria*, he had never gained his point if he had not took the advantage of a falſe Report that was ſpread of *Antoninus*'s death. Some ſay he himſelf invented this Piece of News, and that *Fauſtina* ſeeing her Husband old, and broken with Sickneſs and Labours, and her Son *Commodus* too young to ſucceed him, and fearing leſt ſhe ſhould fall from her Grandeur, held Intelligence with him, and by an extraordinary fetch of Politicks, ſtir'd up his Ambition, by offering him both her Bed and the Empire, which by this only means, as ſhe pretended, could be ſecured to her Children. But there is no probability that *Fauſtina* would take ſuch falſe meaſures, and the very Character of *Caſſius* is alone enough to juſtifie her. However it was, he publiſht the news of the Emperor's death, with all the marks of the moſt ſincere Affection, and to this he added, That the Army in *Pannonia* finding *Commodus* too young to be Emperor, had named him to ſucceed in his place. There was nothing more wanting to make this Title be confirmed, and after having diſpoſed of the chief Commands in the Army, which he diſpoſed of to

his

his Friends, he thought of ſecuring all that might poſſibly make Head againſt him, and in a little time he brought under his ſubjection all the Country from *Syria* to Mount *Taurus*. At the ſame time he wrote to his Son who was Governor of *Alexandria* this Letter, which was a kind of *Manifeſto*.

THere is nothing more miſerable than that State which nouriſhes in its Bowels ſuch ſort of People, as all the Riches in the World can never ſatisfie. Marcus Antoninus *is undoubtedly a very good Man, but for the vain Title of Clemency he bears with thoſe Men whoſe Life he himſelf diſapproves. Where is that* Caſſius *whoſe Name we bear to no purpoſe? Where is* Cato *the Cenſor? Where is the diſcipline of our Anceſtors? It died with thoſe great Men, and at preſent there is no more ſearch made after it.* Antoninus *is wholly taken up with his Philoſophy, he is looking after the nature of the Elements and the Soul, and diſcourſing all day what is honeſt and what juſt, and takes no care at all of the Common-wealth. You ſee then that for the reducing it to its Primitive Conſtitution, it is abſolutely neceſſary that Fire and Sword ſhould be employed. What*

ſhould

ſhould I ſuffer theſe Governors of Provinces, if we may call ſuch People Governors and Proconſuls, who think that Antoninus *and the Senate have given them Provinces only to grow rich there and live at their pleaſure? You have heard how this Philoſopher's Captain of the Guards, was a meer Wretch the night before his Promotion to that Dignity, and now all of a ſudden is grown prodigiouſly rich: Whence think you this Wealth can come, but from the Bowels of the Common-wealth and the goods of private Perſons? But 'tis very well they are ſo opulent, the publick Treaſure will be enriched with their Spoils. Let the Gods but favour the right ſide, and the* Caſſii *will ſtill reſtore the Common-wealth to all its Authority.*

Martius Verus the Lieutenant General, who, as has been already ſaid, had great ſhare in thoſe Victories which *Caſſius* gained in *Armenia*, and who commanded then in *Cappadocia*, diſpatched Couriers to *Antoninus*. This Prince fearing leſt *Caſſius* ſhould find ſome means of ſeizing *Commodus*, or elſe diſpatching him, wrote immediately with all ſecrecy to *Rome* to have him come to him, and in the mean time endeavoured to conceal this News from

from the Army; but when he knew it was divulged, and the Camp in a commotion, and that ſome Soldiers made Parties, he called them together, and ſpoke to 'em in theſe Words: *Fellow Soldiers, I dont come hither either to be angry or to complain: For to what purpoſe is it to be angry at Providence, that diſpoſes all things as it pleaſes? Perhaps Complaints might be more excuſable, eſpecially when one ſuffers 'em. In ſhort, is it not very troubleſome to be continually toſt by new Tempeſts into new Wars? Is it not horrible to ſee ones ſelf engaged in a Civil War? But is it not ſtill more troubleſome and horrible to ſee that there is no more Faith in Men; and that one of thoſe whom I thought to have the greateſt concern for my Intereſt, ſhould rebel againſt me without my having done him the leaſt Injuſtice, or being wanting to him in any thing whatſoever? Where can Vertue henceforth be ſecure? Where is a faithful Friendſhip to be found? Is not Truth dead, and then what can be hoped for among Men? If this danger reached no further than my ſelf, I ſhould be very little concerned at it, for I am not Immortal; but ſince it is a publick Revolt we are all equally threatned. I ſhould be very willing that* Caſſius *would come hither*

and clear all our differences before you, or the Senate, by the ordinary Forms of Justice. For without Fighting, with all my Heart I would yield him up the Empire, if it should be judged a thing necessary for the State. It is only for the State that I have so long sustained so great Labours, and expose my self to so many difficulties. It is for that alone that I live so long at such a distance from Italy, *old and infirm as I am, and that I dont make one Meal without care, nor have on single moment of easie rest.* But Cassius *would never consent to this; for how could he trust himself with me, after such base perfidiousness? In the mean time, my Companions, take Courage, the* Cilicians, *the* Syrians, *the* Egyptians *and the* Jews, *never were nor will be so brave as you, though they should be as far above you in number as at present they are below you.* Cassius *himself as great a Commander as he is, and after all the great Actions he has done, ought to be esteemed as nothing: For what can an Eagle do that leads on Pigeons to fight, or a Lion followed only by Hinds? Besides 'tis not* Cassius *that has Conquered the* Arabians *and* Parthians; *'tis you. And whatever Reputation he may have gained by that War, yet have you not* Martius Verus,

who

who yeilds to him in nothing, and who contributed as much if not more to our Victories? But perhaps Caſſius *may at preſent be informed that I am alive, and has repented of his raſhneſs: For if he had not thought me dead, he had never made this Enterpriſe: And though he ſtill perſiſts in it, yet when he knows that we march againſt him, both fear and ſhame will make him lay down his Arms. My Companions, the only thing that I fear is, leſt* Caſſius *not having the Face to endure our preſence and come into our ſight, ſhould kill himſelf; or ſome one knowing that we are coming to fight him, ſhould do us this ill Office, and raviſh from me the moſt glorious Prize that I can hope for from my Victory. And what then is this Prize? 'Tis to pardon an Enemy; to ſhew Friendſhip to a Man that has violated all the Bonds of Friendſhip, and to continue faithful to one ſo perfidious. This may ſeem incredible, but you ought not to diſbelieve it; for in ſhort, all that is good has not entirely left the Earth, and there remains ſtill ſome Footſteps of the ancient Vertue. If the Gods favour me ſo far as to put an happy end to theſe diſorders, I ſhall have the ſatisfaction of ſhewing you that which at preſent may appear impoſſible; and I ſhall at leaſt extract this good from ſo much*

miſchief, That I ſhall convince Men of this important Truth, that a good Uſe may be made even of Civil Wars.

He wrote the ſame thing to the Senate, who declared *Caſſius* a Publick Enemy, and confiſcated all his Goods to the uſe of the City, the Emperor having refuſed to take them to his own. In the mean time *Commodus* arrived at the Army, *Antoninus* gave him immedately the Tribunician Power; and having ordered all things for the march of the Army, went into *Italy* for the Empreſs and his other Children, whom he reſolved to carry with him: Being come to Mount *Alba*, he wrote this Letter to *Fauſtina*.

VErtus *wrote truth when he gave me the adviſe that* Caſſius *would uſurp the Empire. I believe you have heard what the Fortune-tellers have foretold him. Come then to* Alba, *where I expect you, that under the Protection of the Gods we may diſcourſe of our Affairs, and fear nothing.*

Fauſtina made him this Anſwer.

I Will

I Will come to morrow to Alba *according to your Orders; in the mean time I beſeech you, if you love your Children, root out theſe Rebels; It is an ill cuſtom to let Captains and Souldiers take advantage of you, who will at laſt infallibly ruin you, if you don't prevent them.*

Fauſtina being hindred from going to Mount *Alba*, *Antoninus* wrote to her to come to *Formiæ*, where he was to embark, but the ſickneſs of their eldeſt Daughter detaining her ſtill at *Rome*, ſhe wrote him this Letter.

IN Caſſius's *revolt, the Empreſs* Fauſtina, *my Mother, adviſed our Father* Antoninus *to be good to his own firſt, and then to Strangers: For an Emperor can't be ſaid to be good, that has no care of his Wife and Children. You ſee the Age and Condition of our Son* Commodus; *our Son in Law* Pompeianus *is Old and a Stranger. Look then what you have to do with* Caſſius *and his Accomplices. Spare not thoſe Traytors, who have not ſpared you, and who would neither ſpare Me, nor Our Children if they could compaſs their Deſigns. I will follow you inſtantly.* Fadilla's *ſick-*

neſs has hindred my coming to Formiæ, *but if I cannot get thither, I hope I ſhall meet you at* Capua; *the good Air of that place may recover Me and my Children. I deſire you to ſend your Phiſitian* Soteridas *from* Formiæ, *for I have no great opinion of* Soſitheus, *who does not know how to deal with Children.*

Calphurnius *has delivered me all your Letters, the Seals ſafe: I will anſwer them if my departure be delayed, and I will ſend the truſty* Cælitius, *who ſhall have order to tell you by word of mouth what* Caſſius's *Wife, Children, and Son in Law ſay of you, which I cannot put in writing.*

Caſſius, who was too able a man not to know that great Crimes muſt have a ſpeedy execution, endeavour'd to draw *Greece* to his ſide, that his way might lay open to *Italy*. Foreſeeing therefore that *Herod*'s Credit and Eloquence might be uſeful to him in this deſign, he omitted nothing that might gain him, and ſtir up that reſentment which he ſuppoſed he might have conceived againſt *Antoninus*; but *Herod* without hearkning to his Propoſals, or reading his Letters through, made him this anſwer,

ſwer, which was ſuch a one as he deſerv'd. *Herod* to *Caſſius*. *You're mad.*

This Anſwer in the Original μαί η.

Caſſius was not more ſucceſsful in other places; he could not bring over any conſiderable City, nor gain any to his Party, but ſuch as were already ruin'd by their Debts and Vices. This bad ſucceſs brought him into diſcredit with the Souldiers, and at laſt having rather dreamt that he was Emperor, than been ſo really, he was ſlain three months and ſix days after his Revolt. His Head was carried to the Emperor, and preſented to him whilſt he was at *Formiæ*, as may be ſeen in his Anſwer to a Letter which *Fauſtina* ſent him after ſhe received the news of the death of *Caſſius*.

NO one can ſhew greater Tenderneſs and Affection, my dear Fauſtina, *than you do to me and our Children. I have here at* Formiæ *read over and over again the Letter, in which you adviſe me, to puniſh* Caſſius's *Accomplices. But for my part I am reſolved to pardon his Wife, his Children, and his Son in Law, and I am going to write to the Senate, that their Proſcription be not too harſh, nor their Puniſhment too ſevere: For there is nothing more recommends a* Roman *Emperor than Cle-*

mency. It is that which has raised Cæsar *and* Augustus *to the Rank of Gods, and made our Father deserve the Name of* Pius. *In short, had this War been ended, as I desired, even* Cassius *himself had not been slain. Rest content therefore: The Gods take care of me, and my Piety is acceptable to them. I have named our Son* Pompeianus *Consul for the Year ensuing.*

This Clemency was admired by some, and condemned by others. One of these last took the Liberty of asking *Antoninus* one Day, What he thought *Cassius* would have done if he had conquer'd? He answered him: *We have not served the Gods so ill, nor lived after such a manner, as to have any cause to fear that* Cassius *should vanquish us.*

After this he reckon'd up those Princes who had been driven out, or defeated by Rebels, or slain by their Subjects, and shewed that their Unhappiness was brought upon them by their Cruelty or their ill Conduct. *For,* said he, *Nero and* Caligula *were the only Authors of their own Misfortunes:* Otho *and* Vitellius *had not the Courage to reign, and* Galba *was ruined by his Avarice.* He added, *That you should scarce find a good Prince that*

had such Fortune, and quoted the Examples of *Augustus*, *Trajan*, *Adrian* and *Antoninus Pius*, who all triumphed over their Domestick Enemies, the greatest part of which were slain against the Conquerors Order, or without his Knowledge. It were much to be wished that this Maxim were true, but in these latter Ages there are but too sure Proofs, that it is not always so. *Antoninus* wrote afterwards to the Senate, and this is what remains of his Letter.

IN Consideration then of my Victory, you have given your Consent that my Son-in-law Pompeianus *shall be Consul. His Age ought long ago to have been honour'd with that Dignity, if such deserving Men had not been preferred to it, to whom it was but just that the Publick should acquit it self of the Obligations it had to them. As for what relates to the Revolt of* Cassius, *I pray and conjure you, to remit your usual Severity, and not do so much Wrong to my Piety and Clemency, or rather to your own, as to condemn any Person to Death. Let no Senator be punish'd, nor any Nobleman's Blood be spilt; recal the Exiles, and let the proscribed Persons enjoy their Goods. Would to God even those who are*

Dead

Dead could be recalled from their Graves; for I no ways approve the Revenge which an Emperor takes of his Private Injuries: It always appears too great, how just soever it may be. Wherefore you shall pardon Cassius's *Children, his Wife, and his Son-in-law: But say I, you shall pardon? alas they have done nothing, let them therefore live in Safety, and perceive that they live under the Government of* Marcus Antoninus. *Let the Goods belonging to their Family be restored them, that having their Gold, their Silver, and their Moveables, they may be Rich without Fear, and enjoy perfect Liberty, and where ever they go may bear the Marks of my Goodness and of yours. 'Tis no great Mercy to pardon the Wives and Children of them who are Proscribed: I beseech you do more for my sake; deliver from Death, Proscription, Fear, Hatred, Infamy, and Protect from all manner of Injury those Conspirators who are of the Body of Knights or Senators, and let this be allowed to my Government: That so in the Crime of Treason one may approve, or at least excuse the Death of such as have been slain by the Chance of War.*

The reading of this Letter was followed with a thousand Acclamations, and

and a thouſand Bleſſings. In the mean Time the Emperor having cauſed the Head of *Caſſius* to be buried, and teſtified the Grief that he had for his Death, continued his Journey to accompliſh the appeaſing of this Revolt, and to make the People and Army of the *Eaſt* return to their Duty. He began with *Egypt*, and pardoned all the Cities that had taken *Caſſius*'s part, and left one of his Daughters at *Alexandria*, as a Pledge of his Friendſhip.

Coming to *Peluſium* he found that they celebrated Feaſts there in honour of *Serapis*, to which they came from all Parts of *Egypt*, which gave occaſion to a thouſand Debaucheries and Exceſs; without Fear therefore of the People, who do not willingly ſuffer their Religion to be meddled with, he aboliſhed thoſe Feaſts, and ordered, That the Sacrifices ſhould be performed in private by the Prieſts, without the People's aſſiſting at them. Where-ever he paſſed, he went into the Temples, the Schools, and all Publick Places, and inſtructed the People, converſing familiarly with them, and explaining to them the greateſt Difficulties in Philoſophy, leaving the Marks of his Wiſdom in all Places.

The

The first thing that he did in *Syria* was to burn all the Letters that were found in *Cassius*'s Closet, that he might not against his own Inclinations be forced to hate any Body. Others pretend, that *Martius Verus*, whom the Emperor sent before him into *Syria*, the Government of which Place was conferred on him as a Reward of his Fidelity, had already burnt them by his own Authority, saying, It would please the Emperor; but if he should have the ill Fortune to displease him, he should not be troubled at Death, when it was to save the Life of so many Persons. This Example of the Love of ones Neighbour is very rare in a Heathen, but I don't know whether it is not as rare in a Courtier.

A.D. 176. Towards the latter End of this Year *Antoninus* was proclaimed Emperor the eighth Time, for the Medals joyn this eighth Title with the twenty ninth Year of his Tribunicial Power.

Faustina died in this Voyage, at the Foot of the Mountain *Taurus*: *Antoninus* was sensibly concerned at her Death, and the Senate thinking she would have incensed him against the Conspirators, and that he could not find greater Comfort than in seeing them sacrificed to her Grief,

Grief, increaſed their Severity, out of Complaiſance and Flattery, Vices which don't reign leſs in the moſt illuſtrious Aſſemblies than in the Hearts of Private Perſons. But the Emperor being adverti-ſed of the Intention of the Senate, wrote a ſecond Time to them, to aſſure them, That this Rigor would but increaſe his Grief; he prayed them to put no Body to Death, and concluded his Letter with theſe Words: *If I cannot obtain from you the Life of all the Conſpirators, you will make me deſire to die.*

That no more ſuch Revolts might happen, he ordered, That no Perſon, for the future, ſhould command the Province he was born in.

Among *Caſſius*'s Children, the eldeſt only, called *Mecianus*, Governor of *Alexandria*, was ſlain in his Government the ſame Day that *Caſſius* was in *Syria*. *Heliodorus* only was baniſh'd to an Iſland, the others ſimply baniſhed, and their Eſtates continued to them. His Daughter *Alexandra* and her Husband *Druncianus* had the Liberty of Retiring whither they pleaſed, or elſe of ſtaying at *Rome*. *Antoninus* preſerved to them all their Rights, and had always ſuch a Regard for them, that in a great Tryal which

which they had before the Senate, he forbad the adverse Party to reproach them, either directly or indirectly, with the Misfortunes of their Family, and that they should be fined if they failed in it.

In the mean Time, the Senate, who saw that they could not make their court to the Emperor by their Cruelties; endeavoured to do it by inventing new Honours for *Faustina*. They were not content to raise a Temple to her, but ordered likewise her Statue to be made in Gold, and that every Time the Emperor went to the Theatre, this Statue should be set in the Place where she used to see the Shews, and that the chief *Roman* Ladies should be round about the Seat. But there was a newer Piece of Flattery; They decreed Silver Statues to *Antoninus* and *Faustina*, placed them in the Temple of *Venus*, and erected an Altar to them, whither it was ordained that all the young Maidens of *Rome* should go to sacrifice on their Wedding Day along with those who were to marry them.

Antoninus returned the Senate Thanks for all these Honours, and after the Example of *Antoninus Pius*, he founded a Society of young Maids, whom he bred

at

at his own Expence, and called them *Fauſtinians*, and built a Temple to his Wife in the Town where ſhe died. This Temple had afterwards a Chance which became the Divinity which preſided there: For it was conſecrated to *Heliogabulus*, who was the true God of Impurity.

After the Re-eſtabliſhment of Peace in the Eaſt, *Antoninus* took his Journey to *Rome*. He made ſome ſtay at *Smyrna*, and all People coming to ſalute him, he recollected one Night that he had not ſeen *Ariſtides*, and feared he had neglected him: For it was one of his principal Maxims, always to diſtinguiſh and honour Vertue, and to treat every one according to his Merit. He ſhewed his uneaſineſs to his Courtiers, and above all to the *Quintilians*, who were Governors of *Greece*. They aſſured him that *Ariſtides* had not yet been there, for they ſhould not have failed to have taken him from the Crowd and preſented him to him; however the next day they brought him. As ſoon as *Antoninus* ſaw him; *Ariſtides*, ſaid he to him, *How comes it that you were ſo long before you ſaw me? I was at ſtudy*, replyed *Ariſtides*, *and you know better than any Body that when one is buſie*

busie, the Mind cannot endure that any thing should interrupt its Meditation. The Emperor charmed with this Character so plain and natural, said to him, *When shall we hear you then? You have nothing to do*, replyed *Aristides*, with the same Freedom, *But to give me a Subject, and you shall hear me to morrow, for we are none of those who discourse at random, but who first study for it. I only beg your leave that all my Friends may come with me.* *'Tis granted*, said the Emperor. *But upon condition too*, added *Aristides*, *That they shall clap their Hands and applaud as they please, and cry out as if you were not present.* *Oh for that*, replied the Emperor smilingly, *That shall be wholly left to you, you shall be Master.* *Aristides* the next day spoke in praise of the City of *Smyrna* with a great deal of Success, and we have this Oration among his Works.

From *Smyrna* the Emperor went to *Athens*, where, according to his Desires, he was initiated in the Grand Mysteries of *Ceres*, which was the most Religious, and the most solemn of all the Pagan Devotions: For to be admitted there, one must always have led a very innocent Life, and have no Crime to be objected

to

to one. It was likewiſe the Cuſtom to be prepared for it, by a General Examination made before a Prieſt, appointed to judge of the Condition of thoſe who preſented themſelves.

He did a great many Honours to the *Athenians*, and eſtabliſhed in their City Profeſſors in all ſorts of Sciences, with large Penſions; he made them magnificent Preſents, and granted them a great many Privileges and Immunities. In his Paſſage by Sea, there was a horrible Tempeſt, in which he thought he ſhould be caſt away. As ſoon as he came to *Brunduſium*, he quitted his Soldiers Habit, and made all his Soldiers do ſo too, who during his Reign never appeared in *Italy* but in their Gowns.

He was received at *Rome* with all imaginable ſigns of Joy: And immediately, becauſe he had been abſent almoſt eight Year, he diſtributed eight Pieces of Gold to each one of the People, remitted all that they owed to the Publick and Private Treaſury for threeſcore Years paſt, burnt all their Bills in the midſt of the Market-Place; gave his Son *Commodus* the Habit of a Man, made him Prince of the Youth, aſſociated him in the Empire, triumphed with him, named him Cor- A.D. 176.

ſul for the Year enſuing; and to honour his Conſulſhip, followed his Chariot on Foot, when he went to the *Circus*. He retired afterwards for ſome time to *Lavinium*, into the Arms of Philoſophy, which he called his *Mother*, oppoſing it to the Court, which he called his *Step-Mother*. He had always this Expreſſion of *Plato*'s in his Mouth, *That People were happy whoſe Philoſophers were Kings, or whoſe Kings were Philoſophers.* In the mean time knowing that a People Victorious and in Peace cannot be without Shows, and that Prudence requires that they ſhould be amuſed with innocent Diverſions to eaſe them after their Labours, and to hinder them from thinking of Novelties, which are always fatal to the Common-wealth; he exhibited to them ſuch as were very magnificent, though naturally he himſelf had but a ſmall ſhare in thoſe Diverſions.

A.D. 177. Whilſt *Rome* enjoyed the preſence of her Emperor and the delights of that Peace which her labours had procured her, *Smyrna* was deſtroyed by Fire and an Earthquake, which buried the greateſt part of the Inhabitants under the ruins of the Houſes. *Ariſtides* upon this wrote ſo moving a Letter to the Emperor,

ror, that he could not forbear Weeping at the Reading of it, and immediately iſſued forth his Orders, eſtabliſhed ſuch Funds as were neceſſary, and committed it to a Senator's care to ſee it ſo Rebuilt, as that it might have no cauſe to regret its ancient Magnificence. The Inhabitants of *Smyrna* out of Gratitude to *Ariſtides*, erected his Statue in Braſs in the midſt of the Market-place. A thing particular enough, and which alone may ſhew a happy Age, when the Honour due to the ſole Bounty of a Prince, was entirely rendred to the Eloquence of an Orator. *Antoninus* by their means recompenſed the *Smyrnians*, for the Fidelity and the Services they had done him. For in the Revolt of the *Parthians*, *Alidius Cornelianus* having been worſted and wounded by them, and his Troops broken and put to flight, *Smyrna* received them, buried *Cornelianus*, who died of his Wounds, and the People ſtrove who ſhould treat the Soldiers moſt kindly, gave them all Cloaths, Arms, Mony, as *Venuſium* had done heretofore to thoſe who eſcaped from the defeat at *Cannæ*. What the Emperor did for *Smyrna* he had already done in *Italy*, and beſides for ſeveral other Cities which had had

the ſame Misfortune, as *Carthage*, *Epheſus* and *Nicomedia*.

The Expences of his Shows, the Preſents he beſtowed on the People, the immenſe Sums that he gave to rebuild the Cities ruined by Earthquakes and Fire, and the Taxes that he forgave the People in his moſt preſſing neceſſities, are ſufficient to take away the Reproach that has been made of his not being Liberal. He was indeed a good Husband after the Example of *Antoninus Pius* his Father; and managed his Revenues with a great deal of care. But when the Glory of the State or the eaſe of the People were concerned, his Largeſſes went even to Prodigality, being perſuaded that theſe are the only occaſions on which a Prince may be Prodigal, and that Covetouſneſs then is a dangerous Miſchief. He was uſed to ſay, that Subjects who ſaw a Prince liberal in publick, and a good manager in his private Concerns, pay their Duties with more ſatisfaction, becauſe they are convinced that his Riches are the ſource of their Happineſs, and their Abundance. One muſt not be ſurprized at the little Juſtice that is rendred to *Antoninus* upon this Account: The Largeſſes of Princes that are ill deſigned, are

thoſe

thoſe only which the People honour with the Title of Liberality, whereas thoſe which are ordered by Prudence and Reaſon, paſs for Avarice in their Eſteem: For they never knew the difference between giving and ſquandring, and they judge of Gifts only by their own greedineſs. It is certain that *Rome* never had a Prince that did ſo much good as *Antoninus*, and he was the firſt that built a Temple to the Goddeſs that preſides over Benefits; and which perhaps was the only Vertue that the *Romans* did not then adore. But the introducing of this new Worſhip belonged only to him who knew ſo perfectly all the Ceremonies and Cuſtoms of it, and practiſed them continually. The Medals ſhew that at the end of the year he received the Title of *Imperator* the ninth time, which they joyn with the thirty firſt year of his Tribunitial Power.

Fabia, that we ſpoke of before, who was *Verus*'s Miſtreſs, though ſhe was his Siſter, and who had not leſs Ambition than Impudence, endeavoured to try the laſt efforts of her decaying Charms, and left nothing undone that might oblige the Emperor to marry her. The Emperor who knew her better than he did

Fauſtina, and beſides never thought of Marrying again, always reſiſted her Sollicitations; nay they write, that rather than let his Children have a Mother in Law, he kept a Miſtreſs. It is not a ſure way of refuſing what is ſaid of Men, by ſaying it is contrary to their uſual Diſcourſe; for there is not always a perfect Harmony between their Words and Actions. But ſince *Antoninus*'s Life through the whole courſe of it, correſponds with his Maxims, one may on good Grounds doubt of this particularity; and there needs no other Mark of its falſity, than the Thanks he gives the Gods in his firſt Book, that he was Educated no longer time near his Grand fathers Miſtreſs. How would he have given his Children ſuch an example, as he thanks the Gods he had not long in the Houſe where he was bred?

The Peace which they enjoyed did not laſt two years. The *Scythians* and People of the North took Arms, and attacked the Emperor's Lieutenants, who were not in a condition of making a long reſiſtance. This obliged *Antoninus* to prepare for his departure: He went therefore to the Senate, and this was the firſt time that he asked them to have

Mony

Mony out of the publick Treasury. This Mony was in his own Power, if he would have made use of his Authority; but he said that Emperors had no propriety to any thing, not so much as to the Palace in which they liv'd or belong'd; for these are his Words to the Senate and the People. After this he Married his Son to *Crispina* the Daughter of *Bruttius Halens*, a Man of consular Dignity; and after the Marriage which was without any Pomp, he went to the Temple of *Bellona* where he performed the Ceremony of the Javelin. This Ceremony was very ancient, and was never performed but when the War was to be carried beyond the Seas into a forreign Country. The Emperor went into the Temple, took the bloody Javelin that was kept there, and threw it over against the Column that was in the *Flaminian Circus*.

The *Romans* seeing their Emperor old and broken, yet ready still to go and expose himself to all the dangers of a new War, and fearing at the same time to be deprived of this Prince, and that Prudence which seemed to breath in only him, assembled themselves before the Palace to pray him not to leave them, till he

had given them ſome Precepts for their Conduct, that if the Gods ſhould take him away they might by this help continue in the ſame Path of Vertue which he had lead them into by his Example. *Antoninus* moved to ſee their good Diſpoſitions, ſpent three whole Days in explaining to them the greateſt Difficulties of Morality, and in giving them ſhort Maxims by which they might regulate all their Actions.

He departed afterwards with *Commodus*, and gave the Command of the Army to *Paternus*. The *Scythians* loſt the beſt part of their Troops in the firſt Fight, which was ſo ſtubborn that it laſted from Morning till Night. The Army then proclaimed *Antoninus Imperator* the ninth Time.

It were to be wiſh'd that we had the exact particulars of theſe laſt Campaigns, which were ſo glorious to this Prince: But ſince there is no Author remaining that has wrote of them, we muſt be contented with knowing, That this War had not fewer Difficulties than the former; that the King of the *Scythians* beheaded ſeveral Officers upon Suſpicion of their holding Intelligence with the *Romans*; that *Antoninus* fought ſeveral Bloody

Bloody Battles, where the Victory was always owing to his Prudence, and that great Example of Bravery which he gave his Army; that he was always at the Head of them, in Places which were moſt expoſed to Danger; that he built Forts, into which he put good Garriſons, to keep the Country in aw, and that about the Time that he was going to open the third Campagne, in the beginning of *March*, he was ſeized at *Vienna* with a Sickneſs, that carried him off in few Days. 'Tis ſaid that his Phyſitians haſtned his Death, to make their court to *Commodus*: If this be true, as *Dion* aſſures us, *Antoninus* had more reaſon than he thought, for ſaying to himſelf, as he often did: *How many things have we which make our Death be deſired by a multitude of People? Thoſe whom I have loved moſt are thoſe who deſire I ſhould die, hoping that my Death may procure them ſome Advantage.* And he did not forget to practiſe the Precept which he gave at the ſame Time; *However, don't go out of this Life, with any ill Wiſhes to them; but on the contrary, according to thy good Cuſtom, give them all the Teſtimonies of Friendſhip, ſweetneſs of Temper and good will:* For the ſame *Dion* reports, That

In *Auſtria*, others ſay at *Sirmium*.

there

there was very great Care taken to conceal the Cauſe of his Death; that he recommended his Son to the Army, and when the Tribune came to him for Orders, he ſent him to him ſaying, *Go to the Riſing Sun.* But his being ſo very young, that he could not as yet have given any Signs of ſo Vicious a Nature, muſt render this particular very improbable, and it is manifeſtly contradicted by *Herodian*, who tells us, This Prince was not debauched till after the Death of *Antoninus*. The Hatred that he ſoon drew upon himſelf by his Cruelties, made them without doubt willing to impute this Parricide to him, that there might be no Crime that he was not blackned with, the People eaſily believing that Princes have done every thing which their laſt Actions ſhew them to have been capable of doing. *Antoninus*'s Sickneſs ſoon became deſperate. In this Extremity, which is commonly as a Rock to moſt Men's Conſtancy, this wiſe Emperor made it appear, That thoſe Truths which he had always made Profeſſion of, were ſo deeply graven on his Heart that nothing was able to efface them. But if on one ſide, his Submiſſion to the Orders of Providence made him eaſie to receive his

Death;

Death: So on the other, the Love which he had for his People filled his Heart with Fear and Bitterneſs. As his laſt Hour approached he found his Pains increaſe, and he paſſed the Day before his Death in a perpetual inquietude. The Examples of all thoſe Princes who coming very young to the Throne, had not been able to reſiſt their Vices, their Fortune and their Flatteries came continually into his Mind. The Life of *Nero*, and that of *Domitian* ſtill increaſed his Troubles, and he feared leſt his Son, not able to keep himſelf up, upon ſuch a Slippery Place, ſhould forget the good Education he had given him, and loſing all thoſe Seeds of Vertue that he had cultivated with ſo much Care, ſhould plunge himſelf into all ſorts of Debaucheries, and at laſt become a Tyrant to his People inſtead of being their Father and Protector. Beſides, he ſaw his Conqueſts in the North unſettled, the People inclinable to revolt, and the Enemies with their Swords in their Hands, who were the more to be feared for having been often vanquiſhed. He apprehended therefore, and that with good Reaſon, that his Death would re-unite all theſe People, and make them take the Advantage of his Son's Youth

Youth and ſmall Experience to efface the Diſhonour of their Defeats. Strugling with theſe Thoughts, and fluctuating between Hope and Fear, and his Soul overwhelmed with Care, he commanded that his Friends and Principal Officers ſhould come in. When he ſaw them about his Bed, he made *Commodus* come near, and gathering together that little Strength he had left, he ſate up and ſpoke to them in theſe Words.

The Grief which you ſhew to ſee me in the condition I am in, does not at all ſurprize me; Compaſſion is natural to Men, and the Evils which they ſee continually, enlarge it. But I am perſuaded, That theſe Tears which I ſee you ſhed, come for me from another Spring; and the Affections that I have for you makes me reaſonably expect a mutual Friendſhip on your part. This is the favourable Time which will give us both Opportunities, to me of knowing whether I have rightly placed that Eſteem and Conſideration which I have always had of you, and to you of ſhewing me your Acknowledgments, in letting me ſee, That you have not forgot the Benefits that you have received from me. You ſee before your Eyes my Son, whom you your ſelves have brought up, and who being juſt now in the Flower

of

of his Youth, as in a Stormy Sea, has need of wiſe Governors, leſt being hurried away by his Paſſions, as by violent Winds, he may throw himſelf into Vicious Courſes. Inſtead therefore of one Father, whom he is about to loſe, let him find many in you; have you Care of his Youth, give him ſuch Counſels as he needs; repreſent to him, That neither all the Riches in the World are ſufficient to ſatisfie the Luxury of Tyrants, nor the Guards that watch about their Pallaces are able to defend them againſt the hatred of their People. Make him remark, That we ſee no Princes enjoy long and quiet Reigns, but ſuch, who inſtead of exciting hatred by their Cruelties and Violences, have on the contrary by their Mildneſs raiſed Love in the Hearts of their Subjects. Tell him continually, That they are never thoſe who ſerve out of Conſtraint, but they that obey voluntarily, who continue faithful in all Tryals, and who in no encounter can be ſuſpected either of Flattery or Diſſimulation. Let him know that theſe are the only Men who never fall into Diſobedience, at leaſt unleſs they are forced to it by ill Uſage. But at the ſame time be not wanting to ſet before him how difficult, and yet how Neceſſary it is in an Abſolute Power to moderate and ſet Bounds to his Deſires: If you inſtruct

inſtruct him in theſe Truths, if you inceſſantly make him recollect what he has heard, together with the Satisfaction of forming a good Emperor for your ſelves and the whole Empire, you will have the Comfort of rendring to my Memory the greateſt of all your Services, ſince by this means you will make it immortal.

As he was ſpeaking theſe laſt Words he was ſeized with a Weakneſs, which took away the uſe of his Voice; he fell upon his Bed, and died the next Day, being infinitely regretted by thoſe of his own Time, and leaving an Eternal Remembrance of his Vertues to Poſterity. When the News of his Death was publick, there was a general Affliction throughout the Army and all *Italy*: There never was ſo great Mourning, nor was *Rome* in the like Conſternation; it ſeemed as if the Glory, the Proſperity of the Empire, that all was dead with *Antoninus*. Some called him their Father, others their Brother, theſe their brave Commander, thoſe their good Emperor, their Wiſe and Prudent Prince, and the Pattern of all Vertues; and which is very ſtrange, among ſo many thouſand Men, who all gave him different Praiſes, there was not one who did not ſpeak Truth.

The

The Senate and People adored him before his Funerals were over, and as if it had been a ſmall thing to raiſe him a Golden Statue in the *Julian Chamber*, and to decree him all Divine Honours, they declared ſuch Perſons to be Sacrilegious as had not in their Houſes, according to their Quality, either a Picture or a Statue of *Antoninus*.

The Place where the Senate aſſembled.

So there died in his fifty ninth Year almoſt compleat, the beſt and greateſt Emperor that *Rome* ever had. He reigned nine Years with his Brother and ten alone; and his greateſt Happineſs was to die before he knew the wicked Inclinations of his Son, who was a Monſter in all ſorts of Vices.

The END.

Printed for Tho. Bennet *at the* Half Moon *in* S. Paul's Church-yard.

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A Sermon preached before the Honourable Houſe of Commons, *November* 26. 1691. being a day of Thankſgiving; by *W. Jane* D. D. Dean of *Glocester*.

A Sermon preached before the King and Queen, *November* 29. 1691. by the Right Reverend Father in God, *Edward* Lord Biſhop of *Worcester*.

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MARCUS AURELIUS

ANTONINUS

THE

ROMAN EMPEROUR,

HIS

MEDITATIONS

Concerning HIMSELF:

Treating of a Natural Man's Happineſs: Wherein it conſiſteth, and of the Means to attain unto it.

Tranſlated out of the Original *GREEK*; with *NOTES.*

BY

MERIC CASAUBON, D.D. and Prebendary of *Chriſt-Church*, *Canterbury.*

The Fifth Edition.

ECCLUS 18. 8.

What is man, and whereto ſerveth he?
What is his good, and what is his evil?

LONDON,

TO THE

Moſt Reverend Father in GOD,

WILLIAM,

By the Divine Providence,

Lord Archbiſhop of *Canterbury*, Primate of all *ENGLAND*, and Metropolitane; One of the Lords of His Majeſty's moſt Honourable Privy Council, and Chancellour of the Univerſity of *Oxford*: My very Honourable good Lord.

May it pleaſe your Grace,

Preſent here unto you the Writings of a King. I have preſumed that You would honour that ſacred Name even in a Heathen ſo far, as to accept of the Work, were it but for the Authour's ſake. For as it may well be eſteemed (in ſuch an Age as this) none of Your Grace's leaſt commendations, that

you are truly φιλοβασιλεὺς, *ſo I ſuppoſe Your ſelf account it no ſmall happineſs, that You live to ſerve ſo Great and Gratious a King. But if the bare Name of a King would not ſerve, I could add, that they are the Writings of the* Wiſeſt, *the* Learned'ſt, *the* Beſt *that ever was among Heathen Kings, if Hiſtorians may be credited. It is obſerved by ſome of them as a great argument of the Divine Providence, that ſuch a Prince was provided againſt ſuch times, when all things ſeemed to tend to ruine and confuſion, and all humane ordinary means were thought too little to keep the Empire ſtanding: the happy preſervation whereof they generally adſcribe to the ſingular and extraordinary* Wiſedom *of this One; both in his Wars abroad; and in his Civil Government at home. Hence it is, that as of a man of whom there is no hope,*

hope, we commonly ſay, Nè Salus quidem : *ſo was it uſed as a Proverb in after-ages by ſome of them, of a State irrecoverably gone, and declined,* Nè Marcus quidem. *As for his* Learning, *I could wiſh Your Grace had the leiſure to peruſe the Hiſtorian's own words, leſt mine may ſeem too hyperbolical, and yet come far ſhort of their expreſſions. What ſhall I ſay then of his* Integrity, *which is ſo commended by them, as it alone might well be thought ſufficient without any other commendation, to make him Incomparable? And indeed I fear I have ſpoken but improperly, when I have mentioned his Wiſedom, Learning and Integrity, as three ſeveral Excellencies, ſince that (as he himſelf profeſſed, and they report of him) all the Learning he was ambitious of, was but to be Wiſe ; and all the Wiſedom, but to be Good. The Writings of ſuch a one*

I know Your Grace would reſpect, although he had been no King. And yet another reaſon, which hath made me the bolder to preſent them to Your Grace is, becauſe in reading them You ſhall often reade Your ſelf; and though perchance Your Modeſty will not ſuffer You to make the application, yet others will, I am ſure, that ſhall reade him; and I could not but have reſpect unto it. Upon theſe reaſons I have preſumed. If beyond reaſon; I can excuſe my boldneſs no otherwiſe, but as I am,

YOUR GRACE'S

Humbly devoted Chaplain,

Meric Caſaubon.

Some few Testimonies concerning *Antoninus*, and these his Books.

Out of *SUIDAS*.

MARCUS *the Roman Emperour, whom it is easier to admire in silence, than to praise, it being altogether impossible to equal his merits with any expression of words. For from his youth, having betaken himself to a composed and setled course of life, he was never seen to alter his countenance, through either fear, or pleasure. He most approved the* Stoicks, *and was their follower, not onely in their order and discipline of life, but also in their course and method of Learning. He therefore from his younger years, became so famous and illustrious, that* Adrianus *intended oftentimes to settle the Empire upon him: but having after a more legal way first settled it upon* Antoninus Pius, *he nevertheless reserved the succession of it unto* Marcus. *He thought good also by marriage to allie him unto* Antoninus Pius, *that so by succession of blood also he might come to the Empire. As for* Marcus, *he still continued in the same private course of life, and in the like subjection as other Romans did, and was in nothing altered by this adoption and new affinity. And when he*

was come to the Empire; and had the abſolute power in his hands, [or, *and was an abſolute Monarch:*] *he was never known to doe any thing inſolently, but as in matters of bounty he was always moſt free and exuberant; ſo in his government, he was no leſs meek and moderate.*

Again out of the ſame.

MArcus Antoninus, *a Roman Emperour, having deſerved in all things the commendation of a perfect Philoſopher,* &c. *He hath written concerning the courſe of his own life, twelve Books.*

Athenagoras, a Philoſopher of *Athens*, in his Apology for the Chriſtians addreſſed unto *Marcus Antoninus*, and his Son *Commodus*, by way of humble Mediation and Interceſſion.

I *Know well enough, that ye do not more ſurpaſs others in royal power and prudence, than in the exact perfection of all manner of Learning: ſo that even they that have ſingled out, and wholly applyed themſelves to any one part, have not attained to that happy perfection in that one, which ye have attained unto in all parts of Learning.*

Jul. Capitol. *in vita* Marci.

ERat enim ipſe tantæ tranquillitatis, ut vultum nunquam mutaverit mœrore vel gaudio, Philoſo-

Philoſophiæ deditus Stoicæ, quam & per optimos quoſque magiſtros acceperat, & *undique ipſe collegerat.*

Vulcatius Gallicanus, *in* Avidio Caſſio.

NEC defuere qui illum [*Caſſium*, ſcil.] *Catilinam* vocarent; cum & ipſe gauderet ſe ita appellari, addens futurum ſe *Sergium*, ſi *Dialogiſtam* occidiſſet, *Antoninum* hoc nomine ſignificans; qui tantum enituit in Philoſophia, ut iturus ad bellum *Marcommanicum*, timentibus cunctis ne quid fatale proveniret, rogatus ſit, non adulatione ſed ſerio, ut præcepta Philoſophiæ ederet, *&c.*

Aurelius Victor, *in Breviario.*

TAntum *Marco* ſapientiæ, innocentiæ, ac literarum fuit, ut is *Marcommanos* cum filio *Commodo*, quem *Cæſarem* ſuffecerat, petiturus, Philoſophorum obteſtantium [*vi*] circumſunderetur, ne ſe expeditioni aut pugnæ prius committeret, quam ſectarum ardua & occulta explanaviſſet. Ita incerta belli *(in)* ejus ſalute doctrinæ ſtudiis metuebantur; tantumque illo imperante floruere artes bonæ, ut illam gloriam etiam temporum putem.

I. C. *Exercit. in* Bar. *pag.* 85.

MUlta in hanc ſententiam ſcribit *M. Antoninus* Imperator, in ſuis illis *divinis* libris *&c.*

Idem

Idem ad ista Julii Capit. ridens res humanas, *&c.* Non ridere, sed rite, ac suo pretio æstimare res humanas solitus hic vir sapientissimus. *Hoc ille* nos docet, *divinis* illis suis libris: velut cum ait in 11. non enim tempero mihi, quin mellitissimi doctoris verba adscribam, *&c.*

Canterus, *Nov. Lect. lib. 7. cap.* 1.

M*Arcus Aurelius Antoninus*, Imperator optimus, atque idem Philosophus tantus, ut hoc meruerit proprium cognomen, duodecim conscripsit *de officio suo* libros, maximæ pietatis, humanitatis, temperantiæ, eruditionis, aliarum rerum præclararum testes plenissimos; & cum quibus multorum Philosophorum operosa præcepta collata, merito sordere possint. Quocirca nemo, spero, male collocatum tempus putabit, quod in ejus operis lectionem studiose quondam impendimus, cum ex ea præter cætera, fructum hunc retulerimus, quod ex multis vitiosis locis duo saltem dextro, si dicere licet, *Æsculapio* sanavimus. Ac primum sub finem primi libri ait, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ πλέον με προκόψειν ἐν ῥητορικῇ καὶ ποιητικῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτηδεύμασι, repetitur autem, ἀπὸ κοινοῦ, παρὰ τῶν θεῶν ἔλαβον, sed pro μὲν ego μὴ legendum affirmare non dubito. Nam ideo mox subjungit hæc, ἐν οἷς ἴσως ἂν κατεσχέθην, εἰ ᾐσθόμην ἐμαυτὸν, εὐόδως προϊόντα. Quod si, inquit, in poeticis & oratoriis studiis fœliciter progressus fuissem; nemo me inde retrahere, & ad majora perducere facile potuisset. Quocirca Diis gratias ago, quod in studiis illis non nimis magnum feci profectum, nec

Lib. I. *num.* XIV.

nec ea nimis adamare cœpi. Nec injuria, Imperator. Nam ut in homine privato tolerari fortassis queat, si natura jubente, suppetente otio, aspirante fortuna, jucunda Musarum studia paulo diutius colat, & amœnissimas syrenas, quæ tamen non dent sine mente sonum, attentius ac pertinacius auscultet: Ita non potest is, quem ad res maximas gerendas, ac totius Universi curam natura progenuit, alio cogitationes omnes suas, quam ad eum scopum dirigere, & ut illum assequatur quam citissime, non omnem operam dare. Sed jam ad alterum pergamus locum. In fine libri sexti, hanc adfert similitudinem, εἰ κυβερνῶν οἱ ναῦν ἢ ἰατρεύοντ οἱ κάμνοντες κακῶς ἔλεγον, ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἂν σφᾶς πείσειεν; ἢ πῶς αὐτὸς ἐνεργοίη τὸ τοῖς ἐμπλέουσι σωτήριον, ἢ τὸ τοῖς θεραπευομένοις ὑγιεινόν; Quemadmodum, inquit, si nautæ gubernatori, aut ægroti medico maledicerent, non facile alium auscultarent, nec vel ille vectorum salutem, vel hic ægrotantium sanitatem procurare posset: ita cum quis alius nunquam alteri bene & recte monenti parere consilium capit, is non temere vel rectum vitæ cursum tenere, vel post errorem in viam possit redire. Verum quod pene oblitus eram, * pro κυβερνῶντα & ἰατρεύοντα, legendum est κυβερνῶντ᾽ ἂν & ἰατρεύοντα. Quod cum non advertisset interpres, alioqui doctissimus, quique paucos hac ætate pares habet, alienum plane sensum commentus est. Sed profecto homines omnes sumus, & erramus facillime: nec reperitur hoc seculo quisquam, qui securus possit medium Momo digitum ostendere.

Lib. VI. *num.* I.

* There is no need of this. The sense is better as the words are printed. See there.

Many

Many more Testimonies might be added if need were: but of all late Writers I know not any that hath had more to doe with Antoninus *than* Barthius *in his* Adversaria; *I will not say to what purpose, because I will not preoccupy the Reader's judgment, the Book being every where to be had. In lieu of it, I will add that here, which I know will be of very good use to the Learned: and that is, a brief* Collection *of those passages of* Antoninus, *(of all I will not say, but of most I dare) that are any where cited by* Suidas; *with reference to the particular Books and places of* Antoninus *from whence they are taken: whereby many places both in the Text of* Suidas *it self, and in the late learned Interpreters Translation of the said* Suidas, *may easily be corrected and supplied by them that will take the pains to compare them.*

Suidas, Ἀκενόσπουδον πρὸς Διογνήτῳ, Anton. B. I. n. III. *Of Diognetus*, &c.

Suidas, ἀκέραιον· ἐκ τῆς Μάρκου Ἀντωνίνου συγγραφῆς· κἂν τρισχίλια ἔτη βιώσεσθαι μέλλῃς καὶ τοσαυτάκις μύρια, ὅμως μέμνησο, &c. Anton. B. II. n. XII. *If thou shouldst live three thousand or as many* 10000. *of years*, &c.

Suidas, ἀποθανεῖν· ἐάν τις αὐτὸ μόνον εἰδῇ, καὶ τῷ μερισμῷ τῆς ἐννοίας διαλεύσει τὰ ἐμφανταζόμενα αὐτῷ, &c. Anton. B. II. n. X. *As also what is it to dye, and how if a man shall consider*, &c.

Suidas, ἄχολος· ὁ μὴ εὐκαιρῶν, &c. μηδὲ χωρὶς ἀνάγκης λέγειν πρός τινα, ἢ ἐν ὀπιστολῇ γράφειν, ὅτι ἄχολός εἰμι· μηδὲ διὰ τοιούτου τρόπου, &c. Anton. B. I. n. IX. *not often, nor without great necessity*, &c.

Suidas, ἀψικάρδιος· εἰ δὲ ἰδιωτικὸν πρᾶπλημα, &c. Anton. B. IX. n. III. *But if thou desirest a more popular*, &c.

Suidas,

Suidas, ἀψίκορος, εὐμετάβλητος, &c. Συντηρητικὸν δεῖ εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, καὶ μηδαμοῦ ἀψίκορον, Anton. B. I. n. XIII. *His care to preserve his friends*, &c.

Suidas, Γράος· γράσος· ἡ δυσοσμία, &c. τῷ γράσωνι μὴ ὀργίζου, Anton. B. V. n. XXII. *Be not angry*, &c.

Suidas, Δαίμων ἡ ἑκάστου τύχη, &c. οὐδὲν ἀθλιώτερον τοῦ πάντα κύκλῳ περιερχομένου, καὶ τὰ νέρθεν γῆς ἐρυνῶντος, καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχαῖς τῶν πλησίον, &c. Anton. B. II. n. II. *There is nothing more wretched than that soul which in a kind of circuit compasseth all things*, &c.

Suidas, Ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι· γενικῇ· μέμφεσθαι· μὴ ὀνειδιστικῶς ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν βαρβάρων ἢ σόλοικον, &c. Anton. B. I. n. VII. *And not reproachfully to reprehend any other*, &c.

Suidas, εὔλυτος· Μάρκος Ἀντωνῖνος φησὶν, ἔσω ἀναμένων τὸ ἀνακλητικὸν, ἐκ τοῦ βίου εὔλυτος, &c. Anton. B. III. n. V. *As one that expected, as it were, nothing but the sound of the Trumpet*, &c.

Suidas, εὐμάρεια· ἡ εὐκολία· λέγεται δὲ καὶ εὐκοσμία ἐπὶ Μάρκῳ Ἀντωνίνῳ, Anton. B. IV. n. III. ἐν πάσῃ εὐμαρείᾳ εὐθὺς γίνεται· τὴν δὲ εὐμάρειαν οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγω ἢ εὐκοσμίαν, *By tranquillity I understand a decent orderly disposition and carriage*, &c.

Suidas, Ὀρθὸς λέγεται καὶ ὄρθιος· Μάρκος, ὀρθὸν δὲ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὀρθούμενον, Anton. B. III. n. VI. *Rather like one that is streight of himself*, &c.

Suidas, Ὠστικῶς, τὸ μετὰ βίας καὶ ὠθισμοῦ· μηδὲ ὠστικῶς καὶ μετὰ βίας πρὸς θάνατον ἔχειν, Anton. B. IX. n. III. *It is therefore the part of a wise man in matter of death, not in any wise to carry himself*, &c.

Suidas,

Suidas, ὀρτυγοκόπος, παιδία τις, &c. μηδὲ ὀρτυγοκοπεῖν, μηδὲ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπτῆσθαι, Anton. B. I. n. III. *Not to keep Quails for the game*, &c.

Suidas, Παράπηγμα, κανὼν, &c. εἰ δὲ ἰδιωτικὸν παράπηγμα, Anton. B. IX. n. III. *See before in* ἀψικάρδιος.

Suidas, πρασιάνος· ὅτι πρασιάνος λέγεται καὶ βενετιάνος, καὶ παλμουλάριος, καὶ σκουτάριος παρὰ Μάρκῳ Ἀντωνίνῳ, Anton. B. I. n. II.

Suidas, προσοχὴ, ἀκριβὴς ἐπιμ. &c. τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος ἐπιμελετικῶς δεῖ ἔχειν ἐμμέτρως· οὔτε ὡς ἄν τις φιλόζωος, οὔτε πρὸς κενοπισμὸν, &c. Anton. B. I. n. XIII. *His care of his body within bounds and measure*, &c.

Suidas, Συμβαίνοντα, συμφωνοῦντα· τὸ συμβαίνειν λέγομεν, ὡς τοὺς τετραγώνους λίθους ἐν τοῖς τείχεσι, &c. Anton. B. V. n. VIII. *As of square stones, when either in walls*, &c.

Suidas, Τερατεία, ψευδολογία· παραδοξολογία· τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν τερατευομένων, καὶ γοήτων περὶ ἐπῳδῶν, &c. Anton. B. I. n. III. *Those things which are spoken by such as take upon them*, &c.

Suidas, τὸ παρὸν εὖ τίθεσθαι. There is no more now in *Suidas* than so: which certainly is out of *Antoninus*, B. VI. n. II. ἀρκεῖ οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης τὸ παρὸν εὖ θέσθαι. *That thou dost well acquit thy self of that present duty.*

Divers other words there be, as καταμύσεις, ἐυσυνείδητος, *&c.* in the exposition of which, I am persuaded that *Suidas* had a reference to *Antoninus*; yet because he neither cites the passage, nor names the Authour, I would not bring such in this number.

TO

TO THE READER.

THis Book (of what worth I ſay not; but more men, I fear, will commend it, than will know how to make uſe of it:) after it had for ſo many ages undeſervedly been buried in darkneſs, is now firſt, if I may not ſay brought unto light, yet at leaſt made common and intelligible. Twice, it is true, within theſe 80. years it hath already been ſet out in its own Original Greek: and ſet out both times with a Latin Tranſlation, much reviſed and corrected in the latter Edition. Yet ſuch are thoſe Editions both of them, ſo confuſed, and ſo corrupt; and ſuch is the Tranſlation in both the Editions, ſo imperfect often, and impertinent, that I ſay not ſo abſurd and erroneous; as that it is not eaſie to determine, whether it be harder to underſtand *Antoninus* his meaning by the Greek that is printed; or the Greek that is printed, by the Tranſlation of it: but that of both we may boldly and peremptorily conclude; of the one, that it cannot poſſibly be underſtood, as it is printed; and of the other, that it would be more for the credit of the Authour (a man otherwiſe acknowledged very learned:) if we did take no notice of it at all. I muſt add beſides, that there hath been many years ago a certain Book, firſt written in Spaniſh, and ſince tranſlated into Italian, French, Engliſh, and how many Tongues more I know not; pretended by the Title to be a Tranſlation of *M. Aurel. Antoninus*. But that the Authour of it, (a learned Spaniard)

Spaniard) was in good earneſt, I could never have believed, and would have thought I had done him great wrong to ſay it, had not I read his Prefaces, where he ſo earneſtly by reaſons, ſuch as he could find, goes about to make his Title good, and as earneſtly expoſtulates with men for their incredulity, who did not take his reaſons for current and clear ones. I cannot but commend his intention, which certainly was to doe good; but this way I much abhor, and wonder as much at his judgment and diſcretion. Sure I am that by his whole Book it doth not appear, that he had ever ſo much as ſeen that himſelf, which this Title doth promiſe unto others, *M. Aurel. Antoninus* his Book: which either muſt be this here, or none. For beſides this there is not any other, that ever was extant. For as for thoſe other Writings of his, which either he himſelf in his ſecond Book, or *Capitolinus* in his Life, or *Nicephorus* in his Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory (*lib.* 3. *cap.* 31.) or any others mention, they mention them as Books written and compoſed by him, but not as ever publickly extant; which if they had, *Suidas*, or whoſoever they be, whom *Suidas* in his Dictionary, in the word *Marcus*, doth alledge, would not have omitted them. Thus much I thought good here briefly to acquaint the Reader with; who, if he pleaſe, may receive farther ſatisfaction by the enſuing Diſcourſe.

A DIS-

A DISCOURSE

By way of

PREFACE:

CONCERNING

The Uſe and Subject of this Book: The Authour *ANTONINUS*; And this Tranſlation of it.

OF all the ſeveral Sects and Profeſſions of Philoſophers that ever were known or heard of in the World, there was not any that ever did hold maxims and opinions ſo contrary to fleſh and bloud; never any that was judged even by the learned Heathens themſelves (witneſs learned Plutarch, *who hath written a whole Book of this very ſubject:) ſo groſly and manifeſtly to oppoſe nature, and to overthrow all grounds and principles of humane ſenſe or reaſon, as the Stoicks did. And yet of all Sects and Profeſſions, never any that either with the beſt was of more credit, or with the vulgar more plauſible. So plauſible and popular, that there have been times, when the number of the Stoicks alone, did exceed all the followers and profeſſours of all other Sects being put together. A thing the more to be wondred at, becauſe that for that very reaſon, Chriſtianity (though nothing ſo harſh in compariſon:) hath ever by them of contrary*

Lucian. in Hermotimo. & Iſ. C. ad iſta Perſ. Si Cynico Barbam petulans, &c. p. 165.

trary profeſſions, been much oppoſed and contradicted. Of this a main reaſon I conceive to have been, that the Stoicks, though by their particular Tenets and Opinions, they might ſeem of all others moſt to oppoſe nature, yet that which they propoſed unto themſelves as the end of their lives, and the ground of all their Philoſophy; that which they did ever ſound in the ears of men and preſs them with, was, τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν, to live according to nature. Μίμνησο ὅτι ἡ φιλοσοφία μόνα θέλει, ἃ φύσις σου θέλει· Remember that Philoſophy requireth no more at thy hands, than what thine own nature doth require, and leads thee unto; *ſaith* Antoninus: πῶς ἀμὸν δεῖ μὴ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώπινις ὁρμαῖν δοκοῦσι τὰ φαινόμενα αὐτοῖς οἰκεῖα καὶ συμφέροντα; What a cruel and unnatural thing would it be to reſtrain men from the purſuit of thoſe things which they conceive to themſelves and their own nature, moſt proper and convenient? *So they all ſpeak, and that which they all generally did moſt beat upon, was this. Now whether the particular means which they did commend and propoſe, were indeed proper and natural unto that end, unto which they did propoſe them, I will not here diſpute. For the end, whether true or pretended, is that which men uſually take moſt notice of. As for the means, how direct or indirect to that end, is not ſo eaſily diſcerned. Their end therefore, being of it ſelf ſo plauſible and acceptable, I conceive it to have been the thing eſpecially, which made their doctrine and Philoſophy ſo too. And I am as verily perſuaded, that a conceit and opinion many Chriſtians*

B. V. n. IX.

B. VI. n. XXV.

See *Ant.* B. V. n. I.

ſtians have, that moſt of thoſe things which are reproved in them as ſins and vices, agree beſt with their natures; and many, if not moſt, of thoſe duties that are required of them as Chriſtians, are againſt, not depraved and corrupted onely, which is not properly nature, but abſolutely againſt the nature of man: and in general, that divine law and humane ſenſe and reaſon, are things contrary and oppoſite; is that as much as any thing that doth diſcourage them from the intent, practice, and ſtudy of thoſe things which they by their profeſſion cannot but acknowledge themſelves bound unto. For it is not more natural to a man to love his own fleſh, *(which the Apoſtle witneſſeth,* no man ever hated:) *than to love nature, and what he conceives to be according to nature. Though it be not ſo, yet if he conceive it ſo, he affects it naturally, and in time it becomes natural unto him indeed.*

Now concerning Chriſtianity, I know it is the opinion of many, that, matters of faith and the Sacraments onely excepted, there is nothing in the whole Goſpel which is not juris naturalis, *and moſt agreeable to humane reaſon. For my part, as I would not take upon me to maintain their opinion preciſely true in all points and circumſtances; ſo I muſt needs ſay, if we eſteem that natural, which natural men of beſt account, by the mere ſtrength of humane reaſon, have taught and taken upon them to maintain as juſt and reaſonable, I know not any Evangelical precept, or duty belonging to a Chriſtian's practice, (even the harſheſt, and thoſe that ſeem to ordinary men moſt contrary to fleſh and bloud, not excepted,) but* See *Hugo Grot. de jure Belli ac P.* lib. 1. cap. 2. ſect. 6.

upon due ſearch and examination, will prove of that nature. I ſay, upon due ſearch and examination. Many have touched upon this point, rather to ſhew the way unto others, than by way of undertaking themſelves: among others, of late, the beſt able that I know now living to perform this, or any thing elſe that belongs to a general and complete Scholar, Mr. Hugo Grotius, *in his collection and Tranſlation of the Greek ſentences. There be too, I know, that have undertaken much in this kind: but of whom (as many as I have ſeen:) I may boldly ſay (and the more boldly becauſe I name none:) that in many reſpects they have performed but little. I wiſh it with all my heart, that ſome able and judicious man would think it worth his labour and pains: were it but to this end, that the harſhneſs which many Chriſtians (though Chriſtians, yet fleſh and bloud they will ſay) do conceive to be in many divine precepts, might be mollified and leſſened, when it ſhall appear that the very ſame things did not ſeem harſh to them, who (in compariſon of them whom God hath called by more ſpecial and ſupernatural illumination,) were nothing but fleſh and bloud. That they who as men can ſo hardly prevail upon themſelves to ſtrive againſt nature, and to yield to thoſe things which they conceive againſt all humane ſenſe and reaſon; might be of another mind, when they ſhall ſee that mere natural men, who in humane ſenſe and reaſon, of all others moſt excelled, have both eſteemed themſelves bound by nature, and others moſt unnatural that refuſed, to follow or to forbear thoſe very things:* ut quivis arbitretur *(ſaith* Minutius F. *though upon another occaſion)* aut nunc Chriſtianos philoſophos

loſophos eſſe, aut philoſophos fuiſſe jam tunc Chriſtianos. *But not to proſecute this general any farther at this preſent: Of all Books in this kind that ever have been written by any Heathens, I know not any which either in regard of it ſelf, (for the bulk thereof;) or in regard of the Authour, deſerves more reſpect, than this of* Marcus Antoninus; *ſon by nature of* Annius Verus (*a man of great quality in* Rome) *and adopted ſon of* Antoninus Pius, *a Roman Emperour, whom alſo he ſucceeded in the Empire about the year of our Lord* 162, *or* 163. *The chiefeſt ſubject of the Book is, the vanity of the world and all worldly things, as wealth, honour, life,* &c. *and the end and ſcope of it, to teach a man how to ſubmit himſelf wholly to God's providence, and to live content and thankfull in what eſtate or calling ſoever. But the Book, I doubt not, will ſufficiently commend it ſelf, to them who ſhall be able to reade it with any judgment, and to compare it with others of the ſame ſubject, written either by Chriſtians or Heathens: ſo that it be remembred that it was written by a Heathen: that is, one that had no other knowledge of any God, than ſuch as was grounded upon natural reaſons merely; no certain aſſurance of the Immortality of the ſoul; no other light whereby he might know what was good or bad, right or wrong, but the light of nature, and humane reaſon. Which though it were, (ſuch as it was) from God the Authour of Nature (as what is not?) yet in regard it was not by any revelation, or any other extraordinary means, is therefore called humane and natural. As for the Book then, to let it ſpeak for it ſelf.*

In the Authour of it two main things I conceive very considerable, which because by the knowledge of them the use and benefit of the Book may be much greater than otherwise it would be, I would not have any ignorant of. The things are these: first, that he was a very great man, one that had good experience of what he spake; and, secondly, that he was a very good man, one that lived as he did write, and exactly (as far was possible to a natural man,) performed what he exhorted others unto.

For the first, I have always thought that it was not without God's especial Providence, that of all them that once were the peculiar people of God, he was chosen to write against the vain pleasures and delights of this world, who of all the rest had had most knowledge and experience of those things that he did write against. A poor man may from his heart perchance declaim against the vanity of wealth and pleasures; and a private man, against the vanity of honour, and greatness; both of them it may be from their hearts, but it is ever suspicious, and therefore of less power and efficacy. Suspicious I mean, that they are angry with that they would fain, and cannot get themselves; yea, and perchance inveigh of purpose, that by inveighing (an ordinary thing in the world) they may get that which they inveigh against. But at the best, that they make a vertue of necessity; that they speak against they know not what; and though they mean sincerely, as now; yet if they were in place themselves, God knows what mind they would be of. And the event, indeed, doth justifie

these

these suspicions but too often. But when a man shall hear such a one as Solomon *was, speaking in this manner:* I said in my heart, go to now, I will prove thee with mirth, *&c.* I made me great works, *&c.* I made me gardens and orchards, *&c.* I made me pools of water, *&c.* I got me servants and maidens, *&c.* I gathered me silver and gold, *&c.* So I was great, *&c.* And whatsoever my eyes desired, I kept not from them, I withheld not my heart from any joy, *&c.* Then I looked on all the works that my hands had wrought, and on the labour that I had laboured to doe; and behold, all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and there was no profit under the Sun: *Is there any man so bewitched, and besotted with worldly wealth and pleasure, whom such a confession from such an one, will not move, for a-while at the least? And if this of* Solomon, *who at first had received such a measure of Grace and illumination from God, that it may be more justly wondred, that he ever did any thing contrary to this profession, than that he should profess so much; how much more should that confession of* Antoninus *move us, dilated here by him, and inlarged into XII. Books, and briefly expressed and summed up in these words of his eighth Book,* πεπείρασαι ἐπὶ πόσα πλανηθεὶς, οὐδαμοῦ εὗρες τὸ εὖ ζῆν· B.VIII.n.1 οὐκ ἐν Συλλογισμοῖς, οὐκ ἐν πλούτῳ, οὐκ ἐν δόξῃ, οὐκ ἐν ἀπολαύσει, οὐδαμοῦ; Thou hast already had sufficient experience, that of those many things about which thou hast hitherto wandred, thou couldst not find happiness in any of them: not in syllogisms, and Logical subtilties; not in wealth, not in honour and reputation; not

in pleasure: in none of all these. *Of* Antoninus *I say, a mere Heathen, led by humane reason onely;* Antoninus, *a man for worldly state and greatness so far greater than* Salomon, *as Lord and Master I dare say of more great Kingdoms, than* Salomon *was of great towns in all his Kingdom;* Antoninus, *a man for his goodness and wisedom, by all men during his life, had in that honour and reputation, as never man either before him was, or (that we know of) ever after him.*

But his goodness was the second consideration. It hath ever been the complaint of all ages: There hath ever been store enough of men that could speak well, and give good instructions: But great want of them that either could, or so much as endeavoured to doe as they spake and taught others to doe. And what is the good that such can doe? The onely good I can conceive, is, that they perswade men as much as in them lies (and they go very effectually about it:) that τὸ ὑποβὰς τοῦτο καὶ ὅσον περὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις λαλούμενον, κατάψευμά ἐστιν ἀλαζόνων ἀνδρῶν καὶ σοφιστῶν, ἢ τὴν Δίκα νομοθετῶν, εἰς φόβον καὶ ὄκνησιν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν. That all this that we call vertue and godliness, so much spoken of amongst men, are but words and empty sounds; that there is no such thing really existent indeed, as piety and justice, but that it is a mere figment of some cunning jugglers and impostours, or at the best a pretty device of Law-makers and Founders of Commonwealths, to keep silly people in awe and fear. *Can any man think otherwise (if otherwise he be not better grounded:) that shall hear them speak, and then look upon their actions? Such therefore in my judgment*

judgment might deſerve far more thanks if they did forbear, and would rather loſe the commendations of either a ſmooth tongue, or a ready pen, than to incur both the juſt ſuſpicion of being Atheiſts themſelves, and the certain guilt and crime of having made many others ſo. Be it therefore ſpoken to the immortal praiſe and commendation of this famous Antoninus, *that as he did write, ſo he did live. Never did Writers ſo conſpire to give all poſſible teſtimony of goodneſs, uprightneſs, innocency, and whatſoever could among Heathens be moſt commendable, as they have done to commend this One. They commend him, not as the beſt Prince onely, but abſolutely as the beſt man, and beſt Philoſopher that ever was. And it is his proper commendation, that being ſo commended, he is commended without exception. If any thing hath ever been talked againſt him, the Hiſtorians mention it but as a talk: not credited by them, nor by any that ever were of any credit. Thus the Heathens of Him. The Chriſtians had but little reaſon to ſpeak well of him, as having ſuffered many cruel perſecutions under him: And in this caſe how free they have been (ſome of them,) even with all extremity to inveigh againſt other Emperours, though much commended and magnified by the Heathens, is not unknown. Yet I find not that ever they could faſten any thing upon our* Antoninus, *whereby to ſtain his reputation; that ever they did ſo much as object unto him, thoſe many and grievous perſecutions, which they did ſuffer under him, as his own act, or charge him therefore of cruelty. And though it be granted, that* Antoninus *gave way to thoſe perſecutions, which certainly he could not altogether*

ther be ignorant of; yet to them that know the state of those days, it can be no wonder, that such a thing should happen in the days of such a Prince as Antoninus *was. When Christians, besides the infamy of many horrible crimes, as common incest, homicide,* &c. *which (such was the power of calumny:) lay upon them; were generally accounted no better than mere Atheists and Epicures. For indeed,* Atheists, Christians *and* Epicures, *were commonly joined together as names, if not of the same signification, yet of very great affinity, and hardly distinguished by the vulgar, but that of the three, the* Christian *was thought the worst. Let it be then* Antoninus *his commendation, the greater and the more incredible in this age, the more the age is full of dissimulation and hypocrisie, that he was not (as now they rightly style themselves, whom the common received Names of* Christians, *and* Protestants *will not content, such is their* Zeal *and* Purity, *they think:) a* Professour: *as he spake and wrote, so he did. His meditations were his actions. His deeds (so still you remember Him a man and a Heathen) did agree with his sentences.* Ὅτι οὐ προσποίητος, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς πάντα ἐπρατῆς, πρόδηλον, &c. *And again,* ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ἦν, καὶ οὐδὲν προσποίητον εἶχε, *&c.* That he did not onely as he spake, but what he did, he did it out of mere love to vertue. That it was a clear case, which no man doubted of, that he was in very deed a good man: so incapable was he of any dissimulation. *So* Dio *of him, and so others.*

And now that I have spoken so much of Antoninus *his life, it will not be amiss to say somewhat of that*

that ſurname, the Philoſopher, *which by many hath been given and appropriated to this Emperour. Inſomuch as* Xylander, *though he found it not at all (as he confeſſeth) in his MS. yet thought it fitting to add it in the Title and Inſcription of theſe Books, as his proper and uſual Cognomen. But ſure enough it is (as hath been obſerved by learned men,) that this Title of* Philoſopher *was never taken by* Antoninus *himſelf, nor given unto him by others, as a proper ſurname, as his father* Antoninus *was ſurnamed* PIUS, *and others otherwiſe, but onely as a deſerved Elogium and teſtimony, at the diſcretion of them that either did ſpeak unto Him, or wrote of Him. And ſo indeed it was very commonly, and even by thoſe learned and pious Chriſtians, that directed Apologies unto Him for the Chriſtians, adſcribed unto him as an Elogium and Teſtimony: juſt indeed and deſerved, but arbitrary, and not proper unto Him by way of a Cognomen or ſurname. But, an Elogium and Teſtimony of what think you? of his great learning (as we take learning now;) and progreſs in the Sciences? Reade him himſelf, and judge how much he would have eſteemed ſuch a commendation. A man would think, if Heathens, through their ignorance of the true God, and of his truth, had been miſtaken in the true application of words of praiſe or diſpraiſe; that we, by the help of a better light, might have rectified them, and not followed their examples. But now it is fallen out quite contrary. Who they be that the holy Scriptures uſually call* wiſe; *who they, to whom they adſcribe* knowledge *and* underſtanding; *and who they are, who by them are termed* fools,

fools, blind, ignorant, *and the like, is not unknown unto any. So spake the ancient Heathens, when they would speak properly. He that was an honest, upright, vertuous man, without dissimulation and hypocrisie, though he were such a one as had never been brought up to learning; yea, such a one as could neither reade nor write, was their* σπουδαῖος, πεπαιδευμένος, φιλόσοφος, *their good Scholar, their learned Man, their Philosopher. His life and his actions were all that they stood upon; though indeed they were of opinion, that it was very difficult, if not altogether impossibile, for a man to come to the knowledge of that which is right and wrong, just or unjust, and by consequent of true vertue, without much study and pains taking. On the other side, an unjust man, a cunning, an intemperate; in general, a vitious man, was their* ἀπαίδευτος, ἀμαθὴς, ἰδιώτης, *their Illiterate, their Ignorant, their Idiot. The most ordinary distinction was, of an* Idiot, *and a* Philosopher. *Neither was this the proper language of the Stoicks (which Sect our* Antoninus *was much addicted unto,) but of the Platonicks likewise, and of most others. But the main and principal property, whereby they did distinguish a Philosopher from all other men, was that he did all things* μετὰ τῆς ἀναπολογήτου, *with a relation unto God and his Providence;* ἀφορῶν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐν παντὶ μικρῷ καὶ μεγάλῳ, *as* Epictetus *(in* Arrianus*) speaketh. This you shall find that* Antoninus *doth much stand upon. For indeed they did esteem it the very character and essential note of a Philosopher. Insomuch as that if any man seemed never so just and upright in his actions, yet if it were not* μετὰ τῆς ἀναπολογήτου, with reference to God, and

and our dependences on Him, as the Supreme Cauſe and Moderatour of all things: *they eſteemed him little more than a mere Idiot.*

Much more I had here to ſay concerning this matter, both in defence of Plato *(whoſe name hath much ſuffered through ſome mens ignorance of the true ſenſe of this word* Philoſophus*) and for the clearing of many obſcure places of* Antoninus, *which otherwiſe I think will hardly be underſtood. But becauſe I fear it would make the body of this Preface to ſwell too much beyond the proportion of the reſt, and that in the Notes it will come in well enough, I will reſerve it unto that place.*

See notes upon B. VIII. n. I.

Now for this my Tranſlation of Antoninus, *which is the laſt thing we are to ſpeak of, were it ſo that this Book were as commonly known, and as eaſie to be got as many others of leſs worth are, I ſhould be well content to ſpare the labour of this account, and refer it wholly to the judgment of the Reader. But foraſmuch as by my own experience I know the Book, (though twice printed,) to be ſo rare, that it is not to be found in many private ſtudies, and ſometimes not for many years together, in any Book-ſeller's ſhop: (I was beholding to learned Mr.* Holdſworth's *well-furniſhed Library for the firſt ſight, and long uſe of the latter and better Edition; as alſo for the uſe of many other Books:) and that the Latin Tranſlation of* Xylander *hath been commended and approved by the moſt learned* (doctiſſimus; eruditiſſimus Interpres; vir profundæ eruditionis, *&c. So they ſpeak of him:) I do think it very neceſſary, both that I ſhould give the Reader that ſatisfaction, that I do not* actum agere, *and doe my ſelf that right, that whereas I take upon me*

to

to tranſlate Marcus Aurel. Antoninus Auguſtus, *I may not be ſuſpected to have tranſlated* Guliel-mus Xylander Auguſtanus. *Indeed what might be expected from* Xylander's *Interpretation, may be collected by his own ingenuous intimation, both in his Preface, where he is fain to apologize for it, that he durſt undertake it, profeſſing that* in quibuſdam *he was conſtrained,* divinare & audac-ter à codice Græco aut uſu communi recedere; *as alſo in his Notes, where his words are,* Sunt autem paſſim permulta, in quibus ariolo magis, quam interprete opus ſit: *And that he doth ſo indeed, it doth but too manifeſtly appear by his Tranſlation. For I dare boldly ſay, and doe him no wrong, that ſometimes in a whole page, he hath not two lines of* Antoninus *his ſenſe and meaning. Beſides the liberty that he takes unto himſelf to ſupply of his own head, to leave out ſometimes words, ſometimes lines, to change and alter at his will; without any reaſon given for it, or ſo much as making the Reader acquainted with it. And whereas* Xylander *puts the fault of all this upon the corruption and imperfection of the Copy, I cannot altogether allow of it. For as I confeſs the faults and corruptions of it, if in the printed copies they have not been made more, than they were in the Manuſcript (which I do not believe:) to be many; ſo of thoſe many, I know none or very few, that may be termed incurable. And as for the* Lacunæ *of it, I hope that they neither in this Tranſlation (and what ancient Book is there almoſt but hath ſome?) will not be found many. As for any greater* hiatus, *as perchance of many leafs together, if any ſhall ſuſpect the Copy to have been defective*

in

in that kind, the method and compoſition of the Book being ſuch, that it doth for the moſt part conſiſt of certain Aphoriſms and Canons, (they called them κανόνας, θεωρήματα, δόγματα, κοσμικὰς λόγους, &c.) without any certain order or ſeries, *either in regard of the whole (but that they all tend to one purpoſe;) or in regard of the parts themſelves: as it is not poſſible by the matter it ſelf for any man to determine how much more in this kind may have been written by* Antoninus; *ſo if there were never ſo much extant, yet how this that we have here, could thereby be made more perfect than it is, I do not ſee. Their conceit, who by reaſon of this independance of matters, would have the whole Book to be but excerpts and* Συνόψεις *of a greater and better compacted Work; there being ſo many other books both ſacred and profane written in the ſame kind; and* Epictetus *(the Pattern of all latter Stoicks:) his Enchiridion among the reſt; it can at the beſt paſs but for a mere conceit, and needs I hope no other refutation.*

To tell you then what I have done, and that you may be the better ſatisfied that I except not againſt Xylander's *Interpretation without cauſe, it remains that for a* Specimen *I produce ſome few paſſages, by which it will be eaſie for any to judge of the reſt. But firſt I muſt faithfully profeſs that my purpoſe in all this is not any ways to detract, either from* Xylander *himſelf, or from the judgment of thoſe learned men, by whom he hath been highly commended, but rather to follow (after my beſt ability:)* Xylander's *own example; whom for his great pains, and labour in his lifetime to further and promote learning I acknowledge*

ledge to have deserved much honour and respect from all that love learning. I might add that I shall deal with him more ingenuously too, than some others have done, who take upon them to correct some corrupt places of Antoninus, *which* Xylander *in his Translation, whereof they take no notice, had already plainly corrected. But now to* Antoninus.

Where Antoninus *in his first Book saith, that he learned by his Father's example, that it is not im-*
P. I. n. xiv. *possible for a man that lives at the Court,* ἐγγυτάτω ἰδιώτου συστέλλειν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ νὴ διὰ (*reade* νὴ Δία, μὴ διὰ τοῦτο·) τοῦτο ταπεινότερον ἢ ῥᾳθυμότερον ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἡγεμονικῶς πραχθῆναι δέοντα. *To live almost a private man's life, for matter of worldly pomp and magnificence, and all outward shew and appearance (expressed by him before more at large:) and yet for all that, not to be a whit the more base and pusillanimous, or less stout or resolute in any publick affairs that shall require the power and authority of a Prince*
Bas. Edit. p. 174. *and Commander: he translates it,* Sed licere ei proximum privato homini habitum sumere: imo vero eum splendorem, eos qui principes rempublicam gerere velint, demissiores, segnioresque efficere. *Which neither of it self affords any tolerable sense, and is as wide from* Antoninus *his meaning, as any thing that could have been conceived.*

Bas. Edit. p. 247. *In the eighth Book* Antoninus *saith that* ἡ κοινὴ φύσις—ἴσους καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν τοὺς μερισμοὺς χρόνων, οὐσίας, αἰτίου, ἐνεργείας, συμβάσεως, ἑκάστοις ποιεῖται· *That the common Nature (which was one of the many* Synonyma's *by which the Stoicks did express God,)*

doth

doth distribute all things in equality, as matter, form, duration, and the like; and then adds, σκόπει δ, μὴ εἰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἴσον εὑρήσεις ὀπὶ παντός; This equality thou shalt observe, not if absolutely thou shalt go to compare all the particulars of any one thing by themselves, with the particulars of another by themselves: ἀλλὰ εἰ συλλήβδην τὰ πάντα τοῦδε, (*it is printed,* τὰ πάντα τοῦ δ, &c.) πρὸς ἀθρόα τὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου; *that is,* but if thou consider all the particulars of any one thing together, with all the particulars of another together likewise. *His meaning is, that every natural thing in his own kind, that is, after a Geometrical, though not Arithmetical equality, is equally perfect: an Ant as perfect in her quantity, as an Elephant and Whale, so great and vast, in theirs; as strong for her little proportion of body, and other circumstances of her nature, and as long lived, as any other creature; and so of all other things, if all things be well considered. And this doth not onely extend to things of several kinds and natures; but even to those that are of the same. It is a very pleasant and usefull speculation, as it may be prosecuted and applied, and it is very fully expressed by* Antoninus. *After this (as his manner is,) abruptly passing to another matter,* Ἀναγιγνώσκειν οὐκ ἔξεστιν, *saith he to himself (for so must the words be distinguished, which in the Greek are vitiously joined and confounded* ——— τὰ πάντα· τοῦ δ πρὸς ἀθρόα τὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀναγιγνώσκειν οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἀλλὰ, &c.) *by way of objection, and then immediately answers,* ἀλλὰ ὕβριν ἀνείργειν ἔξεστιν, ἀλλὰ ἡδονῶν καὶ πόνων καθυπερτερεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ δοξαρίου ὑπεράνω εἶναι ἔξεστιν, *&c.* Thou hast no

B. VIII. n. VI.

time nor opportunity to reade Books; What then? Hast thou not time and opportunity to practise thy self, to forbear contempt and contumely: (*towards thy self, I understand it; that is, thy soul according to* Plato's *doctrine, followed and expressed by* Antoninus, *in those words at the beginning of the second Book*, ὑβριζε, ὕβριζε ἑαυτὴν, ὦ ψυχὴ, &c. *And again at the end of the same Book more at large:*) to resist and overcome all pains and pleasures, to contemn honour and vain-glory, and not onely to be angry with those whom thou dost find unsensible, and unthankfull towards thee, but also to have a care of them still, and of their welfare? *Confer this with other like passages of* Antoninus, *both for form and matter, and you will think that nothing could be plainer. All this is expressed by* Xylander: Considera autem æqualitatem eam inventurum te si singulas res examines; sin unam cum universis conferas, non item. *And then he leaves a blank, and begins a new line*; Atqui licet libidinem arcere, voluptatibusque & doloribus superiorem esse, itemque gloriola: licet etiam stupidis & ingratis non irasci.

See B. V. n. V. B. VII. n. xxxviij.

Some three or four pages from the beginning of the seventh Book, τὸ ἐπίκοτον τοῦ προσώπου (*saith* Antoninus:) λίαν παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν πολλάκις ἐναπεθνήσκειν ἢ πρόχημα· ἢ [γὰρ εἰ] τὸ τελευταῖον ἀπεσβέσθη, ὥστε ὅλως ἐξαφθῆναι μὴ δυνάσθαι· αὐτῷ γε τούτῳ * παρακολουθεῖν πειρῶ, ὅτι παρὰ τὸν λόγον· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ συναίσθησις τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν [γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν] οἰχήσηται, τίς ἔτι τοῦ ζῆν αἰτία; That an angry countenance, (*saith he*) is much against nature, hence mayst thou gather, because

B. VII. n. xviij. Bas. edit. 234.

* See note 2. upon B. II.

cause oftentimes it is the proper countenance of them that are at the point of death; [*and a fore-runner of death as it were.*] But were it so that all anger and passion were so throughly quenched in thee, that it were altogether impossible that it should be kindled any more, yet [*herein must not thou rest satisfied, but*] farther endeavour by good consequence of true ratiocination perfectly to conceive and understand, that all anger and passion is against reason: For if thou shalt not be sensible of thine innocency, as it is innocency; if that also shall be gone from thee, [*the comfort of a good conscience, that thou dost all things to thy utmost power according to Reason:*] what shouldst thou desire to live any longer for? *All this is by* Xylander *contracted into these few words*; Irati vultus omnino est contra naturam, quando sæpius immoriendi sit prætextus, aut ad extremum extinctus est, ut omnino inflammari non potuerit. Hoc ipso intelligere labora, iram à ratione esse alienam. Nam si etiam sensus peccati nullus erit, quæ erit vivendi causa?

See B. III. n. vij. x. xiij. B. VIII. n. ij. Page 251.

At the end of the fifth Book, Antoninus *having spoken of some vanities, adds*, ἄνθρωπε, ἐπελάθου τί ταῦτα ἦν; ναὶ ἀλλὰ τούτοις σπεισσούσαστα. O man, hast thou forgotten what things these are? yea, but howsoever, they are things that other men much care for; *saith he, by way of objection; then answers*, διὰ τοῦτο οὖν καὶ σὺ μωρὸς γένη; ἐγενόμην ποτέ. Will thou therefore be a fool also? it is enough that thou hast already been one so long. *And then passes to another matter:* Ὁπουδέποτε καταληφθεὶς, εὔμοιρος ἄνθρωπος·

τὸ δὲ εὔμοιρον, ἀγαθὸν μοῖραν σεαυτῷ ἀπονέμαι· ἀγαθαὶ δὲ μοῖραι, ἀγαθαὶ ἕξεις ψυχῆς, ἀγαθαὶ ὁρμαὶ, ἀγαθαὶ πράξεις. Let death ſurpriſe a man where and when it will: It is more than it can doe to make him therefore unhappy. He is an happy man, who *(in his life-time)* dealeth unto himſelf a happy lot and portion. A happy lot and portion is; good inclinations of the ſoul, good motions and deſires, good actions. *This paſſage cannot well be tranſlated, becauſe we have never a word anſwerable to the Greek* εὔμοιρον, *which* Antoninus *here elegantly and acutely plays upon, which may ſignifie either in general a happy man, or in particular one that dies happily: but properly ſignifies one that hath obtained a good part or portion. Howſoever, to render it as it may be rendred, the ſenſe is very tolerable. Now* Xylander *having found the words ſomewhat confuſed, and incorrect, (for it is printed,* ἐγκύμιλω πατὲ ὀπωδήπαλε καλαιφθεὶς εὔμοιρον ἄνθρωπον τὸ ὄ, &c.) *tranſlates them:* Propterea tu quoque ſtultus es factus? Aliquando utcunque relictus, factus ſum fœlix: Fœlicitas autem eſt, &c.

At the end of the ſeventh Book, Antoninus *his words are,* ἢ τὸ ὅλη φύσει ὀπὶ τὸν κοσμοποιΐαν ἄρμησεν· ἰδὼν ὃ ἤτοι πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον καθ' ἑπακολέθησιν γίνεται, ἢ τὰ λογικὰ [*it is printed,* ἢ ἀλίζισα] κὴ τὰ πυριώταλά ἐστιν, ἐφ' ἃ πεπεῖται ἰδίαν ὁρμὴν τὸ τῦ κόσμα ἡγεμονικόν· εἰς πολλά σε γαλιωὸπρεσν πεπόνει τῦτο μονοδόμβων. *That the place muſt be ſo read and corrected (if any man make a queſtion of it:) I will be judged by* Antoninus *himſelf,* B. VI. num. 39. B. VII. n. 44. *not to mention others, as* Arrianus *Lib.* 1. *cap.* 12. Ven. *Edit. pag.* 21.

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The nature of the Univerſe, *ſaith he*, did once certainly deliberate and reſolve upon the creation of the world. Whatſoever therefore, ſince that, is, and happens in the world, is either but a conſequent of that firſt and one deliberation; *(by which all things by a neceſſary and uninterrupted* ſeries *of cauſes, were ordained and appointed to be:)* or if ſo be that this Ruling rational part of the World takes any thought and care of things particular, They are ſurely his reaſonable and principal creatures, that are the proper object of his particular care and providence. This often thought upon, will much conduce to thy tranquillity. *I take* κεφάλαια *here, as ſpoken of the ſame that* λογικά *to which purpoſe he hath other paſſages, that reaſonable creatures are the chiefeſt creatures. Yet if any man would rather have it,* ἢ ἃ λογικά, τὰ κεφάλαιά ἐστιν, ἤτοι ἃ, *&c.* reaſonable creatures are his chiefeſt objects, *I will not be againſt it, and it will be all one thing. But who could bear with* Xylander *his Interpretation?* Univerſi natura olim ad mundum fabricandum ſe contulit: nunc autem vel omnia quæ fiunt, conſequentia fiunt ſua: vel etiam in præcipuis eorum, ad quæ ſe mundi gubernatrix natura confert, rationi nullum locum eſſe & conſilio, tenendum eſt. Hoc ſi memoria teneas, multis in rebus animo ut ſis tranquilliori, efficiet.

An eaſie matter it were to add to theſe many more ſuch paſſages, if I thought it as neceſſary as it would be eaſie. They that ſhall take the pains (and it will be worth their pains I dare promiſe them) to compare diligently the Tranſlations with

Antoninus *himſelf, will, I doubt not, before they have gone one or two Books over, be of my mind. I have of purpoſe made choice of ſuch places eſpecially, where I have made bold ſomewhat to correct the Text. I ſay bold, but no bolder, I will maintain, than any reaſonable man muſt, and ought, that doth undertake any ſuch work. For I have not (to my knowledge:) by my Tranſlation altered any one place in this kind in the whole Book, but ſuch as by certain proofs and demonſtrations from* Antoninus *himſelf I can maintain. Thoſe places that I thought any thing doubtfull, I have given account of them to the Reader in my Notes. And if I have left any for deſperate, as either imperfect or not intelligible by me, I may truly ſay, that had I taken to my ſelf but the tenth part of the liberty, which* Xylander *doth uſually throughout the whole Book; I needed not to have left any ſuch places at all. And I make no queſtion, but that in ſo doing, I might have given to many content and ſatisfaction good enough. But conſidering how much this liberty is commonly abuſed, and how prejudicial it proves to good Authours, I have rather choſen ſometimes to ſay leſs than I might, than to give unto others an example of this bold kind of dealing with ancient Authours. The chiefeſt ground of all the obſcurity in the Book, is, that* Antoninus *having been all his life an indefatigable ſtudent, and ſo read a world of Writers of all ſorts, his manner is in theſe his Books, as he read any thing that made for his preſent purpoſe, cloſely and briefly to allude unto it, by ſome ſhort meditation upon it: ſometimes barely to excerp ſome words, which either he had an eſpecial liking unto, or afterward intended farther*

to

to meditate upon, without any mention of the place or Authour from whence they are taken. Now many of these Authours being quite perished, many of his allusions so close and obscure, that though the Authours be yet extant, yet it is not easie to find from whence, or of whom, nor to what intent or purpose: it must not be wondered, if not onely many places seem obscure, but some also of little worth and use; because it doth not appear, what farther use Antoninus *had of them in his mind. Howsoever to them that are any thing versed in the writings of ancient Philosophers, Stoicks especially, there will not occur many such places. If a man take but* Arrianus *and* Seneca, *and compare them diligently with* Antoninus, *he will find a marvellous consent, and many obscure short places of* Antoninus, *illustrated and explained by their larger discourse. I have done it in some few places, which I thought could not well otherwise be understood. And for the rest, I leave them to every diligent Reader's industry. Neither indeed would I have put my self to the labour of writing any Notes at all, if the Book could as well have wanted them, as I could easily have found as well, or better to my mind, how to bestow my time. However as I thought some would be needfull, so did I think also, that in the former Books, I did give satisfaction to the Reader, I might afterwards be spared, and either be trusted my self, or trust to the Reader's diligence and ability for the rest. Wherefore by supplying a word or two in the Text, I thought I could help the sense, and illustrate the matter sufficiently; to spare my self a Note, and for the ease of the Reader, I have done*

it. *All such additions to the Text, you shall find within two such* [ ] *marks included. And whereas those former passages by me produced, wherein I except against the Latin Translation, are all such as could not be well translated without some correction of the Text, that it may not be thought, that in such places onely it is amiss, I have for the farther satisfaction of the Reader (the Books, as hath already been said, being so scarce and hard to be come by:) taken occasion in my Notes, now and then to instance in some other passages, wherein there can be no such exception.*

In the Authour himself I fear exception will be taken, at many places, as mere repetitions; at some others wherein he seemeth to contradict what he had said before. But if the Readers consider, first, that what Antoninus *wrote, he wrote it not for the publick, but for his own private use; and secondly, that* Antoninus *his words are so intermingled every where with his* Excerpta, *that it doth not well appear what is his own, and what is not: as in regard of the first consideration they will, I doubt not, allow him far more liberty than otherwise were fitting: so in regard of the second, I presume they will yield both those many suspected repetitions in the Books, and those few supposed contradictions, the one perchance to be but several collections of one subject, and to one purpose from several Authours; and the others certainly, rather the different opinions of different Authours concerning the same thing, than the contradictions of one man, inconstant to himself. And as for such places which may give offence, as repugnant to our Christian faith, and impious; as when he seemeth*

to

to ſpeak doubtfully of God and his Providence, and to adſcribe all things to fatal Neceſſity, and the like: I ſhall but deſire the Readers to remember who he was that wrote, and I hope they will deſire no farther ſatisfaction in this point. For that any Chriſtian ſhould expect from any out of the Church, and without the Scriptures, perfect ſound knowledge in theſe high points, would be no ſmall wonder to me: it being both the happineſs of every the meaneſt Chriſtian, that he may know more in theſe myſteries, than the greateſt Philoſophers could ever with all their wit and learning attain unto; and the proper privilege of the Divine Scriptures, that from them onely all ſolid truth in points of this nature is to be expected. However, that Antoninus *may not want any juſt defence that his cauſe doth afford, the Reader muſt farther be intreated not to judge of his opinions, by one or two ſhort paſſages here and there occurrent, which whether they be his or no (as we have already ſaid) is hard to determine; but to have a reſpect to other more large and peremptory paſſages concerning the ſame purpoſe elſe-where to be found. As for example, concerning God and his Providence, to* B. II. num. VIII. B. VI. num. XXXIX. *&c. and concerning fatal Neceſſity, not onely to the ſame* B. II. num. VIII. *but alſo to divers other places, as* B. VIII. num. 6. 27. 30. 32. 46. &c. *by which places, as it doth plainly appear, that he doth exclude all manner of Neceſſity from humane wills and actions: ſo doth it appear by other paſſages, as* B. VIII. num. 33. *that he did not altogether exclude from the power of Providence not even thoſe actions of men that are moſt contrary to the will*

of

of God: from which place moreover may appear what is that he often calls εἱμαρμένην, Fate, *or* Destiny; *which in his meaning is no other than God's sovereign Power and Providence in ordering the matters of the world, not subject either to opposition or mutability: as by* Hierocles *in his* De Providentia, *by* Plotinus, *by* Alexander Aphrodisæus, *and generally by all* Aristotle *his Greek Interpreters, as* Simplicius, Themistius, Philoponus, *and many others it is interpreted. To which purpose he doth also expound the word* Fortune, B. I. n. XVII. *by which, other places, which otherwise perchance might be mistaken (as* B. I. n. XIV. *last words) must be expounded. And herein, you must know that* Antoninus *takes no more liberty to himself in using this word in the sense he doth, than* Plato *did, who although he disputes at large in his* X. de Legib. *that even the least things happen by Providence, and thinks it great impiety for a man to doubt of it: yet where he speaks of the uncertainty and instability of all wordly affairs, even of those that are setled with the best wisedom and discretion of men, he useth these and the like expressions,* θνητῶν μὲν μηδένα νομοθετεῖν μηδὲν, τύχας δ' εἶναι χρεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα· that good laws oftentimes avail but little, for that in very deed it is chance and fortune, which for the most part is all in all in worldly affairs, *&c. that is, in regard of us men, and of the secondary causes, not in regard of God. In which sense the use of the word even unto us Christians, is allowed by the best Schoolmen. Whether that also were* Aristotle's *meaning in his Physicks, where he treats of* chance *and fortune, I leave to others to consider, and shall be glad my self to judge as favourably as any other,*

Plat. de leg. lib. 4.

Aqu. 1. q. 22. art. 3. &c.

Arist. Physic. lib. 2. c. 4. & 5.

other, upon any, though but probable ground of reaſon. On the other ſide, although Antoninus *doth every where abſolutely maintain this liberty of man's will, and that he was not acquainted with the myſtery of original ſin, and natural concupiſcence; yet ſhall you not find in him thoſe blaſphemies, in exaltation of this humane power and liberty, which you ſhall in* Seneca, *and other Stoicks: neither did he (it ſhould ſeem, though but an Heathen:) ſo much rely upon it, but that he doth very piouſly commend prayers, as very powerfull and effectual unto vertue. See* Lib. IX. Num. XL.

Now if Antoninus *himſelf, being a Roman, for the propriety and facility of his expreſſions (wherein the Latin tongue, in matter of Philoſophy, comes as ſhort of the Greek, as the Engliſh doth of the Latin:) did in the compoſing of theſe his Books prefer the Greek tongue before his own mother-tongue; no man, I hope, will expect, that all things ſhould in this Tranſlation run ſo ſmoothly as in another kind of Tranſlation haply they might. But herein I muſt confeſs my fear is for* Antoninus, *more than for my ſelf. For, firſt, whereas he, being (I think) as well acquainted with ancient Writers and Philoſophers as ever any was, doth every where very ſtrictly and carefully obſerve their porper choice words and terms, which both make the ſenſe it ſelf more current, and pleaſing; and for a Scholar to know them, and to be acquainted with them, is in many reſpects very uſefull; This in the Tranſlation muſt needs be loſt, and by conſequent ſo much loſt to* Antoninus, *of his due praiſe and commendation. And, ſecondly, whereas in all theſe his twelve Books there be not ma-*

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ny lines (if any,) which, if well conſidered, will not be found either to be taken out of ſome ancient Authour, or at leaſt by way either of Exception, Confirmation, Illuſtration, and the like, to either paſſage or opinion of ſome ancient to have ſome relation: as to the learned I know whatſoever is in this kind, be it otherwiſe what it will, cannot but be acceptable and uſefull; ſo to others, I fear, many things for want of this uſe of it, which they are not capable of, will ſeem but dry and impertinent. In theſe two reſpects I cannot deny but I have done Antoninus *ſome wrong to make him ſo vulgar, as I have done; and yet becauſe I thought he might in other reſpects doe good to any that ſhould reade him, if before the credit of one I have preferred the good of many, I have but done what* Antoninus *himſelf (as by theſe his Books may appear,) would have me, or any others doe in the like caſe.*

And now in the laſt place, if any ſhall by theſe my pains receive any content, my deſire is that they would thank him, by whoſe encouragement eſpecially I did undertake this little work, my Reverend kind friend Doctour Lyndſell, *the right worthy Biſhop of* Peterborough, *a man for his ſingular worth and learning in all kind of literature, not to be named by any that know him, without expreſſion of all due reſpect and admiration; and one to whom my ſelf and my ſtudies, of old, have been much beholding, as I ſhall ever moſt gladly acknowledge.*

M. AV-

M. AVREL. ANTONINVS,
THE
ROMAN EMPEROUR,
His FIRST BOOK concerning HIMSELF.

Wherein ANTONINUS *recordeth, What and of whom, whether Parents, Friends or Maſters, by their good examples, or good advice and counſel, he had learned.*

Divided into *Numbers* or *Sections.*

[*Antoninus Book* VI. *Num.* XLIII. Whenſoever thou wilt rejoice thy ſelf, call to mind the ſeveral gifts and vertues of thoſe whom thou doſt daily converſe with: as for example, the induſtry of one, the modeſty of another, the liberality of a third; of another ſome other thing. For nothing can ſo much rejoice thee, as the Reſemblances and Parallels of ſeveral vertues, eminent in the diſpoſitions of them that live with thee, eſpecially when all at once, as near as may be, they repreſent themſelves unto thee. See therefore that thou have them always in a readineſs.]

Num. I.

OF my Grandfather *Verus* [*I have learned*] to be gentle and meek, and to refrain from all anger and paſſion. From the fame and memory of him that begot me [*I have learned both*] ſhamefacedneſs, and manlike behaviour. Of my Mother [*I have learned*] to be religious, and bountifull; and to forbear, not onely to doe, but

but to intend any evil; to content my ſelf with a ſpare diet, and to fly all ſuch exceſs as is incidental to great wealth. Of my great Grand-father, [1] both to frequent publick Schools and Auditories; and to get me good and able Teachers at home; and that I ought not to think much, if upon ſuch occaſions, I were at exceſſive charges.

II. Of him that brought me up not to be fondly addicted to [*either of the two great factions of the Courſers in the Circus, called*] *Praſini*, and *Veneti*: nor [*in the Amphitheatre*] partially to favour [*any of the Gladiatours, or Fencers, as either*] the *Parmularii*, or the *Secutoriani*. Moreover, to endure labour; not to need many things; when I have any thing to doe, to doe it my ſelf [*rather than by others*;] not to meddle with many buſineſſes; and not eaſily to admit of any ſlander.

III. Of *Diognetus*, not to buſie my ſelf about vain things, and not [2] eaſily to believe thoſe things, which are [*commonly*] ſpoken by ſuch as take upon them to work wonders, and by Sorcerers [or, *Præſtigiatours, and Impoſtours*;] concerning the power of charms, and their driving out of Dæmons, [or, *evil ſpirits*;] and the like. Not to [3] keep *Coturnices* [or, *Quails for the game*;] nor to be mad after ſuch things. Not to be offended with other mens liberty of ſpeech; and to apply my ſelf [or, *to become familiar*] unto Philoſophy. [*Him alſo I muſt thank*] that ever I heard firſt *Bacchius*, then *Tandaſis*, and *Marcianus*: and that I did write [4] Dialogues in my youth, and that I took liking

liking to the [*Philosophers*] little couch and skins, and such other things, which by the Grecian discipline are proper [*to those who profess Philosophy.*]

IV. To *Rusticus* I am beholding, that I first entred into the conceit that my life wanted some redress and cure. And then, that I did not fall into the ambition of [*ordinary*] Sophists, either to write tracts concerning the [*common*] Theorems, or to exhort men [*unto vertue and the study of Philosophy*] by [*publick*] orations; as also that I never by way of ostentation [5] did affect to shew my self an active able man, [*for any kind of bodily exercises.*] And that I gave over the study of Rhetorik and Poetry, and * of elegant neat language. That I did not use to walk about the house in my Senatour's robe, nor to doe any such things. Moreover [*I learned of him*] to write letters without any affectation or curiosity: such as that was, which by him was written to my Mother from *Sinoessa:* and to be easie and * ready to be reconciled and well pleased again with them that had offended me, as soon as any of them would be content to seek unto me again. To read with diligence; not to rest satisfied with a light and superficial knowledge, nor quickly to assent to things commonly spoken: whom also I must thank that ever I lighted upon *Epictetus* [6] his *Hypomnemata* [or, *moral commentaries and commonefactions:*] which also he gave me of his own.

See B. xj. n. 27.

5. * ἀστειολογίας, not ἀστρολογίας: as was found by *Xylander* in his written Copy; and by him turned into ἀστρολ. which he was sorry for afterwards.

* ὀυδιαλλάκτως: not (as printed) ὀυδιαλέκτως.

6.

V. From *Apollonius*, true liberty, and unvariable stedfastness, and not to regard any thing at all, though never so little, but right and reason: and always, whether in the sharpest pains, or after

after the loſs of a child, or in long diſeaſes, to be the ſame man; who alſo was a preſent and viſible example unto me, that it was poſſible for the
7. ſame man to be both vehement and remiſs: ⁷ a man not ſubject to be vexed, and offended [*with the incapacity of his Scholars and Auditours*] in his lectures and expoſitions; and a true pattern of a man who, of all his good gifts and faculties, leaſt eſteemed in himſelf that his excellent skill and ability to teach and perſuade others the common Theorems, [*and Maxims of the Stoick Philoſophy.*] Of him alſo I learned, how to receive favours and kindneſſes (as commonly they are accounted,) from friends, ſo that I might not become obnoxious unto them, for them, nor more yielding [*upon occaſion, than in right I ought*;] and yet ſo that I ſhould not paſs them neither, as an unſenſible and unthankfull man.

VI. Of *Sextus* mildneſs, and the pattern of a family governed with paternal affection; and a purpoſe to live according to nature: to be grave without affectation: to obſerve carefully the ſeveral diſpoſitions of my friends, not to be of-
8. fended with Idiots, nor ⁸ unſeaſonably to ſet upon thoſe that are carried with the vulgar opinions, with the Theorems and Tenets of Philoſophers: [*his converſation*] being an example how a man might accommodate himſelf to all men and companies; ſo that though his company were ſweeter and more pleaſing, than any flatterers cogging and fawning; yet was it at the ſame time moſt reſpected and reverenced: who alſo had a proper happineſs, and faculty, rationally

tionally, and methodically to find out, and ſet in order all neceſſary *Dogmata* [or *determinations*] and inſtructions for a man's life. A man without ever the leaſt appearance of anger, or any other paſſion; able at the ſame time * almoſt exactly to obſerve the Stoick *Apathia*, [or, *unpaſſionateneſs*] and yet to be moſt tender-hearted: ever of good credit, and yet almoſt without any noiſe, or rumor: very learned, and yet making little ſhew.

VII. From *Alexander* the Grammarian, to be unreproveable my ſelf, and not reproachfully to reprehend any man for a barbariſm, or a ſoloeciſm, or any falſe pronunciation; but dexterouſly by way of anſwer, or teſtimony, or confirmation of the ſame matter (taking no notice of the word) to utter it as it ſhould have been ſpoken; or by ſome other ſuch cloſe and indirect admonition, handſomly and civilly to tell him of it.

VIII. Of *Fronto*, to how much envy and fraud and hypocriſie the ſtate of a Tyrannous King is ſubject; and how for the moſt part they who are commonly called *eupatridæ* [or *patricii*, i. nobly born] are in ſome ſort incapable [or, *void*] of natural affection.

IX. Of *Alexander* the Platonick, not often nor without great neceſſity to ſay, or to write to any man in a letter, *I am not at leiſure*; nor on this manner ſtill to put off thoſe duties, which we owe to our friends and acquaintances (to every one in his kind,) under pretence of urgent [or, inſtant] affairs.

X. Of *Catulus*, not to contemn any friend's

expostulation, though unjust, but to strive to reduce him to his former disposition: Freely and heartily to speak well of all my masters [upon any occasion;] as it is reported of *Domitius*, and *Athenodotus*; and to love my children with true affection.

XI. From my brother *Severus*, to love truth and justice, and to be kind and loving to all them of my house and family; by whom also I came to the knowledge of *Thrasea*, and *Helvidius*, and *Cato*, and *Dio*, and *Brutus*. He it was also that did put me in the first conceit and desire of an equal commonwealth, administred by justice and equality; and of a Kingdom wherein should be regarded nothing more than the good and welfare [or, Liberty,] of the subjects. Of him also, to observe a constant tenour, (not interrupted with any other cares and distractions,) in the study and esteem of Philosophy: to be bountifull and liberal in the largest measure; always to hope the best; and to be confident that my friends love me. In whom I moreover observed open dealing towards those whom he reproved at any time, and that his friends might without all doubt or much observation know what he would, or would not; so open and plain was he.

See B. VIII. num. LVIII.

10. XII. From *Claudius Maximus*, in all things to endeavour to have power of my self, and in nothing to be carried about; to be chearfull and courageous in all sudden chances and accidents, as in sicknesses; to love mildness, and moderation, and gravity; and to doe my business, whatsoever it be, throughly, and without

queru-

querulousness. Whatsoever he said, all men believed him, that as he spake, so he thought, and whatsoever he did, that he did with a good intent. His manner was, never to wonder at any thing; nor to be affrighted, [or, *astonished*;] never to be in haste, and yet never slow; nor to be perplexed, or dejected, or at any time unseemly, [or, *excessively*] to laugh: nor to be angry, or suspicious, but ever ready to doe good, and to forgive, and to speak truth; and all this, as one that seemed rather of himself to have been streight and right, than ever to have been rectified, or redressed: neither was there any man that ever thought himself undervalued by him, or that could find in his heart, to think himself a better man than he. He would also be very pleasant and gratious.

XIII. In my Father, I observed his meekness; his constancy without wavering in those things, which after a due examination and deliberation, he had determined. How free from all vanity he carried himself in matter of honour and dignity, (as they are esteemed:) his laboriousness and assiduity, his readiness to hear any man, that had ought to say, tending to any common good: how generally and impartially he would give every man his due; his skill and knowledge, when rigour and extremity, or when remissness and moderation was in season; how he did abstain from all unchaste love of youths; **his moderate condescending to other mens occasions as an ordinary man*, neither absolutely requiring of his friends, that they should wait upon him at his ordinary meals, nor that they should of ne-

* Gr. κατὰ τὰ συνήθη.

ceſſity accompany him in his journies; and that whenſoever any buſineſs upon ſome neceſſary occaſions was to be put off and omitted before it could be ended, he was ever found when he went about it again, the ſame man that he was before. His accurate examination of things
11. in conſultations, and patient hearing of others. He would not haſtily give over the ſearch of the matter, as one eaſie to be ſatisfied with ſudden notions and apprehenſions. His care to preſerve his friends; how neither at any time he would carry himſelf towards them with diſdainfull neglect, and grow weary of them; nor yet at any time be madly fond of him. His contented mind in all things, his chearfull countenance, his care to foreſee things afar off, and to take order for the leaſt, without any noiſe or clamour. Moreover, how all acclamations and flattery were repreſſed by him: how carefully he obſerved all things neceſſary to the go-
12. vernment, and kept an account of the common expences, and how patiently he did abide, that he was reprehended by ſome for this his ſtrict and rigid kind of dealing. How he was neither a ſuperſtitious worſhipper of the gods, nor an ambitious pleaſer of men, or ſtudious of popular applauſe; but ſober in all things, and every where obſervant of that which was fitting; no affecter of novelties: in the uſe of thoſe things which conduced to his eaſe and convenience, (plenty whereof his fortune did afford him,) without pride and bragging, yet with all freedom and liberty: ſo that as he did freely enjoy them without any anxiety or affectation when they were

were present; so when absent, he found no want of them. Moreover, that he [13] was never commended by any man, as either a learned acute man, or an obsequious officious man, or a fine Oratour; but as a ripe mature man, a perfect sound man; one that could not endure to be flattered; able to govern both himself and others. Moreover, how much he did honour all true Philosophers, without upbraiding those that were not so; his sociableness, his gratious and delightfull conversation, but never unto satiety; his care of his body within bounds and measure, not as one that desired to live long, or over-studious of neatness and elegancy; and yet not as one that did not regard it: so that through his own care and providence, he seldom needed any inward Physick, or outward applications: but especially how ingenuously he would yield to any that had obtained any peculiar faculty, as either Eloquence, or the knowledge of the laws, or of ancient customs, or the like; and how he concurred with them, in his best care and endeavour that every one of them might in his kind, for that wherein he excelled, be regarded and esteemed: and although he did all things carefully after the ancient customs of his forefathers, yet even of this was he not desirous that men should take notice, that he did imitate ancient customs. Again, how he was not easily moved and tossed up and down, but loved to be constant, both in the same places and businesses; and how after his great fits of head-ach, he would return 13.

fresh and vigorous to his wonted affairs. Again, that secrets he never had many, nor often, and such onely as concerned publick matters: His discretion and moderation, in exhibiting of the *Spectacles*, [or, *publick fights and shows for the pleasure and pastime of the people*:] in publick buildings, Congiaries, and
14. the like. In all these things, [14] having a respect unto men onely as men, and to the equity of the things themselves, and not unto the glory that might follow. Never wont to use the baths at unseasonable hours; no great builder; never curious or solicitous, either about his meat, or about his workmanship, or colour of his cloths, or about any thing that belonged
15. to external beauty. [15] His homely Countrey apparel, and such ordinarily as mean Villages could afford him. How he carried himself when he was in the Countrey towards that Customemaster, that excused himself, and desired some abatement [or, *desired him that he would forgive him.*] In all his conversation, far from all inhumanity, all boldness and incivility, all greediness and impetuosity; never doing any thing with such earnestness and intention, that a man could say of him, that he did sweat about it: but contrariwise, all things distinctly, as at leisure; without trouble; orderly, soundly, and agreeably. A man might have applied that to him, which is recorded of *Socrates*, that he knew how to want, and to enjoy those things, in the want whereof most men shew themselves weak, and in the fruition, intemperate: But to hold out firm and constant,

ſtant, and to keep within the compaſs of true moderation and ſobriety in either eſtate, is proper to a man, who hath a perfect and invincible ſoul; ſuch as he ſhewed himſelf in the ſickneſs of *Maximus*.

XIV. From the gods [*I received*] that I had good grandfathers, and parents, a good ſiſter, good maſters, good domeſticks, loving kinſmen, almoſt all that I have; and that I never through haſte and raſhneſs tranſgreſſed againſt any of them, notwithſtanding that my diſpoſition was ſuch, as that ſuch a thing (if occaſion had been) might very well have been committed by me, but that it was the mercy of the gods, to prevent ſuch a concurring of matters and occaſions as might make me to incur this blame. That I was not long brought up by the Concubine of my Father; that I preſerved the flower of my youth. That I took not upon me to be a man before my time, but rather put it off longer than I needed. That I lived under the government of my Lord and Father who would take away from me all pride and vain-glory, and reduce me to that conceit and opinion, that it was not impoſſible [*for a prince*] to live in the Court 16. without a troop of guards and followers, extraordinary apparel, ſuch and ſuch torches and ſtatues, and other like particulars of ſtate and magnificence; but that a man may reduce and contract himſelf almoſt to the ſtate of a private man, and yet for all that not become the more baſe and remiſs in thoſe publick matters and affairs, wherein power and authority is requiſite. That I have

had such a Brother, who by his own example might stir me up to think of my self; and by his respect and love, delight and please me. That I have got ingenuous children, and that they were not born distorted, nor with any other natural [or, bodily] deformity. That I was no great proficient in the study of Rhetorick and Poetry, and of other faculties, which perchance I might have dwelt upon, if I had found my self to go on in them with success. That I did betimes preferre those by whom I was brought up, to such places and dignities, which they seemed unto me most to desire; and that I did not put them off with hope and expectation, that (since that they were yet but young,) I would do the same hereafter. That I ever knew *Apollonius*, and *Rusticus*, and *Maximus*. That I have had occasion often and effectually to consider and meditate with my self, concerning that life which is according to nature, what the nature and manner of it is: So 17. that as for the gods and such suggestions, helps and inspirations, as might be expected from them, nothing did hinder, but that I might have begun long before to live according to nature; or that even now that I was not yet partaker and in present possession of that life, that I my self (in that I did not observe those inward motions and suggestions, yea, and almost plain and apparent instructions and admonitions of the gods,) was the only cause of it. That my body in such a life, hath been able to hold out so long. That I never had to doe with *Benedicta* and *Theodotus*, yea, and afterwards

when

when I fell into ſome fits of love, I was ſoon cured. That having been often diſpleaſed, with *Ruſticus*, I never did any thing unto him for which afterwards I had occaſion to repent. That it being ſo that my mother was to dye young, yet ſhe lived with me all her latter years. That as often as I had a purpoſe to help and ſuccour any that either was poor, or fallen into ſome preſent neceſſity, I never was anſwered [*by my officers*] that there was not ready money enough to doe it; and that I my ſelf never had occaſion to require the like ſuccour from any other. That I have ſuch a wife, ſo obedient, ſo loving, ſo ingenuous. That I had choice of fit and able men, to whom I might commit the bringing up of my children. That by dreams I have received help, as for other things, ſo in particular, how I might ſtay my caſting of bloud, and cure my dizzineſs; as that alſo that happened unto me at *Cajeta*, as * unto *Chryſes* [*when he Prayed by the ſea-ſhore.*] And when I did firſt apply my ſelf to Philoſophy, that I did not fall into the hands of ſome Sophiſts, or ſpent my time either in reading the manifold volumes [*of ordinary Philoſophers,*] nor in practiſing my ſelf in the ſolution of arguments and fallacies, nor dwelt upon the ſtudies of the Meteors, [*and other natural curioſities.*] All theſe things without the aſſiſtence of the gods, and * fortune, could not have been. * See the Notes. * See n. XVII.

XV. In the countrey of the *Quadi* at *Granua*, theſe.

Betimes in the morning ſay [or, fore-ſay,] to

to thy self, This day I shall have to doe with an idle, curious man, with an unthankfull man, a railer, a crafty, false, or an envious man; an
18. [18] unsociable, uncharitable man. All these ill qualities have happened unto them, through ignorance of that which is truly good, and truly bad. But I that understand the nature of that which is good, that it [*only*] is to be desired; and of that which is bad, that it [*only*] is [*truly*] odious and shamefull: who know moreover, that this trangressour, whosoever he be, is my kinsman, not by the same bloud and seed, but by participation of the same reason, and of the same *divine Particle*; How can I either be hurt by any of those, since it is not in their power, to make me incurre any thing that is [*truly*] reproachfull? or angry, and ill affected towards him, who by nature is so near unto me? for we are all born to be fellow-workers, as the feet, the hands, and the eye-lids; as the rowes of the upper and under teeth: for such therefore to be in opposition, is against nature; and what is it to chase at, and to be averse from, but to be in opposition?

XVI. Whatsoever I am, is either flesh, or
* πνευμάτιον. * life, or [*that which we commonly call*] the mistriss and over-ruling part of man; [*Reason.*] Away with thy books, suffer not thy mind any more to be distracted, and carried to and fro;
* See B. III. n. XV. * for it will not be; but as even now ready to
19. dye, think little of thy flesh: [19] bloud, bones and a skin; a Pretty piece of knit and twisted work, consisting of nerves, veins and arteries; [*think no more of it, than so.*] And as for thy life,

life, consider what it is: a wind; not one constant wind neither, but every moment of an hour let out, and suckt in again. The third, is thy ruling part; and here consider; Thou art an old man; suffer not that excellent part to be brought in subjection, and to become slavish: suffer it not to be drawn up and down with unreasonable and * *unsociable* lusts and motions, as it were with wires and nerves; suffer it not any more, either to repine at any thing now present, or to fear and fly any thing to come, which the Destiny hath appointed thee. * ἀκοινώνητον See before Note 18.

XVII. Whatsoever proceeds from the gods [*immediately*,] that [*any man will grant*] totally depends from their divine providence. As for those things that [*are commonly said to*] happen by Fortune, even those must be conceived to have dependence from nature, or from that first and general connexion and concatenation of all those things, which [*more apparently*] by the divine Providence are administred and brought to pass. All things flow from thence: And whatsoever it is that is both necessary, and conducing to the whole; part of which thou art: and whatsoever it is that is requisite and necessary for the preservation of the general, must [*of necessity*] for every particular nature, be good and behovefull. And as for the whole, it is preserved, as by the perpetual mutation and conversion of the simple Elements one into another, so also by the mutation and alteration of things mixed and compounded. Let these things suffice thee; Let them be always unto thee as thy general rules and See B. III. num. XII.

rules and precepts. As for thy thirſt after books, away with it with all ſpeed, that thou die not murmuring and complaining, but truly meek and well ſatisfied, and from thy heart thankfull unto the gods.

THE SECOND BOOK.

REmember how long thou haſt already put off theſe things, and how often a certain day and hour, as it were, having been ſet unto thee by the gods, thou haſt neglected it. It is high time for thee to underſtand the true nature both of the world, whereof thou art a part; and of that Lord and Governour of the World, from whom, as a chanel from the ſpring, thou thy ſelf didſt flow: And that there is but a certain limit of time appointed unto thee, which if thou ſhalt not make uſe of to calm and allay the many diſtempers of thy ſoul, it will paſs away and thou with it, and never after return.

II. Let it be thy earneſt and inceſſant care as a Roman, and a man, to perform whatſoever it is that thou art about, with true and unfeigned gravity, natural affection, freedom and juſtice: and as for all other cares and imaginations, how thou mayeſt eaſe thy mind of them. Which thou ſhalt doe, if thou ſhalt go about every action as thy laſt action, free from all vanity, all paſſionate and wilfull aberration from right reaſon, and from all hypocriſie, and ſelf-love, and diſlike of thoſe things, which by the

* fates

* fates [or, *appointment of God,*] have happened unto thee. Thou ſeeſt that the things are but few, which for a man to hold on in a proſperous courſe, and to live a divine life, are requiſite and neceſſary; for the gods will require no more of any man, that ſhall but keep and obſerve theſe things. See Pref. fol. 26.

III. Doe, Soul, doe; abuſe and contemn thy ſelf; yet a while, and the time for thee to reſpect thy ſelf will be at an end. Every man's happineſs † depends from himſelf, but behold thy life is almoſt at an end, whiles affording thy ſelf no reſpect, thou doſt make thy happineſs to conſiſt in the ſouls and conceits of other men. See Pref. fol. 18. and Num. XIV. of this Bo. 1.

IV. Why ſhould any of theſe things that happen externally, ſo much diſtract thee? Give thy ſelf leiſure to learn ſome good thing; and ceaſe roving and wandring, to and fro. Thou muſt alſo take heed of [or, avoid:] another kind of wandring, for they are idle in their actions, who toil and labour in this life, and have no certain ſcope to which to direct all their motions, and deſires.

V. For not obſerving the ſtate of another man's ſoul, ſcarce was ever any man known to be unhappy. But whoſoever they be that ‡ intend not, and guide not by reaſon and diſcretion the motions of their own ſouls, they muſt of neceſſity be unhappy. 2.

VI. Theſe things thou muſt always have in mind: What is the nature of the Univerſe, and what is mine in particular: This unto that what relation it hath: what kind of part, of what kind

of

of Univerſe it is: And that there is no body that can hinder thee, but that thou mayeſt always both do and ſpeak thoſe things which are agreeable to that nature whereof thou art a part.

VII. *Theophraſtus*, where he compares ſin
3. with ſin (as after a [3] vulgar ſenſe ſuch things I grant may be compared:) ſays well and like a Philoſopher, that thoſe ſins are greater which are committed through luſt, than thoſe which are committed through anger. For he that is angry ſeems with a kind of grief and cloſe contraction of himſelf, to turn away from reaſon: but he that ſins through luſt, being overcome by pleaſure, doth in his very ſin bewray a more impotent and unmanlike diſpoſition. Well then, and like a Philoſopher, doth he ſay, that he of the two is the more to be condemned, that ſins with pleaſure, than he that ſins with grief. For indeed this latter may ſeem firſt to have been wronged, and ſo in ſome manner through grief thereof to have been forced to be angry; whereas he who through luſt doth commit any thing, did of himſelf merely reſolve upon that action.

VIII. Whatſoever thou doſt affect, whatſoever thou doſt project, ſo doe, and ſo project all, as one who, for ought thou knoweſt, may at this very preſent depart out of this life. And as for death, if there be any gods, it is no grievous thing to leave the ſociety of men. The gods will do thee no hurt thou maiſt be ſure. But if it be ſo that there be no gods, or that they take no care of the world, why ſhould I deſire to live in a world void of

gods,

gods, and of all divine providence? But gods there be certainly, and they take care for the world; and as for thoſe things which be truly evil, as vice and wickedneſs; ſuch things they have put in a man's own power, that he might avoid them if he would: and had there been any thing beſides, that had been truly bad and evil, they would certainly have had a care of that alſo, that a man might have avoided it. But why ſhould that be thought to hurt and prejudice a man's life in this world, which cannot any ways make man himſelf the worſe in his own perſon? Neither muſt we think that the Nature of the Univerſe did either through ignorance paſs theſe things, or if not as ignorant of them, yet as unable either to prevent, or better to 4. order and diſpoſe them. It cannot be that ſhe through want either of power or skill, ſhould have committed ſuch a thing, as to ſuffer all things both good and bad, equally and promiſcuouſly to happen unto all, both good and bad. As for life therefore, and death, ho- 5. nour and diſhonour, labour and pleaſure, riches and poverty, all theſe things happen unto men indeed, both good and bad, equally; but as things which of themſelves are neither good nor bad; becauſe of themſelves, neither ſhameful nor praiſe-worthy.

IX. Conſider how quickly all things are diſſolved and reſolved: the bodies and ſubſtances themſelves, into the matter and ſubſtance of the world; and their memories into the general Age and Time of the world. Conſider the nature of all worldly ſenſible things;

things; of those especially, which either ensnare by pleasure, or for their irksomness are dreadfull, or for their outward lustre and shew are in great esteem and request, how vile and contemptible, how base and corruptible, how destitute of all true life and being they are.

X. It is the part of a man endowed with a good understanding faculty, to consider what
6. they themselves are in very deed, [6] from whose bare conceits and voices, honour and credit do proceed: as also what it is to dye, and how if a man shall consider this by it self alone, *to dye*, and separate from it in his mind all those things which with it usually represent themselves unto us, he can conceive of it no otherwise than as of a work of nature, and he that fears any work of nature, is a very child. Now death, it is not only a work of nature, but also conducing to Nature.

XI. Consider with thy self how man, and by what part of his, is joined unto God, and how
7. that part of man is affected, [7] when it is said to be *diffused*. There is nothing more wretched than that soul, which in a kind of circuit compasseth all things, searching (as he saith) *even the very depths of the Earth*; and by all signs and conjectures prying into the very thoughts of other mens souls; and yet of this is not sensible, that it is sufficient for a man to apply himself wholly, and to confine all his thoughts
8. and cares to [8] the tendance of that Spirit, which is within him, and truly and really to serve him. His service doth consist in this,

this, that a man keep himself pure from all violent passion, and evil affection, from all falseness and vanity, and from all manner of discontent, either in regard of the gods or men. For indeed whatsoever proceeds from the gods, deserves respect for their worth and excellency; and whatsoever proceeds from men, as they are our kinsmen, should by us be entertained, with love, always, sometimes, as proceeding from their ignorance of that which is truly good and bad, (a blindness no less, than that by which we are not able to discern between white and black:) with a kind of pity and compassion also. 9.

XII. If thou shouldst live 3000, or as many 10000 of years, yet remember this, that 10. man can part with no life properly, save with that little part of life which he now lives: and that which he lives, is no other than that which at every instant he parts with. That then which is longest of duration, and that which is shortest, come both to one effect. For although in regard of that which is already past there may be some inequality, yet that time which is now present and in being is equal unto all men. And that being it which we part with [*whensoever we die,*] it doth manifestly appear, that it can be but a moment of time that we then part with. For as for that which is either past or to come, a man cannot be said properly to part with it. For how should a man part with that which he hath not; These two things therefore thou must remember. First, that all things in the world from all eternity, by a perpetual re-

volution of the same times and things ever continued and renewed, are of one kind and nature; so that whether for an hundred years onely, or for an infinite space of time, a man see those things which are still the same, it can be no matter of great moment. And secondly, that that life which any the longest liver, or the shortest liver parts with, is of one length and duration the very same; for that only which is present, is that which either of them can lose, as being that onely which they have: for that which he hath not, no man can truly be said to lose.

XII. Remember, that all is but opinion and conceit; for those things are plain and apparent which were spoken unto *Menenius* the Syrick, and as plain and apparent is the use that may be made of those things, if that which is true and serious in them be received as well as that which is sweet and pleasing.

XIV. A man's soul doth wrong and disrespect it self, first and especially, when as much as in it self lies it becomes an *Apostema*, and as it were an excrescency of the world; for to be grieved and displeased with any thing that happens in the world, is direct *Apostasie* from the Nature of the Universe, part of which, all particular Natures of the world are. Secondly, when she either is averse from any man, or led by contrary desires and affections, tending to his hurt and prejudice; such as are the souls of them that are angry. Thirdly, when she is overcome by any pleasure or pain. Fourthly, when she doth dissemble, and covertly and falsly, either doeth or saith any thing. Fifthly, when she

doth

doth either affect or endeavour any thing to no certain end, but rashly and without due ratiocination, and consideration, how consequent or inconsequent it is to the common end. For even the least things ought not to be done, without relation unto the end; and the end of the reasonable creatures is, to follow and obey him, who is the reason as it were, and the law of this * great City, and most ancient Common-wealth. * See B. X. n. 34.

XV. The time of a man's life is as a point; the substance of it ever flowing, the sense obscure: and the whole composition of the body, tending to corruption. His soul is restless, fortune uncertain, and fame doubtfull; to be brief, as a stream so are all things belonging to the body; as a dream, or as a smoak, so are all that belong unto the soul. Our life is a warfare, and a mere pilgrimage. Fame after life is no better than oblivion. What is it then that will adhere and follow? One only thing, Philosophy. And Philosophy doth consist in this, for a man to preserve that Spirit which is within him, from all manner of contumelies and injuries, and above all pains or pleasures; never to doe any thing either rashly, or feignedly, or hypocritically: Wholly to depend on, [or, of] himself, and his own proper actions: all things that happen unto him, to embrace contentedly, as coming from Him from whom he Himself also came; and above all things, with all meekness and a calm chearfulness, to expect death, as being nothing else but the resolution of those Elements, of which every creature is composed.

And if the Elements themſelves ſuffer nothing by this their perpetual converſion of one into another; why ſhould that diſſolution and alteration, which is ſo common unto all, be feared by any? Is not this according to Nature? But nothing that is according to Nature can be evil.

Whilſt I was at Carnuntum.

THE THIRD BOOK.

A Man muſt not onely conſider how daily his life waſteth and decreaſeth, and that but a very little [or, the leſſer] portion of it is now behind; but this alſo, that if he live long, he cannot be certain, whether his underſtanding ſhall continue ſo able and ſufficient, for either diſcreet conſideration, in matter of buſineſſes; or for contemplation, which is the thing whereon true knowledge of things both divine and humane doth depend. For if once he ſhall begin to dote, his reſpiration, nutrition, his imaginative, and appetitive, and other natural faculties, [*may ſtill continue the ſame:*] he ſhall find no want of them. But how to make that right uſe of himſelf that he ſhould, how to obſerve exactly in all things that which is right and juſt; how to redreſs and rectifie all [*wrong, or ſudden*) apprehenſions and imaginations, and even of

of this particular, to consider duly, whether he should live any longer or no; for all such things, wherein the best strength and vigour of the mind is most requisite, [*his Power and ability*] will be already passed and gone. Thou must hasten therefore; not onely because thou art every day nearer unto death than other, but also because that intellective faculty in thee, whereby thou art inabled to know the true nature of things, and to order all thy actions by that knowledge, doth daily waste and decay: [or, *may fail thee before thou die.*]

H. This also thou must observe, that whatsoever it is that naturally doth happen to things natural hath somewhat in it self that is pleasing and delightfull; [or, attractive:] as a [*great*] loaf when it is baked, some parts of it cleave as it were, and part asunder, [*and make the crust of it rugged and unequal,*] and yet those parts of it, though in some sort it be against the art and intention of baking it self, that they are thus cleft and parted, [*which should have been, and were first made all even and uniform,*] they become it well nevertheless, and have a certain peculiar property to stir the appetite. So Figs are accounted fairest and ripest then, when they begin to shrink, and wither as it were. So ripe Olives, when they are next to putrefaction, then are they in their proper beauty. The hanging down of Grapes, the brow of a Lion, the froth of a foming wild Boar, and many other like things, though by themselves considered, they are far from any beauty, yet because they happen naturally, they both are comely and

delightfull; so that if a man shall with a profound mind and apprehension, consider all things in the world, even among all those things which are but mere accessaries, and natural *appendices* as it were, there will scarce appear any thing unto him, wherein he will not find matter of pleasure and delight. So will he behold with as much pleasure the true *rictus* of wild beasts, as those which by skilfull Painters, and other Artificers are imitated. So will he be able to perceive the proper ripeness and beauty of old age whether in man, or woman; and whatsoever else it is, that is beautifull and alluring * in whatsoever is with chaste and continent eyes, he will soon find out and discern. Those and many other things will be discern, not credible unto every one, but unto them onely who are truly and familiarly acquainted, both with nature it self, and all natural things [or, *and all the works of nature.*]

* See the Latine Notes.

III. *Hippocrates* having cured many sicknesses, fell sick himself and died. The *Caldeans* [*and Astrologians*] having foretold the deaths of divers, were afterwards themselves surprised by the Fates. *Alexander* and *Pompeius*, and *Caius Cæsar*, having utterly destroyed so many towns, and cut off in the fields so many thousands both of horse and foot, yet they themselves at last, were fain to part with their own lives. *Heraclitus* having written so many naturall tracts concerning the [*last and generall*] conflagration of the world, died afterwards all filled with water within, and all bedaubed with dirt and dung without. Lice killed *Democritus*, and *Socrates*, another sort of vermine, [*wicked, ungodly men*]

men.] How then ſtands the caſe? Thou haſt taken ſhip, thou haſt ſailed, thou art come to land, go out; if to another life, there alſo ſhalt thou find gods, who are every where. If all life and ſenſe ſhall ceaſe, then ſhalt thou ceaſe alſo to be ſubject to either pains, or pleaſures; and to ſerve and tend this vile Cottage; ſo much the viler, by how much that which miniſters unto it doth excell; the one being a rational ſubſtance, and a ſpirit, the other nothing but earth and blood.

IV Spend not the remnant of thy days in thoughts and fancies concerning other men, when it is not in relation to ſome common good, when by it thou art hindred from ſome other [*better*] work. That is, [*ſpend not thy time*] in thinking, what ſuch a man doth, and to what end: what he ſaith, and what he thinks, and what he is about, and ſuch other things [or, *curioſities*] which make a man to rove and wander from the care and obſervation of that part of himſelf, which is rational, and over-ruling. See therefore in the whole *ſeries* and connexion of thy thoughts, that thou be careſull to prevent [or avoid] whatſoever is idle and impertinent; but eſpecially, whatſoever is curious and malitious; and thou muſt uſe thy ſelf to think onely of ſuch things, of which if a man upon a ſudden ſhould ask thee, what it is that thou art now thinking, thou mayeſt anſwer freely and boldly, *This*, and *That*; that ſo by thy thoughts it may preſently appear that all in thee is ſincere, and peaceable; as becometh one that is made for ſociety, and regards not

pleasures, nor gives way to any voluptuous imaginations at all [or, *to any longing thoughts or desires at all:*] free from all contentiousness, envy and suspicion, and from whatsoever else thou wouldest blush to confess thy thoughts were set upon. He that is such, is he surely that doth not put off to lay hold on that which is best indeed, a very Priest and Minister of the gods, well acquainted and in good correspondence with Him especially that is seated and placed within himself, [*as in a Temple and Sacrary:*] To whom also he keeps and preserves himself neither spotted by pleasure, nor daunted by pain; free from any manner of wrong, or contumely, [*by* [a] *himself offered unto himself:*] not capable of any evil [[b] *from others:*] a wrestler of the best sort, and for the highest prize, that he may not be cast down by any passion or affection of his own; deeply died and drenched in righteousness, embracing and accepting with his whole heart whatsoever either happeneth or is allotted unto him. One who not often, nor without some great necessity tending to some publick good, mindeth what any other either speaks, or doeth, or purposeth: for those things onely that are in his own power [or, *that are truly his own*;] are the objects of his employments, and his thoughts are ever taken up with those things, which of the whole Universe are by the Fates [or, *Providence*] destinated and appropriated unto Himself. Those things that are his own and in his own power, he himself takes order for that they be

a See B. II. num. XIV.

b See B. IV. num. VII.

good: and as for thoſe that happen unto him, he believes them to be ſo. For that lot and portion which is aſſigned to every one * as it is unavoidable and neceſſary, ſo is it always profitable: [or, is partly from without, unavoidable: and partly from within, depending of the will.] He remembers beſides that whatſoever partakes of reaſon, is of kin unto him, and that to care for all men *generally*, is agreeing to the nature of a man: But as for honour and praiſe, that they ought not *generally* to be admitted and accepted of from all, but from ſuch onely who live according to nature. As for them that do not, what manner of men they be at home, or abroad, day, or night, how conditioned themſelves, with what manner of conditions [or, *with men of what conditions*] they moil and paſs away the time together, he knoweth, and remembers right well: he therefore regards not ſuch praiſe and approbation, as proceeding from them, who cannot like and approve themſelves.

* See the Latine Notes.

V. Do nothing againſt thy will, nor contrary to the community, nor without due examination, nor with reluctancy. Affect not to ſet out thy thoughts with curious neat language. Be neither a great talker, nor a great undertaker. Moreover, let thy god that is in thee to rule over thee, find by thee, that he hath to doe with a man; an aged man; a ſociable man; a Roman; a Prince; one that hath ordered his life, as one that expecteth, as it were, nothing but the ſound of the trumpet, ſounding a retreat to depart out of this life with all readineſs

and

and expedition; as one who needs neither the oath [*which ordinary souldiers take,*] nor any witnesses, [*to be the more strongly bound to this obedience and service; but of himself is ready to run at the first call of the trumpet.*]

VI. A magnificent thing it is, [or, most comfortable,] as much as any thing; [*so to compose thy self,*] as to stand in no need [*to enjoy thy happiness:*] either of other mens help or attendance, or of that rest and tranquillity, which thou must be beholding to others for. Rather like one that is streight of himself [or, *hath ever been streight*] than one that hath been rectified. See B. I. n. XII.

VII. If thou shalt find any thing in this mortal life better than righteousness, than truth, temperance, fortitude: and in general, better than a mind contented both with those things which according to right and reason are done by thee through her help; and in those, which without her will and knowledge happen unto thee by the Providence; If, I say, thou canst find out any thing better than this; apply thy self unto it with thy whole heart, and that which is best whersoever thou dost find it, injoy [*freely.*] But if thou shalt find nothing worthy to be preferred before that Spirit which is within thee; if nothing better than to subject unto thee thine own lusts and desires, and not to give way to any fancies or imaginations before thou hast duely considered of them; nothing better than to withdraw thy self (to use *Socrates* his words) from all sensuality, and submit thy self unto the gods, and to have care

of

of all men in general: If thou shalt find that all other things in comparison of this, are but vile, and of little moment; then give not way to any other thing, which being once, [*though but*] affected and inclined unto, it will no more be in thy power, without all distraction [*as thou oughtest*] to prefer and to pursue after that good, which is thine own and thy proper good. For it is not lawfull, that any thing that is of another [*and inferiour*] kind and nature, be it what it will, as either popular applause, or honour, or riches, or pleasures; should be suffered to confront and contest as it were, with that which is rational, and operatively good. For all these things, if once, though but for a while, they begin to please, they presently prevail, and pervert a man's mind, [or, *turn a man from the right way.*] Do thou therefore, I say, absolutely and freely make choice of that which is best, and stick unto it. Now, that [*they say*] is best, which is most profitable. If they mean profitable to man as he is a rational man, stand thou to it, and maintain it; but if they mean Profitable, as he is a creature [*onely,*] reject it; and from this thy Tenet and Conclusion *keep off carefully all plausible shews, and colours of external appearance*, that thou maist be able to discern things rightly.

Greek ἀτύφως φύλασσε See B. VI. num. XI.

VIII. Never esteem of any thing as profitable, which shall ever constrain thee either to break thy faith, or to lose thy modesty; to hate any man, to suspect, to curse, to dissemble, to lust after any thing, that requireth the secret of walls, or veils. But he that preferreth before all

all things his Rational part and Spirit, and the ſacred myſteries of vertue which iſſueth from it; he ſhall never lament and exclaim; never ſigh, he ſhall never want either ſolitude or company: and which is chiefeſt of all, he ſhall live without either deſire or fear. And as for life, whether for a long or ſhort time he ſhall enjoy his ſoul thus compaſſed about with a body, he is altogether indifferent. For if even now he were to depart, he is as ready for it, as for any other action, which may be performed with modeſty and decency. For all his life long, this is his onely care, that his mind may always be occupied in ſuch intentions and objects as are proper to a rational ſociable creature.

IX. In the mind that is [*once truly*] diſciplined and purged, thou canſt not find any thing, either foul or impure, or as (it were) feſtered: nothing that is either ſervile, or affected: no [*partial*] tie; no [*malitious*] averſeneſs; nothing obnoxious; nothing concealed. The life of ſuch an one, Death can never ſurpriſe as imperfect; as of an Actour that ſhould die before he had ended, or the Play it ſelf were at an end, a man might ſpeak.

X. Uſe thine opinative faculty with all honour and reſpect, for in her [*indeed*] is all: that thy opinion do not beget in thy underſtanding any thing contrary to either Nature, or the proper conſtitution of a Rational creature. The end and object of a Rational conſtitution, is, to doe nothing raſhly, to be kindly affected towards men, and in all things willingly to ſubmit unto the gods. Caſting therefore all other

things

things aſide, keep thy ſelf to theſe few, and remember withall that no man properly can be ſaid to live more than that which is now preſent, which is but a moment of time. Whatſoever is beſides, either is already paſt, or incertain. The time therefore that any man doth live is but a little, and the place where he liveth is but a very little corner of the earth, and the greateſt fame that can remain of a man after his Death, even that is but little, and that too, ſuch as it is whilſt it is, is by the ſucceſſion of ſilly mortal men preſerved, who likewiſe ſhall ſhortly die, and [*even whiles they live*] know not what in very deed they themſelves are: and much leſs can know one, who long before is dead and gone.

XI. To theſe fore-ſpoken ever-preſent helps and *mementoes*, let one more be added, Ever to make a particular deſcription and delineation as it were of every object that preſents it ſelf to thy mind, that thou mayſt wholly and throughly contemplate it, in its own proper nature, bare and naked; wholly, and ſeverally; divided into its ſeveral parts and quarters: and then by thy ſelf in thy mind, to call both it, and thoſe things of which it doth conſiſt, and into which it ſhall be reſolved, by their own proper true Names and appellations. For there is nothing ſo effectual to beget true Magnanimity, as to be able truly and methodically to examine and conſider all things that happen in this life, and ſo to penetrate into their natures, that at the ſame time, this alſo may concur in our apprehenſions: What is the true uſe of it: and what is the true nature of this Univerſe, to which it is uſefull? See B. VI. num. XI.

uſefull? How much in regard of the Univerſe may it be eſteemed? how much in regard of man, a Citizen of the ſupreme City, of which all other Cities in the World are as it were but houſes and families?

XII. What is this that now my fancy is ſet upon? of what things doth it conſiſt? how long can it laſt? which of all the vertues, is the proper vertue for this preſent uſe? as whether meekneſs, fortitude, truth, faith, ſincerity, contentation, or any of the reſt? Of every thing therefore thou muſt uſe thy ſelf to ſay, This [*immediately*] comes from God, This by that fatal connexion and concatenation of things, or (which almoſt comes to one:) by ſome coincidental caſualty. And as for this, it proceeds from my neighbour, my kinſman, my fellow: through his ignorance indeed, becauſe he knows not what is truly natural unto him: But I know it, and therefore carry my ſelf towards him according to the natural law of fellowſhip; that is, kindly, and juſtly. As for thoſe things that of themſelves are altogether indifferent, as in my beſt judgement I conceive every thing to deſerve more or leſs, ſo I carry my ſelf towards it.

See B. I. n. XVII.

XIII. If thou ſhalt intend that which is preſent, following the rule of right and reaſon carefully, ſolidly, meekly, and ſhalt not intermix any other buſineſſes, but ſhalt ſtudy this [*onely*] to preſerve thy Spirit impolluted, and pure, and as one that were even now ready to give up the ghoſt, ſhalt cleave unto Him without either hope or fear of any thing, in all things that thou ſhalt

See B. VI. 2. 30. VIII. 30. IX. 5. 24. X. 13. 33.

ſhalt either do or ſpeak, contenting thy ſelf with Heroical truth, thou ſhalt live happily; and from this there is no man that can hinder thee.

XIV. As Phyſicians [*and Chirurgians*] have always their inſtruments ready at hand for all ſudden cures; ſo have thou always thy *Dogmata* in a readineſs for the knowledge of things, both *divine* and *humane*: and whatſoever thou doeſt, even in the ſmalleſt things that thou doeſt, thou muſt ever remember that mutual relation and connexion that is between theſe two [*things divine, and things humane.*] For without relation unto God, thou ſhalt never perform aright any thing humane; nor on the other ſide any thing divine [*without ſome reſpect had to things humane.*]

XV. Be not deceived; For thou ſhalt never live to reade thy moral Commentaries, nor the Acts of the ancient [*famous*] Romans and Grecians; nor thoſe *Excerpta* from ſeveral Books; all which thou hadſt provided and laid up for thy ſelf, againſt thine old age. Haſten therefore to an end, and giving over all vain hopes, help thy ſelf [*in time*] if thou carеſt for thy ſelf, as thou oughteſt to doe.

XVI. *To* [a] *ſteal, to* [b] *ſow, to buy, to be* [c] *at reſt, to* [d] *ſee what is to be done* (which is not ſeen by the eyes, but by another kind of ſight:) what theſe words mean, and how many ways to be underſtood, they do not underſtand. *The body, the ſoul, the Underſtanding.* [*As*] the ſenſes [*naturally,*] belong to the *body*, and the deſires and affections to the *ſoul*, ſo do the *dogmata* to the *underſtanding*.

[a] See B. X. n. XV.
[b] See B. XI. n. XVI.
[c] See B. IV. n. XXIX.
[d] See B. IV. n. III.
[e] See B. IV. n. XXIV.
B. VIII. n. XXXVI.

XVII. To

XVII. To be capable of fancies and imaginations, is common to man and beast. To be violently drawn and moved by the lusts and desires [*of the soul*,] is proper to wild beasts and monsters; such as *Phalaris* and *Nero* were. To follow reason for ordinary duties and actions, is common to them also, who believe not that there be any gods, and [*for their advantage would make no conscience*] to betray their own Countrey; and who, when once the doors be shut upon them, dare do any thing. If therefore all things else be common to these likewise, it follows, that for a man to like and embrace all things that happen and are destinated unto him, and not to trouble and molest that Spirit which is seated in the temple of his own breast, with a multitude of [*vain*] fancies and imaginations, but to keep him propitious, and to obey him as a god, never either speaking any thing contrary to truth, or doing any thing contrary to Justice; is the onely true property of a good man. And such an one, though no man should believe that he liveth as he doth, either sincerely and conscionably, or chearfully and contentedly; yet is he neither with any man at all angry for it, nor diverted by it from the way that leadeth to the end of his life, at which it behooves a man to arrive with all quietness, purity and alacrity; in all things without any manner of compulsion fitted and accommodated to his proper lot and portion.

See Pref. pag. 12. and notes upon Book VIII. 1.

THE

THE FOURTH BOOK.

THAT inward mistress part [*of man,*] if it be in its own true natural temper, is towards all worldly chances and events ever so disposed and affected, that it will easily turn and apply it self to that which may be, and is within its own power to compass, [*when that cannot be which in first it intended.*] For it never doth absolutely addict and apply it self to any one object, but whatsoever it is that it doth now intend and prosecute, it doth prosecute it *with* * *exception and reservation*; so that whatsoever it is that falls out contrary [*to its first intentions,*] even that afterwards it makes its proper object. Even as the fire when it prevails upon those things that are in his way; by which things indeed a little fire would have been quenched, but a great fire doth soon turn to its own nature, and so consume whatsoever comes in its way: yea, by those very things it is made greater and greater.

* Gr. μετὰ ὑπεξαιρέσεως.

II. Let nothing be done rashly and at random, but all things according to the most exact and perfect Rules of Art.

III. They seek for themselves private retiring-places, as Countrey villages, the sea-shoar, mountains; yea, thou thy self art wont to long much after such places. But all this [*thou must know*] proceeds from simplicity in the highest

See B. X. XXIV.

degree. At what time ſoever thou wilt, it is in thy power to retire into thy ſelf, and to be at reſt. For a man cannot retire any whither for to be more at reſt, and freer from all buſineſs, than to his own ſoul. He eſpecially who is before-hand provided of ſuch things within, which whenſoever he doth withdraw himſelf to look in, may preſently afford unto him perfect eaſe and tranquillity. By * *tranquillity* I underſtand a decent orderly diſpoſition and carriage free from all confuſion and tumultuouſneſs. Afford then thy ſelf this retiring continually, and thereby refreſh and renew thy ſelf. Let thoſe [*precepts*] be brief and fundamental, which as ſoon as thou doſt call them to mind, may ſuffice thee to purge thy ſoul throughly, and to ſend thee away well pleaſed with thoſe things, whatſoever they be, which now again, [*after this ſhort withdrawing of thy ſoul into her ſelf:*] thou doſt return unto. For what is it that thou art offended at? Can it be at the wickedneſs of men, when thou doſt call to mind this concluſion, that all reaſonable creatures are made one for another? and that it is part of juſtice to bear with them? and that it is againſt their wills that they offend? and how many already, who [*once likewiſe*] proſecuted their enmities, ſuſpected, hated, and fiercely contended, are now [*long ago*] ſtretcht out, and reduced unto Aſhes? It is time for thee to make an end. As for thoſe things which among the common chances of the world happen unto thee as thy particular lot and portion, canſt thou be diſpleaſed with any of them, when thou doſt

* Gr. εὐμάρειαν.

dost call that [*our ordinary*] *Dilemma* to mind, *Either a Providence*, *or* [Democritus *his*] *Atoms*; and with it, whatsoever we brought to prove, that the whole world is as it were one City? And as for thy body, what canst thou fear, if thou dost consider that thy Mind and Understanding, when once it hath recollected it self, and knows its own power, hath in this life and breath, (whether * it run smoothly and gently, or whether harshly and rudely,) no interest at all, but is altogether indifferent: and whatsoever else thou hast heard and assented unto concerning either pain or pleasure? But the care of thine honour and reputation will perchance distract thee. How can that be, if thou dost look back, and consider both how quickly all things that are, are forgotten, and what an immense *chaos* of eternity was before, and will follow after all things; and the vanity of praise, and the inconstancy and variableness of humane Judgements and opinions, and the narrowness of the place wherein it is limited and circumscribed? For the whole earth is but as one point; and of it, this inhabited part of it is but a very little part; and of this part, how many in number, and what manner of men are they that will commend thee? What remains then, but that thou often put in practice this kind of retiring of thy self to this little part of thy self; and above all things, keep thy self from distraction, and [a] *intend not any thing vehemently*; but be free and consider all things, [b] *as a man*, [*whose proper object is vertue*,] as a *man*

* See B. V. n. XX. B. VII. XXXVII. B. IX. XLI.

[a] Gr. μὴ κατεντείνου.
[b] Gr. ὡς ἀνήρ.

* Gr. ὡς ἄνθρωπος. See Note XIV. and XVIII. upon B. I. and B. V. num. VI.

* *man,* [*whose true nature is to be kind and sociable:*] as a Citizen; as a mortal creature? Among other things, which to consider and look into thou must use to withdraw thy self, let those two be among the most obvious and at hand. One, that the things or objects themselves reach not unto the soul, but stand without still and quiet, and that it is from the opinion onely which is within, that all the tumult and all the trouble doth proceed. The next, that all these things, which now thou seest, shall within a very little while be changed, and be no more: and ever call to mind, how many changes and alterations in the world thou thy self hast already been an eye-witness of in thy time. This world is mere change, and this life, opinion.

IV. If to understand and to be reasonable be common unto all men, then is that reason, for which we are termed reasonable, common unto all. If reason in general, then is that reason also which prescribeth what is to be done, and what not, common unto all. If that, then Law. If Law, then are we fellow-Citizens. If so, then are we partners in some one Common-weal. If so, then the world is as it were a City. For what other Common-weal is it that all men can be said to be members of? From this Common City it is, that Understanding, Reason, and Law is derived unto us, for from whence else? For as that which in me is earthly, I have from some [*common*] earth; and that which is moist, from some other Element is imparted; as my breath and life hath its proper fountain; and that likewise which is dry and fiery in me: (for there

there is nothing which doth not proceed from ſomething; as alſo there is nothing that can be reduced to mere nothing:) ſo alſo is there ſome [*common beginning*] from whence my underſtanding hath proceeded.

V. As generation is, ſo alſo death, a ſecret of Nature's wiſedom; a mixture of Elements reſolved into the ſame Elements again, a thing ſurely which no man ought to be aſhamed of: in the *ſeries* of other fatal events and conſequences, which a rational creature is ſubject unto, not improper or incongruous; nor contrary to the natural and proper conſtitution of man himſelf.

VI. Such and ſuch things from ſuch and ſuch cauſes, muſt of neceſſity proceed. He that would not have ſuch things to happen, is as he that would have the fig-tree [*grow*] without any ſap or moiſture. In ſumme, remember this, that within a very little while, both thou and he ſhall both be dead, and after a little while more, not ſo much as your names and memories ſhall be remaining. See B. VI. n. LII. B. VIII. n. XIII.

VII. Let opinion be taken away, and no man will think himſelf wronged. If no man ſhall think himſelf wronged, then is there no more any ſuch thing as *wrong*. That which makes not man himſelf the worſe, cannot make his life the worſe, neither can it hurt him either inwardly or outwardly. It was expedient in nature that it ſhould be ſo, and therefore neceſſary.

VIII. Whatſoever doth happen in the world, doth happen juſtly, and ſo, if thou doſt well take heed, thou ſhalt find it. I ſay not onely in right order by a *ſeries* of inevitable conſequences,

but according to Juſtice, and as it were by way of equal diſtribution, according to the true worth of every thing. Continue then to take notice of it, as thou haſt begun, and whatſoever thou doeſt, doe it not without this *proviſo*, that it be a thing of that nature that a good man, (as the word *good* is properly taken) may doe it. This obſerve carefully in every action.

IX. Conceit no ſuch things as he that wrongeth thee conceiveth, or would have thee to conceive, but look into the matter it ſelf, and ſee what it is in very truth.

X. Theſe two rules thou muſt have always in a readineſs. Firſt, doe nothing at all, but what Reaſon, proceeding from the Regal and ſupreme part, ſhall for the good and benefit of men ſuggeſt unto thee. And, ſecondly, if any man that is preſent ſhall be able to rectifie thee, or to turn thee from ſome [*erroneous*] perſuaſion, that thou be always ready to change thy mind, and this change to proceed, not from any reſpect of any pleaſure or credit thereon depending, but always from ſome probable appatent ground of Juſtice, or from ſome publick good thereby to be furthered; or from ſome other ſuch inducement.

XI. Haſt thou Reaſon; I have. Why then makeſt thou not uſe of it? For if thy Reaſon doe her part, what more canſt thou require?

XII. As a part hitherto thou haſt had a particular ſubſiſtence: and now ſhalt thou vaniſh away into the common ſubſtance of him who firſt begot thee, or rather thou ſhalt be reſumed again into that original rational ſubſtance, out of

of which all others have iſſued and are propagated. Many ſmall pieces of Frankincenſe are ſet upon the ſame Altar, one drops firſt [*and is conſumed,*] another after; and it comes all to one.

XIII. Within ten days [*if ſo it happen*] thou ſhalt be eſteemed a god of them, who now if thou ſhalt return to the *Dogmata* and to the honouring of Reaſon, will eſteem of thee no better than of a mere brute, and of an Ape.

XIV. Not as though thou hadſt thouſands of years to live. Death hangs over thee: whilſt yet thou liveſt, whilſt thou mayſt be good.

XV. How much time and leiſure doth he gain, who is not curious to know what his neighbour hath ſaid, or hath done, or hath attempted, but onely what he doth himſelf, that it may be juſt and holy? or, to expreſs it in *Agatho*'s words, *Not to look about upon the evil conditions of others, but to run on ſtreight in the line, without any looſe and extravagant agitation?*

XVI. He who is greedy of credit and reputation after his death, doth not conſider, that they themſelves by whom he is remembred, ſhall ſoon after every one of them be dead; and they likewiſe that ſucceed thoſe; untill at laſt all memory, which hitherto by the ſucceſſion of men admiring, and ſoon after dying, hath had its courſe, be quite extinct. But ſuppoſe that both they that ſhall remember thee, and thy memory with them ſhould be immortal, what is that to thee? I will not ſay to thee after thou art dead, but even to thee living. What is thy praiſe? but onely for a ſecret and politick conſideration, which we call εἰκονομίαν, or Diſpen-

ſation; [*Publick praiſes and commendations, being ordinarily a ſtrong motive to draw men to the love of vertue.*] For as for that, that it is the gift of nature [*whatſoever is commended in thee, what might be objected from thence,*] let that now that we are upon another conſideration, be omitted as unſeaſonable. That which is fair and goodly, whatſoever it be, and in what reſpect ſoever it be, that it is fair and goodly, it is ſo of it ſelf, and terminates in it ſelf, not admitting praiſe as a part or member: that therefore which is praiſed, is not thereby made either better or worſe. This I underſtand either of thoſe things that are commonly called fair and good, as thoſe which are commended even for the matter it ſelf, or for curious workmanſhip. As for that which is truly good, what can it ſtand in need of [*to commend it*] more than either Juſtice or Truth; or more than either kindneſs or modeſty? For which of all thoſe either becomes good or fair, becauſe commended; or diſpraiſed ſuffers any damage? Doth the Emerald become worſe in it ſelf, or more vile, if it be not commended? Doth gold, or ivory, or purple? Is there any thing that doth, though never ſo common, as a knife, a flower, or a tree?

XVII. If ſo be that the ſouls remain after death [*ſay they that will not believe it,*] how is the air from all eternity able to contain them? How is the earth [*ſay I,*] ever from that time able to contain the bodies of them that are buried? For as here the change and reſolution of dead bodies into another kind of ſubſiſtence, (whatſoever it be,) makes place for

for other dead bodies: ſo the ſouls after death transferred into the air, after they have converſed there a-while, are either by way of tranſmutation, or transfuſion, or conflagration, received again into that original rational ſubſtance, from which all others do proceed; and ſo give way to thoſe ſouls, who before coupled and aſſociated unto bodies, [*now begin to ſubſiſt ſingle.*] This, upon a ſuppoſition that the ſouls after death doe for a-while ſubſiſt ſingle, may be anſwered. And here, (beſides the number of bodies ſo buried and contained by the earth,) we may farther conſider the number of ſeveral beaſts, eaten by us men and by other creatures. For notwithſtanding that ſuch a multitude of them is daily conſumed, and as it were buried in the bodies of the eaters, yet is the ſame place and body able to contain them, by reaſon of their converſion partly into bloud, partly into air and fire. What in theſe things is the ſpeculation of truth? to divide things into that which is paſſive and material, and that which is active and formal.

XVIII. Not to wander out of the way, but upon every motion and deſire to perform that which is juſt: and ever to be carefull to attain to the true natural apprehenſion of every fancy that preſents it ſelf.

XIX. Whatſoever is expedient unto thee, O World! is expedient unto me. Nothing can be unſeaſonable unto me as either coming before, or after its due time, which unto thee is ſeaſonable. Whatſoever thy ſeaſons bear, ſhall ever by me be eſteemed as happy fruit, and increaſe.

increaſe. O Nature! from thee are all things, in thee all things ſubſiſt, and to thee all tend. Could he ſay of *Athens*, *Thou lovely City of* Cecrops? and ſhalt not thou ſay of the World, *Thou lovely City of God?*

XX. They will ſay commonly, *Meddle not with many things, if thou wilt live chearfully.* Certainly there is nothing better, than for a man to confine himſelf to neceſſary actions; to ſuch and ſo many onely, as reaſon in a creature that knows it ſelf born for ſociety, will command and enjoin. This will not onely procure that chearfulneſs, which from the goodneſs; but that alſo which from the paucity of actions doth uſually proceed. For ſince it is ſo, that moſt of thoſe things which we either ſpeak or doe are unneceſſary; if a man ſhall cut them off, it muſt needs follow that he ſhall thereby gain much leiſure, and ſave much trouble; and therefore at every action a man muſt privately by way of admonition ſuggeſt unto himſelf, What! May not this that I now go about be of the number of unneceſſary actions? Neither muſt he uſe himſelf to cut off actions onely, but thoughts and imaginations alſo, that are unneceſſary; for ſo will unneceſſary conſequent actions the better be prevented and cut off.

XXI. Try alſo how a good man's life (of one who is well pleaſed with thoſe things whatſoever, which among the common changes and chances of this world fall to his own lot and ſhare; and can live well contented and fully ſatisfied in the juſtice of his own proper preſent action, and in the goodneſs of his diſpoſition for

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the future:) will agree with thee. Thou haſt had experience of that other kind of life: make now trial of this alſo. Trouble not thy ſelf any more henceforth, reduce thy ſelf unto perfect ſimplicity. Doth any man offend? It is againſt himſelf that he doth offend: [*why ſhould it trouble thee?*] Hath any thing happened unto thee? It is well, whatſoever it be, it is that which of all the common chances of the world from the very beginning in the *ſeries* of all other things that have happened, or ſhall happen, was deſtinated and appointed unto thee. To comprehend all in few words; Our life is ſhort; we muſt endeavour to gain the preſent time with beſt diſcretion and juſtice. Uſe recreation with ſobriety.

XXII. Either this world is a Κόσμος, or a *comely piece*, becauſe all diſpoſed and governed by certain order: or if it be a mixture, though confuſed, yet ſtill it is a Κόσμος, *a comely piece.* For is it poſſible that in thee there ſhould be any beauty at all, and that in the whole world there ſhould be nothing but diſorder and confuſion? and all things in it too, [*by natural different properties*] one from another differenced and diſtinguiſhed; and yet through-diffuſed, and by natural Sympathy one to another united, as they are? See B. VI. n. xxxviij.

XXIII. *A black* [or, *malign*] *diſpoſition, an effeminate diſpoſition, an hard inexorable diſpoſition, a wild inhumane diſpoſition, a ſheepiſh diſpoſition, a childiſh diſpoſition; a blockiſh, a falſe, a ſcurril, a fraudulent, a tyrannical:* [*what then?*] If he be a ſtranger in the world that knows not See before n. XV.

not the things that are in it; why not he a ſtranger as well, that wonders at the things that are done in it?

XXIV. He is a true *fugitive*, that flies from reaſon, by which men are ſociable. He *blind*, who cannot ſee with the eyes of his underſtanding. He *poor*, that ſtands in need of another, and hath not in himſelf all things needfull for this life. He an *Apoſteme* of the world, who by being diſcontented with thoſe things that happen unto him in the world, doth as it were *Apoſtatize*, and ſeparate himſelf from common Nature's rational Adminiſtration. For the ſame nature it is that brings this unto thee, whatſoever it be that firſt brought thee into the world. He is a Separatiſt from the City [*of the whole world*,] who [*by irrational actions*] withdraws his own ſoul from the One and common ſoul of all rational Creatures.

XXV. There is, who without ſo much as a Coat; and there is, who without ſo much as a Book, doth put Philoſophy in practice. I am half naked, neither have I bread to eat, and yet I depart not from Reaſon, ſaith one. But, I ſay; I want the food of good teaching and inſtructions, and yet I depart not from Reaſon.

XXVI. What Art and Profeſſion ſoever thou haſt learned, endeavour to affect it, and comfort thy ſelf in it; and paſs the remainder of thy life as one who from his whole heart commits himſelf, and whatſoever belongs unto him, unto the gods: and as for men, carry not thy ſelf either tyrannically, or ſervilely towards any.

XXVII.

XXVII. Conſider in thy mind, for example's ſake, the times of *Veſpaſian*: Thou ſhalt ſee but the ſame things; ſome marrying, ſome bringing up children, ſome ſick, ſome dying, ſome fighting, ſome feaſting, ſome merchandizing, ſome tilling, ſome flattering, ſome boaſting, ſome ſuſpecting, ſome undermining, ſome wiſhing to dye, ſome fretting and murmuring at their preſent eſtate, ſome wooing, ſome hoarding, ſome ſeeking after Magiſtracies, and ſome after Kingdoms. And is not that their age quite over and ended? Again, conſider now the times of *Trajan*. There likewiſe thou ſeeſt the very ſelf ſame things, and that age alſo is now over and ended. In the like manner conſider other periods, both of times, and of whole nations, and ſee how many men, after they had with all their might and main intended and proſecuted ſome one worldly thing or other, did ſoon after drop away, and were reſolved into the Elements. But eſpecially thou muſt call to mind them, whom thou thy ſelf [*in thy life-time*] haſt known much diſtracted [*about vain things*,] and in the mean time neglecting to doe that, and cloſely and unſeparably (as fully ſatisfied with it,) to adhere unto it, which their own proper conſtitution did require. And here thou muſt remember, that thy carriage in every buſineſs muſt be according to the worth and due proportion of it; for ſo ſhalt thou not eaſily be [*tired out*] and vexed, if thou ſhalt not dwell upon ſmall matters longer than is fitting.

XXVIII.

XXVIII. Thoſe words which once were common and ordinary, are now become obſcure and obſolete; and ſo the names of men once commonly known and famous, are now become in a manner obſcure and obſolete names. *Camillus*, *Caeſo*, *Voleſius*, *Leonnatus*; and after a while, *Scipio*, *Cato*, then *Auguſtus*, then *Adrianus*, then *Antoninus Pius*: All theſe in a ſhort time will be out of date, and [*as things of another world as it were*,] become fabulous. And this I ſay of them who once ſhined as the wonders of their Ages; for as for the reſt, no ſooner are they expired, than with them all their fame and memory. And what is it then that ſhall always be remembred? all is vanity. What is it that we muſt beſtow our care and diligence upon? even upon this onely: That our minds and wills be juſt; that our actions be charitable; that our ſpeech be never deceitfull: or, [*that our underſtanding be not ſubject to errour*;] that our inclination be always ſet to embrace whatſoever ſhall happen unto us, as neceſſary, as uſual, as ordinary, as flowing from ſuch a beginning, and ſuch a fountain, [*from which both thou thy ſelf, and all things are.* Willingly therefore and wholly ſurrender up thy ſelf unto that fatal concatenation, yielding up thy ſelf unto the Fates to be diſpoſed of at their pleaſure.

See the Pref. towards the end.

XXIX. Whatſoever is now preſent, and from day to day hath its exiſtence; all objects of memories, and the minds and memories themſelves, inceſſantly conſider; all things that are, have their being by change and alteration. Uſe thy

thy ſelf therefore often to meditate upon this, that the Nature of the Univerſe delights in nothing more, than in altering thoſe things that are, and in making others like unto them. So that we may ſay, that whatſoever is, is but as it were the ſeed of that which ſhall be. For if thou think that that onely is ſeed, which either the earth or the womb receiveth, thou art very ſimple.

XXX. Thou art now ready to dye, and yet haſt thou not attained to that perfect ſimplicity? thou art yet ſubject to many troubles and perturbations; not yet free from all fear and ſuſpicion of external accidents; nor yet either ſo meekly diſpoſed towards all men, as thou ſhouldeſt; or ſo affected as one whoſe onely ſtudy, and onely wiſedom is, to be juſt in all his actions.

XXXI. Behold and obſerve, what is the ſtate of their rational part; and thoſe that the world doth account wiſe, ſee what things they flie and are afraid of; and what things they hunt after.

XXXII. In another man's mind and underſtanding thy evil cannot ſubſiſt, nor in any proper temper or diſtemper of the natural conſtitution of thy body, which is but as it were the coat or cottage of thy ſoul. Wherein then, but in that part of thee, wherein the conceit and apprehenſion of any miſery can ſubſiſt? Let not that part therefore admit any ſuch conceit, and then all is well. Though thy body, which is ſo near it, ſhould either be cut or burnt, or ſuffer any corruption or putrefaction, yet let that part to which it belongs to judge of theſe,

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be ſtill at reſt; that is, Let her judge this, that whatſoever it is, that equally may happen to a wicked man and to a good man, is neither good nor evil. For that which happens equally to him that lives according to Nature, [*and to him that doth not,*] is neither according to nature, nor againſt it; [*and by conſequent, neither good, nor bad.*]

See B. VI. n. XXIII. XXXIII. Ever conſider and think upon the world, as being but one living ſubſtance, and having but one ſoul, and how all things in the world are terminated into one ſenſitive power, [or, *terminate into one general ſenſe,*] and are done by one general motion as it were, and deliberation [*of that one ſoul;*] and how all things that are, concur in the cauſe of one another's being; and by what manner of connexion and concatenation all things happen.

XXXIV. What art thou, [*that better and divine part excepted*] but, as *Epictetus* ſaid well, *a wretched ſoul appointed to carry a carkaſe up and down?*

XXXV. To ſuffer change can be no hurt; as no benefit it is, by change to attain to being. The age and time of the world is as it were a ſtoud and ſwift current, conſiſting of the things that are brought to paſs in the world. For as ſoon as any thing hath appeared, and is paſſed away, another ſucceeds; and that alſo will preſently out of ſight.

XXXVI. Whatſoever doth happen in the world, is [*in the courſe of nature*] as uſual and ordinary as a Roſe in the Spring, and fruit in Summer. Of the ſame nature is ſickneſs and death, ſlander,

ſlander, and lying in wait, and whatſoever elſe ordinarily doth unto fools uſe to be occaſion either of joy or ſorrow. That which ſucceeds, whatſoever it be, doth always very naturally, and as it were familiarly, follow upon that which was before. For thou muſt conſider the things of the world, not as a looſe independent number, conſiſting merely of neceſſary events; but as a diſcreet connexion of things orderly and harmoniouſly diſpoſed. There is then to be ſeen in the things of the world, not a bare ſucceſſion, but an admirable correſpondence and affinity.

XXXVII. Let that of *Heraclitus* never be out of thy mind, that the death of earth is water, and the death of water is air, and the death of air is fire; and ſo on the contrary. Remember him alſo who was ignorant whither the way did lead, and how that Reaſon being the thing by which all things in the world are adminiſtred, and which men are continually and moſt inwardly converſant with, yet is the thing which ordinarily they are moſt in oppoſition with; and how thoſe things which daily happen among them, ceaſe not daily to be ſtrange unto them; and that we ſhould not either ſpeak or doe any thing as men in their ſleep, [*by opinion and bare imagination:*] for then we think we ſpeak and doe; and that [*we muſt not be*] as children, who follow their fathers [*example,*] for beſt reaſon alledging their bare κατὰ παράδοσιν; or, *As* [*by ſucceſſive tradition from our fore-fathers*] *we have received it.*

XXXVIII. Even as if any of the gods should tell thee, thou shalt certainly dye to morrow, or next day, thou wouldst not (except thou wert extremely base and pusillanimous) take it for a great benefit, rather to dye the next day after, than to morrow: (for alas, what is the difference!) so [*for the same reason*] think it no great matter to dye rather many years after, than the very next day.

See num. XLII.

XXXIX. Let it be thy perpetual meditation, how many Physicians who once looked so grim, and so tetrically shrunk their brows upon their Patients, are dead and gone themselves. How many Astrologers, after that in great ostentation they had foretold the death of some others; how many Philosophers, after so many elaborate tracts and volumes concerning either mortality, or immortality; how many brave Captains and Commanders, after the death and slaughter of so many; how many Kings and Tyrants, after they had with such horrour and insolency abused their power upon mens lives, as though themselves had been immortal; how many, that I may so speak, whole Cities [*both Men and Towns*,] *Helice*, *Pompeii*, *Herculanum*, and others innumerable, are dead and gone: Run them over also, whom thou thy self, one after another, hast known in thy time to drop away. Such and such a one took care of such and such a ones burial, and soon after was buried himself. So one, so another: and all things in a short time. *For herein lieth all indeed, ever to look upon all things that belong unto man, as things for their continuance

See notes.

* See B. V. n. XXVII. B. VII. num. III.

[*that*

[*that last but*] from day to day; [or, *that are but for a day:*] and for their worth, most vile, and contemptible; as [*for example, what is man?*] That which but the other day [*when he was conceived*] was *vile* * *snivel*; and within few days shall be either an embalmed carkass, or mere ashes. Thus must thou according to [*truth and*] nature, throughly consider, how [*man's life*] is but for a very moment of time, and so depart meek and contented: even as if a ripe Olive falling, should praise the ground that bare her, and give thanks to the tree that begat her. See notes. * Greek μυξάριον. See B. VI. num. XI.

XL. Thou must be like a promontory of the sea, against which though the waves beat continually, yet both it self stands, and about it are those swelling waves stilled and quieted.

XLI. Oh, wretched I, to whom this mischance is happened! nay, happy I, to whom this thing being happened, I can continue without grief; neither wounded by that which is present, nor in fear of that which is to come. For, as for this, it might have happened unto any man; but every man having such a thing befallen him, could not have continued without grief. Why then should that rather be an unhappiness, than this a happiness? But however, canst thou, O man, term that unhappiness, which is no mischance to the nature of man? canst thou think that a mischance to the nature of man, which is not contrary to the [*end, and*] will of his nature? What then hast thou learned to be the will of man's nature? Doth that then which hath happened unto thee, hinder

thee from being just? or magnanimous? or temperate? or wise? or circumspect? or true? or modest? or free? or from any thing else of all those things in the present enjoying and possession whereof the nature of man is fully satisfied, as then enjoying all that is proper unto her? Now to conclude; upon all occasion of sorrow remember henceforth to make use of this *Dogma*, that to undergo this, whatsoever it is that hath happened unto thee, is in very deed no such thing of it self as unhappiness; but that to bear it generously is certainly great happiness.

XLII. It is but an ordinary course one, yet it is a good effectual remedy against the fear of death, for a man to consider in his mind the examples of such, who greedily and covetously (as it were) did for a long time enjoy their lives. What have they got more, than they whose deaths have been untimely? Are not they themselves dead at the last? as *Cadicianus*, *Fabius*, *Julianus*, *Lepidus*, or any other who in their life-time having buried many, were at the last buried themselves. The whole space of any man's life is but little; and as little as it is, with what troubles, with what manner of dispositions, and in the society of how wretched a body must it be passed? Let it be therefore unto thee altogether as a matter of indifferency. For if thou shalt look backward, behold what an infinite Chaos of time doth present it self unto thee; and as infinite a Chaos, if thou shalt look forward. In that which is so infinite, what difference can there be between that which liveth but three days, and * that which liveth three ages?

* Gr. ὁ τρίημ. τοῦ τριγερηνίου. that is, properly, *thrice Nestor's age*: which importeth many ages.

XLIII.

XLIII. Let thy courſe ever be the moſt compendious way. The moſt compendious is that which is according to nature: [*that is*] in all both words and deeds, ever to follow that which is moſt ſound and perfect. For ſuch a reſolution will free a man from all trouble, ſtrife, diſſembling and oſtentation.

THE FIFTH BOOK.

IN the morning, when thou findeſt thy ſelf unwilling to riſe, conſider with thy ſelf preſently, it is to go about a man's work that I am ſtirred up. Am I then yet unwilling to go about that, for which I my ſelf was born and brought forth into this world? Or was I made for this, to lay me down, and make much of my ſelf in a warm bed? O but this is pleaſing. And was it then for this that thou wert born, that thou mighteſt enjoy pleaſure? Was it not in very truth for this, that thou mighteſt [*always*] be buſie and in action? Seeſt thou not [*how all things in the world beſides*,] how every Tree and Plant, how Sparrows and Ants, Spiders and Bees, how all in their kind are intent [*as it were*] *orderly* to perform whatſoever (towards the preſervation of this *orderly* Univerſe; or, *of this Univerſe, which doth conſiſt of Order*) naturally doth become and belong unto them? And wilt not thou doe that which belongs unto a man to doe? Wilt not thou run to doe that which thy nature doth

require? But thou muſt have ſome reſt. Yes, thou muſt. Nature hath of that alſo, as well as of eating and drinking, allowed thee a certain ſtint. But thou goeſt beyond thy ſtint, and beyond that which would ſuffice, and in matter of action, there thou comeſt ſhort of that which thou mayeſt. It muſt needs be therefore, that thou doſt not love thy ſelf, for if thou didſt, thou wouldſt alſo love thy nature, and that which thy nature doth propoſe unto her ſelf as her end. Others, as many as take pleaſure in their trade and profeſſion, can even pine themſelves at their works, and neglect their bodies and their food for it; and doſt thou leſs honour thy nature, than an ordinary mechanick his trade, or a good dancer his art? than a covetous man his ſilver, and a vain-glorious man applauſe? Theſe, to whatſoever they take an affection, can be content to want their meat and ſleep, to further that every one which they affect: and ſhall actions tending to the common good of humane ſociety, ſeem more vile unto thee, or worthy of leſs reſpect and intention?

II. How eaſie a thing is it for a man to put off from him all turbulent adventitious imaginations, and preſently to be in perfect reſt and tranquillity?

III. Think thy ſelf fit and worthy to ſpeak or to doe any thing that is according to Nature, and let not the reproach, or report of ſome that may enſue upon it, [*ever*] deterre thee. If it be right and honeſt to be ſpoken or done, undervalue not thy ſelf ſo much as to be diſcouraged from it. As for them, they have their own rational overruling

ruling part, and their own proper inclination; which thou muſt not ſtand and look about to take notice of, but go on ſtreight, whither both thine own particular and the common nature do lead thee; and the way of both theſe is but one.

IV. I continue my courſe by actions according to nature, untill I fall and ceaſe, breathing out my laſt breath into that air, by which continually breathed in I did live; and falling upon that earth, out of whoſe gifts and fruits my father gathered his ſeed, my mother her bloud, and my nurſe her milk, out of which for ſo many years I have been provided, both of meat and drink. And laſtly, which beareth me that tread upon it, and beareth with me that ſo many ways do abuſe it, [or, *and ſo freely make uſe of it, ſo many ways to ſo many ends.*]

V. No man can admire thee for thy ſharp acute language, [*ſuch is thy natural diſability that way.*] Be it ſo: yet there be many other [*good*] things, for the want of which thou canſt not plead the want of natural ability. Let them be ſeen in thee, which depend wholly from thee; ſincerity, gravity, laboriouſneſs, contempt of pleaſures; be not querulous, be content with little; be kind, be free; avoid all ſuperfluity; all vain prating; be magnanimous. Doſt not thou perceive, how many things there be, which notwithſtanding any pretence of natural indiſpoſition and unfitneſs, thou mighteſt have performed and exhibited, and yet ſtill thou doſt voluntarily continue drooping downwards? Or wilt thou ſay, that it is through defect

of thy natural conſtitution, that thou art conſtrained to murmure, to be baſe and wretched, to flatter; now to accuſe, and now to pleaſe, and pacifie thy body: to be vain-glorious, to be ſo giddy-headed and unſettled in thy thoughts? nay (witneſſes be the Gods) of all theſe thou mighteſt have been rid long agoe: Onely this thou muſt have been contented with, to have born the blame of one that is ſomewhat ſlow and dull. Wherein thou muſt ſo exerciſe thy ſelf, as one who neither doth much take to heart this his natural defect, nor yet pleaſeth himſelf in it.

VI. Such there be, who when they have done a good turn to any, are ready to ſet them on the ſcore for it, [*and to require retaliation.*] Others there be, who though they ſtand not upon retaliation, to require any, yet they think with themſelves nevertheleſs, that ſuch a one is their debtour, and they *know* [*as their word is*] what they have done. Others again there be, who when they have done any ſuch thing, do not ſo much as know what they have done; but are like unto the Vine, which beareth her grapes, and when once ſhe hath born her own proper fruit, [*is contented*] and ſeeks for no further recompence. As a Horſe after a race, and a Hunting-dog when he hath hunted, and a Bee when ſhe hath made her honey, look not for applauſe and commendation; ſo neither doth that man [*that rightly doth underſtand his own nature*] when he hath done a good turn: but from one doth pro-

See B. IV. III.

proceed to doe another, even as the Vine after ſhe hath once born fruit in her own proper ſeaſon is ready for another time. Thou therefore muſt be one of them, who what they doe, barely doe it without any farther thought, and are in a manner unſenſible of what they doe. Nay, [*but, will ſome reply perchance*] this very thing a rational man is bound unto, to underſtand what it is that he doeth. For it is the property, ſay they, of one that is naturally ſociable, to be ſenſible that he doth operate ſociably: nay, and to deſire, that the party himſelf that is ſociably dealt with, ſhould be ſenſible of it too. [*I anſwer,*] That which thou ſayeſt is true indeed, but the true meaning of that which is ſaid thou doſt not underſtand. And therefore art thou one of thoſe firſt whom I mentioned. For they alſo are led by a probable appearance of reaſon. But if thou doſt deſire to *underſtand truly* what it is that is ſaid, fear not that thou ſhalt therefore give over any ſociable action.

VII. The form of the *Athenian*'s prayer did run thus; *O rain, rain, good Jupiter, upon all the grounds and fields that belong to the* Athenians. Either we ſhould not pray at all, or more abſolutely and freely; [*and not every one for himſelf and his own onely.*]

VIII. As we ſay commonly, The Phyſician hath *preſcribed* unto this man riding; unto another cold baths; unto a third, to go barefoot: ſo it is alike to ſay, The Nature of the Univerſe hath preſcribed unto this man ſickneſs, or blindneſs, or ſome loſs or damage, or ſome ſuch thing. For as there, when we ſay of a Phyſician

Phyſician that he hath *preſcribed* any thing, our meaning is, that he hath appointed this for that, as ſubordinate and conducing to health: ſo here, whatſoever doth happen unto any, is ordained unto him as a thing ſubordinate unto the Fates, and therefore do we ſay of ſuch things, that they do συμβαίνειν, that is, *happen*, or, *fall together*; as of ſquare ſtones, when either in walls or pyramids in a certain poſition they fit one another, and agree as it were in an harmony, the Maſons ſay, that they doe συμβαίνειν; as if thou ſhould'ſt ſay, *fall together*: ſo that in the general, [*though the things be divers that make it*] yet the conſent or harmony it ſelf is but one. And as the whole world is made up of all the particular bodies in it, one perfect and complete body, of the ſame nature that particular bodies are of; ſo is the Deſtiny of particular cauſes [*and events*] one general one, of the ſame nature that particular cauſes are. What I now ſay, even they that are mere Idiots are not ignorant of: for they ſay commonly τοῦτο ἤνεγκεν αὐτῷ, that is, *This his Deſtiny hath brought upon him.* This therefore is [*by the Fates*] properly and particularly *brought* upon this, as that unto this [*in particular*] is by the Phyſician preſcribed. Theſe therefore let us accept of in like manner, as we doe thoſe that are preſcribed unto us by our Phyſicians: For them alſo in themſelves ſhall we find to contain many harſh things, but we nevertheleſs, in hope of health and recovery, accept of them. Let the fulfilling and accompliſhment of thoſe things which the common nature hath determined, be unto

thee

thee as thy health. Accept then, and be pleased with whatsoever doth happen, though otherwise harsh and unpleasing, as tending to that end, to the health and welfare of the Universe, and to *Jove*'s happinness and prosperity. For this, whatsoever it be, should not have been [a] *produced*, had it not [b] *conduced* to the good of the Universe. For neither doth any ordinary particular nature bring any thing to pass, that is not to whatsoever is within the sphere of its own proper administration and government agreeable and subordinate. For these two considerations then thou must be well pleased with any thing that doth happen unto thee. First, because that for thee properly it was brought to pass, and unto thee it was prescribed; and that from the very beginning by the *series* and connexion of the first causes, it hath ever had a reference unto thee. And secondly, because the good success and perfect wel-fare, and indeed the very continuance of Him that is the Administratour of the whole, doth in a manner depend on it. For the *whole* (because *whole*, therefore entire and perfect:) is maimed and mutilated, if thou shalt cut off any thing at all, whereby the coherence and contiguity (as of parts, so) of causes is maintained and preserved. Of which certain it is, that thou dost (as much as lieth in thee,) cut off, and in some sort violently take somewhat away, as often as thou art displeased [*with any thing that happeneth.*]

[a] ἔφερεν
[b] συνέφερεν

IX. Be not discontented, be not disheartned, be not out of hope, if often it succeed not so well with thee punctually and precisely to doe all

all things according to the right *dogmata*; but being once caſt off, *return unto* them again: and as for thoſe many and more frequent occurrences [*either of worldly diſtractions, or humane infirmities*,] which as a man thou canſt not but in ſome meaſure be ſubject unto, be not thou diſcontented with them; but however, love and affect that [*onely*] which thou doſt *return unto*: [*a Philoſopher's life, and proper occupation after the moſt exact manner.*] And when thou doſt return to thy Philoſophy, return not unto it [*as the manner of ſome is after play and liberty as it were*,] to their School-Maſters and Pedagogues; but as they that have ſore eyes to their ſponge and egg; or as another to his cataplaſm; or as others to their fomentations: ſo ſhalt not thou make it a matter of oſtentation at all to obey reaſon; but of eaſe and comfort. And remember that Philoſophy requireth nothing of thee, but what thy nature requireth; and wouldeſt thou thy ſelf deſire any thing that is not according to nature? for which of theſe [*ſayeſt thou; that which is according to Nature, or againſt it,*] is of it ſelf more kind and pleaſing? Is it not for that reſpect eſpecially, that pleaſure it ſelf is to ſo many mens hurt and overthrow, moſt prevalent, [*becauſe eſteemed commonly moſt kind and natural?*] But conſider well whether magnanimity rather, and true liberty, and true ſimplicity, and equanimity, and holineſs; whether theſe be not moſt kind and natural. And prudence it ſelf, what more kind and amiable than it, when thou ſhalt truly conſider with thy ſelf, what it

is

is through all the proper objects of thy rational intellectual faculty, currently to goe on without any fall or ſtumble? As for the things of the world, their true nature is in a manner ſo involved with obſcurity, that unto many Philoſophers, and thoſe no mean ones, they ſeemed altogether incomprehenſible; and even to the Stoicks themſelves, ſcarce, and not without much difficulty comprehenſible; ſo that all aſſent of ours is fallible; for who is he that is infallible [*in his concluſions?*] From the nature of things, paſs now unto their ſubjects and matter: how temporary; how vile are they? ſuch as may be in the power and poſſeſſion of ſome abominable looſe liver, of ſome common ſtrumpet, of ſome notorious oppreſſour and extortioner. Paſs from thence to the diſpoſitions of them that thou doſt ordinarily converſe with, how hardly do we bear even with the moſt loving and amiable? that I may not ſay, how hard it is for us to bear even with our own ſelves. In ſuch obſcurity and impurity [*of things,*] in ſuch [*and ſo continual*] a flux both of the ſubſtances and time, both of the motions themſelves and things moved, what it is that we can faſten upon; either to honour and reſpect eſpecially, or ſeriouſly and ſtudiouſly to ſeek after; I cannot ſo much as conceive. For indeed they are things contrary.

X. Thou muſt comfort thy ſelf in the expectation of thy natural diſſolution, and [*in the mean time*] not grieve at the delay; but reſt contented in thoſe two things. Firſt, that nothing ſhall happen unto thee, which is not according to the nature of the Univerſe. Secondly,

condly, that it is in thy power, to doe nothing againſt thine own proper god, and [*inward*] Spirit. For it is not in any man's power to conſtrain thee to tranſgreſs againſt him.

XI. What is the uſe that now at this preſent I make of my ſoul? Thus from time to time and upon all occaſions thou muſt put this queſtion to thy ſelf, What is now that part of mine which they call the rational miſtriſs part, imployed about? Whoſe ſoul do I now properly poſſeſs? a child's? or a youth's? a woman's? or a tyrant's? ſome brute's, or ſome wild beaſt's ſoul?

See the notes.

XII. What thoſe things are in themſelves, which by the greateſt part are eſteemed *good*, thou mayeſt gather even from this. For if a man ſhall hear things mentioned as *good*, which are really *good* indeed, ſuch as are prudence, temperance, juſtice, fortitude; after ſo much heard and conceived, he cannot endure to hear of any more; for the word *good* is properly ſpoken of them. But as for thoſe which by the vulgar are eſteemed *good*, if he ſhall hear them mentioned as *good*, he doth hearken for more. He is well contented to hear that what is ſpoken by the Comedian, is but familiarly and popularly ſpoken; ſo that even the vulgar apprehend the difference. For why is it elſe, that this offends not and needs not to be excuſed, [*when vertues are ſtyled good:*] but that which is ſpoken in commendation of wealth, pleaſure, or honour, we entertain it onely as merrily and pleaſantly ſpoken? Proceed therefore, and enquire farther, whether it may not be that thoſe things alſo, which being mentioned [*upon the ſtage*

ſtage as the onely things which made a man truly rich and happy,] were merrily [*and with great applauſe of the multitude*] ſcoffed at with this jeſt, *that they that poſſeſſed them, had not in all the world of their own (ſuch was their affluence and plenty) ſo much as a place where to void their excrements:* Whether, I ſay, theſe ought [*not*] alſo in very deed to be much reſpected, and eſteemed of as the onely things that are truly *good.*

XIII. All that I conſiſt of, is either form or matter. No corruption can reduce either of theſe unto nothing: for neither did I of nothing become a ſubſiſtent creature. Every part of mine then, will by mutation be diſpoſed into a certain part of the whole world; and that in time into another part; and ſo *in infinitum:* by which kind of mutation, I alſo became what I am, and ſo did they that begot me, and they before them, and ſo upwards *in infinitum.* For ſo we may be allowed to ſpeak, though the age and government of the world be to ſome certain periods of time limited and confined.

XIV. Reaſon, and rational power, are faculties which content themſelves with themſelves, and their own proper operations. And as for their firſt inclination and motion, that they take from themſelves. But their progreſs is right to the end and object, which is in their way, as it were, and lieth juſt before them: [that is, *which is feaſible and poſſible, whether it be that which at the firſt they propoſed to themſelves, or no.*] For which reaſon alſo ſuch actions are termed κατορθώσεις, to intimate the directneſs

See B. IV. n. I. B. V. n. XVII. B. VI. n. XLV.

of

of the way, [*by which they are atchieved.*] Nothing muſt be thought to belong to a man, which doth not belong unto him as he is a man. Theſe [*the event of purpoſes*] are not things required in a man. The nature of man doth not profeſs any ſuch things. The final ends and conſummations [*of actions*] are nothing at all to a man's nature. The end therefore of a man, or that *ſummum bonum* whereby that end is fulfilled, cannot conſiſt in the conſummation of actions [*purpoſed and intended.*] Again, concerning theſe [*outward worldly*] things, were it ſo that any of them did properly belong unto man, then would it not belong unto man to contemn them, and to ſtand in oppoſition with them. Neither would he be praiſe-worthy that can live without them; or he good, (if theſe were good indeed,) who of his own accord doth deprive himſelf of any of them. But we ſee contrarywiſe, that the more a man doth withdraw himſelf from theſe [*wherein external pomp and greatneſs doth conſiſt,*] or any other like theſe, or the better he doth bear with the loſs of theſe, the better he is accounted.

XV. Such as thy thoughts and ordinary cogitations are, ſuch will thy mind be in time. For the ſoul doth as it were receive its tincture from the phancies and imaginations. Dye it therefore and throughly ſoke it with the aſſiduity of theſe cogitations. As for example. Whereſoever thou mayeſt live, there it is in thy power to live well and happy: But thou mayeſt live at the Court, there then alſo mayeſt thou live well and happy. Again, that which every thing is made for, he is alſo made

made unto that; and cannot but naturally incline unto it. That which any thing doth naturally Incline unto, therein is his end. Wherein the end of every thing doth conſiſt, therein alſo doth his good and benefit conſiſt. Society therefore is the proper good of a rational creature: For that we are made for ſociety, it hath long ſince been demonſtrated. Or can any man make any queſtion of this, that whatſoever is naturally worſe and inferiour, is ordinarily ſubordinated to that which is better? and that thoſe things that are beſt, are made one for another? and thoſe things that have ſouls, are better than thoſe that have none? and of thoſe that have, thoſe beſt that have rational ſouls?

XVI. To deſire things impoſſible is the part of a mad-man: But it is a thing impoſſible that wicked men ſhould not commit ſome ſuch things. Neither doth any thing happen to any man, which in the ordinary courſe of nature as natural unto him doth not happen. Again, the ſame things happen unto others alſo. And truly, if either he that is ignorant that ſuch a thing hath happened unto him, or he that is ambitious to be commended for his magnanimity, can be patient, and is not grieved; is it not a grievous thing, that either ignorance, or a vain deſire to pleaſe and to be commended, ſhould be more powerfull and effectual than true prudence? As for the things themſelves, they touch not the ſoul, neither can they have any acceſs unto it: neither can they of themſeves any ways either affect it or move it: For ſhe her ſelf alone can affect and move her ſelf, and accor-

See Note upon B.IV. n. III.

See B. VI. n. VII.

ding as the *Dogmata* and opinions are, which ſhe doth vouchſafe her ſelf, ſo are thoſe things which, as acceſſories, have any co-exiſtence with her.

XVII. After one conſideration, man is neareſt unto us; as we are bound to doe them good, and to bear with them: but as he may oppoſe any of our true proper actions, ſo man is unto me but as a thing indifferent; even as the Sun, or the Wind, or ſome wild Beaſt. By ſome of theſe it may be, that ſome operation or other of mine may be hindred; however, of my mind and reſolution it ſelf there can be no lett or impediment, by reaſon of that ordinary conſtant, both *Reſervation* [*wherewith it inclineth*,] and ready Converſion [*of objects, from that which may not be, to that which may be; which in the proſecution of its inclinations, as occaſion ſerves, it doth obſerve.*] For by theſe the mind doth turn and convert any impediment whatſoever, to be her aim and purpoſe. So that what before was the impediment, is now the principal object of her working; and that which before was in her way, is now her readieſt way.

See B. IV. n. I.

XVIII. Honour that which is chiefeſt and moſt powerfull in the world, and that is it which makes uſe of all things, and governs all things, [*God.*] So alſo in thy ſelf, honour that [*thy ſpirit or underſtanding*] which is chiefeſt, and moſt powerfull; and is of one kind and nature with that [*which we now ſpake of:*] For it is the very ſame, which being in thee, turneth all other things to its

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own uſe, and by whom alſo thy life is governed.

XIX. That which doth not hurt the City it ſelf, cannot hurt any Citizen. This rule thou muſt remember to apply and make uſe of upon every conceit and apprehenſion of wrong. * If the whole City be not hurt by this, neither am I certainly. And if the whole be not, why ſhould I make it my private grievance? [*conſider rather*] what it is wherein he is overſeen [*that is thought to have done the wrong.*] [*Again,*] Often meditate how ſwiftly all things that ſubſiſt, and all things that are done in the world, are carried away, and as it were conveighed out of ſight: For both the ſubſtances themſelves, (we ſee) as a flood, are in a continual flux; and all actions in a perpetual change; and the cauſes themſelves ſubject to a thouſand alterations: neither is there any thing almoſt, that may ever be ſaid to be now ſettled and conſtant. Next unto this, and which follows upon it, [*conſider*] both the infiniteneſs of the time already paſſed, and the immenſe vaſtneſs of that which is to come, wherein all things are to be reſolved, and annihilated. Art not thou then a very fool, who for theſe things art either puffed up with pride, or diſtracted with cares, or canſt find in thy heart to make ſuch moans, as for a thing that would trouble thee for a very long time? Conſider the whole Univerſe, whereof thou art but a very little part; and the whole age of the world together, whereof but a ſhort and very momentary portion is allotted unto thee; and all the Fates and Deſtinies together, of which how much is it that

* See the Latine notes. See n. 8. & 29. of this book; and in the Table, *the World*, *a City*.

comes to thy part and ſhare! [*Again:*] Another doth treſpaſs againſt me. Let him look to that. He is maſter of his own diſpoſition, and of his own operation. I for my part am in the mean time in poſſeſſion of as much as the common nature would have me to poſſeſs: and that which mine own nature would have me doe, I doe.

XX. Let not that chief commanding part of thy ſoul be ever ſubject to any variation through any corporal either pain or pleaſure, neither ſuffer it to be mixed with theſe, but let it both circumſcribe it ſelf, and confine thoſe affections to their own proper parts and members. But if at any time they do reflect and rebound upon the mind and underſtanding, (as in an united and compacted body it muſt needs,) then muſt thou not go about to reſiſt ſenſe and feeling, it being natural. However let not thy underſtanding [*to this natural ſenſe and feeling, which whether unto our fleſh pleaſant or painfull, is unto us nothing properly,*] add an opinion of either good or bad, [*and all is well.*]

See notes. XXI. *To live with the Gods.* He liveth with the Gods, who at all times affords unto them the ſpectacle of a ſoul both contented and well pleaſed with whatſoever is afforded or allotted unto her; and performing whatſoever is pleaſing to that Spirit, whom (being part of himſelf) *Jove* hath appointed to every man as his overſeer and governour; which is every man his Intellect and Reaſon.

XXII. Be not angry, neither with him whoſe breath,

breath, neither with him whoſe *ala* [or *armeholes*] are offenſive. What can he doe? ſuch is his breath [*naturally,*] and ſuch are his *ale*; and from ſuch, ſuch an effect, and ſuch a ſmell muſt of neceſſity proceed. O! but the man, (ſayeſt thou) hath underſtanding in him, and might of himſelf know, that he by ſtanding near cannot chuſe but offend. And thou alſo (God bleſs thee,) haſt underſtanding. Let thy reaſonable faculty work upon his reaſonable faculty; ſhew him his fault, admoniſh him. If he hearken unto thee, thou ſhalt cure him, and there will be no more occaſion of anger.

XXIII. *Where there ſhall neither roarer be, nor harlot.* [*Why ſo?*] As thou doſt purpoſe to live, when thou haſt retired thy ſelf [*to ſome ſuch place, where neither roarer nor harlot is:*] ſo mayeſt thou here. And if they will not ſuffer thee, then mayeſt thou leave thy life [*rather than thy calling,*] but ſo as one that doth not think himſelf any ways wronged. Onely as one would ſay, Here is a ſmoak; I will not out of it. And what a great matter is this? Now till ſome ſuch thing force me out, I will continue free; neither ſhall any man hinder me to doe what I will, and my Will ſhall ever be by the proper nature of a reaſonable and ſociable creature regulated and directed. See B. IV. n. III. and the notes upon this place.

XXIV. That rational Eſſence by which the Univerſe is grounded, is for community and ſociety; and therefore hath it both made the things that are worſe for the beſt, and hath allied and knit together thoſe which are beſt

as it were in an harmony. Seeſt thou not how it hath ſubordinated, and co-ordinated? and how it hath diſtributed unto every thing according to its worth? and thoſe which have the pre-eminency and ſuperiority above all, hath it united together into a mutual conſent and agreement.

XXV. How haſt thou carried thy ſelf hitherto towards the Gods? towards thy Parents? towards thy Brethren? towards thy Wife? towards thy Children? towards thy Maſters? thy foſter-Fathers? thy Friends? thy Domeſticks? thy Servants? Is it ſo with thee, that hitherto thou haſt neither by word or deed wronged any of them? Remember withall through how many things thou haſt already paſſed, and how many thou haſt been able to endure; ſo that now the *Legend* of thy life is full, and thy charge is accompliſhed. Again, how many truly good things have certainly by thee been diſcerned? how many pleaſures, how many pains haſt thou paſſed over with contempt? how many things [*externally*] glorious haſt thou deſpiſed? towards how many perverſe unreaſonable men haſt thou carried thy ſelf kindly and diſcreetly?

XXVI. Why ſhould imprudent, unlearned ſouls trouble that which is both learned and prudent? And which is that that is ſo? ſhe that underſtandeth the beginning and the end, and hath the true knowledge of that rational Eſſence, that paſſeth through all things ſubſiſting, and through all ages [*being ever the ſame*,] diſpoſing and diſpenſing (as it were) this

this Universe by certain periods of time.

XXVII. Within a very little while, thou wilt be either ashes, or a *skeleton*; and a Name, perchance; and perchance, not so much as a Name. And what is that but an [*empty*] sound, and a rebounding Echo? Those things which in this life are deerest unto us, and of most account, they are [*in themselves*] but vain, putrid, contemptible. [*The most weighty and serious, if rightly esteemed, but*] as puppies biting one another; or untoward children, now laughing, and then crying. As for faith, and modesty, and justice, and truth, *they long since* [*as one of the Poets hath it*] *have abandoned this spatious Earth, and retired themselves into Heaven.* What is it then that doth keep thee here, if things sensible be so mutable and unsettled, and the senses so obscure, and so fallible, and our Souls nothing but an exhalation of bloud, and to be in credit among such, be but vanity? What is it that thou dost stay for? an Extinction, or a Translation: for either of them with a propitious and contented mind. But till that time come, what will content thee? what else, but to worship and praise the gods, and to doe good unto men; to bear with them, and to forbear to doe them any wrong; and for all external things belonging either to this thy wretched body, or life, to remember that they are neither thine, nor in thy power? See B. VII. num. III.

XXVIII. Thou mayest always speed, if thou wilt but make choice of the right way; if in the course both of thine opinions and actions, thou wilt observe a true method. These two things

be common to the ſouls, as of God, ſo of men, and of every reaſonable creature: firſt, that [*in their own proper work*] they cannot be hindred by any thing: and ſecondly, that their happineſs doth conſiſt in a diſpoſition to, and in the practice of righteouſneſs; and that in theſe their deſire is terminated.

XXIX. If this [*that makes my friend to lament*] neither be my wicked act, nor an act any ways depending from any wickedneſs of mine, and that by it the publick [or, *Univerſe*] is not hurt; what doth it concern me? And wherein can the publick be hurt? For thou muſt not altogether be carried by conceit [*and common opinion.*] As for help, thou muſt afford that unto them after thy beſt ability, and as their need ſhall require, though they ſuſtain damage but in theſe middle [or, *worldly*] things; but however do not thou conceive that they are truly hurt thereby: for that is not right. But as that old foſter-Father [*in the Comedy*] being now to take his leave, doth [*with a great deal of Ceremony*] require this foſter-Child's *rhombus*, [or, *rattle-top, that he was wont to play with, for a remembrance of him*;] remembring nevertheleſs that it is but a *rhombus*, [*a rattle, or a bawble:*] ſo here alſo [*doe thou likewiſe.*] For indeed what is all this ſolemn declaiming and exclaiming at the *Roſtra* [*if it be rightly conſidered?*] O man! haſt thou forgotten what thoſe things are? yea, but they are things that others much care for, and highly eſteem of. Wilt thou therefore be a fool too? Once I was; [*let that ſuffice.*]

See num. XIX. and B.X. n.VI.

XXX.

XXX. Let death ſurprize me when it will, and where it will, I may be εὐμοιρος [or, *a happy man*] nevertheleſs. For he is a happy man, who [*in his life-time*] dealeth unto himſelf a happy lot and portion. A happy lot and portion is good inclinations of the ſoul, good deſires, good actions.

THE SIXTH BOOK.

THE matter it ſelf of which the Univerſe doth conſiſt, is of it ſelf very tractable and pliable. That rational Eſſence that doth govern it, hath in it ſelf no cauſe to doe evil. It hath no evil [*in it ſelf*,] neither can it doe any thing that is evil; neither can any thing be hurt by it. And all things are done and determined according to its will and preſcript.

II. Be it all one unto thee, whether half frozen or well warm; whether onely ſlumbering or after a full ſleep; whether diſcommended or commended thou doe thy duty; or whether dying or doing ſomewhat elſe; for that alſo *to dye*, muſt among the reſt be reckoned as one of the duties and actions of our lives. [*Whenſoever then the time of that duty ſhall be,*] then alſo muſt it ſuffice thee [*to make thee happy*] that then thou doſt well acquit thy ſelf of that preſent duty; [or, *that the preſent time is ſpent by thee upon a good action.*]

III. Look in, let not either the proper quality, or

or the true worth of any thing pass thee, [*before thou hast fully apprehended it.*]

IV. All substances come soon to their change, and either they shall be resolved by way of exhalation, (if so be that all things shall be re-united into one substance,) or [*as others maintain,*] they shall be scattered and dispersed. As for that Rational Essence by which all things are governed, as it best understandeth it self, both its own disposition, and what it doeth, and what matter it hath to doe with, [*and accordingly doth all things; so we that doe not, no wonder, if we wonder at many things, the reasons whereof we cannot comprehend.*]

V. The best kind of revenge is, not to become like unto them.

See B. V. n. XVI.

VI. Let this be thy onely joy, and thy onely comfort, from one sociable [*kind*] action [*without intermission*] to pass unto another, God being ever in thy mind.

VII. The rational commanding part, as it alone can stir up and turn it self; so it maketh both it self to be, and every thing that happeneth, to appear unto it self as it will it self.

VIII. According to the nature of the Universe all things [*particular*] are determined, not according to any other nature, either about, compassing and containing; or within, dispersed and contained; or without, depending. Either this Universe is a mere confused mass, and an intricate context of things, which shall in time be scattered and dispersed again: or it is an Union consisting of Order, and administred by providence. If the first, why should I desire

to

to continue any longer in this *fortuit* confuſion and commixtion? or why ſhould I take care for any thing elſe, but that as ſoon as may be I may be Earth [*again?*] And why ſhould I trouble my ſelf any more [*whilſt I ſeek to pleaſe the gods?*] Whatſoever I doe, Diſperſion is my end, and will come upon me whether I will or no. But if the latter be, then am not I religious in vain; then will I be quiet and patient, and put my truſt in Him who is the Governour of all.

IX. Whenſoever by ſome preſent hard occurrences thou art conſtrained to be as it were troubled and vexed, return unto thy ſelf as ſoon as may be, and be not out of tune longer than thou muſt needs: For ſo ſhalt thou be the better able to keep thy part another time, and to maintain the harmony, if thou doſt uſe thy ſelf to this continually; once out, preſently to have recourſe unto it, and to begin again.

X. If it were that thou hadſt at one time both a ſtepmother and a natural mother living, thou wouldſt honour and reſpect her alſo; nevertheleſs to thine own natural mother would thy refuge and recourſe be continually. So let the Court and thy Philoſophy be unto thee. Have recourſe unto it often, and comfort thy ſelf in her, by whom it is that thoſe other things are made tolerable unto thee, and thou alſo in thoſe things not intolerable unto others.

XI. How marvellous uſefull is it for a man to repreſent unto himſelf meats, and all ſuch things that are for the mouth, under a right apprehenſion

prehenſion and imagination? as for example; This is the carkaſs of a Fiſh, this of a Bird, and this of a Hog. And again more generally; This *Falernum*, [*this excellent highly commended wine*,] is but the bare juice of an ordinary Grape. This purple robe, but Sheeps hairs, died with the bloud of a Shell-fiſh. So for *coitus*, it is but the attrition of an ordinary baſe entrail; and the excretion of a *little* * *vile ſnivel*, with a certain kind of convulſion: [*according to* Hippocrates *his opinion.*] How excellent uſefull are theſe lively Fancies and Repreſentations of things, thus penetrating and paſſing through the objects, to make their true nature known and apparent! This muſt thou uſe all thy life long, and upon all occaſions; and then eſpecially, when matters are apprehended as of great worth and reſpect, [*thy art and care muſt be*] to uncover them, and to behold their vileneſs, and to take away from them all thoſe ſerious circumſtances and expreſſions, under which they made ſo grave a ſhew. *For outward pomp and appearance* is a great juggler; and then eſpecially art thou moſt in danger to be beguiled by it, when (to a man's thinking) thou moſt ſeemeſt to be employed about matters of moment.

* Greek μυξαείν. See B. IV. n. xxxix.

Gr. ὁ πρόσ. See B. III. n. VII.

XII. See what *Crates* pronounceth concerning *Xenocrates* himſelf.

XIII. Thoſe things which the common ſort of People do admire, are moſt of them ſuch things as are very general, and may be comprehended under things merely natural, or naturally affected and qualified: as ſtones, wood, figs, vines, olives. Thoſe that be admired by them that are more

more moderate and reſtrained, are comprehended under things animated; as flocks and herds. Thoſe that are yet more gentle and curious, their admiration is commonly confined to reaſonable creatures onely; not in general as they are reaſonable, but as they are capable of art, or of ſome craft and ſubtile invention: or perchance barely to reaſonable creatures; as they that delight in the poſſeſſion of many ſlaves. But he that honours a reaſonable ſoul in general, as it is reaſonable and naturally ſociable, doth little regard any thing elſe; and above all things is careſull to preſerve his own in the continual habit and exerciſe both of reaſon and ſociableneſs: and thereby doth co-operate with him, of whoſe nature he doth alſo participate; [*God.*]

XIV. Some things haſten to be, and others to be no more. And even whatſoever now is, ſome part thereof hath already periſhed. Perpetual fluxes and alterations renew the world, as the perpetual courſe of time doth make the age of the world (of it ſelf infinite) to appear always freſh and new. In ſuch a flux and courſe of all things, what of theſe things that haſten ſo faſt away ſhould any man regard, ſince among all there is not any that a man may faſten and fix upon? as if a man would ſettle his affection upon ſome ordinary Sparrow flying by him, who is no ſooner ſeen, than out of ſight. For we muſt not think otherwiſe of our lives than as a mere exhalation of bloud, or of an ordinary reſpiration of air. For what [*in our common apprehenſion*] it is, to breathe in the air, and to breathe it out again, which we doe daily; ſo much is it and no more, at once to breathe

breathe out all thy reſpirative faculty into that common air from whence but lately (as being but from yeſterday and to day,) thou didſt firſt breathe it in, and with it, life.

XV. Not vegetative ſpiration, it is not ſurely (which Plants have) that [*in this life*] ſhould be ſo dear unto us; nor ſenſitive reſpiration, the proper life of beaſts, both tame and wild; nor this our imaginative faculty; nor that we are ſubject to be led and carried up and down by the ſtrength and violence of our ſenſual appetites; or that we can aſſemble and live together; or that we can feed: for that in effect is no better, than that we can void the excrements of our food. What is it then that ſhould be dear unto us? to hear a clattering noiſe? if not that, then neither to be applauded by the tongues of men. For the praiſes of many tongues is in effect no better than the clattering of ſo many tongues. If then neither applauſe, what is there remaining that ſhould be dear unto thee? This I think: that [*in all thy motions and actions*] thou be moved, and reſtrained, according to thine own true natural conſtitution and conſtruction onely. And to this even ordinary arts and profeſſions do lead us: For it is that which every art doth aim at, that whatſoever it is that is by art effected and prepared, may be fit for that work that it is prepared for. This is the end that he that dreſſeth the Vine, and he that takes upon him either to tame Colts, or to train up Dogs, doth aim at. What elſe doth the education of Children, and all learned profeſſions

ſeſſions tend unto? Certainly then it is that which ſhould be dear unto us alſo. If in this particular it go well with thee, care not for the obtaining of other things. But is it ſo, that thou canſt not but reſpect other things alſo? Then canſt not thou be truly free; then canſt thou not have ſelf-content; then wilt thou ever be ſubject to paſſions. For it is not poſſible but that thou muſt be envious, and jealous, and ſuſpicious of them who [*thou knoweſt*] can bereave thee of ſuch things; and again, a ſecret underminer of them whom thou ſeeſt in preſent poſſeſſion of that which is dear unto thee. To be ſhort, he muſt of neceſſity be full of confuſion within himſelf, and often accuſe the gods, whoſoever ſtands in need of theſe things. But if thou ſhalt honour and reſpect thy mind onely, that will make thee acceptable towards thy ſelf, towards thy friends very tractable, and conformable and concordant with the gods; that is, accepting with praiſes whatſoever they ſhall think good to appoint and allot unto thee. See note 5. upon the II. B. out of *Epictetus*, and n. XXXVI. of this VI. B.

XVI. Under, above, and about, are the motions of the Elements; but the motion of vertue is none of thoſe motions, but is ſomewhat more excellent and divine: Whoſe way (to ſpeed and proſper in it) muſt be through a way that is not eaſily comprehended. See *Job* 28. 1,2. to 12,13, &c.

XVII. Who can chuſe but wonder at them? They will not ſpeak well of them that are at the ſame time with them, and live with them: yet they themſelves are very ambitious,

ous, that they that ſhall follow, whom they have never ſeen, nor ſhall ever ſee, ſhould ſpeak well of them. As if a man ſhould grieve that he hath not been commended by them that lived before him.

XVIII. Do not ever conceive any thing impoſſible to man, which by thee cannot, or not without much difficulty, be effected; but whatſoever in general thou canſt conceive poſſible and proper unto any man, think that very poſſible unto thee alſo.

XIX. Suppoſe that at the *Paleſtra* [or *fencing-ſchool*] ſome body hath all torn thee with his nails, and hath broken thy head. Well, thou art wounded. Yet thou doſt not exclaim; thou art not offended with him. Thou doſt not ſuſpect him for it afterwards, as one that watcheth to doe thee a miſchief. Yea, even then, though thou doſt thy beſt to ſave thy ſelf from him, yet not from him as an enemy. It is not by way of any ſuſpicious indignation, but by way of gentle and friendly declining. Keep the ſame mind and diſpoſition in other parts of thy life alſo. For many things there be, which we muſt conceit and apprehend, as though we had had to doe with an antagoniſt at the *Paleſtra*. For, as I ſaid, it is very poſſible for us to avoid and decline, though we neither ſuſpect nor hate.

XX. If any body ſhall reprove me, and ſhall make it apparent unto me, that in any either opinion or action of mine I do err, I will moſt gladly retract. For it is the truth that I ſeek after, by which I am ſure that never

never any man was hurt; and as ſure, that he is hurt that continueth in any errour or ignorance whatſoever.

XXI. I for my part will doe what belongs unto me: as for other things, whether things unſenſible or things irrational; or if rational, yet deceived and ignorant of the true way, they ſhall not trouble or diſtract me. For as for thoſe creatures which are not indued with reaſon, and all other things and matters of the world whatſoever, I freely and generouſly, as one indued with reaſon, of things that have none, make uſe of them. And as for men, towards them, as naturally partakers of the ſame reaſon, my care is to carry my ſelf ſociably. But whatſoever it is that thou art about, remember to call upon the gods. And as for the time, how long thou ſhalt live to doe theſe things, let it be altogether indifferent unto thee, for even three ſuch hours are ſufficient.

XXII. *Alexander* of *Macedon*, and he that dreſſed his Mules, when once dead, both came to one paſs. For either they were both reſumed into thoſe original rational eſſences from whence all things in the world are propagated; or both after one faſhion were ſcattered into Atoms.

XXIII. Conſider how many different things, whether they concern our bodies, or our ſouls, in a moment of time come to paſs in every one of us; and ſo thou wilt not wonder if many more things, or rather all things that are done, can at one time ſubſiſt, and co-exiſt in that both *One* and *General*, which we call the *World*. See B. IV. n. xxxiij.

XXIV. If any ſhould put this queſtion unto thee, how this word *Antoninus* is written; wouldſt thou not preſently fix thine intention upon it, and utter out in order every letter of it? And if any ſhall begin to gain-ſay thee, and quarrel with thee about it; wilt thou quarrel with him again, or rather go on meekly as thou haſt begun, untill thou haſt numbred out every letter? Here then likewiſe remember, that every duty that belongs unto a man doth conſiſt of ſome certain letters or numbers as it were, to which without any noiſe or tumult keeping thy ſelf, thou muſt orderly proceed to thy propoſed end, forbearing to quarrel with him that would quarrel and fall out with thee.

XXV. Is it not a cruel thing to forbid men to affect thoſe things which they conceive to agree beſt with their own natures, and to tend moſt to their own proper good and behoof? But thou after a ſort denieſt them this liberty, as often as thou art angry with them for their ſins. For ſurely they are led unto thoſe ſins, whatſoever they be, as to their proper good and commodity. But it is not ſo [*thou wilt object perchance; and they are deceived.*] Thou therefore teach them better, and make it appear unto them: but be not thou angry with them.

XXVI. Death is a ceſſation from the impreſſions of the ſenſes, the tyranny of the paſſions, the errours of the mind, and the ſervitude of the body.

XXVII. If in this kind of life thy body be able to hold out, it is a ſhame that thy ſoul ſhould

ſhould faint firſt, and give over. Take heed; leſt [*of a Philoſopher*] thou become a [*mere*] *Cæſar* in time, and receive a new tincture [*from the Court.*] For it may happen, [*if thou doſt not take heed.*] Keep thy ſelf therefore truly ſimple, good, ſincere, grave, free from all oſtentation, a lover of that which is juſt, religious, kind, tender-hearted, ſtrong and vigorous to undergo any thing that becomes thee. Endeavour to continue ſuch as Philoſophy [*hadſt thou wholly and conſtantly applied thy ſelf unto it,*] would have made and ſecured thee. Worſhip the gods, procure the welfare of men: this life is ſhort. Charitable actions, and a holy diſpoſition, is the onely fruit of this earthly life.

XXVIII. Doe all things as becometh the Diſcipline of *Antoninus* [*Pius.*] Remember his reſolute conſtancy in things that were done by him according to reaſon, his equability in all things, his ſanctity; the chearfulneſs of his countenance, his ſweetneſs, and how free he was from all vain-glory; how carefull to come to the true and exact knowledge of matters in hand, and how he would by no means give over till he did fully and plainly underſtand the whole ſtate of the buſineſs: and how patiently and without any conteſtation he would bear with them that did unjuſtly condemn him: how he would never be overhaſty in any thing; nor give ear to ſlanders and falſe accuſations, but examine and obſerve with beſt diligence the ſeveral actions and diſpoſitions of men. Again; how he was

no back-biter, not eaſily frighted, not ſuſpicious, and in his language free from all affectation and curioſity: and how eaſily he would content himſelf with few things, as lodging, bedding, cloathing, and ordinary nouriſhment and attendence. How able to endure labour, how patient; able through his ſpare diet to continue from morning to evening without any neceſſity of withdrawing before his accuſtomed hours to the neceſſities of nature: his uniformity and conſtancy in matter of friendſhip. How he would bear with them that with all boldneſs and liberty oppoſed his opinions; and even rejoice if any man could better adviſe him: and laſtly, how religious he was without ſuperſtition. [*All theſe things of him remember,*] that whenſoever thy laſt hour ſhall come upon thee, it may find thee, as it did him, [*ready for it*] *in the* * *poſſeſſion of a good conſcience.*

* Gr. εὐσυνειδήτῳ.

XXIX. Stir up thy mind, and recall thy wits again [*from thy natural dreams and viſions:*] and when thou art perfectly awaken'd, and canſt perceive that they were but dreams that troubled thee; as one newly awakened [*out of another kind of ſleep,*] look upon theſe worldly things with the ſame mind as thou didſt upon thoſe, [*that thou ſaweſt in thy ſleep.*]

XXX. I conſiſt of body and ſoul: unto my body all things are indifferent, for of it ſelf it cannot affect one thing more than another with apprehenſion of any difference; as for my mind, all things which are not within

within the verge of her own operation, are indifferent unto her, and for her own operations, thoſe altogether depend of her; neither doth ſhe buſie herſelf about any, but thoſe that are preſent; for as for future and paſſed operations, thoſe alſo are now at this preſent indifferent unto her.

XXXI. As long as the foot doth that which belongeth unto it to doe, and the hand that which belongs unto it, their labour, whatſoever it be, is not unnatural. So a man as long as he doth that which is proper unto a man, his labour cannot be againſt nature; and if it be not againſt nature, then neither is it hurtfull unto him. [*But if it were ſo that happineſs did conſiſt in pleaſure*,] how came notorious robbers, impure, abominable livers, paricides and tyrants, in ſo large a meaſure to have their part of pleaſures?

XXXII. Doſt thou not ſee, how even thoſe that profeſs mechanick arts, though in ſome reſpect they be no better than mere Idiots, yet they ſtick cloſe to the courſe of their trade, neither can they find in their heart to decline from it? And is it not a grievous thing that an Architect, or a Phyſician ſhall reſpect the courſe and myſteries of their profeſſion, more than a man the proper courſe and condition of his own nature, Reaſon, which is common to him and the gods?

XXXIII. *Aſia*, *Europe*, what are they, but as corners of the whole world? of which the whole Sea is but as one drop; and the great mount

Athos but as a clod; as all preſent time is but as one point of eternity. All, petty things; all, things that are ſoon altered, ſoon periſhed. And all things come from one beginning; either all ſeverally and particularly deliberated and reſolved upon, by the general Ruler and Governour of all; or all by neceſſary conſequence. So that the dreadfull *hiatus* of a gaping Lion, and all poiſon, and all hurtfull things, are but (as the thorn and the mire) the neceſſary conſequences of goodly fair things. Think not of theſe therefore, as things contrary to thoſe which thou doſt much honour and reſpect; but conſider in the mind the true fountain of all.

See B. VII. n. XLIV.

XXXIV. He that ſeeth the things that are now, hath ſeen all that either was ever, or ever ſhall be; for all things are of one kind, and all like one unto another. Meditate often upon the connexion of all things in the World; and upon the mutual relation that they have one unto another. For all things are after a ſort folded and involved one within another, and by theſe means all agree well together. For one thing is conſequent unto another, by local motion, by natural conſpiration and agreement, and by ſubſtantial union, [or, *reduction of all ſubſtances into one.*]

XXXV. Fit and accommodate thy ſelf to that eſtate and to thoſe occurrences, which by the deſtinies have been annexed unto thee; and love thoſe men whom thy fate it is to live with; but love them truly. An inſtrument, a tool, an utenſil, whatſoever it be, if

if it be fit for the purpoſe it was made for, it is as it ſhould be, though he perchance that made and fitted it be out of ſight and gone. But in things natural, that power which hath framed and fitted them, is, and abideth within them ſtill: for which reaſon it ought alſo the more to be reſpected, and we are the more obliged (if we may live and paſs our time according to her purpoſe and intention) to think that all is well with us, and according to our own minds. After this manner alſo, and in this reſpect it is, that he that is all in all doth enjoy his happineſs.

XXXVI. What things ſoever are not within the proper power and juriſdiction of thine own Will [*either to compaſs or avoid*,] if thou ſhalt propoſe unto thy ſelf any of thoſe things as either good, or evil; it muſt needs be that according as thou ſhalt either fall into that which thou doſt think evil, or miſs of that which thou doſt think good, ſo wilt thou be ready both to complain of the gods, and to hate thoſe men, who either ſhall be ſo indeed, or ſhall by thee be ſuſpected, as the cauſe either of thy miſſing of the one, or falling into the other. And indeed we muſt needs commit many evils, if we incline to any of theſe things, more or leſs, with an opinion of any difference. But if we mind and fanſie thoſe things onely as good and bad, which wholly depend of our own Wills, there is no more occaſion why we ſhould either murmure againſt the gods, or be at enmity with any man.

XXXVII. We all work to one effect, ſome willingly, and with a rational apprehenſion of what we doe; others without any ſuch knowledge. As, I think, *Heraclitus* in a place ſpeaketh of them that ſleep, that even they do work in their kind, and do confer to the general operations of the World. One man therefore doth co-operate after one ſort, and another after another ſort: but he that doth murmure, and to his power doth reſiſt and hinder; even he as much as any [*doth co-operate.*] For of ſuch alſo did the World ſtand in need. Now do thou conſider among which of theſe thou wilt rank thy ſelf. For as for him who is the Adminiſtratour of all, he will make good uſe of thee [*whether thou wilt or no,*] and make thee (as a part and member of the whole) ſo to co-operate with him, that whatſoever thou doeſt, ſhall turn to the furtherance of his own counſels and reſolutions. But be not thou [*for ſhame*] ſuch a part of the whole, as that * vile and ridiculous Verſe (which *Chryſippus* in a place doth mention) is a part of the Comedy.

See B. viij. n. xxxiij.

* See the Notes.

XXXVIII. Doth either the Sun take upon him to doe that which belongs to the rain? or his ſon *Æſculapius* that which unto the Earth doth properly belong? How is it with every one of the ſtars in particular? Though they all differ one from another, [*and have their ſeveral charges and functions by themſelves,*] do they not all nevertheleſs concurre and co-operate to one end?

See B. IV. n. XXII. B. VII. n. XXVI. laſt lines.

XXXIX. If ſo be that the gods have deliberated in particular of thoſe things which ſhould happen

happen unto me, I muſt ſtand to their deliberation, as diſcreet and wiſe. For that a god ſhould be an imprudent god, is a thing hard even to conceive: and why ſhould they reſolve to doe me hurt? for what profit either unto them or the Univerſe (which they ſpecially take care for) could ariſe from it? But if ſo be that they have not deliberated of me in particular, yet certainly they have of the whole in general; and thoſe things which in conſequence and coherence of this general deliberation happen unto me in particular, I am bound to embrace and accept of. But if ſo be that they have not deliberated at all, (which indeed is very irreligious for any man to believe: for then let us neither ſacrifice, nor pray, nor reſpect our oaths, neither let us any more uſe any of thoſe things, which we being perſuaded of the preſence and [*ſecret*] converſation of the gods among us, daily uſe and practiſe:) but, I ſay, if ſo be that they have not indeed [*either in general or particular*] deliberated of any of thoſe things that happen unto us in this world; yet [*God be thanked, that*] of thoſe things that concern my ſelf, it is lawfull for me to deliberate my ſelf, and all my deliberation is but concerning that which may be to me moſt profitable. Now that unto every one is moſt profitable, which is according to his own conſtitution and Nature. And my Nature is to be rational [*in all my actions*,] and as a good and natural member of a City and Common-wealth, towards my fellow-members ever to be ſociably and kindly diſpoſed and affected. My City and Countrey, as I am

Antoninus,

Antoninus, is *Rome*; as a man, the whole World. Thoſe things therefore that are expedient and profitable to thoſe Cities, are the onely things that are good and expedient for me.

XL. Whatſoever in any kind doth happen to any one, is expedient to the whole. And thus much [*to content us*] might ſuffice, [*that it is expedient for the whole in general.*] But yet this alſo ſhalt thou generally perceive, if thou doſt diligently take heed, that whatſoever [*doth happen*] to any one man or men ****. And now I am content that the word *expedient*, ſhould more generally be underſtood of [*thoſe things which we otherwiſe call*] middle things, [or, *things indifferent*; *as health, wealth, and the like.*]

XLI. As the ordinary ſhews of the Theatre, and of other ſuch places, when thou art preſented with them, [*affect thee*;] as the ſame things ſtill ſeen, and in the ſame faſhion, make the ſight ingratefull and tedious; ſo muſt all the things that we ſee all our life long affect us. For all things, above and below, are ſtill the ſame, and from the ſame [*cauſes.*] When then will there be an end?

XLII. Let the ſeveral deaths of men of all ſorts, and of all ſorts of profeſſions, and of all ſorts of nations, be a perpetual object of thy thoughts, **** ſo that thou mayſt even come down to *Philiſtio*, *Phœbus*, and *Origanion*. Paſs now to other generations. Thither ſhall we after many changes, where ſo many brave Oratours are; where ſo many grave Philoſophers, *Heraclitus*, *Pythagoras*, *Socrates*. Where

ſo

ſo many *Hero's* of the old times; and then ſo many brave Captains of the latter times; and ſo many Kings. After all theſe, where *Endoxus*, *Hipparchus*, *Archimedes*; where ſo many other ſharp, generous, induſtrious, ſubtile, peremptory diſpoſitions; and among others, even they that have been the greateſt Scoffers and Deriders of the frailty and brevity of this our humane life; as *Menippus*, and others, as many as there have been ſuch as he. Of all theſe conſider, that they long ſince are all dead and gone. And what do they ſuffer by it? Nay, they that have not ſo much as a Name remaining, what are they the worſe for it? One thing there is, and that onely, which is worth our while in this *World*, and ought by us much to be eſteemed; and that is, according to truth and righteouſneſs, meekly and lovingly to converſe with falſe and unrighteous men.

XLIII. Whenſoever thou wilt rejoice thy ſelf, call to mind the ſeveral gifts and vertues of them whom thou doſt daily converſe with; as for example, the induſtry of the one, the modeſty of another, the liberality of a third, of another ſome other thing. For nothing can ſo much rejoice thee, as the reſemblances and parallels of ſeveral vertues, viſible and eminent in the diſpoſitions of thoſe who live with thee; eſpecially when all at once, as near as may be, they repreſent themſelves unto thee. See therefore that thou have them always in a readineſs.

XLIV. Doſt thou grieve that thou doſt weigh but ſo many pounds, and not 300 rather? Juſt

as

as much reaſon haſt thou to grieve that thou muſt live but ſo many years, and no longer. For as for bulk and ſubſtance thou doſt content thy ſelf with that proportion of it that is allotted unto thee, ſo ſhouldſt thou for time.

XLV. Let us doe our beſt endeavours to perſuade them; but however, if Reaſon and Juſtice lead thee to it, doe it, though they be never ſo much againſt it. But if any ſhall by force withſtand thee, and hinder thee in it, convert [*thy vertuous inclinations from one object unto another, from Juſtice*] to contented æquanimity, and chearfull patience: ſo that what [*in the one*] is thy hindrance, thou mayſt make uſe of it for the exerciſe of another vertue: and remember that it was with due exception and reſervation, that thou didſt at firſt incline and deſire. For thou didſt not ſet thy mind upon things impoſſible. Upon what then? that all thy deſires might ever be moderated with this due kind of reſervation. And this thou haſt, and mayſt always obtain [*whether the thing deſired be in thy power or no. And what do I care for more, if*] that for which I was born, and brought forth into the world, [*to rule all my deſires with reaſon and diſcretion,*] may be?

See B. V. n. XIV.

XLVI. The ambitious ſuppoſeth another man's act, [*praiſe and applauſe,*] to be his own happineſs; the voluptuous his own ſenſe and feeling; but he that is wiſe, his own action.

XVII. It is in thy power abſolutely to exclude all manner of conceit and opinion as concerning

cerning this matter; and by the ſame means, to exclude all grief and ſorrow from thy ſoul. For as for the things and objects themſelves, they of themſelves have no ſuch power, whereby to beget and force upon us any opinion at all.

XLVIII. Uſe thy ſelf when any man ſpeaks unto thee, ſo to hearken unto him, as that in the *interim* thou give not way to any other thoughts; that ſo thou mayſt (as far as is poſſible) ſeem fixed and faſtned to his very ſoul, whoſoever he be that ſpeaks unto thee.

XLIX. That which is not good for the Beehive, [or, *whole ſwarm*] cannot be good for the Bee.

L. Will either paſſengers, or patients, find fault and complain, either the one if they be well carried, or the others if well cured? Do they take care for any more than this; the one, that their Ship-maſter may bring them ſafe to land; and the other, that their Phyſician may effect their recovery?

LI. How many of them who came into the world at the ſame time when I did, are already gone out of it?

LII. To them that are ſick of the Jaundies, Hony ſeems bitter; and to them that are bitten by a mad Dog, the Water terrible; and to Children, a little Ball ſeems a fine thing. And why then ſhould I be angry? or do I think that errour and falſe opinion is leſs powerfull [*to make men tranſgreſs,*] than either choler [*immoderate and exceſſive*] to cauſe the Jaundies; or poiſon, to cauſe Rage? See B. VII. n. xxxiv. B. VIII. n. XIII. &c.

LIII.

LIII. No man can hinder thee to live as thy nature doth require. Nothing can happen unto thee, but what the common good of Nature doth require.

LIV. What manner of men they be whom they ſeek to pleaſe, and what to get, and by what actions: how ſoon time will cover and bury all things; and how many it hath already buried.

THE SEVENTH BOOK.

WHAT is Wickedneſs? It is that which many times and often thou haſt already ſeen and known [*in the world.*] And ſo oft as any thing doth happen [*that might otherwiſe trouble thee,*] let this *memento* preſently come to thy mind, that it is that which thou haſt already often ſeen and known. Generally, above and below, thou ſhalt find but the ſame things. The very ſame things whereof ancient ſtories, middle-age ſtories, and freſh ſtories are full: whereof Towns are full, and Houſes full. There is nothing that is new. All things that are, are both uſual and of little continuance.

II. What fear is there that thy *Dogmata* [or, *philoſophical Reſolutions and Concluſions,*] ſhould become dead in thee, [*and loſe their proper power and efficacy to make thee live happy,*] as long as thoſe proper and cor-relative fancies, and repreſentations of things on which they mutually

ally depend (which continually to ſtir up and revive is in thy power,) are ſtill kept freſh and alive? It is in my power concerning this thing [*that is happened, whatſoever it be,*] to conceit that which is right and true. If it be, why then am I troubled? Thoſe things that are without my underſtanding, are nothing to it at all: [and that is it onely which doth properly concern me.] Be always in this mind, and thou wilt be right.

III. [*That which moſt men would think themſelves moſt happy for, and would prefer before all things, if the gods would grant it unto them after their deaths,*] thou mayſt [*whilſt thou liveſt*] grant unto thy ſelf; to live again; ſee the things of the World again, as thou haſt already ſeen them. For what is it elſe to live again? Publick ſhews and ſolemnities with much pomp and vanity, ſtage-plays, flocks and herds, conflicts and contentions, a bone thrown to a company of hungry Currs, a bait for greedy Fiſhes, the painfulneſs and continual burthen-bearing of wretched Ants, the running to and fro of terrified Mice, little Puppets drawn up and down with wires and nerves; [*theſe be the objects of the World.*] Among all theſe thou muſt ſtand ſtedfaſt, meekly affected, and free from all manner of indignation; with this right ratiocination and apprehenſion, that as the worth is of thoſe things which a man doth affect, ſo is [*in very deed*] every man's worth [*more or leſs.*]

See B. IV. n. xxxix. B. V. num. XXVII.

IV. Word after word, every one by it ſelf, muſt the things that are ſpoken be conceived and

and understood; and so the things that are done, purpose after purpose, every one by it self likewise. And as in matter of purposes and actions, we must presently see what is the proper [*use and*] relation of every one; so of words must we be as ready, to consider of every one, what is the true meaning and signification of it [*according to truth and nature, however it be taken in common use.*]

See B. III. num. XVI. B. IV. n. XXIV.

V. Is my reason and understanding sufficient for this or no? If it be sufficient, [*without any private applause, or publick ostentation*] I will make use of it for the work in hand, as of an Instrument which by nature I am provided of. If it be not, and that otherwise it belong not unto me particularly as a private duty, I will either give it over, or leave it to some other, that can better effect it: or I will endeavour it; but with the help of some other, who, with the joint help of my Reason, is able to bring somewhat to pass that will now be seasonable and usefull for the common good. For whatsoever I doe either by my self, or with some other, the onely thing that I must intend, is, that it be good and expedient for the publick. [For as for praise, consider] how many who once were much commended, are now already quite forgotten; yea, they that commended them, how even they themselves are long since dead and gone. Be not therefore ashamed, whensoever thou must use the help of others. For whatsoever it be that lieth upon thee to effect, thou must propose it unto thy self, as the scaling of walls is unto a Souldier. And what if thou through

through [*either*] lameneſs [*or ſome other impediment*] art not able to reach unto the top of the battlements alone, which with the help of another thou mayſt? [*wilt thou therefore give it over, or go about it with leſs courage and alacrity, becauſe thou canſt not effect it all alone?*]

VI. Let not things future trouble thee. For if neceſſity ſo require that they come to paſs, thou ſhalt (whenſoever that is,) be provided for them with the ſame reaſon, by which whatſoever is now preſent is made both tolerable and acceptable unto thee. All things are linked and knit together, and the knot is ſacred, neither is there any thing in the world that is not kind and natural in regard of any other thing. [Or, *that hath not ſome kind of reference and natural correſpondence with whatſoever is in the world beſides.*] For all things are ranked together, and by that decency of its due place and order that each particular doth obſerve, they all concur together to the making of one and the ſame κόσμος [or, *World, as if you ſaid*, a comely piece, or an orderly compoſition.] For all things throughout, there is but one and the ſame order; and through all things, one and the ſame god, the ſame ſubſtance, and the ſame Law. There is one common Reaſon, and one common Truth, that belongs unto all reaſonable creatures: for neither is there more than one perfection of all creatures that * *are of the ſame kind*, and partakers of the ſame reaſon.

* ὁμογενῶν.

VII. Whatſoever is material, doth ſoon vaniſh away into the common ſubſtance of the

whole; and whatsoever is made *formal* [or, *whatsoever doth animate that which is material*,] is soon resumed into the common Reason of the Whole, and the fame and memory of any thing is soon swallowed up by the general Age and duration of the whole.

VIII. To a reasonable creature, the same action is both according to nature, and according to reason.

IX. *Streight* [of it self] *not made streight.*

X. As several members in one body united, so are reasonable creatures in a body divided and dispersed, all made and prepared for one common operation. And this thou shalt apprehend the better, if thou shalt use thy self often to say to thy self, I am μέλος, or *a member*, of the mass and body of reasonable substances. But if thou shalt say, I am μέρος, or *a part*, thou dost not yet love men from thy heart. The joy that thou takest in the exercise of bounty is not yet grounded upon a due ratiocination, and right apprehension of the nature of things. Thou dost exercise it as yet upon this ground barely, as a thing convenient and fitting; not, as doing good to thy self, [*when thou doest good unto others.*]

XI. Of things that are external happen what will to that which can suffer by external accidents. Those things that suffer let them complain themselves, if they will; as for me, as long as I conceive no such thing, that that which is happened is evil, I have no hurt, and it is in my power not to conceive any such thing.

XII.

XII. Whatſoever any man either doeth or ſaith, thou muſt be good; [*not for any man's ſake, but for thine own nature's ſake:*] as if either Gold, or the Emerald, or Purple, ſhould ever be ſaying to themſelves, Whatſoever any man either doeth or ſaith, I muſt ſtill be an Emerald, and I muſt keep my colour.

XIII. [*This may ever be my comfort and ſecurity:*] my underſtanding, that ruleth over all, will not of it ſelf bring trouble and vexation upon it ſelf. This I ſay; it will not put if ſelf in any fear, it will not lead it ſelf into any concupiſcence. If it be in the power of any other to compell it to fear or to grieve, let him doe it. But ſure if it ſelf do not of it ſelf, through ſome [*falſe*] opinion or ſuppoſition, incline it ſelf to any ſuch diſpoſition, [*there is no fear.*] For as for the body, why ſhould I make the grief of my body to be the grief of my mind? If that it ſelf can either fear or complain, let it. But as for the ſoul, which indeed can onely be truly ſenſible of either fear or grief; to which onely it belongs, according to its different imaginations and opinions to admit of either of theſe, or of their contraries; [*thou mayſt look to that thy ſelf, that*] it ſuffer nothing. Induce her not to any ſuch opinion or perſuaſion. The underſtanding is of it ſelf ſufficient unto it ſelf, and needs not (if it ſelf doth not bring it ſelf to need) any other thing beſides it ſelf; and by conſequent, as it needs nothing, ſo neither can it be troubled and hindred by any thing, if it ſelf doth not trouble and hinder it ſelf.

XIV. What is εὐδαιμονία [or, *happineſs*,] but * ἀγαθὸς δαίμων, [or, *a good Dæmon*, or, *Spirit?*] What then doſt thou doe here, O opinion, by the gods I adjure thee, that thou get thee gone as thou cameſt: for I need thee not. Thou cameſt indeed [unto me] according to thy ancient wonted manner. [*It is that that all men have ever been ſubject unto. That thou cameſt therefore*] I am not angry with thee; onely be gone, [*now that I have found thee what thou art.*]

* See the Latin Notes.

XV. Is any man ſo fooliſh as to fear change, to which all things [*that once were not*] owe their being? And what is it that is more pleaſing and more familiar to the nature of the Univerſe? How couldſt thou thy ſelf uſe thy ordinary hot baths, ſhould not the wood [*that heateth them*] firſt be changed? how couldſt thou receive any nouriſhment from thoſe things that thou haſt eaten, if they ſhould not be changed? Can any thing elſe almoſt (that is uſefull and profitable) be brought to paſs without change? How then doſt not thou perceive, that for thee alſo [*by death*] to come to change, is a thing of the very ſame nature, and as neceſſary for the nature of the Univerſe?

XVI. Through the Subſtance of the Univerſe, as through a torrent, paſs all particular bodies, being all of the ſame nature, and all joint workers with the Univerſe in ſelf, as in one of our bodies ſo many members among themſelves. How many ſuch as *Chryſippus*, how many ſuch as *Socrates*, how many ſuch as *Epictetus*,

Epictetus, with the Age of the world long ſince ſwallowed up and devoured? Let this come into thy mind upon every occaſion, be it either men or buſineſs, that thou haſt occaſion to think of, [*to the end that thy thoughts be not diſtracted, and thy mind too earneſtly ſet upon any thing.*] Of all my thoughts and cares one onely thing ſhall be the object, that I my ſelf doe nothing which to the proper conſtitution of man (either in regard of the thing it ſelf, or in regard of the manner, or of the time of doing,) is contrary. The time when thou ſhalt have forgotten all things is at hand. And that time alſo is at hand, when thou thy ſelf ſhalt be forgotten by all. [*Whilſt thou art, apply thy ſelf to that eſpecially*] which unto man as he is a man is moſt proper and agreeable; and that is, for a man even to love them that tranſgreſs [*againſt him.*] This ſhall be, if at the ſame time [*that any ſuch thing doth happen,*] thou call to mind, that they are thy Kinſmen; that it is through ignorance and againſt their wills that they ſin; and that within a very ſhort while after, both thou and he ſhall be no more. But above all things, that he hath not done thee any hurt; for that by him thy mind and underſtanding is not made worſe or more vile than it was before.

XVII. The nature of the Univerſe, of the common ſubſtance of all things, as it were of ſo much wax, hath now perchance formed a Horſe; and then deſtroying that figure, hath new tempered and faſhioned the matter of it into the form and ſubſtance of a Tree; then

that again into the form and ſubſtance of a man; and then that again into ſome other. Now every one of theſe doth ſubſiſt but for a very little while. As for diſſolution, if it be no grievous thing to the cheſt or trunk, to be joined together; why ſhould it be more grievous to be put aſunder?

XVIII. An angry countenance is much againſt nature, and it is oftentimes the proper countenance of them that are at the point of death. * But be it ſo, that all anger and paſſion is ſo throughly quenched in thee, that it is altogether impoſſible to kindle it any more: [*yet herein muſt not thou reſt ſatisfied*;] but farther endeavour, by good conſequence of true ratiocination, perfectly to conceive and underſtand, that all anger and paſſion is againſt reaſon. For if thou ſhalt not be ſenſible of thine innocency; if that alſo ſhall be gone from thee, [*the comfort of a good conſcience, that thou doeſt all things according to reaſon:*] what ſhouldeſt thou live any longer for? All things that now thou ſeeſt are but for a moment. That nature, by which all things in the world are adminiſtred, will ſoon bring change and alteration upon them, and then of their ſubſtances make other things, [*like unto them*;] and then ſoon after others again of the matter and ſubſtance of theſe: that ſo by theſe means the world may ſtill appear freſh and new.

* See *Suidas*, and other ancients, who bear witneſs to *Anton.* that he was never ſeen to change his countenance through either anger or joy.

XIX. Whenſoever any man doth treſpaſs againſt thee, preſently conſider with thy ſelf what it was that he did ſuppoſe to be good, what to be evil, when he did treſpaſs. For this when

when thou knoweſt, thou wilt pity him; thou wilt have no occaſion either to wonder, or to be angry. For either thou thy ſelf doſt yet [*live in that errour or ignorance, as that thou doſt*] ſuppoſe either that very thing that he doeth, or ſome other like [*worldly*] thing, to be good; and ſo thou art bound to pardon him, [*if he have done that which thou in the like caſe wouldeſt have done thy ſelf.*] Or if ſo be that thou doſt not any more ſuppoſe the ſame things to be good or evil that he doeth; how canſt thou but be gentle unto him that is in an errour? See B. X. n. XXX.

XX. Fanſie not to thy ſelf things future, as though they were preſent: but of thoſe that are preſent, take ſome aſide, that thou takeſt moſt benefit of, and conſider of them particularly, how wonderfully thou wouldeſt want them, if they were not preſent. But take heed withall, leſt that whilſt thou doſt ſettle thy contentment in things preſent, thou grow in time ſo to overpriſe them, as that the want of them (whenſoever it ſhall ſo fall out) ſhould be a trouble and vexation unto thee. Wind up thy ſelf into thy ſelf. Such is the Nature of thy reaſonable commanding part, as that if it exerciſe juſtice, and have by that means tranquillity within it ſelf, it doth reſt fully ſatisfied with it ſelf [*without any other thing.*]

XXI. Wipe off all opinion: Stay the force and violence of unreaſonable luſts and affections: Circumſcribe the preſent time: Examine whatſoever it be that is happened, either to thy ſelf or to another: Divide all preſent objects, either in that which is formal or material;

rial; Think of the last hour. That which thy neighbour hath committed, where the guilt of it lieth, there let it rest. * *Extend* thy mind to [or, *Examine in order*] whatsoever is spoken. Let thy mind penetrate both into the effects, and into the causes. Rejoice thy self with true simplicity and modesty; and that all *middle things* between vertue and vice are indifferent unto thee. [*Finally,*] Love mankind; obey God.

* Συμπερι-ελθειν.

XXII. *All things* (saith he) *are by certain order and appointment.* And what if the Elements onely * * *, It will suffice to remember, that all things in general are by certain order and appointment: or if it be but few * *. And as concerning death, that either Dispersion, or the Atoms, or Annihilation, or Extinction, or Translation [*will ensue.*] And as concerning pain, that that which is intolerable is soon ended by death; and that which holds long must needs be tolerable; and that the mind in the mean time, [*which is all in all*] may * *by way of intersusion, or intercception* [*by stopping all manner of commerce and sympathy with the body,*] still retain its own tranquillity. Thy understanding is not made worse by it. As for those parts that suffer, let them, if they can, declare their grief themselves. As for praise and commendation, view their mind and understanding, what estate they are in; what kind of things they flee, and what things they seek after: and that as in the sea-shore, whatsoever was before to be seen, is by the continual succession of new heaps of sand cast up one upon another,

* κατ' ἐπιλυσιν. See B. V. n. XX. B. IX. n. XLI. See n. VI. upon B. II. and B. VII. p. xxxiv.

another, ſoon hid and covered; ſo in this life, all former things by thoſe which immediately ſucceed.

XXIII. Out of *Plato*. *He then whoſe mind is endowed with true magnanimity, who hath accuſtomed himſelf to the contemplation both of all times, and of all things in general; can this mortal life (thinkeſt thou) ſeem any great matter unto him? It is not poſſible, anſwered he. Then neither will ſuch a one account death a grievous thing? By no means.*

XXIV. Out of *Antiſthenes*. *It is a princely thing to doe well, and to be evil ſpoken of. It is a ſhamefull thing that the face ſhould be ſubject unto the mind, to be put into what ſhape it will, and to be dreſſed by it as it will; and that the mind ſhould not beſtow ſo much care upon her ſelf, as to faſhion her ſelf, and to dreſs her ſelf as beſt becometh her.*

XXV. [*Out of ſeverall Poets and Comicks.*] *It will but little avail thee, to turn thine anger and indignation upon the things themſelves* [*that have fallen croſs unto thee.*] *For as for them they are not ſenſible of it, &c. Thou ſhalt but make thy ſelf a laughing-ſtock both unto the gods and men, &c. Our life is reaped like a ripe ear of corn: one is yet ſtanding, and another is down, &c. But if ſo be that I and my children be neglected by the gods, there is ſome reaſon even for that, &c. As long as right and equity is on my ſide, &c. Not to lament with them, Not to tremble, &c.*

XXVI. Out of *Plato*. *My anſwer, full of juſtice and equity, ſhould be this: Thy ſpeech is not right, O man, if thou ſuppoſeſt, that he that*

is

is of any worth at all, ſhould apprehend either life or death as a matter of great hazard or danger; and ſhould not make this rather his onely care, to examine his own actions, whether juſt or unjuſt; whether actions of a good, or of a wicked man, &c. *For thus in very truth ſtands the caſe, O ye men of Athens! What place or ſtation ſoever a man either hath choſen to himſelf, judging it beſt for himſelf, or is by lawfull authority put and ſettled in; therein do I think (all appearance of danger notwithſtanding,) that he ſhould continue, as one who feareth neither death, nor any thing elſe, ſo much as he feareth to commit any thing that is vitious and ſhamefull,* &c. *But, O noble Sir, conſider, I pray, whether true generoſity and true happineſs do not conſiſt in ſomewhat elſe rather, than in the preſervation either of our or other mens lives. For it is not the part of a man that is a man indeed, to deſire to live long,* [*or to make much of his life whilſt he liveth:*] *But rather (he that is ſuch) will in theſe things wholly refer himſelf unto the gods, and believing that which every woman can tell him, that no man can eſcape death; the onely thing that he takes thought and care for is this, that what time he liveth, he may live as well and as vertuouſly as he can poſſibly,* &c. *To look about, and with the eyes to follow the courſe of the ſtars and planets, as though thou wouldeſt run with them; and to mind perpetually the ſeveral changes of the Elements one into another. For ſuch fancies and imaginations help much to purge away the droſs and filth of this our earthly life,* &c. That alſo is a fine paſſage of *Plato*'s, where he ſpeaketh of worldly things in theſe words: *Thou muſt alſo*

See B. IX. n. XXIX. B. XII. n. XVIII.

as

as from ſome higher place look down, as it were, upon the things of this world; as flocks, armies, husband-mens labours, marriages, divorces, generations, deaths, the tumults of Courts, and places of judicatures, deſart places, the ſeveral nations of Barbarians, publick feſtivals, mournings, fairs, markets. How all things [upon Earth] are pell-mell; and how [*miraculouſly*] things contrary one to another concur to the beauty and perfection of this Univerſe. See B. IV. n. XXII.

XXVII. To look back upon things of former ages, as upon the manifold changes and converſions of ſeveral Monarchies and Common-wealths. We may alſo fore-ſee things future, for they ſhall all be of the ſame kind; neither is it poſſible that they ſhould leave the tune, or break the conſort that is now begun, as it were, by theſe things that are now done and brought to paſs in the World. It comes all to one therefore, whether a man be a ſpectatour of the things of this life but forty years, or whether he ſee them ten thouſand years together: for what ſhall he ſee more? *And as for thoſe parts that came from the Earth, they ſhall return unto the Earth again; and thoſe that came from Heaven, they alſo ſhall return unto thoſe heavenly places.* Whether it be a mere diſſolution and unbinding of the manifold intricacies and intanglements of the confuſed Atoms; or ſome ſuch diſperſion of the ſimple and incorruptible Elements * * *. *With meats and drinks and divers charms, they ſeek to divert the chanel, that they might not dye. Yet muſt we needs endure that blaſt of wind that cometh from above,*

bove, though we toil and labour never so much.

* Gr. καββαλιώτερος.

XXVIII. *He hath * a stronger body, and is a better wrestler than I.* [*What then?*] Is he more bountifull? is he more modest? Doth he bear all adverse chances with more equanimity; or with his neighbours offences with more meekness and gentleness than I?

XXIX. Where the matter may be effected agreeably to that Reason, which both unto the gods and men is common, there can be no just cause of grief or sorrow. For where the fruit and benefit of an action well begun and prosecuted according to the proper constitution of man may be reaped and obtained, [or, *is sure and certain*,] it is against reason that any damage should there be suspected. In all places, and at all times, it is in thy power religiously to embrace whatsoever [*by God's appointment*] is happened unto thee, and justly to converse with those men whom thou hast to doe with; and accurately to examine every fancy that presents it self, that nothing may slip and steal in, before thou hast rightly apprehended the true Nature of it.

XXX. Look not about upon other mens minds and understandings; but look right on forwards whether Nature, both that of the Universe, in those things that happen unto thee, and thine in particular, in those things that are to be done by thee, doth lead and direct thee. Now every one is bound to doe that which is consequent and agreeable to that end which by his true natural constitution he was ordained unto.

unto. As for all other things, they are ordained for the use of reasonable creatures: as in all things we see that that which is worse and inferiour, is made for that which is better. Reasonable creatures, they are ordained one for another. That therefore which is chief in every man's constitution, is, that he intend the common good. The second is, that he yield not to any lusts and motions of the flesh. For it is the part and privilege of the reasonable and intellective faculty, that she can so bound her self, as that neither the sensitive nor the appetitive faculties may any ways prevail upon her. For both these are brutish. And [*therefore*] over both she challengeth mastery, and cannot any ways endure [*if in her right temper,*] to be subject unto either. And this indeed most justly. For by nature she was ordained to command all in the body. The third thing proper to man by his constitution is, to avoid all rashness and precipitancy; and not to be subject to errour. To these things then let the mind apply her self, and go streight on [*without any distraction about other things,*] and she hath her end, [*and by consequent her happiness.*]

XXXI. As one who had lived, and were now to dye by right, whatsoever is yet remaining, bestow that wholly as [*a gratious*] overplus upon a *vertuous life.* Love and affect that onely, whatsoever it be that happeneth, and is by the Fates appointed unto thee. For what can be more *reasonable?* And as any thing doth happen unto thee [*by way of cross or calamity,*] call

Gr. κατ' ἀρ φύσιν. See Pref.

to

to mind presently and set before thine eyes the examples of some other men, to whom the self-same thing did once happen likewise. Well, what did they? They grieved, they wondred, they complained. And where are they now? All dead and gone. Wilt thou also be like one of them? Or rather leaving these fickle dispositions to men of the world, (or, *men of as fickle minds as fickle bodies; ever changing, and soon changed themselves:*) let it be thine onely care and study, how to make a right use of all such accidents. For there is good use to be made of them, and they will prove fit matter for thee to work upon, if it shall be both thy *care* and thy *desire*, that whatsoever thou doest, thou thy self mayst like and approve thy self for it. And both these see that thou remember well, according as the diversity of the matter of the action that thou art about shall require. Look within; within is the fountain of all good: Such a fountain, where springing waters can never fail, so thou dig still deeper and deeper.

XXXII. Thou must use thy self also to keep thy body fixed and steady; free from all loose, fluctuant, either motion, or posture. And as upon thy face and looks, thy mind hath easily power over them to keep them to that which is grave and decent; so let it challenge the same power over the whole body also. But so observe all things in this kind, as that it be without any manner of affectation.

XXXIII. The art of true living in this world, is more like a wrestler's than a dancer's practice. For

For in this they both agree, [*to teach*] a man, whatſoever falls upon him, that he may be ready for it, and that nothing may caſt him down.

XXXIV. Thou muſt continually ponder and conſider with thy ſelf, what manner of men they be, and for their minds and underſtandings, what is their preſent eſtate, whoſe good word and teſtimony thou doſt deſire. For then neither wilt thou ſee cauſe to complain of them that offend againſt *their wills*; or find any want of their applauſe, if once thou doſt but penétrate into the true ſource and ground both of their opinions and of their deſires. *No ſoul* (ſaith he) *is willingly bereaved of the Truth*; and by conſequent, neither of juſtice, or temperance, or kindneſs and mildneſs; nor of any thing that is of the ſame kind. It is moſt needfull that thou ſhouldeſt always remember this: For ſo ſhalt thou be far more gentle and moderate towards all men. See B. VIII. n. XIII.

XXXV. What pain ſoever thou art in, let this preſently come to thy mind, that it is not a thing whereof thou needeſt to be aſhamed; neither is it a thing whereby thy underſtanding, that hath the government of all, can be made worſe. For neither in regard of the ſubſtance of it, nor in regard of the end of it, (which is, to intend the common good;) can it alter and corrupt it. This alſo of *Epicurus* mayſt thou in moſt pains find ſome help of, that it is *neither intolerable, nor eternal*; ſo thou keep thy ſelf to the true bounds and limits [*of reaſon,*] and add not unto them the opinion [*of either good or evil.*] This alſo thou muſt conſider, that many things

things there be, which oftentimes unsensibly trouble and vex thee, [*as not armed against them with patience, because they go not ordinarily under the name of pains,*] which in very deed are of the same nature as pain; as to slumber unquietly, to suffer heat, to want appetite: when therefore any of these things make thee discontented, check thy self with these words. Now hath pain given thee the foil; Thy courage hath failed thee.

XXXVI. Take heed lest at any time thou stand so affected, though towards unnatural evil men, as ordinary men are commonly one towards another.

XXXVII. How know we whether *Socrates* were so eminent indeed, and of so extraordinary a disposition? For that he dyed more gloriously, that he disputed with the Sophists more subtilly, that he watched in the *Pagus* more assiduously, that being commanded to fetch [*innocent*] *Salaminius*, he refused to doe it more generously; all this will not serve. Nor that * *he walked in the streets with much gravity and majesty*; as was objected unto him by his adversaries: which nevertheless a man may well doubt of, whether it were so or no, [or, *which above all the rest, if so be that it were true, a man would well consider of, whether commendable, or discommendable.*] The thing therefore that we must inquire into is this; What manner of soul *Socrates* had; whether his disposition was such, as that all that he stood upon and sought after in this world, was barely this, That he might ever carry himself justly towards men, and holily

* Gr. ἐν τῇ ὁδοῖς ἐβρενθύετο. See *Suidas.*

lily towards the gods, neither vexing himself to no purpose at the wickedness of others, nor yet ever condescending to any man's *evil fact*, or *evil intentions*, [*through either fear, or ingagement of friendship.*] Whether of those things that happened unto him by God's appointment, he neither did wonder at any when it did happen, or thought it intolerable in the trial of it. And, lastly, whether he never did suffer his mind to sympathize with the senses and affections of the body. For we must not think that Nature hath so mixed and tempered it with the body, as that she hath not power to circumscribe her self, and by her self to intend her own ends and occasions.

XXXVIII. *For it is a thing very possible, that a man should be a very divine man, and yet be altogether unknown.* This thou must ever be mindfull of, as of this also, that *a man's true happiness doth consist in very few things.* And that although thou dost despair, that thou shalt ever be a good either Logician or Naturalist, yet thou art never the farther off by it from being either liberal, or modest, or charitable, or obedient unto God.

XXXIX. Free from all compulsion in all chearfulness and alacrity thou mayst run out thy time, though men should exclaim against thee never so much, and the wild beasts should pull in sunder the poor members * of this mass of flesh that compasseth thee about. For what in either of these or the like cases should hinder the mind to retain her own rest and tranquillity, consisting both in the right judgment

* See the Notes.

of those things that happen unto her, and in the ready use of all present matters and occasions? So that her *judgment* may say to that which is *befaln her by way of cross*, This thou art in very deed, and according to thy true nature; notwithstanding that in the judgment of opinion thou dost appear otherwise: and her *discretion to the present object*, Thou art that which I sought for. For whatsoever it be that is now present, shall ever be embraced by me as a fit and seasonable object, both for my reasonable faculty, and for my *sociable*, or *charitable*, inclination to work upon. And that which is principal in this matter, is, that it may be referred either unto [*the praise of*] God, or to [*the good of*] men. For either unto God or man, whatsoever it is that doth happen in the world, hath in the ordinary course of nature its proper reference; neither is there any thing, that [*in regard of nature*] is either new or reluctant and intractable, but all things both usual and easie.

Gr. τὴν κρίσιν τῷ πρεσπίπτοντι. τὴν χρῆσιν τῷ ὑποπίπτοντι.

XL. Then hath a man attained to the estate of perfection in his life and conversation, when he so spends every day, as if it were his last day: never hot and vehement in his affections, nor yet so cold and stupid as one that had no sense; and free from all manner of dissimulation.

XLI. Can the gods, who are immortal, for the continuance of so many ages bear without indignation with such and so many sinners as have ever been; yea not onely so, but also take such care for them, that they want nothing? and dost thou so grievously take on, as one that could

could heat with them no longer; thou that art but for a moment of time; yea, thou that art one of thoſe ſinners thy ſelf? A very ridiculous thing it is, that any man ſhould diſpenſe with vice and wickedneſs in himſelf, which is in his power to reſtrain; and ſhould go about to ſuppreſs it in others; which is altogether impoſſible.

XLII. What object ſoever our reaſonable and *ſociable* faculty doth meet with, that affords nothing either for the ſatisfaction of reaſon, or for the practice of charity, ſhe worthily doth think unworthy of her ſelf.

XLIII. When thou haſt done well, and another is benefited by thy action, muſt thou like a very fool look for a third thing beſides, as that it may appear unto others alſo that thou haſt done well, or that thou mayſt in time receive one good turn for another? No man uſeth to be weary of that which is beneficial unto him. But every action according to Nature is beneficial. Be not weary then of doing that which is beneficial unto thee, whilſt it is ſo unto others.

XLIV. The nature of the Univerſe did once certainly deliberate, and ſo reſolve upon the creation of the World [*before it was created; whatſoever it hath done ſince.*] Now ſince that time, whatſoever it is that is and happens in the world, is either but a conſequent of that one and firſt deliberation: Or if ſo be that this ruling rational part of the world takes any thought and care of things particular, they are ſurely

See B. VI. n. xxxiij, xxxix. B. IX. n. XXVI.

his reaſonable and principal creatures, that are the proper object of his particular care and providence. This often thought upon will much conduce to thy tranquillity.

THE EIGHTH BOOK.

THIS alſo, among other things, may ſerve to keep thee from vain-glory, if thou ſhalt conſider, that thou now art altogether incapable of the commendation of one who all his life long, or from his youth at leaſt, hath lived a Philoſopher's life. For both unto others, and to thy ſelf eſpecially, it is well known, that thou haſt done many things contrary to that perfection of life. Thou haſt therefore been confounded in thy courſe, and henceforth it will be hard for thee to recover the Title and credit of a Philoſopher. And to it alſo is thy calling and profeſſion repugnant. If therefore thou doſt truly underſtand what it is that is of moment indeed; as for thy fame and credit, take no thought or care for that: let it ſuffice thee, if all the reſt of thy life, be it more or leſs, thou ſhall live as thy nature requireth, [or, *according to the true and natural end of thy making.*] Take pains therefore to know what it is that thy nature require h, and let nothing elſe diſtract thee. Thou haſt already had ſufficient experience, that of thoſe many things about which thou haſt hitherto wandred, thou couldeſt not find

find happineſs in any of them. Not in Syllogiſms and Logical ſubtilties, not in wealth, not in honour and reputation, not in pleaſure. In none of all theſe. Wherein then is it to be found? In the practice of thoſe things which the nature of man, as he is a man, doth require? How then ſhall he doe thoſe things? If his *Dogmata*, or moral Tenets and Opinions (from which all motions and actions do proceed,) be right and true. Which be thoſe *Dogmata?* Thoſe that concern that which is good or evil: as that there is nothing truly good and beneficial unto man, but that which makes him juſt, temperate, courageous, liberal; and that there is nothing truly evil and hurtfull unto man, but that which cauſeth the contrary effects.

II. Upon every action that thou art about, put this queſtion to thy ſelf; How will this when it is done agree with me? Shall I have no occaſion to repent of it? Yet a very little while and I am dead and gone, and all things are at an end. What then do I care for more than this, that my preſent action, whatſoever it be, may be the proper action of one that is reaſonable; whoſe end is the common good; who in all things is ruled and governed by the ſame law [*of right and reaſon*,] by which God himſelf is?

III. *Alexander*, *Caius*, *Pompeius*; what are theſe to *Diogenes*, *Heraclitus*, and *Socrates?* Theſe penetrated into the true nature of things; into all cauſes, and all ſubjects: and upon theſe did they exerciſe their power and authority: [or, *theſe were the objects of their power and juriſdiction:*]

diction:] But as for those, as the extent of their errour was, [or, *of their care and providence in worldly matters*,] so far did their slavery extend.

* Gr. διαῤῥαγῆς, *burst thy self*, properly.

IV. *What they have done, they will still doe, although thou shouldst* * *burst thy self.* First, Let it not trouble thee. For all things [*both good and evil*] come to pass according to the nature and general condition of the Universe, and within a very little while all things will be at an end; no man will be remembred: as now of *Hadrianus* (for example) and *Augustus*, it is already come to pass. Then, secondly, Fix thy mind upon the thing it self; look into it, and remembring thy self, that thou art bound nevertheless to be a good man, and what it is that thy nature requireth of thee as thou art a man, be not diverted from what thou art about, and speak that which seemeth unto thee most just: onely speak it kindly, modestly, and without hypocrisie.

V. That which the nature of the Universe doth busie her self about, is, that which is here, to transfer it thither, to change it; and thence again to take it away, and to carry it to another place. All things are but [*successive*] changes [*of one into another:*] So that thou needest not fear any new thing. For all things are usual and ordinary; and all things are disposed by equality.

VI. Every particular nature hath content, when in its own proper course it speeds. A reasonable nature doth then speed, when first in matter of fancies and imaginations it gives no

no conſent to that which is either falſe or uncertain. Secondly, when in all its motions, and reſolutions it takes its level at the common good onely, and deſireth nothing, and flieth from nothing, but what is in its own power to compaſs or avoid. And, laſtly, when it willingly and gladly embraceth whatſoever is dealt and appointed unto it by the common Nature. For it is part of it; even as the nature of any one leaf is part of the common nature of all plants and trees. But that the nature of a leaf is part of a nature both unreaſonable and unſenſible, and which [*in its proper end*] may be hindred; [or, *which is ſervile and ſlaviſh:*] whereas the nature of man is part of a common nature which cannot be hindred, and which is both reaſonable and juſt. From whence alſo it is, that according to the worth of every thing, ſhe doth make ſuch equal diſtribution of all things, as of duration, ſubſtance, form, operation, and of events and accidents. But herein conſider, not whether thou ſhalt find this equality in every thing abſolutely and by it ſelf; but whether in all the particulars of ſome one thing taken together, and compared with all the particulars of ſome other thing together likewiſe.

VII. Thou haſt no time nor opportunity to reade. What then? Haſt thou not time and opportunity to exerciſe thy ſelf, not to wrong [*thy ſelf*;] to ſtrive againſt [*all carnal*] pleaſures and pains, and to get the upper hand of them; to contemn honour and vain-glory; and not onely not to be angry with them whom

towards thee thou doſt find unſenſible and unthankfull, but alſo to have a care of them ſtill, and of their welfare?

VIII. Forbear henceforth to complain of the troubles of a Courtly life, either in publick before others, or in private by thy ſelf.

IX. Repentance is an inward and ſelf reprehenſion for the neglect or omiſſion of ſomewhat that was profitable. Now whatſoever is good, is alſo profitable, and it is the part of an honeſt vertuous man to ſet by it, and to make reckoning of it accordingly. But never did any honeſt vertuous man repent of the neglect or omiſſion of any [*carnal*] pleaſure: no [*carnal*] pleaſure then is either good or profitable.

X. This, what is it in it ſelf, and by it ſelf, according to its proper conſtitution? What is the ſubſtance of it? What is the matter, [or, *proper uſe?*] What is the form [or, *efficient cauſe?*] What is it for in this world, and how long will it abide? [*Thou muſt thou examine all things that preſent themſelves unto thee.*]

XI. When thou art hard to be ſtirred up and awakened out of thy ſleep, admoniſh thy ſelf and call to mind, that, to perform actions tending to the common good, is that which thine own proper conſtitution, and that which the nature of man do require. But to ſleep, is common to unreaſonable creatures alſo. And what more proper and natural, yea what more kind and pleaſing, than that which is according to Nature?

XII. As

XII. As every fancie and imagination preſents it ſelf unto thee, conſider (if it be poſſible) the true nature and the proper qualities of it, and reaſon with thy ſelf about it.

XIII. At thy firſt encounter with any one, ſay preſently to thy ſelf, This man, what are his opinions concerning that which is good or evil? as concerning pain, pleaſure, and the cauſes of both; concerning honour and diſhonour, concerning life and death; thus and thus. Now if it be no wonder that a man ſhould have ſuch and ſuch opinions; how can it be a wonder that he ſhould doe ſuch and ſuch things? I will remember then, that he cannot but doe as he doeth [*holding thoſe opinions that he doth.*] And that as it is a ſhame for any man to wonder that a fig-tree ſhould bear figs, ſo is it alſo to wonder that the World ſhould bear any thing, whatſoever it is which in the ordinary courſe of nature it may bear. To a Phyſician alſo and to a Pilot it is a ſhame, either for the one to wonder that ſuch and ſuch a one ſhould have an Ague; or for the other, that the winds ſhould prove contrary.

XIV. Remember, that to change thy mind upon occaſion, and to follow him that is able to rectifie thee, is equally ingenuous, [*as to find out at the firſt what is right and juſt, without help.*] For of thee nothing is required that is beyond the extent of thine own deliberation and judgment, and of thine own underſtanding.

XV. If it were thine act and in thine own power, why wouldſt thou doe it? If it were not, whom

whom doſt thou accuſe? the atoms, or the gods? For to doe either is the part of a mad-man. Thou muſt therefore blame no body, but, if it be in thy power, redreſs what is amiſs; if it be not, to what end is it to complain? For nothing ſhould be done but to ſome certain end.

XVI. Whatſoever dyeth [*and falleth, however and whereſoever it dye and fall,*] it cannot fall out of the world. If here it have its abode and change, here alſo ſhall it have its diſſolution into its proper elements. The ſame are the world's Elements, and the elements of which thou doſt conſiſt. And they when they are changed, they murmure not; [*why ſhouldſt thou?*]

XVII. Whatſoever is, was made for ſomething, as a Horſe, a Vine. Why wondereſt thou? The Sun it ſelf can tell thee, for what work he was made: and ſo [*hath*] every god [*its proper function.*] What then were thou made for? to diſport and delight thy ſelf? See how even common ſenſe and reaſon cannot brook it.

XVIII. Nature hath its end as well in the end and final conſummation of any thing that is, as in the beginning and continuation of it.

XIX. As one that toſſeth up a Ball. And what is a Ball the better, if the motion of it be upwards; or the worſe, if it be downwards, or if it chance to fall upon the ground? So for the Bubble; if it continue, what is it the better? and if it diſſolve, what is it the worſe? And ſo is it of a Candle too. [*And ſo muſt thou reaſon with*

with thy ſelf, both in matter of fame, and in matter of death. For as for the body it ſelf, (the ſubject of death) wouldſt thou know the vileneſs of it?] Turn it about, [*that thou mayſt behold it the worſt ſide upwards as well as in its more ordinary pleaſant ſhape:*] how doth it look when it is old and withered? when ſick and pained? when in the act of luſt and fornication? [*And as for fame,*] This life is ſhort. But he that praiſeth, and he that is praiſed; he that remembers, and he that is remembred, [*will ſoon be duſt and aſhes.*] Beſides, it is but in one corner of this part of the World [*that thou art praiſed;*] and yet in this corner thou haſt not the joint praiſes of all men, no, nor ſcarce of any one conſtantly. And yet the whole earth it ſelf, what is it but as one point, [*in regard of the whole world?*]

XX. That which muſt be the ſubject of thy conſideration, is either the matter it ſelf, or the *Dogma*, or the operation, or the true ſenſe and ſignification.

XXI. Moſt juſtly have theſe things happened unto thee: [*why doſt not thou amend?*] O but thou hadſt rather *become* good to morrow, than to *be* ſo to day.

XXII. Shall I doe it? I will; ſo the end of my action be to doe good unto men. Doth any thing by way of croſs or adverſity happen unto me? I accept it, with reference unto the Gods, and [*their providence;*] the fountain of all things, from which whatſoever comes to paſs doth hang and depend.

XXIII. [*By one action judge of the reſt.*] This bathing

bathing [*which usually takes up so much of our time*] what is it? Oil, sweat, filth; [or, *the sordes of the body:*] water, an excrementitious viscosity, [*the excrements of oil, and other ointments used about the body, and mixed with the sordes of the body:*] all base and loathsome. And such [*almost*] is every part of our life, and every [*worldly*] object.

XXIV. *Lucilla* [*buried*] *Verus*; then was *Lucilla* her self [*buried by others.*] So *Secunda*, *Maximus*, then *Secunda* her self. So *Epitunchanus*, *Diotimus*; then *Epitunchanus* himself. So *Antoninus Pius*, *Faustina* [*his wife*;] then *Antoninus* himself. This is the course of the world. First, *Celer*, *Adrianus*; then *Adrianus* himself. And those austere ones, those that foretold other mens deaths, those that were so proud and stately, where are they now? Those austere ones I mean, such as were *Charax*, and *Demetrius* the Platonick, and *Eudæmon*; and others like unto those. They were but for one day; all dead and gone long since. Some of them no sooner dead, than forgotten. Others soon turned into fables. Of others, even that which was fabulous is now long since forgotten. This therefore thou must remember, that whatsoever thou art compounded of, shall [*soon*] be dispersed, and that thy life and breath, [or, *thy soul,*] shall either be no more, or shall be translated, and appointed to some certain place and station.

XXV. The true joy of a man is, to doe that which properly belongs unto a man. That which is most proper unto a man, is, First, to be kindly affected

affected towards them that are of the same kind and nature as he is himself; to contemn all sensual motions and appetites; to discern rightly all plausible fancies and imaginations; to contemplate the nature of the Universe; both it, and all things that are done in it. [*In which kind of contemplation*] three several relations [*are to be observed.*] The first, to the appearing secondary cause. The second, to the first original cause, God, from whom originally proceeds whatsoever doth happen in the World. The third and last, to them that we live and converse with: [*what use may be made of it to their use and benefit.*]

XXVI. If pain be an evil, either it is in regard of the body, (and that cannot be, *because the body of it self is altogether insensible:*) or in regard of the soul. But it is in the power of the soul to preserve her own peace and tranquillity, and not to suppose that pain is evil. For all judgement and deliberation, all prosecution or aversation is from within, whither the sense of evil [*except it be let in by opinion*] cannot penetrate.

Gr. οὐκοῦν ἀποφαινέσθω. See B. VII. n. XIII.

XXVII. Wipe off all [*idle*] fancies, and say unto thy self incessantly, Now, if I will, it is in my power to keep out of this my soul all wickedness, all lust and concupiscences, all trouble and confusion: But on the contrary, to behold and consider all things according to their true nature, and to carry my self towards every thing according to its true worth. Remember then this thy power, that Nature hath given thee.

XXVIII.

XXVIII. Whether thou ſpeak in the Senate, or whether thou ſpeak to any particular, let thy ſpeech be always grave and modeſt. But thou muſt not openly and vulgarly obſerve that ſound and exact form of ſpeaking [*concerning that which is truly good and truly evil; the vanity of the world, and of worldly men:*] which otherwiſe Truth and Reaſon doth preſcribe.

XXIX. *Auguſtus* his Court, his Wife, his Daughter, his Nephews, his Sons in Law, his Siſter, *Agrippa*, his Kinſmen, his domeſticks, his Friends; *Areus*, *Mecœnas*, his *aruſpices* [or *ſlayers of beaſts for ſacrifice and divination:*] There thou haſt the death of a whole Court together. Proceed now on to the reſt [*that have been ſince that of* Auguſtus.] Hath death dealt with them otherwiſe, [*though ſo many and ſo ſtately whilſt they lived,*] than it doth uſe to deal with any one particular man? Conſider now the death of a whole kindred and family, as of that of the *Pompeys*, as that alſo that uſeth to be written upon ſome monuments, HE WAS THE LAST OF HIS OWN KINDRED. O, what care did his Predeceſſours take that they might leave a ſucceſſour! yet, behold, at laſt one or other muſt of neceſſity be THE LAST. Here again therefore conſider the death of a whole kindred.

XXX. Contract thy whole life to the meaſure and proportion of one ſingle action. And if in every particular action thou doſt perform what is fitting to the utmoſt of thy power, let it ſuffice thee, [or, *think that thou haſt lived long enough.*] And who can hinder thee, but that thou

thou mayſt perform what is fitting? But there may be ſome outward let and impediment. Not any that can hinder thee, but that whatſoever thou doeſt, thou mayſt doe it juſtly, temperately, and with the praiſe of God. Yea, but there may be ſomewhat whereby ſome operation or other of thine may be hindred. And then with that very thing that doth hinder, thou mayſt be well pleaſed, and ſo by this gentle and equanimous converſion of thy mind unto that which may be, [*inſtead of that which at firſt thou didſt intend,*] in the room of that former action there ſucceedeth another, which agrees [*as well*] with this *contraction* of thy life that we now ſpeak of.

XXXI. Receive [*temporal bleſſings*] without oſtentation, when they are ſent; and [*thou ſhalt be able*] to part with them with all readineſs and facility when they are taken from thee again.

XXXII. If ever thou ſaweſt either a hand, or a foot, or a head lying by it ſelf, in ſome place or other, as cut off from the reſt of the body, ſuch muſt thou conceive him to make himſelf, as much as in him lieth, that either is offended with any thing that is happened, (whatſoever it be) and as it were divides himſelf from it; or that commits any thing againſt the natural Law of mutual correſpondence and ſociety among men; or, [*he that commits any act of uncharitableneſs.*] Whoſoever thou art that art ſuch, thou art caſt forth I know not whither out of the general unity, which is according to Nature. Thou wert born indeed a-part, but now thou haſt

hast cut thy self off. However, herein is matter of joy and exultation, that thou mayst be united again. God hath not granted it unto any other part, that once separated and cut off, it might be re-united and come together again. But, behold, that GOODNESS [*how great and immense it is!*] which hath so much esteemed MAN. As at first he was so made, that he needed not, except he would himself, have rent or divided himself from the whole; so once divided and cut off, IT hath so provided and ordered it, that if he would himself, he might return, and grow together again, and be admitted into his former rank and place of a part, as he was before.

See n. LIII. B. XI. n. VII.

XXXIII. The Nature of the Universe as it hath imparted almost all her other faculties and properties unto every reasonable creature, so this in particular we have received from her, that as whatsoever doth oppose it self unto her, and doth withstand her in her purposes and intentions, she doth, though against its will and intention, *bring it about to her self, to serve her self of it in the execution of her own destinated ends*; and so [*by this though not intended co-operation of it with her self*] makes it part of her self [*whether it will or no*;] So may every reasonable Creature, what crosses or impediments soever it meets with [*in the course of this mortal life,*] it may use them as fit and proper objects, to the furtherance of whatsoever is intended, and absolutely proposed unto it self [*as its natural end and happiness.*]

Gr. ὑποπεριτρέπει καὶ κατατάσσει εἰς τὴν εἱμαρμένην. See B. VI. XXXVII.

XXXIV.

XXXIV. Let not the general repreſentation unto thy ſelf of the wretchedneſs of this our mortal life trouble thee. Let not * *thy mind wander up and down, and heap together in her thoughts* the many troubles and grievous calamities which thou art as ſubject unto as any other. But as every thing in particular doth happen, put this queſtion unto thy ſelf, and ſay, What is it that in this preſent matter ſeems unto thee ſo intolerable? For thou wilt be aſhamed to confeſs it. Then upon this preſently call to mind, that neither that which is future, nor that which is paſt can hurt thee; but that onely which is preſent. (And that alſo is much leſſened, if thou doſt rightly circumſcribe it.) And then check thy mind, if for ſo little a while (a mere inſtant) it cannot hold out with patience. * Gr. συμφέρεσθαι.

XXXV. What? are either *Pantheas* or *Pergamus* abiding to this day by their Maſter's tombs? or either *Chabrias* or *Diotimus* by that of *Adrianus*? O foolery! For what if they did? would their Maſters be ſenſible of it? or if ſenſible, would they be glad of it? or if glad, were theſe immortal? Was not it appointed unto them alſo (both men and women,) to become old in time, and then to dye? And theſe once dead, what would become of theſe former? [*And when all is done, what is all this for,*] but for *a bag of bloud and corruption*; [or, *a loathſome carkaſs?*] See notes.

XXXVI. *If thou beeſt quick-ſighted, be ſo in matter of judgment, and beſt diſcretion,* ſaith he.

XXXVII. In the whole conſtitution of a man, I

ſee not any vertue contrary to juſtice, whereby it may be reſiſted and oppoſed. But one whereby pleaſure and voluptuouſneſs may be reſiſted and oppoſed, I ſee, Continence.

XXXVIII. If thou canſt but withdraw conceit and opinion concerning that which may ſeem hurtfull and offenſive, thou thy ſelf art as ſafe as ſafe may be. Thou thy ſelf? and who is that? Thy Reaſon? Yea, but I am not Reaſon. Well, be it ſo. However, let not thy Reaſon [or, *underſtanding*] admit of grief; and if there be any thing in thee that is grieved, let that (whatſoever it be,) conceive its own grief, [*if it can.*]

See before n. XXVI.

XXXIX. That which is an hindrance of the ſenſes, is an evil to the ſenſitive nature. That which is an hindrance of the appetitive and proſecutive faculty, is an evil to the ſenſitive nature. As of the ſenſitive, ſo of the vegetative conſtitution, whatſoever is an hindrance untó it, is alſo in that reſpect an evil unto the ſame. And ſo likewiſe, whatſoever is an hindrance unto the mind and underſtanding, muſt needs be the proper evil of the reaſonable nature. Now apply all thoſe things unto thy ſelf. Do either pain or pleaſure ſeize on thee? Let the ſenſes look to that. Haſt thou met with ſome obſtacle or other in thy purpoſe and intention? If thou didſt propoſe without due reſervation and exception, now hath thy reaſonable part received a blow indeed. But if in general thou didſt propoſe unto thy ſelf whatſoever might be, thou art not thereby either hurt, nor [*properly*] hindered. For in thoſe things that properly belong unto

See B. IV. n. I.

unto the mind, ſhe cannot be hindred by any man. It is not Fire, nor Iron, nor the Power of a Tyrant, nor the Power of a ſlandering Tongue, nor any thing elſe that can penetrate into her.

XL. *If once round and ſolid, there is no fear that ever it will change.*

XLI. Why ſhould I grieve my ſelf, who never did willingly grieve any other? One thing rejoiceth one, and another thing another. As for me, this is my joy; If my underſtanding be right and ſound, as neither averſe from any man, nor refuſing any of thoſe things which as a man I am ſubject unto; If I can look upon all things in the world meekly and kindly; accept all things, and carry my ſelf towards every thing according to the true worth of the thing it ſelf.

XLII. This time that is now preſent, beſtow thou upon thy ſelf. They that rather hunt for fame after death, do not conſider, that thoſe men that ſhall be hereafter, will be even ſuch as theſe, whom now they can ſo hardly bear with: And beſides, they alſo will be mortal men. But [*to conſider the thing in it ſelf*] if ſo many with ſo many voices ſhall make ſuch and a ſound, or ſhall have ſuch and ſuch an opinion concerning thee, what is it at all to thee?

XLIII. Take me and throw me where thou wilt: [*I am indifferent.*] For there alſo I ſhall have that Spirit which is within me propitious; that is, well pleaſed and fully contented, both in that conſtant diſpoſition, and with thoſe particular actions which to its own proper conſtitution are ſuitable and agreeable.

XLIV. Is this then a thing of that worth, that for it my ſoul ſhould ſuffer, and become worſe than it was? as either baſely dejected, *and caſt down; or confounded within it ſelf, or terrified? What can there be that thou ſhouldſt ſo much eſteem?

* See Latin Notes.

XLV. Nothing can happen unto thee, which is not incidental unto thee as thou art a man. As nothing can happen either to an ox, a vine, or to a ſtone, which is not incidental unto them; unto every one in his own kind. If therefore nothing can happen unto any thing which is not both uſual and natural; why art thou diſpleaſed? Sure the common nature of all would not bring any thing upon any, that were intolerable. If therefore it be a thing external that cauſeth thy grief, [*know, that*] it is not that properly that doth cauſe it, but thine own conceit and opinion concerning the thing: which thou mayſt rid thy ſelf of when thou wilt. But if it be ſomewhat that is amiſs in thine own diſpoſition that doth grieve thee, mayſt thou not rectifie thy *dogmata* [or, *moral Tenets and opinions?*] But if it grieve thee, that thou doſt not perform that which ſeemeth unto thee right and juſt, why doſt not thou chuſe rather to perform it than to grieve? But ſomewhat that is ſtronger than thy ſelf doth hinder thee. Let it not grieve thee then, if it be not thy fault that the thing is not performed. Yea, but it is a thing of that nature, as that thy life is not worth the while, except it may be performed. If it be ſo, upon condition that thou be kindly and lovingly diſpoſed towards

towards all men, thou mayſt be gone. For even then, as much as at any time, art thou in a very good eſtate of performance, when thou doſt dye in charity with thoſe that are an obſtacle unto thy performance.

XLVI. Remember that thy mind [*is of that nature as that it*] becometh altogether unconquerable, when once recollected in her ſelf; ſhe ſeeks no other content than this, that ſhe cannot be forced: yea, though it ſo fall out, that it be even againſt Reaſon it ſelf that it doth bandy. How much leſs when by the help of Reaſon ſhe is able to judge of things with diſcretion? And therefore let thy chief Fort and place of defence be a mind free from paſſions. A ſtronger place, (whereunto to make his refuge, and ſo to become impregnable,) and better fortified than this, hath no man. He that ſeeth not this, is unlearned. He that ſeeth it, and betaketh not himſelf to this place of refuge, is unhappy.

XLVII. Keep thy ſelf to the firſt [*bare and naked*] apprehenſions of things, as they preſent themſelves unto thee, and add not unto them. It is reported unto thee, that ſuch a one ſpeaketh ill of thee. Well; that he ſpeaketh ill of thee, ſo much is reported. But that thou art hurt thereby, is not reported: [*That is the addition of opinion, which thou muſt exclude.*] I ſee that my child is ſick. That he is ſick, I ſee; but that he is in danger of his life alſo, I ſee it not. Thus thou muſt uſe to keep thy ſelf to the firſt notions and apprehenſions of things, as they preſent themſelves outwardly; and add not unto

them from within thy self [*through mere conceit and opinion:*] and thou hast no hurt. Or rather add unto them; but as one that understandeth the true nature of all things that happen in the world.

XLVIII. Is the Cucumber bitter? set it away. Are Brambles in the way? avoid them. Let this suffice. * *Add not presently, speaking unto thy self,* What serve these things for in the World? For, this, one that is acquainted with the mysteries of Nature will laugh at thee for it; as a Carpenter would or a Shoe-maker, if meeting in either of their shops with some shavings, or small remnants of their work, thou shouldst blame them for it. And yet those men, it is not for want of a place where to throw them [*that they keep them in their shops for a while:*] but the nature of the Universe hath no such out-place: but herein doth consist the wonder of her art and skill, that she having once circumscribed her self within some certain bounds and limits, whatsoever is within her that seems either corrupted, or old, or unprofitable, she can change it into her self, and of these very things can make new things; so that she needeth not to seek else-where out of her self either for a new supply of matter and substance, or for a place where to throw out whatsoever is irrecoverably putrid and corrupt. Thus she, as for place, so for matter and art, is her self sufficient unto her self.

* μὴ προσεπείπῃς.

XLIX. Not to be slack and negligent, or loose and wanton in thy actions, nor contentious and troublesome in thy conversation, nor

to

to rove and wander in thy fancies and imaginations. Not baſely to contract thy ſoul; nor boiſterouſly to ſally out with it, [or, *furiouſly to launch out as it were*,] nor ever to want employment.

L. They kill me, they cut my fleſh; they perſecute my perſon with curſes. What then? May not thy mind for all this continue pure, prudent, temperate, juſt? As a fountain of ſweet and clear water, though ſhe be curſed by ſome ſtander-by, yet do her ſprings nevertheleſs ſtill run as ſweet and clear as before; yea, though either dirt or dung be thrown in, yet is it no ſooner thrown than diſperſed, and ſhe cleared. She cannot be dyed [or, *infected*] by it. What then muſt I doe, that I may have [*within my ſelf*] an ever-flowing Fountain, and not a Well? Beget thy ſelf by continual [*pains and endeavours*] to [*true*] liberty with charity, and true ſimplicity and modeſty.

LI. He that knoweth not what the world is, knoweth not where he himſelf is. And he that knoweth not what the world was made for, cannot poſſibly know either what are the qualities, or what is the nature of the world. Now he that in either of theſe is to ſeek, for what he himſelf was made is ignorant alſo. What then doſt thou think of that man, who propoſeth unto himſelf, as a matter of great moment, the noiſe and applauſe of men, who both where they are, and what they are themſelves, are altogether ignorant? Doſt thou deſire to be commended of that man, who thrice in one hour

perchance doth himſelf curſe himſelf? Doſt thou deſire to pleaſe him, who pleaſeth not himſelf? or doſt thou think that he pleaſeth himſelf, who doth uſe to repent himſelf almoſt of every thing that he doeth?

* Gr. συμπνεῖν. LII. Not onely now henceforth to * *have a common breath* [or, *to hold correſpondency of breath*,] with that Air that compaſſeth us about; but * *to have a common mind* [or, *to hold correſpondency of mind*] alſo with that rational ſubſtance which compaſſeth all things. For that alſo is of it ſelf, and of its own nature (if a man can but draw it in as he ſhould,) every where diffuſed; and paſſeth through all things, no leſs than the Air doth, if a man can but ſuck it in.

* Gr. συμφρονεῖν.

LIII. Wickedneſs in general doth not hurt the World. Particular wickedneſs doth not hurt any other: onely unto him it is hurtfull [*whoſoever he be that offends,*] unto whom [*in great favour and mercy*] it is granted, that whenſoever he himſelf ſhall but firſt deſire it, he may be preſently delivered of it. Unto my Free-will my neighbour's free-will, whoever he be, (as his life, or his body) is altogether indifferent. For although we are all made one for another, yet have our minds and underſtandings each of them their own proper and limited juriſdiction. For elſe another man's wickedneſs might be my evil; which God would not have, that it might not be in another man's power to make me unhappy: [*which nothing now can doe but mine own wickedneſs.*]

See before n. xxxij.

LIV. The Sun ſeemeth to be ſhed abroad. And

And indeed it is *diffuſed*, but not *effuſed*. For that *diffuſion* of it is a τάσις or an extenſion. For therefore are the beams of it called ἀκτῖνες from the word ἐκτείνεσθαι, *to be ſtretched out and extended*. Now what a Sun-beam is, thou mayſt know if thou obſerveſt the light of the Sun, when through ſome narrow hole it pierceth into ſome room that is dark. For it is always in a direct line. And as by any ſolid body that it meets with in the way that is not penetrable by Air, it is divided and *abrupted*, and yet neither ſlides off, or falls down, but ſtayeth there nevertheleſs: ſuch muſt the *diffuſion* of the mind be; not an effuſion, but an extenſion. What obſtacles and impediments ſoever ſhe meeteth with in her way, ſhe muſt not violently and by way of an impetuous onſet light upon them; neither muſt ſhe fall down; but ſhe muſt ſtand and give light unto that which doth admit of it. For as for that which doth not, [*it is its own fault and loſs, if*] it bereave it ſelf of her light.

LV. He that feareth Death, either feareth that he ſhall have no ſenſe at all, or that his ſenſes will not be the ſame. Whereas [*he ſhould rather comfort himſelf, that*] either no ſenſe at all, and ſo no ſenſe of evil; or if any ſenſe, then another life, and ſo no death [*properly.*]

LVI. All men are made one for another: either then teach them better, or bear with them.

LVII. The motion of the mind is not as the motion of a dart. For the mind when it is wary and cautelous, and by way of diligent circumſpection

cumſpection turneth her ſelf many ways, may then as well be ſaid to go ſtreight on to the object, [*as when it uſeth no ſuch circumſpection.*]

See B. IX. n. XVI. B. I. n. XI.

LVIII. To pierce and penetrate into the eſtate of every ones underſtanding [*that thou haſt to doe with:*] as alſo to make the eſtate of thine own open and penetrable to any other.

THE NINTH BOOK.

HE that is unjuſt, is alſo impious. For the Nature of the Univerſe having made all reaſonable creatures one for another, to the end that they ſhould doe one another good, more or leſs, according to the ſeveral perſons and occaſions; but in no wiſe hurt one another: it is manifeſt that he that doth tranſgreſs againſt this her will, is guilty of *impiety* towards the moſt ancient and venerable of all the Deities. For the Nature of the Univerſe is the nature [*the common Parent of all, and therefore piouſly to be obſerved*] of all things that are; and that which now is, to whatſoever firſt was, and gave it its being, hath relation of bloud and kindred. She is alſo called *Truth*; and is the firſt cauſe of all truths. He therefore that willingly and wittingly doth lye, is impious in that he doth deceive, and ſo commit injuſtice: but he that againſt his will, in that he

he diſagreeth from the nature of the Univerſe, and in that ſtriving with the nature of the World, he doth in his particular * *violate the general order of the world.* For he doeth no better than ſtrive and war againſt it, who contrary to his own Nature applieth himſelf to that which is contrary to truth. For Nature had before furniſhed him with inſtincts and opportunities [*ſufficient for the attainment of it:*] which he having hitherto neglected, is not now able to diſcern that which is falſe from that which is true. He alſo that purſues after pleaſures, as that which is truly good, and flies from pains, as that which is truly evil, is impious. For ſuch a one muſt of neceſſity oftentimes accuſe that common Nature, as diſtributing many things both unto the evil and unto the good, not according to the deſerts of either: as unto the bad oftentimes pleaſures, and the cauſes of pleaſures; ſo unto the good, pains, and the occaſions of pains. Again, he that feareth pains and croſſes in the World, feareth ſome of thoſe things which ſometime or other muſt needs happen in the World. And that we have already ſhewed to be impious. And he that purſueth after pleaſures, will not ſpare [*to compaſs his deſires*] to doe that which is unjuſt, and that is manifeſtly impious. Now thoſe things which unto Nature are equally indifferent, (for ſhe had not created both pain and pleaſure, if both had not been unto her equally indifferent:) they that will live according to Nature, muſt in thoſe things (as being of the ſame mind and diſpoſition that ſhe is) be

Gr. ἀ-κοσμεῖ.

See n. V. upon B. II.

be as equally indifferent. Whoſoever therefore in either matter of pleaſure and pain, death and life, honour and diſhonour, (which things Nature in the adminiſtration of the world indifferently doth make uſe of,) is not as indifferent, it is apparent that he is impious. When I ſay that common Nature doth indifferently make uſe of them, my meaning is, that they happen indifferently in the ordinary courſe of things, which by a neceſſary conſequence, whether as principal and acceſſory, come to paſs in the World; according to that firſt and ancient deliberation of Providence, by which ſhe from ſome certain beginning did reſolve upon the creation of ſuch a World,

* Gr. συλλαβοῦσα τινὰς λόγους. * *conceiving then in her womb as it were ſome certain rational* generative ſeeds and faculties of things future, whether ſubjects, changes, ſucceſſions; both ſuch and ſuch, and juſt ſo many.

II. It were indeed more happy and comfortable, for a man to depart out of this World, having lived all his life long clear from all falſhood, diſſimulation, voluptuouſneſs, and pride. But if this cannot be, yet is it ſome comfort for a man [*joyfully*] to depart [*as*] weary, and out of love with thoſe; rather than to deſire to live, and to continue long in theſe wicked courſes. Hath not yet experience taught thee to flie from the plague? For a far greater plague is the corruption of the mind, than any certain change and diſtemper of the common air can be. This is a plague of creatures, as they are living creatures; but that

that of men as they are men [or *reasonable.*]

III. Thou must not in matter of death carry thy self scornfully, but as one that is well pleased with it, as being one of those things that Nature hath appointed. For what thou dost conceive of these, of a *boy to become a young man, to wax old, to grow, to ripen, to get teeth, or a beard, or gray hairs; to beget, to bear, or to be delivered;* or what other action soever it be that is natural unto man according to the several seasons of his life; such a thing is it also *to be dissolved.* It is therefore the part of a wise man, in matter of death, not in any wise to carry himself either violently or proudly; but patiently to wait for it, as one of Nature's operations: that with the same mind as now thou dost expect when that which yet is but an *Embryo* in thy Wife's belly shall come forth, thou mayst expect also when thy soul shall fall off from that [*outward coat or skin,*] wherein [*as a child in the belly*] it lieth involved and shut up. But if thou desirest a * *more popular, and* [*though not so direct and philosophical, yet*] a very powerfull and penetrative receipt against the fear of death; Nothing can make thee more willing to part with thy life, than if thou shalt consider, both what the subjects themselves are that thou shalt part with, and what manner of dispositions thou shalt no more have to doe with. True it is, that offended with them thou must not be by any means, but take care of them, and meekly bear with them. However, this thou mayst remember, that whensoever it happens that thou depart, it shall not be from men that held the same *Dogmata*, [or,

See Note upon B. XI. n. III.

* Gr. ἰδιωτικὸν παράπηγμα ἀψιγάρδιον.

[or, *opinions in point of life and practice*] that thou doſt. For that indeed, (if it were ſo) is the onely thing that might make thee averſe from death, and willing to continue here, if it were thy hap to live with men that had obtained the ſame principles [or, belief] that thou haſt. But now, what a toil it is for thee to live with men, whoſe courſe of life is ſo different from thine, thou ſeeſt: ſo that thou haſt rather occaſion to ſay, *Haſten, I thee pray, O death; leſt I alſo in time forget my ſelf.*

IV. He that ſinneth, ſinneth unto himſelf. He that is unjuſt, hurts himſelf, in that he makes himſelf worſe than he was before. Not he onely that committeth, but he alſo that omitteth ſomething, is oftentimes unjuſt.

V. If my preſent apprehenſion of the object be right, and my preſent action charitable, and this, towards whatſoever doth proceed *from God*, be my preſent diſpoſition, to be well pleaſed with it, it ſufficeth.

VI. To wipe away fancy, to uſe deliberation, to quench concupiſcence, to keep the mind free to her ſelf.

VII. Of all unreaſonable creatures, there is but one unreaſonable ſoul; and of all that are reaſonable, but one reaſonable Soul, divided betwixt them all. As of all earthly things there is but one Earth; and but one light that we ſee by; and but one air that we breathe in, as many as either breathe or ſee. Now whatſoever partakes of ſome common thing, naturally affects and enclines unto that whereof it is a part, being of one kind and nature with it. Whatſoever is earthly, preſſeth downwards to the common

mon Earth. Whatſoever is liquid, would flow together. And whatſoever is airy, would be together likewiſe. So that without ſome obſtacle, and ſome kind of violence, they cannot well be kept aſunder. Whatſoever is fiery, doth not onely by reaſon of the Elementary fire tend upwards; but here alſo is ſo ready to join, and to burn together, that whatſoever doth want ſufficient moiſture to make reſiſtence, is eaſily ſet on fire. Whatſoever therefore is partaker of that reaſonable common Nature [*naturally*] doth as much and more long after his own kind. For by how much in its own nature it excells all other things, by ſo much more is it deſirous to be joined and united unto that which is of its own nature. As for unreaſonable creatures then, they had not long been, but preſently begun among them ſwarms, and flocks, and broods of young ones, and a kind of mutual love and affection. For [*though but unreaſonable, yet*] a [*kind of*] ſoul theſe had; and therefore was that natural deſire of union more ſtrong and intenſe in them, as in creatures of a more excellent nature, than either in plants, or ſtones, or trees. But among reaſonable creatures began Common-wealths, friendſhips, families, publick meetings, and even in their wars conventions and truces. Now among them that were yet of a more excellent nature, as the ſtars and planets, though by their nature far diſtant one from another, yet even among them began ſome mutual correſpondency and unity. So proper is it to excellency in a high degree to affect

affect unity, as that even in things ſo far diſtant, it could operate unto a mutual Sympathy. But now behold, what is now come to paſs. Thoſe creatures that are reaſonable, are now the onely creatures that have forgotten their natural affection and inclination of one towards another. Among them alone [*of all other things that are of one kind*] there is not to be found *a general diſpoſition to flow together.* But though they fly from Nature, yet are they ſtopt in their courſe, and apprehended. Doe they what they can, Nature doth prevail. And ſo ſhalt thou confeſs, if thou doſt obſerve it. For ſooner mayſt thou find a thing earthly where no other earthly thing is; than find a man that [*naturally*] can live by himſelf alone.

VIII. Man, God, the World, every one in their kind, bear ſome fruits. All things have their proper time *to bear.* Though by cuſtome, the word it ſelf is in a manner become proper unto the Vine, and the like, yet is it ſo nevertheleſs as we have ſaid. As for reaſon, that beareth both common fruit for the uſe of others; and peculiar, which it ſelf doth enjoy. What it ſelf is in it ſelf, it begets in others, and ſo doth multiply.

IX. Either teach them better, if it be in thy power; or if it be not, remember that for this uſe [*to bear with them patiently*] was mildneſs and goodneſs granted unto thee. The gods themſelves are good unto ſuch; yea and in ſome things, (as in matter of health, of wealth, of honour,) are content often to further their endeavours: ſo

good

good and gratious are they. And mightest thou not be so too? or, tell me, what doth hinder thee?

X. Labour not as one [*to whom it is appointed to be*] wretched, nor as one that either would be pitied, or admired; but let this be thine onely care and desire, so always and in all things to prosecute or to forbear, as the law of Charity [or, *mutual society*] doth require.

XI. This day *I did come out* of all my trouble. Nay, I *have cast out* all my trouble; it should rather be. For that which troubled thee, whatsoever it was, was not *without* any where, [that thou shouldest *come out* of it;] but *within* in thine own opinions, from whence it must be *cast out*, before thou canst truly and constantly be at ease.

XII. All those things, for matter of experience, are usual and ordinary; for their continuance, but for a day; and for their matter, most base and filthy. As they were in the days of those whom we have buried, so are they now also, and no otherwise.

XIII. The things themselves [*that affect us*] they stand without doors, neither knowing any thing themselves, nor able to utter any thing to others concerning themselves. What then is it that passeth verdict on them? The understanding.

XIV. As vertue and wickedness consist not in passion, but in action; so neither doth the true good or evil of a reasonable charitable man consist in passion, but in operation and action.

XV. To the stone that is cast up, when it comes

affect unity, as that even in things ſo far diſtant, it could operate unto a mutual Sympathy. But now behold, what is now come to paſs. Thoſe creatures that are reaſonable, are now the onely creatures that have forgotten their natural affection and inclination of one towards another. Among them alone [*of all other things that are of one kind*] there is not to be found *a general diſpoſition to flow together.* But though they fly from Nature, yet are they ſtopt in their courſe, and apprehended. Doe they what they can, Nature doth prevail. And ſo ſhalt thou confeſs, if thou doſt obſerve it. For ſooner mayſt thou find a thing earthly where no other earthly thing is; than find a man that [*naturally*] can live by himſelf alone.

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good

good and gratious are they. And mightest thou not be ſo too? or, tell me, what doth hinder thee?

X. Labour not as one [*to whom it is appointed to be*] wretched, nor as one that either would be pitied, or admired; but let this be thine onely care and deſire, ſo always and in all things to proſecute or to forbear, as the law of Charity [or, *mutual ſociety*] doth require.

XI. This day *I did come out* of all my trouble. Nay, I *have caſt out* all my trouble; it ſhould rather be. For that which troubled thee, whatſoever it was, was not *without* any where, [that thou ſhouldeſt *come out* of it;] but *within* in thine own opinions, from whence it muſt be *caſt out*, before thou canſt truly and conſtantly be at eaſe.

XII. All thoſe things, for matter of experience, are uſual and ordinary; for their continuance, but for a day; and for their matter, moſt baſe and filthy. As they were in the days of thoſe whom we have buried, ſo are they now alſo, and no otherwiſe.

XIII. The things themſelves [*that affect us*] they ſtand without doors, neither knowing any thing themſelves, nor able to utter any thing to others concerning themſelves. What then is it that paſſeth verdict on them? The underſtanding.

XIV. As vertue and wickedneſs conſiſt not in paſſion, but in action; ſo neither doth the true good or evil of a reaſonable charitable man conſiſt in paſſion, but in operation and action.

XV. To the ſtone that is caſt up, when it comes

down it is no hurt unto it; as neither benefit, when it doth aſcend.

XVI. Sift their minds and underſtandings, and behold what men they be whom thou doſt ſtand in fear of, what they ſhall judge of thee, what they themſelves judge of themſelves.

XVII. All things that are in the world are always in the ſtate of alteration. Thou alſo art in a perpetual change, yea and under corruption too, in ſome part: and ſo is the whole world.

XVIII. It is [*not thine, but*] another man's ſin. [*Why ſhould it trouble thee?*] Let him look to it whoſe ſin it is.

XIX. Of an operation and of a purpoſe there is *an ending*, [or of an action and of a purpoſe we ſay commonly, that *it is at an end:*] from opinion alſo there is an [*abſolute*] ceſſation, which is as it were the death of it. In all this there is no hurt. Apply this now to a man's age; as firſt, a child, then a youth, then a young man, then an old man: every change from one age to another is a kind of death. And all this while here is no matter of grief yet. Paſs now unto that life, firſt, that which thou livedſt under thy Grandfather, then under thy Mother, then under thy Father. And thus when through the whole courſe of thy life hitherto thou haſt found and obſerved many alterations, many changes, many kinds of *endings* and ceſſations, put this queſtion to thy ſelf, What matter of grief or ſorrow doſt thou find in any of theſe? [or, *what doſt thou ſuffer through any of theſe?*] If in none of theſe, then neither in the

the *ending* and conſummation of thy whole life, [*which alſo is but*] a ceſſation and change.

XX. [*As occaſion ſhall require,*] either to thine own Underſtanding, or to that of the Univerſe, or to his [*whom thou haſt now to doe with,*] let thy refuge be with all ſpeed. To thine own, that it reſolve upon nothing againſt juſtice. To that of the Univerſe, that thou mayſt remember, part of whom thou art. Of his [*whom thou haſt now to doe with,*] that thou mayſt conſider, whether in the eſtate of ignorance, or of knowledge. And then alſo muſt thou call to mind, that he is thy Kinſman.

XXI. As thou thy ſelf [*whoever thou art*] wert made for the perfection and conſummation [*being a member of it*] of a common ſociety; ſo muſt every action of thine tend to the perfection and conſummation of a life that is [*truly*] *ſociable.* What action ſoever of thine therefore that either immediately or afar off hath not reference to the common good, that is an exorbitant and diſorderly action; yea, it is ſeditious; as one among the people whom from ſuch and ſuch a conſent and unity, ſhould factiouſly divide and ſeparate himſelf.

XXII. Childrens anger, mere baubles, wretched ſouls bearing up dead bodies, *that they may not have their fall ſo ſoon:* Even as it is in that common dirge-ſong, [or, *bearing up dead bodies, that the number of the dead may not be full ſo ſoon.*]

XXIII. Go to the quality of the cauſe [*from which the effect doth proceed.*] Behold it by it

ſelf bare and naked, ſeparated from all that is material. Then conſider the utmoſt bounds of time which that cauſe, thus and thus qualified, can ſubſiſt and abide.

XXIV. Infinite are the troubles and miſeries that thou haſt already been put to, by reaſon of this onely, becauſe that for all happineſs it did not ſuffice thee, [or, *that thou didſt not account it ſufficient happineſs*,] that thy underſtanding did operate according to its natural conſtitution. It is time to make an end, [*and to begin a new courſe.*]

XXV. When any ſhall either impeach thee with falſe accuſations, or hatefully reproach thee, or ſhall uſe any ſuch carriage towards thee, get thee preſently to their minds and underſtandings, and look in them, and behold what manner of men they be. Thou ſhalt ſee that there is no ſuch occaſion why it ſhould trouble thee, what ſuch as they are think of thee. Yet muſt thou love them ſtill, for by nature they are thy friends. And the gods themſelves, in thoſe things that they ſeek from them as matters of great moment, are well content, all manner of ways (*as by dreams and oracles*) to help them [*as well as others.*]

See before n. IX.

XXVI. Up and down, from one age to another, goe the ordinary things of the world; being ſtill the ſame. And either of every thing in particular [*before it come to paſs*,] the mind of the Univerſe doth conſider with it ſelf and deliberate; and if ſo, then ſubmit [*for ſhame*] unto the determination of [*ſuch an excellent*] Underſtanding: or once for all it did

did reſolve upon all things in general; and ſince that, whatſoever happens, happens by a neceſſary conſequence; and all things *indiviſibly in a manner, and inſeparably*, hold one of another. In ſumme, either there is a God, and then all is well; or if all things goe by chance and fortune, yet mayſt thou uſe thine own Providence [*in thoſe things that concern thee properly, and then thou art well.*]

XXVII. Within a while the Earth ſhall cover us all, and then ſhe her ſelf ſhall have her change. And then the courſe will be, from one period of eternity unto another, and ſo a perpetual eternity. Now can any man that ſhall conſider with himſelf in his mind the ſeveral rollings [or, *ſucceſſions*] of ſo many changes and alterations, and the ſwiftneſs of all theſe rollings; can he otherwiſe but contemn in his heart, and deſpiſe all worldly things? The Cauſe of the Univerſe [or, *the general cauſe*] is as it were a ſtrong torrent, it carrieth all away.

XXVIII. And theſe your profeſſed Politicians, the onely true practick Philoſophers of the world, (as they think of themſelves) * *ſo full of affected gravity*, [or, *ſuch profeſs'd lovers of vertue and honeſty*,] what wretches be they in very deed? how vile and contemptible in themſelves? O man! what a doe doſt thou keep? Doe what thy nature doth now require. Reſolve upon it, if thou mayſt: and take no thought, whether any body ſhall know it or not. Yea, but [*ſayſt thou*] I muſt not expect a *Plato*'s Common-wealth. If they profit though

* Gr. μυξῶν μετα'

never ſo little, I muſt be content; and think much even of that little progreſs. Doth then any of them forſake their former [*falſe*] opinions [*that I ſhould think they profit?*] For without a change of opinions, alas! what is all that oſtentation, but mere wretchedneſs of ſlaviſh minds, that groan privately, and yet would make a ſhew of obedience [*to Reaſon and Truth?*] Go to now, and tell me of *Alexander* and *Philippus*, and *Demetrius Phalereus*. Whether they underſtood what the common nature requireth, and could rule themſelves or no, they know beſt themſelves. But if they kept a life, and ſwaggered; I (God be thanked) am not bound to imitate them. The effect of true Philoſophy is, unaffected ſimplicity and modeſty. Perſuade me not to oſtentation and vain-glory.

See B. VII. n. XXVI.

XXIX. From ſome high place as it were to look down, and to behold, here flocks, and there ſacrifices without number; and all kind of navigation; ſome in a rough and ſtormy ſea, and ſome in a calm: the general differences [or, *different eſtates*] of things, ſome, that are now firſt upon being; the ſeveral and mutual relations of thoſe things that are together; and ſome other things that are at their laſt. Their lives alſo who were long a-go, and theirs who ſhall be after thee, and the preſent eſtate and life of thoſe many nations of Barbarians that are now in the World, thou muſt likewiſe conſider in thy mind. And how many there be who never ſo much as heard of thy Name, how many that will ſoon forget it; how many who but

but even now did commend thee, within a very little while, perchance, will ſpeak ill of thee. So that neither fame, nor honour, nor any thing elſe that this world doth afford, is worth the while. The ſumme then of all; Whatſoever doth happen unto thee, whereof God is the cauſe, to accept it contentedly: whatſoever thou doeſt, whereof thou thy ſelf art the cauſe, to doe it juſtly: which will be, if both in thy reſolution and in thy action thou have no farther end, than to doe good unto others, as being that which *by thy natural conſtitution* [or, *as a man*,] thou art bound unto.

XXX. Many of thoſe things that trouble and ſtraiten thee, it is in thy power to cut off, as wholly depending from mere conceit and opinion, and then thou ſhalt have room enough.

XXXI. To comprehend the whole world together in thy mind, and the whole courſe of this preſent age, to repreſent it unto thy ſelf, and to fix thy thoughts upon the ſudden change of every particular object. How ſhort the time is from the generation of any thing, unto the diſſolution of the ſame; but how immenſe and infinite both that which was before the generation, and that which after the generation of it ſhall be. All things that thou ſeeſt will ſoon be periſhed, and they that ſee their corruptions will ſoon vaniſh away themſelves. He that dieth a hundred years old, [or, extreme old,] and he that dieth young, ſhall come all to one.

XXXII. What are their minds and under-

ſtandings, and what the things that they apply themſelves unto? what do they love, and what do they hate for? Fanſie to thy ſelf the eſtate of their ſouls openly to be ſeen. When they *think* they hurt them ſhrewdly whom they ſpeak ill of, and when they *think* they doe them a very good turn whom they commend and extoll; O how full are they then of conceit and opinion!

XXXIII. Loſs and corruption is in very deed nothing elſe but change and alteration; and that is it which the Nature of the Univerſe doth moſt delight in, by which and according to which, whatſoever is done, is well done. For that was the eſtate of worldly things from the beginning, and ſo ſhall it ever be. Or wouldſt thou rather ſay, that all things in the world have gone ill [*from the beginning for ſo many Ages,*] and ſhall ever go ill? And then among ſo many Deities, could no Divine power be found all this while, that could rectifie the things of the world? Or is the world to inceſſant woes and miſeries for ever condemned?

XXXIV. How baſe and putrid every common matter is! Water, duſt, [*and from the mixture of theſe*] bones, and all that loathſome ſtuff [*that our bodies do conſiſt of;*] ſo ſubject to be infected and corrupted. And again [*thoſe other things that are ſo much prized and admired, as*] marble-ſtones [*what are they but, as it were*] the Kernels of the Earth? gold and ſilver, [*what are they, but as*] the more groſs dregs of the Earth? Thy [*moſt royal*] appa-

rel,

rel, for matter, it is but as it were the hair [*of a ſilly ſheep*;] and for colour, the very bloud [*of a ſhel-fiſh*] Of this nature are all other things. Thy life it ſelf is ſome ſuch thing too; [*a mere exhalation of bloud:*] and it alſo apt to be changed into ſome other common thing.

XXXV. Will this querulouſneſs, this murmuring, this complaining, and diſſembling [or apiſh complying] never be at an end? What then is it that troubleth thee? Doth any new thing happen unto thee? What doſt thou ſo wonder at? At the cauſe, or the matter? Behold either by it ſelf, [*is either of that weight or moment indeed?*] And beſides theſe, there is not any thing. But thy duty towards the gods alſo, it is time that thou ſhouldſt acquit thy ſelf of it with more goodneſs and ſimplicity.

XXXVI. It is all one to ſee theſe things for a hundred years together, or but for three years.

XXXVII. If he have ſinned, his is the harm, not mine. But perchance he hath not.

XXXVIII. Either all things by the providence of Reaſon happen unto every particular, as a part of one general body; and then it is againſt reaſon that a part ſhould complain of any thing that happens for the good of the Whole: or if [*according to* Epicurus] *Atoms* [*be the Cauſe of all things,*] and [*that life be*] nothing elſe but an accidentary confuſion of things, and [*death nothing elſe but*] a mere Diſperſion, [*and ſo of all other things;*] what doſt thou trouble thy ſelf for?

XXXIX. Sayſt thou unto that Rational part, thou art dead; corruption hath taken hold

hold on thee? Doth it then alſo void excrements? Doth it, like either Oxen or Sheep, graze or feed? [*that it alſo ſhould be mortal, as well as the body?*]

XL. Either the gods can doe nothing for us at all, or they can ſtill and allay all the diſtractions and diſtempers of thy mind. If they can doe nothing, why doſt thou pray? If they can, why wouldſt thou not rather pray, that they will grant unto thee, that thou mayſt neither fear nor luſt after any of thoſe [*worldly*] things [*which cauſe theſe diſtractions and diſtempers of it?*] Why not rather, that thou mayſt not at either their abſence or preſence be grieved and diſcontented; than either that thou mayſt obtain them, or that thou mayſt avoid them? For certainly it muſt needs be, that if the gods can help us in any thing, they may in this kind alſo. But thou wilt ſay perchance, In thoſe things the gods have given me my liberty: and it is in mine own power to doe what I will. But if thou mayſt uſe this liberty, rather to ſet thy mind at true liberty, than wilfully with baſeneſs and ſervility of mind to affect thoſe things, which [*either to compaſs or to avoid*] is not in thy power; wert not thou better? And as for the gods, who hath told thee that they cannot help us even in thoſe things that they have put in our own power? Whether it be ſo or no, thou ſhalt ſoon perceive, if thou wilt but try thy ſelf and pray. One prayeth that he may compaſs his deſire, to lie with ſuch or ſuch a one; pray thou that thou mayſt not luſt to lie with her. Another, how

how he may be rid of ſuch a one; pray thou that thou [*mayſt ſo patiently bear with him, as that thou*] have no ſuch need to be rid of him. Another, that he may not loſe his child; pray thou that thou mayſt not fear to loſe him. To this end and purpoſe let all thy prayers be, and ſee what will be the event?

XLI. *In my ſickneſs* (ſaith *Epicurus* of himſelf,) *my diſcourſes were not concerning the nature of my diſeaſe, neither was that the ſubject of my talk to them that came to viſit me; but in the conſideration and contemplation of that which was of eſpecial weight and moment, was all my time beſtowed and ſpent, and among others in this very thing, how my mind by a natural and unavoidable ſympathy, partaking in ſome ſort with the preſent indiſpoſition of my body, might nevertheleſs keep herſelf free from trouble, and in preſent poſſeſſion of her own proper happineſs. Neither did I,* ſaith he, *leave the ordering of my body to Phyſicians altogether to doe with me what they would, as though I expected any great matter from them,* [or, *as though I thought it a matter of ſuch great conſequence, by their means to recover my health:*] *for my preſent eſtate, methought, liked me very well, and gave me good content.* Whether therefore in ſickneſs (if thou chance to ſicken,) or in what other kind of extremity ſoever, endeavour thou alſo to be in thy mind ſo affected, as he doth report of himſelf: not to depart from thy Philoſophy for any thing that can befall thee, nor to give ear to the diſcourſes of ſilly people and mere naturaliſts.

XLII.

XLII. It is common to all trades and profeſſions to mind and intend that onely which now they are about, and the inſtrument whereby they work.

XLIII. When at any time thou art offended with any ones impudency, put preſently this queſtion to thy ſelf; What? Is it then poſſible that there ſhould not be any impudent men in the world? Certainly it is not poſſible. Deſire not then that which is impoſſible. For this one, (thou muſt think) whoſoever he be, is one of thoſe impudent ones that the world cannot be without. So of the ſubtile and crafty, ſo of the perfidious, ſo of every one that offendeth, muſt thou ever be ready to reaſon with thy ſelf. For whilſt in general thou doſt thus reaſon with thy ſelf, that the kind of them muſt needs be in the world, thou wilt be the better able to uſe meekneſs towards every particular. This alſo thou ſhalt find of very good uſe, upon every ſuch occaſion, preſently to conſider with thy ſelf, what proper vertue nature hath furniſhed man with againſt ſuch a vice, [or, *to encounter with a diſpoſition vitious in this kind.*] As for example, againſt the unthankfull, it hath given goodneſs and meekneſs, as an antidote; and ſo againſt another [*vitious in another kind*] ſome other peculiar faculty. And generally, is it not in thy power to inſtruct him better that is in an errour? For whoſoever ſinneth, doth in that decline from his purpoſed end, and is certainly deceived. And again, what art thou the worſe for his ſin? For thou ſhalt not find that any one of theſe againſt whom thou art incenſed, hath

hath in very deed done any thing whereby thy mind (the onely true ſubject of thy hurt and evil) can be made worſe than it was. And what a matter of either grief or wonder is this, if he that is *unlearned* doe the deeds of one that is *unlearned?* Shouldſt not thou rather blame thy ſelf, who, when upon very good grounds of reaſon, thou mighteſt have thought it very probable that ſuch a thing would by ſuch a one be committed, didſt not onely not foreſee it, but morever doſt wonder at it, that ſuch a thing ſhould be? But then eſpecially, when thou doſt find fault with either an unthankfull or a falſe man, muſt thou reflect upon thy ſelf. For without all queſtion thou thy ſelf art much in fault, if either of one that were of ſuch a diſpoſition, thou didſt expect that he ſhould be true unto thee: or when unto any thou didſt a good turn, thou didſt not there bound thy thoughts, as one that had obtained his end; nor didſt think that from the action it ſelf thou hadſt received a full reward of the good that thou hadſt done. For what wouldſt thou have more? Unto him that is a man thou haſt done a good turn: doth not that ſuffice thee? What thy nature required, that haſt thou done. Muſt thou be rewarded for it? As if either the eye for that it ſeeth, or the feet for that they go, ſhould require ſatisfaction. For as theſe being by nature appointed for ſuch an uſe, can challenge no more than that they may work according to their natural conſtitution: ſo man being born to doe good unto others, whenſoever he doeth a real good unto any [*by helping them*

out

out of errour;] or though but in *middle* things, [*as in matter of wealth, life, preferment, and the like*] doth help to further their desires; he doth that for which he was made, and therefore can require no more.

THE TENTH BOOK.

O My soul, the time, I trust, will be, when thou shalt be good, simple, single, more open and visible, than that body by which thou art inclosed. Thou wilt one day be sensible of their happiness, whose end is love, and their affections dead to all worldly things. Thou shalt one day be full, and in want of no external thing: not seeking pleasure from any thing, either living or unsensible, that this World can afford; neither wanting time for the continuation of thy pleasure, nor place and opportunity, nor the favour either of the weather or of men. When thou shalt have content in thy present estate, and all things present shall add to thy content: when thou shalt persuade thy self, that thou hast all things, at present; all for thy good, and all by the providence of the gods: and of things future also shalt be as confident, that whatsoever they shall think fit to send, it will all doe well, as tending to the maintenance and preservation in some sort of his perfect welfare and happiness, who is perfection of life, of goodness, justice,

See B. V. n. VIII. last lines.

juſtice, and beauty; who begets all things, and containeth all things in himſelf, and in himſelf doth recollect all things from all places that are diſſolved, that of them he may beget others again like unto them. Such one day ſhall be thy diſpoſition, that thou ſhalt be able, both in regard of the gods, and in regard of men, ſo to fit and order thy converſation, as neither to complain of them at any time, for any thing that they doe; nor to doe any thing thy ſelf, for which thou mayſt [*juſtly*] be condemned.

II. As one who is altogether governed by nature, let it be thy care to obſerve what it is that thy nature [*in general*] doth require. That done, if thou find not that thy nature, as thou art a living ſenſible creature, will be the worſe for it, thou mayſt proceed. Next then thou muſt examine, what thy nature, as thou art a living ſenſible creature, doth require. And that, whatſoever it be, thou mayſt admit of and doe it, if thy nature, as thou art a reaſonable living creature, will not be the worſe for it. Now whatſoever is reaſonable, is alſo *ſociable*. Keep thy ſelf to theſe rules, and trouble not thy ſelf about idle things.

III. Whatſoever doth happen unto thee, thou art naturally by thy natural conſtitution either able, or not able, to bear. If thou beeſt able, be not offended, but bear it according to thy natural conſtitution [or, *as nature hath enabled thee.*] If thou beeſt not able, be not offended. For it will ſoon make an end of thee, and it ſelf (whatſoever it be) at the

ſame time end with thee. But remember, that whatſoever by the ſtrength of opinion, grounded upon a certain apprehenſion of both [*true*] profit and duty, thou canſt conceive tolerable; that thou art able to bear that by thy natural conſtitution.

IV. Him that offends, to teach with love and meekneſs, and to ſhew him his errour. But if thou canſt not, then to blame thy ſelf; or rather not thy ſelf neither, [*if thy will and endeavours have not been wanting.*] See B. VIII. n. XIV, XXX.

V. Whatſoever it be that happens unto thee, it is that which from all time was appointed unto thee. For by the ſame coherence of cauſes, by which thy ſubſtance from all eternity was appointed to be, was alſo whatſoever ſhould happen unto it deſtinated and appointed.

VI. Either [*with* Epicurus, *we muſt fondly imagine*] the Atoms [*to be the cauſe of all things*;] or [*we muſt needs grant*] a Nature. Let this then be thy firſt ground, that thou art part of that Univerſe which is governed by Nature. Then, ſecondly, that to thoſe parts that are of the ſame kind and Nature as thou art, thou haſt relation of kindred. For of theſe if I ſhall always be mindfull, firſt as I am a part, I ſhall never be diſpleaſed with any thing that falls to my particular ſhare of the common chances of the world. For nothing that is behovefull unto the whole, can be [*truly*] hurtfull to that which is part of it. For this being the common privilege of all natures, that they contain nothing in themſelves that is hurtfull unto them; it cannot be that the nature of the Univerſe (whoſe privilege beyond

yond other particular natures, is, that ſhe cannot againſt her will by any higher external cauſe be conſtrained,) ſhould beget any thing [*and cheriſh it in her boſome*] that ſhould tend to her own hurt and prejudice. As then I bear in mind that I am a part of ſuch an Univerſe, I ſhall not be diſpleaſed with any thing that happens. And as I have relation of kindred to thoſe parts that are of the ſame kind and nature that I am, ſo I ſhall be careſull to doe nothing that is prejudicial to the community, but in all my deliberations ſhall they that are of my Kind ever be; and the common good, that which all my intentions and reſolutions ſhall drive unto; as that which is contrary unto it, I ſhall by all means endeavour to prevent and avoid. Theſe things once ſo fixed and concluded, as thou wouldeſt think him an happy Citizen, whoſe conſtant ſtudy and practice were for the good and benefit of his fellow-Citizens, and the carriage of the City ſuch towards him, that he were well pleaſed with it, ſo muſt it needs be with thee, that thou ſhalt live a happy life.

VII. All parts of the world, (all things I mean that are contained within the whole world,) muſt of neceſſity at ſome time or other come to *corruption*; *Alteration* I ſhould ſay, to ſpeak truly and properly; but that I may be the better underſtood, I am content at this time to uſe that more common word. Now ſay I, if ſo be that this be both hurtfull unto them, and yet unavoidable, would not, thinkeſt thou, the whole it ſelf be in a ſweet caſe, all

the parts of it being ſubject to alteration, yea and by their making it ſelf fitted for corruption, as conſiſting of things different and contrary? And did nature then either on her ſelf thus project and purpoſe the affliction and miſery of her parts, and therefore of purpoſe ſo made them, not onely that haply they might, but of neceſſity that they ſhould fall into evil? or did not ſhe know what ſhe did, when ſhe made them? For either of theſe two to ſay, is equally abſurd. But to let paſs nature in general, and to reaſon of things particular according to their own particular natures; how abſurd and ridiculous is it, firſt to ſay, that all parts of the whole are, by their proper natural conſtitution, ſubject to alteration; and then when any ſuch thing doth happen [*as when one doth fall ſick and dyeth*] to take on, and wonder as though ſome ſtrange thing had happened? Though this beſides might move not ſo grievouſly to take on when any ſuch thing doth happen, that whatſoever is diſſolved, it is diſſolved into thoſe things whereof it was compounded. For every diſſolution is either a mere diſperſion of the Elements into thoſe Elements again whereof every thing did conſiſt; or a change of that which is more ſolid, into Earth, and of that which is pure and ſubtile [or, *ſpiritual*] into air. So that [*by this means nothing is loſt, but*] all reſumed again into thoſe *rational generative* ſeeds of the Univerſe; and this Univerſe, either after a certain period of time to be conſumed by fire, or by continual changes to be renewed, and ſo for ever to endure.

Now

Now that ſolid and *ſpiritual* that we ſpeak of, thou muſt not conceive it to be that very *ſame* which at firſt was, when thou wert born. For, alas! all this that now thou art in either kind [*either for matter of ſubſtance, or, of life;*] hath but two or three days ago partly from meats eaten, and partly from air breathed in, received all its **influx*, [*being the ſame then, which it was at firſt when thou wert born, in no other reſpect than a running river, maintained by the perpetual influx and new ſupply of waters, is the ſame.*] That therefore which thou haſt ſince received, not that which came from thy Mother, is that which comes to change [*and corruption.*] But ſuppoſe that that [*for the general ſubſtance, and more ſolid part of it,*] ſhould ſtill cleave unto thee never ſo cloſe; yet what is that to the proper qualities and affections of it, [*by which perſons are diſtinguiſhed*] which certainly are quite different?

* Gr. ἐπιῤῥοὴν.

VIII. Now that thou haſt taken theſe names upon thee of good, modeſt, true; of ἔμφρων, σύμφρων, ἀξιόφρων; take heed leſt at any times [*by doing any thing that is ordinary,*] thou be but improperly ſo called, and loſe thy right to theſe appellations. Or if thou do, return unto them again with all poſſible ſpeed. And remember, that the word ἔμφρων notes unto thee an intent and intelligent conſideration of every object that preſents it ſelf unto thee, without diſtraction. And the word σύμφρων, a ready and contented acceptation of whatſoever by the appointment of the common nature happens unto thee. And the word ἀξιόφρων, a *ſuper-ex-*

tenſion [or, *a tranſcendent, and outreaching diſpoſition*] of thy mind, whereby it paſſeth by all bodily pains and pleaſures, honour and credit, death, and whatſoever is of the ſame Nature, [*as matters of abſolute indifferency, and in no wiſe to be ſtood upon by a wiſe man.*] Theſe then if inviolably thou ſhalt obſerve, and ſhalt not be ambitious to be ſo called by others, both thou thy ſelf ſhalt become a new man, and thou ſhalt begin a new life. For to continue ſuch as hitherto thou haſt been, to undergo thoſe diſtractions and diſtempers [*as thou muſt needs*] for ſuch a life [*as hitherto thou haſt lived,*] is the part of one that is very fooliſh, and is over-fond of his life. Whom a man might compare to one of thoſe half-eaten wretches, matched in the Amphitheatre with wild beaſts; who, as full as they are all the body over with wounds and bloud, deſire for a great favour, that they may be reſerved till the next day, then alſo, and in the ſame eſtate to be expoſed to the ſame nails and teeth as before. Away therefore, ſhip thy ſelf, and [*from the troubles and diſtractions of thy former life*] convey thy ſelf as it were unto theſe few Names; and if thou canſt abide in them [or, *be conſtant in the practice and poſſeſſion of them,*] continue there [*as glad and joyfull*] as one that were tranſlated unto ſome ſuch place [*of bliſs and happineſs,*] as [*that which by* Heſiod *and* Plato *is called*] the Iſlands of the Bleſſed, [*by others called the Elyſian fields.*] And whenſoever thou findeſt thy ſelf, that thou art in danger of a relapſe, and that thou art not able to

to maſter and overcome [*thoſe difficulties and temptations that preſent themſelves in thy preſent ſtation:*] get thee into thy private corner, where thou mayſt be better able. Or if that will not ſerve, forſake even thy life rather. But ſo that it be not in paſſion, but in a plain voluntary modeſt way: this being the onely commendable action of thy whole life, that thus thou art departed: [or, *this having been the main work and buſineſs of thy whole life, that thou mighteſt thus depart.*] Now for the better remembrance of thoſe names that we have ſpoken of, thou ſhalt find it a very good help, to remember the gods [*as often as may be*;] and that the thing which they require at our hands, of as many of us as are by nature reaſonable creatures; is not that [*with fair words, and outward ſhew of piety and devotion*] we ſhould flatter them, but that we ſhould become like unto them: and that as all other natural creatures, the Fig-tree for example, the Dog, the Bee, both doe, all of them, and apply themſelves unto that which by their natural conſtitution is proper unto them; ſo Man likewiſe ſhould doe that which by his Nature, as he is a Man, belongs unto him.

IX. Toys and fooleries [*at home*;] wars [*abroad*;] ſometimes *terror*, ſometimes *torpor*, [or, *ſtupid ſloth:*] this is thy daily ſlavery. By little and little [*if thou doſt not better look to it*] thoſe ſacred *Dogmata* will be blotted out of thy mind. How many things be there, which when, as a mere naturaliſt, thou haſt barely conſidered of according to their nature, thou doſt

let pass without any farther use? Whereas thou shouldst in all things so join action and contemplation, that thou mightest both at the same time attend all present occasions, to perform every thing duly and carefully; and yet so intend the contemplative part too, that no part of that delight and pleasure which the contemplative knowledge of every thing, according to its true nature, doth of its self afford, might be lost. [Or, *that the true and contemplative knowledge of every thing according to its own nature, might of it self, (action being subject to many lets and impediments) afford unto thee sufficient pleasure and happiness.*] Not apparent indeed, but not concealed. And when shalt thou attain to the happiness of true Simplicity, and unaffected gravity? When shalt thou rejoice in the certain knowledge of every particular object according to its true Nature: as what the matter and substance of it is; what the use it is for in the world; how long it can subsist; what things it doth consist of; who they be that are capable of it, and who they that can give it and take it away?

X. As the Spider, when it hath caught the Fly that it hunted after, is not a little proud, nor meanly conceited of it self; as he likewise that hath caught an Hare, or hath taken a Fish with *his* * *net*; as another for the taking of a Boar, and another of a Bear: so may they be proud, and applaud themselves for their valiant acts against the *Sarmatæ* [or, *Northern Nations lately defeated.*] For these also, [*these famous souldiers and warlike men,*] if thou dost look into

* Gr. σαγήνῃ.

See notes.

into their minds and opinions, what doe they for the moſt part but hunt after prey?

XI. To find out, and ſet to thy ſelf ſome certain way and method of contemplation, whereby thou mayſt clearly diſcern and repreſent unto thy ſelf the mutual change of all things, the one into the other. Bear it in thy mind evermore, and ſee that thou be throughly well exerciſed in this particular. For there is not any thing more effectual to beget true magnanimity.

XII. He hath got looſe from, [or, *he hath ſhaken off the bonds of*] his body, and perceiving that within a very little while he muſt of neceſſity bid the World farewell, and leave all theſe things behind him, he wholly applied himſelf, as to righteouſneſs in all his actions, ſo to the common Nature in all things that ſhould happen unto him. And contenting himſelf with theſe two things, to doe all things juſtly, and whatſoever God doth ſend to like well of it; what others ſhall either ſay or think of him, or ſhall doe againſt him, he doth not ſo much as trouble his thoughts with it. To go on ſtreight, whither right reaſon directed him, and in ſo doing to follow God, was the onely thing that he did mind, that, his onely buſineſs and occupation.

XIII. What uſe is there of ſuſpicion at all? [or, *why ſhould thoughts, of miſtruſt and ſuſpicion concerning that which is future, trouble thy mind at all?*] What now is to be done, if thou mayſt ſearch and enquire into that, what needeſt thou care for more? And if thou art well

able to perceive it alone, let no man divert thee from it. But if alone thou doſt not ſo well perceive it, ſuſpend thine action, and take advice from the beſt. And if there be any thing elſe that doth hinder thee, go on with prudence and diſcretion, according to the preſent occaſion and opportunity, ſtill propoſing that unto thy ſelf which thou doſt conceive moſt right and juſt. For to hit that aright, and to ſpeed in the proſecution of it, muſt needs be happineſs, ſince it is that onely which we can [*truly and properly be ſaid to*] miſs of, [or, *miſcarry in.*]

XIV. What is that that is ſlow, and yet quick? merry, and yet grave? He that in all things doth follow Reaſon for his guide.

XV. In the morning as ſoon as thou art awakned, [*when thy judgment before either thy affections or external objects have thought upon it, is yet moſt free and impartial:*] put this queſtion to thy ſelf, whether if that which is right and juſt be done, the doing of it by thy ſelf, or by others [*when thou art not able thy ſelf,*] be a thing material or no. For ſure it is not. And as for theſe that keep ſuch a life, and ſtand ſo much upon the praiſes or diſpraiſes of other men; haſt thou forgotten what manner of men they be? that ſuch and ſuch upon their beds, and ſuch at their board: what their ordinary actions are; what they purſue after, and what they fly from: what theſts and rapines they commit, if not with their hands and feet, yet with that more pretious part of theirs, their minds; which (would it but admit of them)

might

might enjoy faith, modesty, truth, justice, a good spirit.

XVI. *Give what thou wilt, and take away what thou wilt*, saith he that is well taught and truly modest, to him that gives, and takes away. And it is not out of a stout and peremptory resolution, that he saith it, but in mere love, and humble submission.

XVII. Thy life is almost at an end: so live henceforth, [*as indifferent to the world, and all worldly objects*] as one who liveth by himself alone upon some desert hill. For whether here or there, if the whole world be but as one Town, it matters not much for the place. Let them behold, and see a Man, that is a Man indeed, living according to the true nature of man. If they cannot bear with me, let them kill me. For better were it to dye, than so to live [*as they would have me.*]

XVIII. Make it not any longer a matter of dispute or discourse, what are the signs and proprieties of a good man; but really and actually be such a one.

XIX. Ever to represent unto thy self, and to set before thee, both the general Age and time of the World, and the whole Substance of it. And how all things particular in respect of these are for their substance, as one of the least seeds that is, [or *as the seed that is in a Fig:*] and for their duration, as the turning of the Pestle in the Mortar once about. Then to fix thy mind upon every particular object of the World, and to conceive it, (as it is indeed,) as already being in the state of dissolution, and of change; tending

tending to ſome kind of either putrefaction or diſperſion, or whatſoever elſe it is that is the death as it were of every thing in his own kind.

XX. Conſider them through all actions and occupations of their lives: as when they eat, and when they ſleep; when they are in the act of neceſſary exoneration, and when in the act of luſt. Again, when they either are in their greateſt exultation, and in the middle of all their pomp and glory; or being angry and diſpleaſed, in great ſtate and majeſty, as from an higher place, they chide and rebuke. How baſe and ſlaviſh, but a little while ago, they were fain to be, that they might come to this; and within a very little while what will be their eſtate, [*when death hath once ſeized upon them.*]

XXI. That is beſt for every one, that the common Nature of all doth ſend unto every one; and then is it beſt, when ſhe doth ſend it.

XXII. *The Earth* [*ſaith the Poet*] *doth often long after the rain. So is the glorious Sky often as deſirous to fall upon the Earth: which argues a mutual kind of love between them.* And ſo [*ſay I*] doth the world bear a certain affection of love to whatſoever ſhall come to paſs. With thine affections ſhall mine concur, O World. The ſame (and no other,) ſhall the object of my longing be, which is of thine. Now that the world doth *love*, as it is true indeed, ſo it is as commonly ſaid and acknowledged, when [*according to the Greek phraſe, imitated by the Latins, of things that*

uſe

uſe to be,] we ſay commonly, that they *love to be.*

XXIII. Either thou doſt continue in this kind of life, and that is it which ſo long thou haſt been uſed unto [*and therefore tolerable:*] or thou doſt retire [or, *leave the World,*] and that of thine own accord, [*and then thou haſt thy mind:*] or thy life is cut off, and then [*mayſt thou rejoyce that*] thou haſt ended thy charge. One of theſe muſt needs be. Be therefore of good comfort.

XXIV. Let it always appear, and be manifeſt unto thee, that ſolitarineſs and Deſart places, [*by many Philoſophers ſo much eſteemed of and affected,*] are of themſelves but thus and thus; and that all things are here [*to them that live in Towns, and converſe with others,*] as they are [*the ſame nature every where to be ſeen and obſerved,*] to them that have retired themſelves to the top of Mountains, and to deſart Havens, or what other [*deſart and inhabited*] places ſoever. For any where [*if thou wilt*] mayſt thou quickly find and apply that to thy ſelf, which *Plato* ſaith [*of his Philoſopher,*] in a place; [*as private and retired*] ſaith he, [*as if he were*] *ſhut up and incloſed about in ſome Shepherd's lodge, on the top of a hill.* There by thy ſelf *to put theſe queſtions to thy ſelf* [or, *to enter into theſe conſiderations:*] What is my chief and principal part, which hath power over the reſt? What is now the preſent eſtate of it, as I uſe it; and what is it that I employ it about? Is it now void of reaſon or no? Is it free, and ſeparated; or ſo affixed, ſo congealed and grown together, See B. IV. N. III.

ther, as it were, with the fleſh, that it is ſwayed by the motions and inclinations of it?

XXV. He that runs away from his Maſter, is a fugitive. But the Law is every man's Maſter. He therefore that forſakes the Law, is a fugitive. So is he, whoſoever he be, that is either ſorry, angry, or afraid of, or for any thing that either hath been, is, or ſhall be by his appointment, who is the Lord and Governour of the Univerſe. For he truly and properly is Νόμος [or, *the Law*] as the onely νέμων [or, *diſtributer and diſpenſer*] of all things that happen unto any one in his life-time. Whoſoever then is either ſorry, angry, or afraid, is a fugitive.

XXVI. From man is the ſeed. That once caſt into the womb, man hath no more to doe with it. Another Cauſe ſucceedeth, and undertakes the Work, and in time brings a Child (that wonderfull effect from ſuch a beginning,) to perfection. Again, Man lets food down through his throat; and that once down, he hath on more to doe with it. Another Cauſe ſucceedeth, and diſtributeth this food into the Senſes, and the affections; into life, and into ſtrength; and doth with it thoſe other many and marvellous things that belong unto man. Theſe things therefore that are ſo ſecretly and inviſibly wrought and brought to paſs, thou muſt uſe to behold and contemplate; and not the things themſelves onely, but the power alſo by which they are effected; that thou mayſt behold it, though not with the eyes of the body, yet as plainly and viſibly as thou canſt ſee and diſcern the [*outward*] efficient

ent cauſe of the depreſſion and elevation of any thing.

XXVII. Ever to mind and conſider with thy ſelf, how all things that now are, have been heretofore much after the ſame ſort, and after the ſame faſhion that now they are: and ſo to think of thoſe things which ſhall be hereafter alſo. Moreover, whole *dramata*, and uniform ſcenes, [or, *ſcenes that comprehend the lives and actions of men of one calling and profeſſion,*] as many as either in thine own experience thou haſt known, or by reading of ancient Hiſtories; (as the whole Court of *Adrianus*, the whole Court of *Antoninus Pius*, the whole Court of *Philippus*, that of *Alexander*, that of *Cræſus*:) to ſet them all before thine eyes. For thou ſhalt find that they are all but after one ſort and faſhion: [or, *all of the ſame kind and nature:*] onely that the actours were others.

XXVIII. As a Pig that flings and cries when his throat is cut, fanſie to thy ſelf every one to be, that grieves [*for any worldly thing*] and takes on. Such a one is he alſo, who upon his bed alone doth bewail the miſeries of this our mortal life. And remember this, that unto reaſonable creatures onely it is granted that they may willingly and freely ſubmit unto Providence: but abſolutely to ſubmit, is a neceſſity impoſed upon all creatures equally.

XXIX. Whatſoever it is that thou goeſt about, conſider of it by thy ſelf, and ask thy ſelf, What? becauſe I ſhall doe this no more when I am dead, ſhould therefore death ſeem grievous unto me?

XXX.

XXX. When thou art offended with any man's transgreſſion, preſently reflect upon thy ſelf, and conſider what thou thy ſelf art guilty of in the ſame kind. As that thou alſo perchance doſt think it a happineſs either to be rich, or to live in pleaſure, or to be praiſed and commended, and ſo of the reſt in particular. For this if thou ſhalt call to mind, thou ſhalt ſoon forget thine anger: eſpecially when at the ſame time this alſo ſhall concur in thy thoughts, that he was conſtrained [*by his errour and ignorance*] ſo to doe: For how can he chuſe [*as long as he is of that opinion?*] Do thou therefore, if thou canſt, take away that from him that forceth him to doe as he doth.

See B. VII. N. XIX.

XXXI. When thou ſeeſt *Satyro*, think of *Socraticus* and *Eutyches*, or *Hymen*; and when *Euphrates*, think of *Eutychio* and *Sylvanus*; when *Alciphron*, of *Tropæophorus*; when *Xenophon*, of *Crito*, or *Severus*. And when thou doſt look upon thy ſelf, fanſie unto thy ſelf ſome one or other of the *Cæſars*; and ſo for every one, ſome one or other that hath been for eſtate and profeſſion anſwerable unto him. Then let this come to thy mind at the ſame time; And where now are they all? No where, or any where? For ſo ſhalt thou at all times be able to perceive how all worldly things are but as the ſmoke, [*that vaniſheth away:*] or, indeed, mere nothing. Eſpecially when thou ſhalt call to mind this alſo, that whatſoever is once changed, ſhall never be again as long as the world endureth. And thou then, how long ſhalt thou endure. And why doth

doth it not ſuffice thee, if vertuouſly, and as becometh thee, thou mayſt paſs that portion of time, how little ſoever it be, that is allotted unto thee?

XXXII. What a ſubject, and what a courſe of life is it, that thou doſt ſo much deſire to be rid of? For all theſe things what are they, but fit objects for an underſtanding, that beholdeth every thing accurately and according to its true nature, to exerciſe it ſelf upon? Be patient therefore, untill that (as a ſtrong ſtomach that turns all things into its own nature; and as a great fire that turneth into flame and light whatſoever thou doſt caſt into it;) thou have made theſe things alſo familiar, and as it were natural unto thee.

XXXIII. Let it not be in any man's power to ſay truly of thee, that thou art not truly ſimple, [or, *ſincere and open,*] or not good. Let him be deceived whatſoever he be that ſhall have any ſuch opinion of thee. For all this doth depend of thee. For who is it that ſhould hinder thee from being either truly ſimple or good? Do thou onely reſolve rather not to live, than not to be ſuch. For indeed neither doth it ſtand with reaſon that he ſhould live that is not ſuch.

XXXIV. [*Wouldſt thou* now be happy?] Doe that and ſpeak that, whatſoever it be, that may now upon this preſent occaſion according to beſt reaſon and diſcretion either be ſaid or done: (for whatſoever it be, it is in thy power either to doe it or to ſay it, and therefore ſeek not any pretences as though thou wert hindred:) *and thou haſt thy wiſh.* For untill ſuch time

time that thou be ſo minded and affected, as that, what pleaſure is unto the voluptuous, be unto thee, to doe in every thing that preſents it ſelf whatſoever may be done conformably and agreeably to the proper conſtitution of man, [or, *to man as he is a man*:] thou wilt never ceaſe groaning and complaining. For thou muſt account that pleaſure, whatſoever it be, that thou mayſt doe according to thine own Nature. And to doe this, every place will fit thee. Unto the *Cylindrus* [or, *roller*] it is not granted to move every where according to its own proper motion; as neither unto the water, nor unto the fire, nor unto any other thing, that either is merely natural, or natural and ſenſitive, but not rational. For many things there be that can hinder their operations. But of the mind and underſtanding this is the proper privilege, that according to its own nature, and as it will it ſelf, it can paſs through every obſtacle that it finds, and keep ſtreight on forwards. Setting therefore before thine eyes this happineſs and felicity of thy mind, whereby it is able to paſs through all things, [*and is capable of all motions, whether,*] as the fire, upwards, or as the ſtone, downwards, or as the *Cylindrus*, through that which is ſloping; [*content thy ſelf with it, and*] ſeek not after any other thing. For all other kind of hindrances [*that are not hindrances of thy mind*] either they are proper to the body, or merely proceed from the opinion, Reaſon not making that reſiſtence that it ſhould, but baſely and cowardly ſuffering it ſelf to be foiled;

and

and of themſelves can neither wound, nor doe any hurt at all. Elſe muſt he of neceſſity, whoſoever he be that meets with any of them, become worſe than he was before. For ſo is it in all other ſubjects, that that is thought hurtfull unto them whereby they are made worſe. But here contrariwiſe, man (if he make that good uſe of them that he ſhould) is rather the better and the more praiſe-worthy for any of thoſe kind of hindrances, than otherwiſe. But generally remember that nothing can hurt a natural Citizen, that is not hurtfull unto the City it ſelf; nor any thing hurt the City, that is not hurtfull unto the Law it ſelf. But none of theſe caſualties or external hindrances do *hurt the* Law *it ſelf*; [that is, *the providence of Almighty God, who doth over-rule all things in the world, and of his infinite wiſedom diſpenſeth all particular events to the general good and preſervation of the Univerſe:*] neither therefore do they hurt either City or Citizen.

XXXV. [*As he that is bitten by a mad Dog, is afraid of every thing almoſt that he ſeeth: ſo*] unto him whom the *Dogmata* have once bitten [or, *in whom true knowledge hath made an impreſſion*] every thing almoſt [*that he ſees or reads,*] be it never ſo ſhort or ordinary, doth afford a good *memento*, to put him out of all grief and fear; as that of the Poet, *The winds blow upon the trees, and their leaves fall upon the ground. Then do the trees begin to bud again, and by the ſpring-time they put forth new branches. So is the generation of men; ſome come into the world, and others go out of it.* Of theſe leaves

See B. VI. N. LII.

then thy Children are. And they alſo that applaud thee ſo gravely, [or, *that applaud thy ſpeeches with that their uſual acclamation,* ἀξιοπίστως, *O truly ſpoken!*] and ſpeak well of thee; as on the other ſide, they that ſtick not to curſe thee, they that privately and ſecretly diſpraiſe and deride thee, they alſo are but leaves. And they alſo that ſhall follow, in whoſe memories the names of men famous after death is preſerved, they are but leaves neither. For even ſo is it of all theſe [*worldly*] things. Their *Spring* comes, and they are put *forth. Then blows the wind, and they go down.* And then in lieu of them grow others out of the wood [or, *common matter of all things,*] like unto them. But, to endure but for a while, is common unto all. Why then ſhouldſt thou ſo [*earneſtly*] either ſeek after theſe things, or fly from them, as though they ſhould endure for ever? Yet a little while, * *and thine eyes will be cloſed up*, and for him that carries thee to thy grave ſhall another mourn within a while after.

* Gr. καὶ καταμύσεις.

XXXVI. A good eye muſt be good to ſee whatſoever is to be ſeen, and not green things onely. For that is proper to ſore eyes. So muſt a good ear and a good ſmell be ready for whatſoever is either to be heard or ſmelt: and a good ſtomach as indifferent to all kinds of food, as a milſtone is to whatſoever it was made for to grind. As ready therefore muſt a ſound underſtanding be for whatſoever ſhall happen. But he that ſaith, *O that my Children might live!* and, *O that all men might commend me for whatſoever I doe!* is as an eye that ſeeks after

after green things; or as teeth after that which is tender.

XXXVII. There is not any man that is so happy in his death, but that some of those that are by him when he dyes, will be ready to rejoyce at his [*supposed*] calamity. Is it one that was vertuous and wise indeed? Will there not some one or other be found, who thus will say to himself, *Well, now at last shall I be at rest from this Pedagogue. He did not indeed otherwise trouble us much: but I know well enough that in his heart he did much condemn us.* Thus will they speak of the vertuous. But as for us, alas! how many things be there, for which there be many that would be glad to be rid of us? This therefore if thou shalt think of whensoever thou dyest, thou shalt dye the more willingly, when thou shalt think with thy self, I am now to depart from that World, wherein those that have been my neerest friends and acquaintance, they whom I have so much suffered for, so often prayed for, and for whom I have taken such care; even they would have me dye, hoping that after my death they may perhaps live happier than they did before. What then should any man desire to continue here any longer? * Nevertheless, whensoever thou dyest, thou must not be less kind and loving unto them for it; but as before, so then, continue to be their friend, to wish them well, and meekly and gently to carry thy self towards them; but yet so, that on the other side, it make thee not the more unwilling to dye. But as it fareth with them that dye an easie quick death, whose soul

*See notes.

is ſoon ſeparated from their bodies, ſo muſt thy ſeparation from them be. To theſe had nature joyned and annexed me: now ſhe parts us; I am ready to depart, as from friends and kinſmen, but yet without either reluctancy or compulſion. For this alſo is according to Nature.

XXXVIII. Uſe thy ſelf, as often as thou ſeeſt any man doe any thing, preſently (if it be poſſible) to ſay unto thy ſelf, What is this man's end in this his action? But begin this courſe with thy ſelf firſt of all, and diligently examine thy ſelf [*concerning whatſoever thou doeſt.*]

XXXIX. Remember, that that which ſets a man at work, and hath power over the affections to draw them either one way, or the other way, is [*not an external thing properly, but*] that which is hidden within [*every man's Dogmata and opinions:*] That, that is Rhetorick, that is life; that (to ſpeak true) is man himſelf. As for [*thy body,*] which as a veſſel [or, *a caſe,*] compaſſeth thee about, and the many and curious inſtruments that it hath annexed unto it, let them not trouble thy thoughts. For of themſelves they are but as a Carpenter's Axe, but that they are born with us, and naturally ſticking unto us. But otherwiſe, without the inward cauſe that hath power to move them, and to reſtrain them, thoſe parts are of themſelves of no more uſe unto us, than the Shuttle is of it ſelf to the Weav'ſter, or the Pen to the Writer, or the Whip to the Coach-man.

THE

THE ELEVENTH BOOK.

THE natural properties and privileges of a reaſonable ſoul are; That ſhe ſeeth her ſelf that ſhe can order and compoſe her ſelf; that ſhe makes her ſelf as ſhe will her ſelf; that ſhe reaps her own fruits whatſoever; whereas Plants, Trees, unreaſonable creatures, what fruit ſoever they bear, (be it either fruit properly, or analogically onely) they bear it unto others, and not to themſelves. Again, Whenſoever and whereſoever [*ſooner, or later*] her life doth end, ſhe hath her own end nevertheleſs. For it is not with her, as with Dancers and Players, who if they be interrupted in any part of their action, the whole action muſt needs be imperfect: but ſhe, in what part of time or action ſoever ſhe be ſurprized, can make that which ſhe hath in her hand, whatſoever it be, complete and full, ſo that ſhe may depart with that comfort, *I have lived; neither want I any thing of that which properly did belong unto me.* Again, ſhe compaſſeth the whole World, and penetrateth into the Vanity *and mere outſide* (wanting ſubſtance and ſolidity) of it, and ſtretcheth her ſelf unto the infiniteneſs of eternity; and the *revolution* [or, *reſtauration*] *of all things after a certain period of time, to the ſame ſtate and place as before, ſhe fetcheth about, and doth comprehend in her ſelf*; and conſiders withall, and ſees clearly this, that

neither they that ſhall follow us ſhall ſee any new thing that we have not ſeen, nor they that went before any thing more than we: but that he that is once come to forty (if they have any wit at all) can in a manner (for that they are all of one kind) ſee all things, both paſſed and future. As proper is it and natural to the ſoul of man to love her neighbours, to be true and modeſt, and to regard nothing ſo much as her ſelf: which is alſo the property of the Law: whereby [*by the way*] it appears, that ſound *reaſon* and *juſtice* comes all to one, [*and therefore that juſtice is the chief thing that reaſonable creatures ought to propoſe unto themſelves as their end.*]

See B. XII. N. VI.

II. A pleaſant ſong or dance, the *Pancratiaſtes exerciſe*, [*ſports that thou art wont to be much taken with,*] thou ſhalt eaſily contemn, if thou ſhalt divide the harmonious voice into ſo many particular ſounds whereof it doth conſiſt, and of every one in particular ſhalt ask thy ſelf, whether this or that ſound is it that doth ſo take [or, conquer] thee. For thou wilt be aſhamed of it. And ſo for dance, if accordingly thou ſhalt conſider it in every particular motion and poſture by it ſelf: and ſo for the wreſtler's exerciſe too. Generally then, whatſoever it be, beſides vertue, and thoſe things that proceed from vertue, [*that thou art ſubject to be much affected with*] remember preſently thus to divide it, and by this kind of diviſion in each particular, to attain unto the contempt of the whole. Thus thou muſt transfer and apply to thy whole life alſo.

III. That

III. That ſoul which is ever ready, even now preſently (if need be) to be ſeparated from the body, whether by way of Extinction, or Diſperſion, or Continuation [*in another place and eſtate,*] how bleſſed and happy is it? But this readineſs of it, it muſt proceed, not *from an obſtinate and peremptory reſolution of the mind, violently and paſſionately ſet upon oppoſition,* (as Chriſtians are wont;) but from a peculiar judgment, with diſcretion and gravity, ſo that others may be perſuaded alſo and drawn to the like example, but without any noiſe and paſſionate exclamations. Gr. κατὰ ψιλὴν παράταξιν. See the Notes.

IV. Have I done any thing charitably; then am I benefited by it. See that this upon all occaſions may preſent it ſelf unto thy mind, and never ceaſe to think of it. What is thy profeſſion? to be good. And how ſhould this be well brought to paſs, but by certain Theorems and Doctrines; ſome concerning the Nature of the Univerſe, and ſome concerning the proper and particular conſtitution of man [or, *by the true and Theorematical knowledge both of the nature of the Univerſe, &c.*]

V. Tragedies were at firſt brought in and inſtituted, to put men in mind of worldly chances and caſualties: That theſe things in the ordinary courſe of nature did ſo happen; That men that were much pleaſed and delighted by ſuch accidents upon this ſtage, might not by the ſame things upon a greater ſtage be grieved and afflicted: For here you ſee what is the end of all ſuch things; and that even they that cry out ſo mournfully *Io Cithæron,* muſt bear them

[*for all their cries and exclamations,*] as well as others. And in very truth many good things are ſpoken by theſe Poets, as that (for example) is an excellent paſſage: *But if ſo be that I and my two children be neglected by the Gods, they have ſome reaſon even for that, &c.* And again, *It will but little avail thee to ſtorm and rage againſt the things themſelves, &c.* Again, *To reap ones life, as a ripe ear of corn*; and whatſoever elſe is to be found in them that is of the ſame kind. After the Tragedy, the *Comœdia vetus*, or ancient Comedy was brought in, which had the * *liberty to inveigh againſt perſonal vices*; being therefore through this her freedom and liberty of ſpeech of very good uſe and effect, to reſtrain men from pride and arrogance. To which end it was, that *Diogenes* took alſo the ſame liberty. After theſe, what were either the *Media*, or *Nova Comœdia* admitted for, but merely (or for the moſt part at leaſt) for the delight and pleaſure of curious and excellent imitation? * *It will ſteal away*; *look to it, &c.* Why, no man denies but that theſe alſo have ſome good things, [*whereof that may be one:*] But the whole drift and foundation of that kind of *Dramatical Poetry*, what is it elſe but as we have ſaid?

* παιδαγωγικὴν παῤῥησίαν ἔχουσα.

* Gr. ὑπερρύη· ἐπίστησον.

VI. How clearly doth it appear unto thee, that no other courſe of life could fit a true Philoſoper's practice better than this very courſe that thou art now already in?

VII. A branch cut off from the continuity of another branch, muſt needs be cut off from the whole tree: ſo a man that is divided from another man,

man, is divided from the whole Society. A branch is cut off by another; but he that hates and is averse, cuts himself off from his neighbour, and knows not that at the same time he divides himself from the whole body, [or, *corporation.*] But herein is the gift and mercy of God, the Authour of this society, in that, [*once cut off*] we may grow together and become part of the Whole again. But if this happen often, [*the misery is that*] the farther a man is run in this division, the harder he is to be re-united and restored again: and however, the branch which, once cut off, afterwards was graffed in, Gardeners can tell you is not like that which sprouted together at first, and still continued in the unity of the body.

VIII. * *To grow together like fellow-branches* [*in matter of good correspondence and affection*;] but not in matter of opinions. They that shall oppose thee in thy right courses, as it is not in their power to divert thee from thy good action, so neither let it be to divert thee from thy good affection towards them. But be it thy care to keep thy self constant in both; both in a right judgment and action, and in true meekness towards them, that either shall doe their endeavour to hinder thee, or at least will be displeased with thee [*for what thou hast done.*] For to fail in either (either in the one to give over for fear, or in the other to forsake thy natural affection towards him who by nature is both thy friend and thy kinsman,) is equally base, and much savouring of the disposition of a cowardly fugitive soldier.

* Gr. ὁμοθαμνεῖν μὲν, μὴ ὁμοδογματεῖν δὲ.

IX.

IX. It is not possible that any nature should be inferiour unto art, since that all arts imitate nature. If this be so; that the most perfect and general nature of all natures should [*in her operation*] come short of the skill of arts, is most improbable. Now common it is to all arts, to make that which is worse for the better's sake. Much more then doth the common Nature doe the same. Hence is the first ground of Justice. From Justice all other Vertues have their existence. For Justice cannot be preserved, if either we settle our minds and affections upon worldly things; or be apt to be deceived, or rash and inconstant.

X. The things themselves (which either to get or to avoid thou art put to so much trouble,) come not unto thee themselves; but thou in a manner goest unto them. Let then thine own judgment and opinion concerning those things be at rest; and as for the things themselves, they stand still and quiet, without any noise or stir at all: and so shall all pursuing and flying cease.

XI. Then is the Soul [*as* Empedocles *doth liken it,*] like unto a *Sphere*, or Globe, when she is all of one form and figure: When she neither [*greedily*] stretcheth out her self, unto any thing, nor [*basely*] contracts her self, or lies flat and dejected; but shineth all with light, whereby she doth see and behold the true nature, both that of the Universe, and her own in particular.

XII. Will any contemn me? let him look to that, [*upon what grounds he doth it:*] my care shall

ſhall be, that I may never be found either doing or ſpeaking any thing that doth truly deſerve contempt. Will any hate me, let him look to that. I for my part will be kind and loving unto all, and even unto him that hates me [whoſoever he be] will I be ready to ſhew his errour, not by way of exprobration, or oſtentation of my patience, but ingenuouſly and meekly: ſuch as was that famous *Phocion*, if ſo be that he did not diſſemble. For it is inwardly that theſe things muſt be: that the gods [*who look inwardly, and not upon the outward appearance,*] may behold a man truly free from all indignation and grief. For what hurt can it be unto thee [*whatſoever any man elſe doth,*] as long as thou mayſt doe that which is proper and ſutable to thine own nature? Wilt not thou (a man wholly appointed to be both *what*, and *as* the common good ſhall require,) accept of that which is now ſeaſonable to the nature of the Univerſe?

XIII. They contemn one another, and yet they ſeek to pleaſe one another: and whilſt they ſeek to ſurpaſs one another [*in worldly pomp and greatneſs,*] they moſt debaſe and proſtitute themſelves [*in their better part*] one to another.

XIV. How rotten and unſincere is he that ſaith, I am reſolved to carry my ſelf hereafter towards you with all ingenuity and ſimplicity! O man, what doſt thou mean? what needs this profeſſion of thine? the thing it ſelf will ſhew it. It ought to be written upon thy forehead. No ſooner is thy voice heard, than thy countenance muſt

muſt be able to ſhew what is in thy mind: even as he that is loved knows preſently by the looks of his ſweet-heart what is in her mind. Such muſt he be for all the world that is truly ſimple and good, as he whoſe arm-holes are offenſive, that whoſoever ſtands by, as ſoon as ever he comes near him, may as it were ſmell him whether he will or no. But the affectation of ſimplicity is in no wiſe laudable. There is nothing more ſhameſull than perfidious friendſhip. Above all things, that muſt be avoided. [*However*] true goodneſs, ſimplicy and kindneſs cannot ſo be hidden, but that [*as we have already ſaid*] in the very eyes and countenance they will ſhew themſelves.

XV. To live happily is an inward power of the Soul, when ſhe is affected with indifferency [or, *indifferently affected*] towards thoſe things that are by their nature indifferent. To be thus affected, ſhe muſt conſider all worldly objects both divided and whole: remembring withall that no object can of it ſelf beget any opinion in us, neither can come to us, but ſtands without ſtill and quiet; but that we our ſelves beget, and as it were print in our ſelves opinions concerning them. Now it is in our power, not to print them; and [*if they creep in*] and lurk in ſome corner, it is in our power to wipe them off. Remembring moreover that this care and circumſpection of thine is to continue but for a-while, and then thy life will be at an end. And what ſhould hinder, but that thou mayſt doe well with all theſe things? For if they be according to nature, rejoice in them, and let them be pleaſing and acceptable unto thee.

thee. But if they be againſt Nature, ſeek thou that which is according to thine own Nature, and whether it be for thy credit or no, uſe all poſſible ſpeed [*for the attainment of it*;] for no man ought to be blamed, for ſeeking his own good and happineſs.

XVI. Of every thing [*thou muſt conſider*] from whence it came, of what things it doth conſiſt, and into what it will be changed: what will be the nature of it [or, *what it will be like unto*] when it is changed, and that it can ſuffer no hurt by this change. [*And as for other mens either fooliſhneſs, or wickedneſs, that it may not trouble or grieve thee*;] *Firſt*, generally thus; What reference have I unto theſe? and that we are all born for one another's good. Then [*more particularly*] after another conſideration; as a Ram is firſt in a flock of Sheep, and a Bull in a herd of Cattel, ſo am I born to rule over them. Begin yet higher, even from this: If *Atoms* be not the beginning of all things, [*than which to believe nothing can be more abſurd*,] then muſt we needs grant that there is a Nature that doth govern the Univerſe. If ſuch a Nature, then are all worſe things made for the better's ſake; and all better for one another's ſake. *Secondly*, What manner of men they be, at board and upon their beds, and ſo forth. But, above all things, how they are forced by their opinions that they hold, to doe what they doe; and even thoſe things that they doe, with that pride and ſelf-conceit they doe them. *Thirdly*, that if they doe theſe things rightly, thou haſt no reaſon to be grieved. But if not rightly, it muſt needs

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needs be that they doe them againſt their wills, and through mere ignorance. For as [*according to* Plato's *opinion*] no ſoul doth willingly err, ſo by conſequent neither doeth it any thing otherwiſe than it ought, but againſt her will. Therefore are they grieved whenſoever they hear themſelves charged either of injuſtice, or unconſcionableneſs, [or, unthankfulneſs,] or covetouſneſs, or, in general of any injurious kind of dealing towards their neighbours.

4. *Fourthly*, That thou thy ſelf doſt tranſgreſs in many things, and art even ſuch another as they are. And though perchance thou doſt forbear the very act of ſome ſins, yet haſt thou in thy ſelf an habitual diſpoſition to them, but that either through fear, or vain-glory, or ſome ſuch other ſiniſter reſpect, thou art reſtrained.

5. *Fifthly*, That whether they have ſinned or no, thou doſt not underſtand perfectly. For many things are done * *by way of diſcreet policy*; and generally a man muſt know many things firſt, before he be able truly and judiciouſly to judge of another man's action.

* Gr. κατ' οἰκονομίαν.

6. *Sixthly*, That whenſoever thou doſt take on grievouſly, or makeſt great woe, [*little doſt thou remember then*] that a man's life is but for a moment of time, and that within a-while we ſhall all be in our graves.

7. *Seventhly*, That it is not the ſins and tranſgreſſions themſelves that trouble us properly; for they have their exiſtence in their minds and underſtandings onely, [*that commit them:*] but our own opinions concerning thoſe ſins. Remove then, and be content to part with that conceit of thine, that it is a grievous thing, and thou

thou haſt removed thine anger. But how ſhould I remove it? [*How?*] Reaſoning with thy ſelf that it is not ſhamefull. For if that which is ſhamefull be not the onely true evil that is, thou alſo wilt be driven [*whilſt thou doſt follow the common inſtinct of Nature, to avoid that which is evil,*] to commit many unjuſt things, and to become a thief, and any thing, [*that will make to the attainment of thy intended worldly ends.*] *Eighthly*, How many things may and do oftentimes follow upon ſuch fits of anger and grief; far more grievous in themſelves than thoſe very things which we are ſo grieved or angry for. *Ninthly*, That meekneſs is a thing unconquerable, if it be true and natural, and not affected, or hypocritical. For how ſhall even the moſt fierce and malitious that thou ſhall conceive, be able to hold on againſt thee, if thou ſhalt ſtill continue meek and loving unto him; and that even at that time when he is about to doe thee wrong, thou ſhalt be well diſpoſed and in good temper, with all meekneſs to teach him, and to inſtruct him better? [*As for example;*] *My ſon, we were not born for this, to hurt and annoy one another: It will be thy hurt, not mine, my ſon:* and ſo to ſhew him forcibly and fully, that it is ſo in very deed; and that neither Bees doe it one to another, nor any other creatures that are naturally ſociable. But this thou muſt doe not ſcoffingly, nor by way of exprobration, but tenderly without any harſhneſs of words. Neither muſt thou doe it by way of exerciſe or oſtentation, that they that are by and hear thee, may admire thee:

See B. VI. n. XV.

8.

9.

thee: but ſo always that no body be privy to it, but himſelf alone; yea, though there be more preſent at the ſame time. Theſe nine particular heads, as ſo many gifts from the Muſes, ſee that thou remember well: and begin one day, whilſt thou art yet alive, to be a man indeed. But on the other ſide thou muſt take heed as much to flatter them as to be angry with them: for both are equally uncharitable, and equally hurtfull. And in thy paſſions, take it preſently to thy conſideration, that to be angry, is not the part of a man, but that to be meek and gentle, as it ſavours of more humanity, ſo of more manhood. That in this there is ſtrength and nerves [or, *vigour*] and fortitude; whereof anger and indignation is altogether void. For the nearer every thing is unto *unpaſſionateneſs*, the nearer it is unto power. And as grief doth proceed from weakneſs, ſo doth anger. For both [*both he that is angry and that grieveth*] have received a wound, and cowardly have as it were yielded themſelves [*unto their affections.*] If thou wilt have a *Tenth* alſo, receive this Tenth gift from [*Hercules*] the Guide and Leader of the Muſes: That it is a mad man's part, to look that there ſhould be no wicked men in the World, becauſe it is impoſſible. Now for a man to brook well enough, that there ſhould be wicked men in the World, but not to endure that any ſhould tranſgreſs againſt himſelf, is againſt all equity, and indeed tyrannical.

XVII. Four ſeveral diſpoſitions, [or, *inclinations*] there be of the mind and underſtanding, which

which to be aware of thou muſt carefully obſerve: and whenſoever thou doſt diſcover them, thou muſt rectifie them, ſaying to thy ſelf concerning every one of them, *This* imagination is not neceſſary; *This* is uncharitable: *This* thou ſhalt ſpeak as another man's ſlave, or inſtrument; than which nothing can be more ſenſeleſs and abſurd: For the *Fourth*, thou ſhalt ſharply check and upbraid thy ſelf, for that thou doſt ſuffer that more divine part in thee to become ſubject and obnoxious to that more ignoble part of thy body, and the groſs luſts and concupiſcences thereof. 1. 2. 3. 4.

XVIII. What portion ſoever, either of air or fire, there be in thee, although by nature it tend upwards, ſubmitting nevertheleſs to the ordinance of the Univerſe, it abides here below in this mixt body. So whatſoever is in thee, either earthy or humid, although by nature it tend downwards, yet is it againſt its nature both raiſed upwards, and ſtanding [or, *conſiſtent.*] So obedient are even the Elements themſelves to the Univerſe, abiding patiently whereſoever (though againſt their Nature) they are placed, untill the ſound as it were of their retreat and ſeparation. Is it not a grievous thing then, that thy reaſonable part onely ſhould be diſobedient, and ſhould not endure to keep its place: yea, though nothing be enjoined it contrary unto it, but that onely which is according to its Nature? For [*we cannot ſay of it when it is diſobedient, as we ſay of the fire, or air,*] that it tends upwards towards its proper Element, for then goes it the quite contrary

way, [or, *For we cannot say of it, as of the Elements, that it suffers against its own nature to be obedient: but rather when disobedient, then goes it a quite contrary course to that which is natural unto it.*] For the motion of the mind to any injustice, or incontinency, or to sorrow, or to fear, is nothing else but a separation from nature. Also when the mind is grieved for any thing that is happened [*by the divine Providence*] then doth it likewise forsake its own place. For it was ordained unto holiness and godliness, [*which specially consists in an humble submission to God and his Providence in all things*;] as well as unto Justice: these also being part of those duties, which as naturally sociable we are bound unto; and without which we cannot happily converse one with another [or, *without which, common societies cannot prosper:*] yea and the very ground and fountain indeed of all just actions.

See B. XII. n. I.

XIX. He that hath not one and the self-same general end always as long as he liveth, cannot possibly be one and the self-same man always. But this will not suffice, except thou add also what ought to be this general end. For as the general conceit and apprehension of all those things which upon no certain ground are by the greater part of men deemed good, cannot be uniform and agreeable, but that onely which is limited and restrained by some certain proprieties and conditions, as of *community*: [*that nothing be conceived good, which is not commonly and publickly good*:] so must the end also that we propose unto our selves be *common* and *sociable*.

ciable. For he that doth direct all his own private motions and purposes to that end, all his actions will be agreeable and uniform; and by that means he will be still the same man.

XX. Remember the fable of the countrey mouse and the city mouse, and the great fright and terrour that this was put into.

XXI. *Socrates* was wont to call the common conceits and opinions of men, the common *Lamiæ*, or bugbears, of the world: the proper terrour of silly children.

XXII. The *Lacedæmonians*, at their publick *spectacula*, were wont to appoint seats and forms for their strangers in the shadow; they themselves were content to sit any where.

XXIII. What *Socrates* answered unto *Perdiccas*, why he did not come unto him, *Lest of all deaths I should dye the worst kind of death*, said he: *that is, not be able to requite the good that hath been done unto me.*

XXIV. In the ancient mystical letters of the *Ephesians*, [commonly called *Ephesiæ literæ*] there was an *Item*, that a man should always have in his mind some one or other of the Ancient Worthies.

XXV. The *Pythagoreans* were wont betimes in the morning, the first thing they did, to look up unto the heavens, to put themselves in mind of them who constantly and unvariably did perform their task: as also to put themselves in mind of orderliness [or, *good order*] and of purity, and of naked simplicity. For no star or planet hath any cover before it.

XXVI. How *Socrates* looked, when he was

ſain to gird himſelf with a skin, *Xantippe* his wife having taken away his clothes, and carried them abroad with her; and what he ſaid to his fellows and friends, who were aſhamed, and out of reſpect to him, did retire themſelves when they ſaw him thus decked.

XXVII. In matter of writing or reading thou muſt needs be taught before thou canſt doe either: much more in matter of life. For thou art born a mere ſlave, [*to thy ſenſes and brutiſh affections*;] deſtitute [*without teaching*] of all true knowledge and ſound reaſon.

XXVIII. *My heart ſmiled within me. They will accuſe even Vertue her ſelf, with moſt hainous and opprobrious words.*

XXIX. As they that long after [*green*] figs in winter, [*when they cannot be had*;] ſo are they that long after children, before they be granted them.

XXX. *As often as a Father kiſſeth his Child, he ſhould ſay ſecretly with himſelf* (ſaid *Epictetus*,) *To morrow perchance ſhall he dye.* But theſe words be ominous. No words ominous (ſaid he) that ſignifie any thing that is natural: In very truth and deed not more ominous than this, *To cut down grapes when they are ripe.* Green grapes, ripe grapes, dried grapes [or, *raiſins:*] ſo many changes and mutations of one thing, not into that which was not abſolutely [or, *into ſo many ſeveral ſubſtances*,] but rather ſo many ſucceſſions of time in one and the ſelf-ſame ſubject and ſubſtance, [or, *ſo many ſeveral changes and mutations, not into that which hath*

hath no being at all, but into that which is not yet in being.]

XXXI. *Of the free will there is no thief or robber:* out of *Epictetus*; Whose is this also: That we should find a certain art and method of assenting; and that we should always observe with great care and heed the inclinations of our minds, that they may always be with their due restraint and reservation, always charitable, and according to the true worth of every present object. And as for earnest longing, that we should altogether avoid it: and to use averseness in those things onely that wholly depend of our own wills. *It is not about ordinary petty matters, believe it, that all our strife and contention is, but whether* [*with the vulgar*] *we should be mad, or* [*by the help of Philosophy*] *wise and sober*, said he.

XXXII. *Socrates* said, *What will ye have? the souls of reasonable, or unreasonable creatures? Of reasonable. But what? Of those whose reason is sound and perfect? or of those whose reason is vitiated and corrupted? Of those whose reason is sound and perfect. Why then labour ye not for such? Because we have them already. What then do ye so strive and contend between you?*

THE TWELFTH BOOK.

WHatſoever thou doſt hereafter aſpire unto, thou mayſt even now enjoy and poſſeſs, if thou doſt not envy thy ſelf thine own happineſs. And that will be, if thou ſhalt forget all that is paſt, and for the future refer thy ſelf wholly to the divine providence, and ſhalt bend and apply all thy preſent thoughts and intentions to holineſs and righteouſneſs. To holineſs, in accepting willingly whatſoever is ſent by the divine Providence, as being that which the nature of the Univerſe hath appointed unto thee, which alſo hath appointed thee for that, whatſoever it be. To righteouſneſs, in ſpeaking the Truth freely, and without ambiguity; and in doing all things juſtly and diſcreetly. Now in this good courſe, let not other mens either wickedneſs, or opinion, or voice hinder thee: no, nor the ſenſe of this maſs of fleſh that compaſſeth thee: for let that which ſuffers look to it ſelf. If therefore whenſoever the time of thy departing ſhall come, thou ſhalt readily leave all things, and ſhalt reſpect thy mind onely, and that divine part of thine, and this ſhall be thine onely fear, not that ſome time or other thou ſhalt ceaſe to live, but that thou ſhalt never begin to live according to Nature: then ſhalt thou be a man indeed, worthy of that world from which thou hadſt thy beginning; then ſhalt thou ceaſe to be a ſtranger

See Notes upon B. VII. num. XXXIX.

ger in thy Countrey, and to wonder at those things that happen daily, as things strange and unexpected, and anxiously to depend on divers things [*that are not in thy power.*]

II. God beholds our minds and understandings bare and naked from these material vessels, and outsides, and all earthly dross. For with his simple and pure understanding he pierceth into our inmost and purest parts, which from His, as it were by a water-pipe and chanel, first flowed and issued. This if thou also shalt use to doe, [*to look upon thy self as consisting of a bare soul and understanding; all other parts being no parts of thee but improperly,*] thou shalt rid thy self of that manifold luggage wherewith thou art round about encumbred. For he that does not regard either his body, or his cloathing, or his dwelling, or any such external furniture, [*as either part of himself, or properly belonging unto him,*] must needs gain unto himself great rest and ease. Three things there be in all which thou dost consist of, the body, thy life, and thy mind. Of these the two former are so far forth thine, as that thou art bound to take care for them. But the third alone is that which is properly thine. If then thou shalt separate from thy self (that is, from thy mind) whatsoever other men either doe or say, or whatsoever thou thy self hast heretofore either done or said; and all troublesome thoughts concerning the future, and whatsoever (as either belonging to thy body or life,) is without the jurisdiction of thine own will, and whatsoever in the ordinary course of humane chances

and accidents doth happen unto thee; ſo that thy mind (keeping her ſelf looſe and free from all outward co-incidental intanglements, always in a readineſs to depart,) ſhall live by her ſelf, and to her ſelf, doing that which is juſt, accepting whatſoever doth happen, and ſpeaking the truth always: If, I ſay, thou ſhalt ſeparate from thy mind whatſoever by ſympathy might adhere unto it, and all time both paſt and future, and ſhalt make thy ſelf in all points and reſpects like unto *Empedocles* his [*allegorical*] Sphere, *all round and circular*, &c. and ſhalt think of no longer life than that which is now preſent; Then ſhalt thou be truly able to paſs the remainder of thy days without troubles and diſtractions, nobly and generouſly diſpoſed, and in good favour and correſpondency with that Spirit which is within thee.

III. I have often wondered, how it ſhould come to paſs, that every man loving himſelf beſt, ſhould more regard other mens opinions concerning himſelf than his own. For if any God or grave Maſter ſtanding by, ſhould command any of us to think nothing by himſelf, but what he ſhould preſently ſpeak out; no man were able to endure it, though but for one day. Thus do we fear more what our neighbours will think of us, than what we our ſelves.

IV. How comes it to paſs, that the gods having ordered all other things ſo well and ſo lovingly, ſhould be overſeen in this one onely thing, that whereas there have been ſome very good men, that have made many covenants as it were with God, and by many holy actions and outward

ward ſervices contracted a kind of familiarity with Him; and theſe men when once they are dead, ſhould never be **reſtored to life*, but be extinct for ever? But this thou mayſt be ſure of, that this (if it be ſo indeed) would never have been ſo ordered by the gods, had it been fit otherwiſe. For certainly it was poſſible, had it been more juſt ſo; and had it been according to Nature, the Nature of the Univerſe would eaſily have born it. But now becauſe it is not ſo, (if ſo be that it be not ſo indeed) be therefore confident that it was not fit it ſhould be ſo. For thou ſeeſt thy ſelf, that now ſeeking after this matter, how freely thou doſt argue and conteſt with God. But were not the gods both juſt and good in the higheſt degree, thou durſt not thus reaſon with them. Now if juſt and good, it could not be that in the creation of the world, they ſhould either unjuſtly or unreaſonably overſee any thing.

* Gr. αὖθις ἀναστῆναι. See *Suidas* in ἀναβιῶναι. See n. IV. upon B. II.

V. Uſe thy ſelf even unto thoſe things that thou doſt at firſt deſpair of. For the left hand, we ſee, which for the moſt part lieth idle, becauſe not uſed, yet doth it hold the bridle with more ſtrength than the right, becauſe it hath been uſed unto it.

VI. Let theſe be the objects of thy ordinary meditation: to conſider what manner of men both for ſoul and body we ought to be, whenſoever death ſhall ſurpriſe us: the ſhortneſs of this our mortal life: the immenſe vaſtneſs of the time that hath been before, and will be after us: the frailty of every worldly materi-

material object: All these things to consider, and behold clearly in themselves, all disguisement of external outside being removed and taken away. Again, to consider the efficient causes of all things: the proper ends and references of all actions: what pain is in it self, what pleasure, what death, what fame or honour: how every man is the true and proper ground of his own rest and tranquillity, and that no man can truly be hindred by any other: that all is but conceit and opinion. As for the use of the *Dogmata*, thou must carry thy self in the practice of them, rather like unto a *Pancratiastes*, [or, *one that at the same time fights and wrestles, using both hands and feet, &c.*] than a *Gladiator*. For this, if he lose his sword that he fights with, he is gone: whereas the other hath still his hand free, which he may easily turn and manage at his will.

VII. All worldly things thou must behold and consider, dividing them into matter, form and reference, [or, *their proper end.*]

VIII. How happy is man in this his power [*that hath been granted unto him,*] that he needs not doe any thing but what God shall approve, and that he may embrace contentedly whatsoever God doth send unto him?

* See Notes.

IX. *Whatsoever doth happen in the ordinary course and consequence of natural events, neither must the gods, (for it is not possible that they either wittingly or unwittingly should doe any thing amiss;) nor men be accused; for it is through ignorance, and therefore against their wills, that they doe any

any thing amiss. None then must be accused.

X. How ridiculous and strange is he, that wonders at any thing that happens in this life in the ordinary course of nature!

XI. Either Fate, and that an absolute necessary, and unavoidable decree; or a placable and flexible Providence; or All is a mere casual Confusion, void of all order and government. If an absolute and unavoidable Necessity, why dost thou resist? If a placable and exorable Providence, make thy self worthy of the divine help and assistence. If all be a mere Confusion without any Moderatour or Governour, then hast thou reason to congratulate thy self, that in such a general floud of Confusion, thou thy self hast obtained a reasonable Faculty, whereby thou mayst govern thine own life and actions. But if thou beest carried away with the floud, it must be thy body perchance, or thy life, or some other thing that belongs unto them that is carried away: thy mind and understanding cannot. Or should it be so, that the light of a candle is indeed still bright and lightsome untill it be put out: and should Truth, and Righteousness, and Temperance cease to shine in thee whilst thou thy self hast any being?

XII. At the conceit and apprehension that such and such a one hath sinned, [*thou reason with thy self.*] What do I know whether this be a sin indeed, as it seems to be? But if it be, what do I know but that he himself hath already condemned himself for it? And that is all one as if a man should scratch

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and tears his own face, [*an object of compassion rather than of anger.*] Again, that he that would not have a vitious man to sin, is like unto him that would not have moisture in the fig, nor children to weep, nor a horse to neigh, nor any thing else that in the course of nature is necessary. For what shall he doe that hath such an habit? If thou therefore beest * *powerfull and eloquent*, remedy it if thou canst.

* Gr. εἰ γοργὸς εἶ.

XIII. If it be not fitting, doe it not. If it be not true, speak it not. Ever maintain thine own purpose and resolution free from all compulsion and necessity; and always set the Universe before thine eyes.

XIV. Of every thing that presents it self unto thee, to consider what the true nature of it is, and to unfold it, as it were, by dividing it into that which is formal, that which is material, the true use or end of it, and the just time that it is appointed to last.

XV. It is high time for thee to understand that there is somewhat in thee better and more divine than either thy passions, or thy sensual appetites and affections. What is now the object of my mind? is it fear, or suspicion, or lust, or any such thing? To doe nothing rashly without some certain end; let that be thy first care. The next, to have no other end than the common good. For, alas! yet a little while, and thou art no more: no more will any, either of those things that now thou seest, or of those men that now are living, be any more. For all things are by nature appointed [*soon*] to be changed, turned and corrupted

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that other things might ſucceed in their room.

XVI. [*Remember*] that all is but opinion, and all opinion depends of the mind. Take thine opinion away, and then as a Ship that hath ſtricken in within the arms and mouth of the harbour, *a preſent calm; all things ſafe and ſteady; a Bay not capable of any ſtorms and tempeſts:* [*as the Poet hath it.*]

XVII. No operation whatſoever it be, ceaſing for a while, can be truly ſaid to ſuffer any evil, becauſe it is at an end. Neither can he that is the Authour of that operation, for this very reſpect, becauſe his operation is at an end, be ſaid to ſuffer any evil. Likewiſe then, neither can the whole body of all our actions, (which is our life,) if in time it ceaſe, be ſaid to ſuffer any evil for this very reaſon, becauſe it is at an end: nor He truly be ſaid to have been ill affected, that did put a period to this *ſeries* of actions. Now this time or certain period depends of the determination of Nature: ſometimes of particular nature, as when a man dyeth old; but of nature in general, however; the parts whereof thus changing one after another, the whole world ſtill continues freſh and new. Now that is ever beſt and moſt ſeaſonable, which is for the good of the Whole. Thus it appears that death of it ſelf can neither be hurtfull to any in particular, becauſe it is not a ſhamefull thing; (for neither is it a thing that depends of our own will, nor of it ſelf contrary to the common good:) and generally, as it is both expedient and reaſonable to the Whole, that in that reſpect it

muſt

must needs be good. It is that also which is brought unto us by the order and appointment of the divine providence; so that he whose will and mind in these things runs along with the divine ordinance, and by this concurrence of his will and mind with the Divine providence, is lead and driven along as it were by God himself, may truly be termed and esteemed the Θεοφορήτος, or *Divinely led and inspired.*

XVIII. These three things thou must always have in a readiness: First concerning thine own actions, whether thou doest nothing either idlely, or otherwise than justice and equity do require: and concerning those things that happen unto thee externally, that either they happen unto thee by chance, or by providence; either of which to accuse, is equally against reason. Secondly, what our bodies are like unto [or, *what are the beginnings of our bodies*] whilst yet rude and imperfect, untill they be *animated*; and from their *animation* untill their expiration: of what things they are compounded, and into what things they shall be dissolved. Thirdly, [*how vain all things will appear unto thee*] when, from on high as it were, looking down, thou shalt contemplate all things upon Earth, and the wonderfull mutability that they are subject unto: considering withall both the immenseness of that Air and of that Heaven [or, *the infinite both greatness and variety of things aëreal and things celestial*,] that are round about it: and that as often as thou shalt behold them; thou

See B.VII. n. XXVI.

thou ſhalt ſtill ſee the ſame; as the ſame things, ſo the ſame ſhortneſs of continuance of all thoſe things. And, behold, Theſe be the things that we are ſo proud and puffed up for.

XIX. Caſt away from thee opinion, and thou art ſafe. And what is it that hinders thee from caſting of it away! When thou art grieved at any thing, haſt thou forgotten that all things happen according to the Nature of the Univerſe; and that him onely it concerns who is in fault; and moreover, that what is now done, is that which from ever hath been done in the world, and will ever be done, and is now done every where: how nearly all men are allied one to another by a kindred not of bloud, nor of ſeed, but of the ſame mind? Thou haſt alſo forgotten that every man's mind partakes of the Deity, and iſſueth from thence; and that no man can properly call any thing his own, no not his child, nor his body, nor his life, for that they all proceed from that One [*who is the giver of all things:*] That all things are but opinion; that no man lives properly, but that very inſtant of time which is now preſent; [or, *that all life properly doth conſiſt in this preſent inſtant of time ſeparated from that which is either paſt or future:*] And therefore that no man [*whenſoever he dyeth*] can properly be ſaid to loſe any more than an inſtant of time. See B. II. n. XII.

XX. Let thy thoughts ever run upon them, who once for ſome one thing or other were moved with extraordinary indignation; who were once in the higheſt pitch of either honour or

or calamity, or mutual hatred and enmity; or of any other fortune or condition whatsoever. Then consider what's now become of all those things. All is turned to smoak; all to ashes, and a mere fable; and perchance not so much as a fable. As also whatsoever is of this Nature, as *Fabius Catulinus* in the field, *Lucius Lupus*, and *Stertinius* at *Baiæ*, *Tiberius* at *Capreæ*, *Velius Rufus*, and all such examples of vehement prosecution in worldly matters; let these also run in thy mind at the same time; and how vile *every object of such earnest and vehement prosecution is*; and how much more agreeable to true Philosophy it is, for a man to carry himself in every matter that offers it self, justly and moderately, as one that followeth the gods with all simplicity. For, for a man to be proud and high-conceited, that he is not proud and high-conceited, is of all kind of pride and presumption the most intolerable.

Gr. πᾶν τὸ περιεστηκὸς.

XXI. To them that ask thee, Where hast thou seen the gods, and how knowest thou certainly that there be gods, that thou art so devout in their worship? I answer first of all, that even to the very eye they are in some manner visible and apparent. Secondly, neither have I ever seen mine own soul, and yet I respect and honour it. So then for the gods, by the daily experience that I have of their power [*and providence towards my self and others,*] I know certainly that they are, and therefore worship them.

XXII. Herein doth consist happiness of life, for a man to know throughly the true Nature of

of every thing; What is the matter, and what is the form of it: with all his heart and ſoul, ever to doe that which is juſt, and to ſpeak the truth. What then remaineth, but to enjoy thy life in a courſe and coherence of good actions, one upon another immediately ſucceeding, and never interrupted, though for never ſo little a while?

XXIII. There is but one light of the Sun, though it be intercepted by walls and mountains, and other thouſand objects. There is but one common ſubſtance of the whole World, though it be concluded and reſtrained into ſeveral different bodies, in number infinite. There is but one common ſoul, though divided into innumerable particular eſſences and natures. So is there but one common intellectual ſoul, though it ſeem to be divided. And as for all other parts of thoſe Generals which we have mentioned, as either ſenſitive ſouls or ſubjects, theſe of themſelves (as naturally irrational) have no common mutual reference one unto another, though many of them contain a Mind [or, *Reaſonable Faculty*] in them, whereby they are ruled and governed [or, *that hath power and authority over them.*] But of every reaſonable mind this is the particular nature, that it hath reference to whatſoever is of her own kind, and deſireth to be united: neither can this common affection, or mutual unity and correſpondency, be here intercepted or divided, or confined to particulars [*as thoſe other common things are.*]

XXIV. What doſt thou deſire? To live long. What? To enjoy the operations of a ſenſitive

ſoul, or of the appetitive Faculty? or wouldſt thou grow, and then decreaſe again? Wouldſt thou long be able to talk, to think and reaſon with thy ſelf? which of all theſe ſeems unto thee a worthy object of thy deſire? Now if of all theſe thou doſt find that they be but little worth in themſelves, proceed on unto the laſt, which is, In all things to follow God and Reaſon. But for a man to grieve that by death he ſhall be deprived of any of theſe things, is both againſt God and Reaſon.

XXV. What a ſmall portion of vaſt and infinite eternity it is, that is allowed unto every one of us, and how ſoon it vaniſheth into the general age of the world: of the common ſubſtance, and of the common ſoul alſo what a ſmall portion is allotted unto us; and in what a little clod of the whole Earth (as it were) it is that thou doſt crawl. After thou ſhalt rightly have conſidered theſe things with thy ſelf, fanſie not any thing elſe in the world any more to be of any weight or moment but this, to doe that onely which thine own nature doth require; and to conform thy ſelf to that which the common Nature doth afford.

XXVI. What is the preſent eſtate of my underſtanding? For herein lieth all indeed. As for all other things, they are without the compaſs of mine own will: and if without the compaſs of my will, then are they as dead things unto me, and as it were mere ſmoak.

XXVII. To ſtir up a man to the contempt of death, this among other things is of good power and efficacy, that even they who eſteemed

pleaſure

pleaſure to be happineſs, and pain miſery, did nevertheleſs [*many of them*] contemn death [*as much as any.*] And can death be terrible to him, to whom that onely ſeems good which [*in the ordinary courſe of nature*] is ſeaſonable? to him, to whom whether his actions be many or few, ſo they be all good, is all one; and who whether he behold the things of the world [*being always the ſame*] either for many years, or for few years onely, is altogether indifferent? O man! as a Citizen thou haſt lived and converſed in this great City [*the world.*] Whether juſt for ſo many years, or no, what is it unto thee? Thou haſt lived (thou mayſt be ſure) as long as the Laws and Orders of the City required; which may be the common comfort of all. Why then ſhould it be grievous unto thee, if not a Tyrant, nor an unjuſt Judge, but the ſame nature that brought thee in, doth now ſend thee out of the world? As if the *Prætor* ſhould fairly diſmiſs him from the *ſcene* [or *ſtage*] whom he had taken in to act a while. Oh, but the play is not yet at an end; [or, I have not yet pronounced all the five parts;] there are but three Acts yet acted. Thou haſt well ſaid: for in matter of life, three Acts [or, Parts] is the whole Play. Now to ſet a certain time to every man's acting, belongs unto him onely, who as firſt he was the cauſe of thy *compoſition*, ſo is he now of thy diſſolution. As for thy ſelf, thou haſt to doe with neither. Go thy ways then well pleaſed and contented: for ſo is he that diſmiſſeth thee.

F I N I S.

NOTES UPON ANTONINUS.

UPON

The First Book.

THE inscription of these Books is, M. Αντωνίνου τῶν εἰς ἑαυτόν· which I verily believe to be *Antoninus*'s own; because both for propriety and obscurity so sutable to these his Books. For as no other Title could fit the subject of these Books better, if rightly understood; so is the obscurity of it such, that few I think have penetrated into the true meaning of it. Not they, I believe, (as that ancient Greek Author, whom *Suidas* doth allege) who expound it, τῶν ἰδίων βίων διαγωγήν· much less they (as *Xylander* and many others) who translate it, *De vita sua*. *Canterus* comes nearer: *De officio suo*. But, *De seipso* (as *Xylander* himself in his first Edition had well rendred it, but ill expounded it, *seu vita sua:*) or *De se*; as my Father (of blessed memory) doth render it in divers places,

is both more literal, and more true by far. Now by ἐωυτὸν, you must know, the *Stoicks* understood τὸ νοῦν καὶ τὰ δόγματα, a man's reason or intellectual part, and his opinions, by which he did frame and order the course of his life. Of all other things whatsoever, they held, that they were little or nothing at all unto man; (and therefore termed them ἀδιάφορα, or *things indifferent:*) his mind and his opinions (in their judgment,) being the onely thing that every man in himself could properly call *Himself.* Μηδέποτε ἐπὶ τοῖς κοινοῖς, μήτ' ἐπαινεῖτε μήτε ψέγετε, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ δογμάτων. Ταῦτα γὰρ ἕξει τὰ ἴδια ἑκάστου, τὰ καὶ τὰς πράξεις αἰσχρὰς ἢ καλὰς ποιοῦντα. *Never either commend or discommend any man for ordinary common things,* (which men usually are either commended or discommended for:) *but onely for his Dogmata,* or *certain Tenets in points of life and practice. For they onely are that which every man may truly account his own, and that onely which can make actions either shamefull or praise-worthy.* See *Antoninus* himself Book VIII. Number (as for the ease and convenience of the Reader we have divided him) XXXVIII. And again B. X. N. XXXVIII. XII. 2. 26. See *Plato* himself at large in his *Alcibiades*, &c. and out of him *Iamblicus* in his Protrepticks, and *Julian* the Apostate in his 2d Oration. *Apuleius de Deo Socr. Si cotidiana eorum ara dispungas, invenies in rationibus multa prodigè profusa, & in* Semet *nihil. In sui dico Damonis cultum. If thou shalt run over their ordinary expenses* (saith he) *thou shalt find that upon many other occasions they have been very prodigal and excessive; but* upon Themselves *at little or no cost at all. Upon their*

their own Dæmon [or, *Spirit:* See note 8. upon Book II.] *I mean*, &c. So much upon the Title of this Book was by me written at the firſt, when I firſt ſet out this tranſlation of *Antoninus*, *A. D.* 1634. and 1635. Eight years after, to wit, *A. D.* 1643. I did ſet him out in Greek and Latin, with larger and more elaborate Notes and Animadverſions, as it became me, having now to doe with all the learned of *Europe*, to whom I was accountable for what I had done, being the firſt man (ſince the παλιγγενεσία of good learning and literature: *abſit invidia verbo:*) that had taken upon me publickly, to make this divine work of the beſt and moſt learned of all the Emperours that ever were, intelligible and uſefull: as in the Prefaces, both Latin and Engliſh, hath been more largely diſcourſed. In thoſe Latin Notes before mentioned, I have largely diſputed and proved, that the true and exact interpretation of this Title, Εἰς ἑαυτὸν, is, *Of himſelf, and to himſelf:* neither do I ſee, or much fear, what can be oppoſed againſt it by any man. But it is very ſtrange to me, and ſuch kind of dealing as I have not known before, that ſome that have ſet out this Authour ſince, in Greek and Latin with Commentaries; though they take very good notice of my Engliſh Tranſlation (the firſt Edition of it) and of the Notes there; yet they take no notice at all (nor once mention it, that I know of,) of the Latin; nor of thoſe more elaborate Notes and Animadverſions we ſpake of. I am ſure, they could not ſay they had never ſeen it, (a thing very improbable, however:) who have ſaid and acknowledged, they had it in their Study ever ſince it

came out. I beseech the Reader (if so far impartial) to reade and ponder what is written by me, in those Latin Notes, upon this Title; and what is set out by them, so many years after, upon the same. For my part, though I never thought my self worthy of half the thanks (and praises, I might add) which I have received from all parts, for what I have done upon this Authour: not to speak of great preferment offered me beyond the Seas, for it: nor, yet, can modestly entertain so great an opinion of my self: Yet I must say, and acknowledge, that since I have heard of the endeavours of many to cry down what, I believe, they never read, or understood: (but this is it, not to be of the faction:) I am now forced to think much better of it, and to applaud my self more than ever I did before. It was never my intention to write Commentaries (though I do not except against those that have done it; but rather think them worthy of many thanks, since there be that need and like such,) upon the Book; and I have given my reason in my Latin Notes, *p.* 10, 11. upon those words there, μήτε παιδεύειν, &c. I wish I may live and have an opportunity to set out my Latin Notes, with some Additions, which may be of some consequence to the Book, and the right understanding of it, in divers places.

1. *Both to frequent publick Schools.*] τὸ μὲν εἰς δημοσίας διατριβὰς φοιτᾶν, rendred by *Xylander*, *ut me in publicos ludos commearem, sed*, &c. which by the plain and evident testimony of ancient Writers will appear most false. Witness the anci-

ancient Authour cited by *Suidas*, who speaking of *Antoninus*, ἀκροατὴς μὲν ἀλλων γενόμενος, ὕστερον διήκουσε καὶ Σέξτου ἐκ Βοιωτίας φιλοσόφου ἐπ' αὐτῆς Ῥώμης (saith he with great admiration:) θαμίζων 'αυτῷ καὶ φοιτῶν ἐπὶ θύραις. And that he did so to his dying day appeareth by that which followeth in the same writer. *Tantum in eo studium Philosophiæ fuit* (they are the words of *Julius Capitolinus* in his life:) *ut adscitus jam in Imperatoriam dignitatem, tamen ad domum Apollonii discendi causa veniret. Audivit & Sextum Chæronensem, &c.* And again, *Studuit & Juri, audiens L. Volusium, &c. Frequentavit & declamatorum Scholas publicas, &c.* So much I think will suffice, to make any man confess that it must be written, as I have interpreted it, not τὸ μὴ, but τό με εἰς δημοσίας, &c. or without any pronoun (if any man had rather have it so, because it is omitted in most places, though expressed in some towards the end,) τὸ εἰς δημ. &c.

2. *Not easily to believe those things which are commonly, &c.*] The words are, καὶ τὸ ἀπιστητικὸν (ἀπιστιτικὸν in the Second Edition:) τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν τερατευομένων, &c. *Xylander* in his Translation corrects it, ἀπιστητικὸν· which is very probable. *Suidas* cites it, ἐπιστητικὸν, which I cannot altogether reject, because ἐπιστῆσαι and ἐφιστάνειν are words that *Antoninus* doth often use, and to this purpose: as where he saith, περὶ οὗ καὶ μάλιστ' ἄν τις ἐπιστήσειεν, εἴπερ ἀληθὲς ἦν. But in this sense I must confess, it should rather have been, ἐπιστατικὸν περὶ τῶν λεγομένων· However, that *Antoninus* by these words doth understand the Christians,

Christians, I think probable for these reasons. First, because (as appeareth by the ancients) Christians were ordinarily accounted by the Heathens, and Christ himself held by them to have been a great Magician. Secondly, that the Heathens themselves, not onely upon other occasions, but especially for Dæmoniacks, and such as were possessed, made often use of Christians, appeareth by more than one passage of *Tertullian:* and in particular, how *Lucilla*, daughter to this *Antoninus*, infested with the Devil, was cured by one *Abercius*, Bishop of *Hieropolis*, may be seen by the acts and particulars of it yet extant. Whether also those laws of *Antoninus*, made against them, *qui sub obtentu & monitu deorum quadam vel renunciant vel jactant, vel scientes effingunt, quo leves hominum animi superstitione Numinis terreantur*, mentioned by *Ulpianus* and *Modestinus*, were made against Christians, as some are of opinion, I will not determine. Now if so be that *Antoninus* doth here intend the Christians, I do not see, how he could altogether discredit the truth of their strange and miraculous operations: especially if we give credit to those acts extant, not as yet, that I know of, questioned by any: and if he did not intend them particularly, (which I confess is not necessary that we should believe;) then that in general he should discredit all such operations as were accounted miraculous and supernatural, is much less credible; whenas (besides many good reasons that might be given to the contrary,) the Christians themselves (as *Athenagoras* who then lived) did not deny, but that strange things in that kind were done and brought to pass among

among the very Heathens. Τὸ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τόπους καὶ πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη γινεσθαί τινας ἐπ' ὀνόματι εἰδώλων ἐνεργείας, οὐδ' ἡμεῖς ἀναιρήσομεν. *That in some certain places and towns of several Nations some operations* (or, *wonderfull effects*) *are brought to pass in the name of Idols, is not by us denied:* saith he in his Apology. I say therefore, except we much restrain *Antoninus* his words, of such and such impostours, and of such and such wonders; I do not see how he could profess that he did ἀπιστεῖν· but δοκιμάσαι well he might; that is, first with best discretion and diligence examine things before he did believe them: and then, in case the truth did appear, yet not as one of the silly multitude, to stand amazed with a superstitious kind of astonishment, but as a wise man to consider of the causes and possibility of all such whether onely seeming, because secret; or truly and really supernatural events and operations. For these reasons I conceive it should have been either τὸ δοκιμαστικὸν περὶ τῶν λεγομένων, *he did consider of them with discretion:* or, τὸ μὴ δοκιμαστικὸν τοῖς λεγομ. at least; that he gave no great heed to such things; rather than so absolutely τὸ ἀπιστικὸν, *that he did not believe.* But I determine it not. All this while, though my matter did in a manner lead me unto it, have I forborn to mention that great wonder, which in the days, and in the very presence of this *Antoninus*, happened in his Wars of *Germany*, when God at the same time by a miraculous rain from Heaven, both revived the *Romans*, which were now at the last cast, having lost already many of their number, which perished for want of water; and overthrew their enemies in the height of their greatest

greatest hopes and security: acknowledged by all generally, as well Heathens as Christians, miraculous; but by the Heathens ascribed, by some of them, to God immediately; by others, to art Magick; and by the Christians, both Fathers and Historians, to the Name of Christ, at the Intercession of some Christian Soldiers of the Army. Before I would ground any thing upon this story, I must first profess my mind concerning some circumstances of it, wherein I may perchance be found to differ from others; and that I would be loth to doe but upon very good grounds, which would require a large discourse; and therefore it is that I have declined it. I will onely tell you (because it may concern *Antoninus*, that you know it) what learned men have judged of those letters, which in these days go under *Antoninus* his Name written by him to the Senate about this matter (produced by *Baron.* and others;) which is, that they are either *suppositiæ, aut saltem interpolatæ. Capp.* Hist. Eccles. p. 42. See *Scaliger* upon *Eusebius*; and *Salmatius* in *Aug. Hist. scriptores.*

3. *Not to keep coturnices*] μὴ ὀρτυγοτροφεῖν. How marvellously and even madly some men were wont to affect such things, may appear by the composition of the word ὀρτυγομανία, which among other examples of the like composition, as γυναικομανία, *&c.* is set down by *Athenæus, lib.* 11.

4. *I did write Dialogues in my youth*] in imitation of *Plato* and others: to good purpose, as *Antoninus* did it; but not as many others, who took a pride

pride in it, and thought themselves fine fellows for it. ἰδὲ πῶς διαλόγους συντίθημι· *Behold how bravely I can write Dialogues:* saith a vain-glorious *Stoick*, *Arr.* lib. 2. cap. 1. The next words may be conferred with those of *Capitolinus* in this Emperour's life: *Duodecimum annum ingressus habitum philosophi sumpsit, & deinceps tolerantiam, cum studeret in pallio, & humi cubaret: vix autem matre agente instrato pellibus lectulo accubaret.* Thus may many other places be compared with the like either of *Capitolinus*, or others that have written his life, or, of him, which will be no great labour for any to doe, that desires to understand this Book, and would be too tedious for me to undertake: which I desire the Reader to take notice of.

5. *That I did never affect by way of ostentation*] ἢ φαντασιοπλήκτως τὸν ἀσκητικὸν, *&c.* Of this kind of vanity see *Epictetus* in *Arrianus* at large, *lib. 6. cap.* 12. περὶ ἀσκήσεως, *Sen.* Ep. XV. *Stulta est, mi Lucili, & minimè conveniens literato viro occupatio exercendi lacertos*, &c.

6. *Epictetus* his *Hypomnemata*] collected and set out by *Arrianus* his Scholar, and so called and intituled by *Arrianus* himself, in his Preface before the said Books: as Learned Mr. *Patrick Young*, the worthy Keeper of the King's Library, and my kind friend, had noted in the Margin of that *Antoninus* which he did lend me.

7. *A man not subject to be vexed*] *Antoninus* his words are, καὶ τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἐξηγήσεσι μὴ δυσχεραντικόν.

τικόν· καὶ τὸ ἰδεῖν ἄνθρωπον σαφῶς ἐλαχιστὸν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ καλῶν ἡγούμενον τὴν ἐμπειρίαν, καὶ τὴν ἐντρέχειαν τὴν περὶ τὸ παραδιδόναι τὰ θεωρήματα· καὶ τὸ μαθεῖν πῶς δεῖ λαμβάνειν τὰς δοκούσας χάριτας παρὰ φίλων, μήτε ἐξηττώμενον διὰ ταῦτα, μήτε ἀναισθήτως παραπέμποντα. *Xylander* translates them, *Tum etiam ut in percipienda doctrina me non morosum præberem, sed circumspicerem de homine qui palam experientiam, & in tradendis scientiis facultatem minimum suorum bonorum putaret, præterea modum beneficia (ut iis videntur) ab amicis accipiendi, ne vel accepta ea nos viliores redderent, vel, &c.* The reason of that limitation, τὰς δοκούσας *(as commonly they are accounted,)* added by *Antoninus* to the word χάριτας, is, because that *favours* and *courtesies* may be thought a thing arbitrary, which either to perform or to omit wholly depends of our own good will and discretion; whereas all possible good turns and good offices of what kind or extent soever, that one man can perform unto another, are, by *Antoninus* his Philosophy, mere duties of nature and right reason: which all men, as men, are equally obliged unto. So afterwards using the word τιμὰς of things external and worldly against the precise decrees of the *Stoicks*, he restrains it likewise with a δοκούσας, τὰς δοκούσας τιμάς· *honours and dignities, as commonly they are accounted.*

8. *Not to be offended with Idiots, nor unseasonably to set*] τὸ ἀνεκτικὸν τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, καὶ τὸ ἀθεώρητον τῶν οἰομένων. There was not any thing more ordinary with their vain-glorious affected *Stoicks*, than in all places and upon all occasions, *semper crepare Theoremata*, To be ever talking and disputing

puting about their Theorems and proper Tenets: so that this very word *Theoremata* became almost infamous, through their abuse and vanity. To repress this abuse the learned Stoicks, who are yet extant, have many caveats and serious admonitions. But most pertinent here are *Epictetus* his words, *cap.* 68. μὴ λάλει τὸ πολὺ ἐν ἰδιώταις περὶ τῶν θεωρημάτων, which he repeats in the very next chapter also. ὅιησις and ὅιεσθαι are words so frequent and ordinary, in the writings of the *Stoicks* appropriated by them to them, that they called *Idiots*, or *worldly men*, as creatures that in very deed see nothing as it is, nor know the true nature of any thing, but are altogether led by fansies and opinions; that I shall not need to produce any examples. Now for the word ἀθεώρητον, that I offer it no violence to translate it as I do, may appear by this passage of *Diog. Laertius*, who writes that the *Stoicks* called vertues some θεωρηματικὰς, τὰς ἐχούσας τὴν σύστασιν ἐκ θεωρημάτων, and some ἀθεωρήτους, ὅτι μὴ ἔχουσιν συγκαταθέσεις, &c. If this would not serve, with little alteration it might have been read to the same purpose τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, τῶν ἀθεωρήτων, τῶν οἰομένων. For in the *Stoicks* language οἱ ἰδιῶται, οἱ ἀθεώρητοι (taken in another sense) and οἱ οἰόμενοι are all one thing; as I could easily have shewed.

9. *Who are commonly called* εὐπατρίδαι] His meaning by these words I take to be no other, than, That many great Men (partly because they think it becomes not their gravity so well to take any thing much to heart, and partly for other reasons, easie to be guessed at by them that are acquainted

acquainted with ancient Histories:) are not commonly so tender-hearted. Some such thing it was that *Antoninus Pius* alluded unto, when in excuse of this our *Antoninus* his (as it was thought by others) unseemly lamentation for the death of his Foster-father, he used these words: *Permittite illi ut homo sit, neque enim vel Philosophia, vel Imperium tollit affectus.* And whereas I render the words before, (οἷα ἡ τυραννικὴ βασιλεία, &c.) the *state of a tyrannous King:* it may be the words import no more than what I find recorded by the Historians, that when *Antoninus first came to the Empire, he disputed among his friends, quæ mala in se contineret Imperium.* The word ἀλήθεια, some lines after, I might have translated, I know, more literally: especially those words of *Capitolinus* being considered, *cum populo non aliter egit, quàm est actum sub civitate libera.* But then would it have been taken by many of the Vulgar quite contrary to *Antoninus* his meaning: whose meaning we may best know by his form of Government, which he never went about to alter, that I know of. *Finis justi imperii* (to use *Amm. Marcellinus* his words) *ut sapientes docent, utilitas obedientiam æstimatur & salus.* He might also allude perchance to that ἀλήθεια that he speaketh of, *Lib.* IX. n. 40. and n. 5. of this *first* Book. And the rather, because I find there was a report among the people concerning this Emperour, *quod populum sublatis voluptatibus vellet cogere ad philosophiam. Jul. Capitol.* in his life.

10. *From Claudius Maximus*] It is printed, ἀπὸ Κλαυ-

παράκλησις Μαξίμου, &c. whereas in all other examples from the beginning to the end, it is constantly παρά. as παρὰ τοῦ πάππου, παρὰ Διογνήτου, παρὰ Ῥουστίκου, &c. But that here also it must of necessity be so, may be collected by these words following some few lines after, καὶ πάντας αὐτῷ πιστεύειν, &c. which words if you refer to παράκλησις, you cannot possibly make any sense of. But if unto παρὰ, it will be here, as in other places, where this παρὰ must be paraphrased, not onely, *I have learned from*, but also, *I have observed in*; as in the example immediately before, παρὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ μου Σεουήρου, καὶ τὸ μὴ δεῖσθαι στοχασμοῦ τοῦ φίλους αὐτοῦ, &c. It was written it seems παρὰ κλ. Μαξίμου, &c. which was turned into παράκλησις. That this *Maximus*'s forename was *Claudius*, we learn by the Historians. *Capitolinus*; *Audivit & Sextum Chæronensem, Plutarchi nepotem, Junium Rusticum, Claudium Maximum & Cinnam Catulum, Stoicos.*

Hence therefore may their errour be clearly refuted (in which I wonder so many great men have been) who confound this *Claudius Maximus* with that other *Maximus Tyrius*, mentioned by *Eusebius*, whose works (or part of them at least) are yet extant; whenas besides the difference of the Names, this also should have moved them to be of another mind, that the one was a profest Stoick, and the other a Platonick. As for *Eusebius* therefore, who may seem to have been in the same errour, and indeed to have led others into it, his Greek words are miscited and mistaken, (though the mistake be ancient it seems;) and must of necessity be corrected by the Latin, as they are yet remaining in

best Editions, being of S. *Jerom*'s *interpretation.*

11. *And patient hearing of others*] in the Greek τὸ ζητητικὸν ἀκριβῶς ἐν τοῖς συμβουλίοις, καὶ ἐπίμονον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ προαπίστη τῆς ἐρεύνης ἀρκεσθεὶς τῆς προχείροις φαντασίαις, which words do not well hang together, as any man may see. My Father in his Notes upon *Jul. Capitol.* cites this place, and writes it thus: ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ, Προαπίστη τῆς ἐρεύνης, *&c.* which may very well be, if you conceive those words, Προαπίστη τῆς ἐρεύνης, ἀρκε. *&c.* (as it seems my Father would have it,) not as *Antoninus*'s own words, but as taken by him from some other, and here applied; as indeed he doth often; and so here perchance. Otherwise, I should like better, that the words were thus read, καὶ ἐπίμονον ἄλλου, ὁ προαπίστη τῆς ἐρεύνης, *&c.* which I have followed in my translation.

12. *And kept an account of the common expences*] καὶ ταμιευτικὸν τῆς χορηγίας, καὶ ὑπομνηστικὸν τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων τίνων καταιτιάσεως. *Capitolinus* in his life, *Rationes omnium provinciarum apprimè scivit, & vectigalium, &c.* This book of accounts was called *Rationarium imperii*: and it was kept very strictly by many Emperours, but not so strictly by any as by this *Antoninus*; who therefore was called by some in scorn κυμινόπρεσης, as *Xiphilinus* recordeth, and is here intimated by our *Antoninus*; who toucheth upon it again, B. VI. n. XXVIII. See also *Julian*, in his *Cæsares*. But as patient as he was, I doubt much where he would have born with any man, that should have reported that of him which *Xylander* (not *Antoninus*,) doth here, who

who translates this passage, *Sumptus procurabat, neque detrectabat de iis rebus causam dicere:* which is little better than of a meek and patient Prince, to make him an obnoxious subject. Now if the word τύρος be not found in other Greek Authours in this very sense, yet is it a most proper word for *Antoninus* his purpose. For what is τύρος properly, but *rigor?* and *rigor* was the word that was then used among the Latins upon this occasion. So *Valerianus* in his Epistle written in the behalf of *Aurelianus*, *Vellemus q.* (saith he) *singulis devotissimis Reipub. viris multo majora deferre compendia— sed facit rigor publicus ut accipere de provinciarum oblationibus ultra ordinis sui gradum nemo plus possit*, &c. *Flav. Vopiscus*, in the life of *Aurelianus* the Emperour.

13. *That he never was commended by any man*] τὸ μήτε ἄν τινα εἰπεῖν μήτε ὅτι σοφιστὴς, μήτε ὅτι οἰκογενὴς ὑερνάκλος, μήτε ὅτι σχολαστικὸς, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἀνὴρ πέπειρος, &c. The Greek words may be interpreted, either that he never so commended others, or, (as we have rendred it,) that he never was by others so commended himself. For both interpretations, probable reasons may be given. As for the first, That such a man as *Antoninus* was should not be commended by any, for any *officious obsequious man*, should be no wonder, a man would think, but rather a wonder if he should. Neither do these other titles of σοφιστὴς, or σχολαστικὸς, sute so well with the person of a Prince, that the omission of them should be noted and recorded as a matter observable. But that so ingenuous a man as *Antoninus* was, should never commend in any other

those said parts and faculties mentioned, is not in any man's judgment, I think, without some wonder; and in the judgment of a Stoick, must needs be very commendable: out of the School of which Sect proceeded this decree, Μηδέποτε ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν μήτ' ἐπαινεῖτε μήτε ψέγετε, &c. *Never either commend or discommend any man for any thing that is common and popular, but onely for his Dogmata or certain Tenets in point of life and practice; for they onely are that which every man may truly account his own, and that onely which can make our actions either shamefull or praise-worthy:* as by *Epictetus* in *Arrianus* you shall find more than once expressed. But now on the other side, that which *Antoninus* not many lines after doth add of his Father's care, that all in any profession (as Oratours by name) excellent, might according to their desert be reputed and respected in the world; and that which in the sixth Book he doth more clearly set down of the same among other things, that he was not *Sophistes*; doth as pregnantly cross and overthrow that former interpretation. Neither is it necessary, that what is here said of *Pius*, must be understood of him when Emperour; which he was not till the year of his life 53. or thereabouts. And as for those other commendations of *Sophista* and *Scholasticus* (words, then, of the same or little different signification:) they were generally then, and many years after, titles of that high credit and esteem, that the greatest that were, as they disdained not the practice, so they were for the most part very ambitious of the Name, *Sen.* Ep. 88. *Magno impendio temporum, magnâ alienarum aurium molestiâ, laudatio*

datio hæc constat, O hominem literatum! *Simus hoc titulo rusticiore contenti*, O virum bonum! That interpretation of the word ὀϋερνάκλος (whereof οἰκογενὴς I suppose to be but an illiterate, though literal *glossema*, from the margin crept into the Text:) *an officious obsequious man*, I have collected from the use of the word *vernilitas* and *verniliter*, for ἀρέσκεια and κολακικῶς, *&c.* which I have found in *Horace*, *Seneca* and others. But a better Interpreter of *Antoninus* his mind (though he was before him) we cannot desire than *Epictetus*, who, if I mistake not much, what ours intended by the word ὀϋερνάκλος, doth more plainly express by ἡδὺς τοῖς συνοῦσιν, a man of a *sweet* and *pleasing conversation*: by whom also, both how ambitious men were generally of this commendation, and how incompatible (as it was used,) the Stoicks esteemed it with true vertue, we may further learn; εἰ γὰρ κρεῖσσον τὸ αἰδήμονα εἶναι καὶ κόσμιον τοῦ εἰπεῖν τινα, ἡδὺς ἄνθρωπος! ἄφες τὰ ἕτερα, &c. *For if of the two* (saith he) *thou hadst rather be a true modest grave man, than hear thy self thus commended, O what a loving sweet man this is! then away with these*, &c. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀρέσει, ταῦτα, &c. *But if otherwise*, &c. *Arrianus*, lib.4. cap.2. περὶ συμπριφορᾶς.

14. *Having a respect unto men onely as men*] In the Greek τὸ ἔμφρον καὶ μεμετρημένον ἔν τε θεωρίαν ἐπιτελέσει, καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις, πρὸς αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ δέον πραχθῆναι δεδορκότος, οὐ πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς πραχθεῖσι εὐδοξίαν, which I think should be read, ——— καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, &c. πραχθῆναι, scil. or, for δεδορκότος, δεδρακότος. I reade it, τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, because this δὲ (πρὸς αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ δέον, &c.) must needs have

reference to some former reason. Now that τοῖς ἀνθρώποις is a very good reason, these other passages of *Antoninus* may declare, *Lib.* VIII. *n.* XXII. πράσσω τι; πράσσω, ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων εὐποιΐαν ἀναφέρων. *Shall I doe it? yes, I will; and the end of my action shall be, to doe good unto men:* that is, and my comfort shall be, that I doe it for the good and benefit of men. And in the IX. Book, n. XLIII. τί γὰρ πλέον θέλεις εὖ ποιήσαι ἄνθρωπον; οὐκ ἀρκεῖ σοι, &c. *Thou hast done a good turn to a man: what wouldst thou more? is not this sufficient? must thou also for a thing done according to thy nature be rewarded?* Many other like passages there be. And here I think it will not be unseasonable to note, that he that reads the writings of the Stoicks, must not always too precisely stand upon the ordinary use and construction of words. For besides that they were *miri verborum opifices*, (as *Cicero* somewhere speaketh of them) and coiners of new words (in this little book you may observe many words not any where else to be read that I know:) their Master *Chrysippus* had taught them (as is recorded by *Plutarch*) not to think much if at any time they committed either ποιὰς ἀσαφείας καὶ ἐλλείψεις, ἢ νὴ Δία σολοικισμοὺς, ἐφ' οἷς ἄλλοι ἂν αἰσχυνθείησαν οὐκ ὀλίγοι· *even such solœcisms which most others would be ashamed off.* For one thing I cannot but highly commend them, that they would express their thoughts, though commonly with words very proper and significant, yet in a style so free from all affectation or curiosity (such as is this of our *Antoninus*, that of *Epictetus* and some others) as cometh next to the simplicity of the Holy Scriptures.

15. *His*

15. *His homely countrey apparel*] The Greek words, as they are printed, are, ἡ ἀπὸ λωρίου στολὴ, ἀνάγουσα ἀπὸ τῆς κάτω ἐπαύλεως, καὶ τῶν ἐν Λανουβίῳ τὰ πολλά· τῷ τελώνῃ ἐν Τούσκλοις παραιτουμένῳ ὡς ἐχρήσατο, καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος τρόπος. Two learned men have had already to doe with this place, and several ways have gone about to correct it; as may be seen in their Notes and Comments upon the *Augustæ Historiæ scriptores*. I may not interpose my self as a Judge between them, for many reasons: neither indeed do I see reason enough yet in their interpretations, that I can warrant either to be true. And therefore though I have translated them, yet I warrant nothing here, but rather desire the Reader to reade them, and use his own judgement: and to remember withall that *Antoninus* wrote not these things unto others, but to himself: So that it can be no wonder if in such passages concerning things so private he cannot be understood by us so long after, though he might very well understand himself, and perchance be understood by them that lived in those days, and knew both him and those that are mentioned by him familiarly.

16. *To live in the Court without either guards or followers*] μήτε δορυφορήσεων χρήζειν, μήτε ἐσθήτων συμειωδῶν, μήτε λαμπάδων καὶ ἀνδριάντων τοιῶνδέ τινων, καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου κόμπου. *Lipsius* in his Comments upon *Tacitus* takes it for granted, that this place must needs be understood of those things which were properly called τὰ σύμβολα, or, *Insignia Imperii*. Indeed ἡ δορυφόρησις, I confess, or οἱ δορυφόροι, is commonly the first that is reckoned among these

particulars; and yet the words are not so proper to expres the Royal guard, but they are sometimes used of any troop or company, that either in duty, good-will, or respect, attend any one, though he be neither King nor Prince. As for the words ἐσθῆτες σημειώδεις, or rather σημειωταὶ, (translated by *Lipsius*, *insignes vestes, purpuráque*) they contain no more than *extraordinary* apparel in general; or that which the Latines called *vestes clavatæ*; of which there were many kinds. All the question is, by λαμπάδιος and ἀνδρειάντες what is to be understood. By λαμπάδιος that πῦρ or *fire* (saith *Lipsius*) which *Herodian* testifieth was wont in his time to be carried before the Emperour, as *Insigne Majestatis*. A strange thing to me it is, if this πῦρ were a λαμπὰς indeed, that *Herodian* making mention of it so often as he doth (four several times at the least) should never call it λαμπὰς, but always τὸ πῦρ. But if this were granted of λαμπὰς, what are these ἀνδρειάντες that *Antoninus* speaks of here? doth any other Authour mention any such thing among the *Insignia Imperii*? That indeed the ancient Romans had their *cubiculares imagines* (as is observed by my Father upon *Suetonius*,) and that the latter Emperours of *Rome* did keep a *Fortunam Auream* in their Bed-chambers as *Insigne Imperii*, I know. Of these I am sure these ἀνδρειάντες here mentioned cannot be understood, and *Lipsius* tells us nothing of them at all, nor any other that I know. For my part, I much incline to think, that *Anton.* doth not here speak of those *Insignia* particularly, but that he doth instance in these particulars, as particulars of worldly pomp

and

and magnificence in general: which he himself by those words (καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου κόμπου) doth seem to intimate. Now amongst those many descriptions of great worldly pomp and magnificence that have been made by ancient Authours, there is not any that hath been more taken notice of (imitated since by others, and among others by *Virgil* himself in his *Culex*,) than that of *Lucretius*, in his second Book, the very beginning whereof is,

Si non aurea sunt Juvenum Simulachra *per ædes*,
Lampadas *igniferas manibus retinentia dextris*,
Lumina nocturnis epulis ut suppeditentur, &c.

And yet long before *Lucretius*, had a greater Poet, even *Homer*, the Poet of Poets, used the same expression, whom *Lucretius* herein doth seem rather to translate than imitate: for as their sense, so their words are the same, without any difference, but of the language. *Homer*'s words in the description of *Alcinous* his Palace are these:

Χρύσειοι δ' ἄρα κοῦροι ἐϋδμήτων ἐπὶ βωμῶν
Ἕστασαν αἰθομένας δαΐδας μετὰ χερσὶν ἔχοντες,
Φαίνοντες νύκτας κατὰ δώματα δαιτυμονέσσι.

Where though there could be no great doubt of it, yet since the Scholiast thought good to make a note of it, I think it not impertinent to transcribe it hither from him, that by χρύσειοι κοῦροι are to be understood ἀνδριάντες τινές which is the word by *Anton.* here used. And though *Lucretius* doth not here mention sumptuous apparel at all, yet elsewhere I find that he doth (in his V. B.) upon that same occasion, and the very self-same that

that is here expressed by *Antoninus*. His words are (speaking of the simplicity of the old time,) *Frigus enim nudos sine pellibus excruciabat Terrigenas: at nos nil ladit veste carere Purpureâ, atque auro signisque ingentibus apta:* which is ἁπλῶς σημειῶσαι, as directly as may be. I need not say more. Let the Reader judge. I must onely add, that whereas *Antoninus* may be thought to commit a kind of *Tautology* in these words, τοιῶνδέ τινων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων κόμπων, his meaning by those τοιῶνδέ τινων is, to distinguish those λαμπάδας and ἀνδριάντας from ordinary common ones, such as were in every *Roman*'s house almost, which could be no fit instance of great excess and sumptuousness; but *Such* and *Such* as were ordinary among the great ones and in great places.

17. *So that as for the Gods*] ὥστε ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς θεοῖς—μηδὲν κωλύειν ἤδη καθ' φύσιν ζῆν με, ἢ ἀπολείπεσθαι ἔτι τούτου παρὰ τὴν ἐμὴν αἰτίαν καὶ παρὰ τὸ, &c. *Xyl. Quod ad Deos attineret — nihil jam obstare, quin aut secundùm naturam viverem, aut non. Atque hoc quidem fore meâ culpâ, qui Deûm monitus,* &c. Between the particles ἤδη and ἔτι there is a manifest opposition, which *Xylander* did not observe. The words otherwise, I confess, are somewhat intricate and confused. Not long after, καὶ τοῦτο ἐν Καϊέτῃ ὥσπερ χρήσῃ, is by *Xylander* rendred, *Hócque Caietæ sicut Chræsæ*, as if it had been, καὶ τοῦτο ἐν Κ. ὥσπερ χρήσῃ. which although *Xylander* do not so well like of in his Notes, and therefore I may the better be excused, if I did not follow him; yet I durst undertake to maintain it to be most right. For *Caieta*, we know, was an Haven-

Haven-Town of *Campania* in *Italy*; where *Antoninus*, as it shall seem, having been an earnest suitor by the sea-shore, whether to *Apollo*, or any other Heathen God, for something or other, wherein he conceived himself afterwards to have been heard; it could not but put him in mind of *Chryses*, *Apollo*'s Priest, who is described in *Homer.* Iliad. 1. earnestly praying διὰ θῖνα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης, that is, *by the sea-shoar*; and there immediately obtaining his request. That the sea-shoar was a place in great request with *Antoninus*, he himself professeth B. IV. n. III.

18. *An unsociable uncharitable Man*] ἀκοινώνητον, ἀκοινώνητος, (a frequent word with him) must in *Antoninus* be taken as the opposite of κοινωνικὸς, *a sociable Man*, one who out of a due respect unto, and affectionate care of humane society, and of the publick community of men, is in all things that tend to their good, willing to fit and accommodate himself unto others, accounting their welfare his own happiness. He then that is not so, is ἀκοινώνητος, that is in general, *an unsociable man.* Now the vertue of a *sociable man* consisting especially partly in meekness and affability, and partly in goodness and bountifulness; ἀκοινωνησία may be more particularly interpreted either a *harsh, rigid and arrogant man*; or one that is *hard-hearted and uncharitable.* Of these two, because *Antoninus* doth always use the word κοινωνικὸς whether adjectively or substantively, with special relation to εὐποιΐαν, εὐμετάδοτον, and the like; by which words he doth also sometimes express him-

self: the proper signification of ἀκοινώνητος must in his acceptation be that which is properly contrary to *goodness and bountifulness*. But as *Charity*, being otherwise of it self but one particular vertue, is nevertheless in another sense and respect said to comprehend all other vertues, (as *Rom.* 13. 1 *Cor.* 13. and elsewhere we are taught at large,) so that a man any ways vitious may be called *an uncharitable man*: even so is the word *unsociable* used by *Antonin.* which therefore I know not how better to express, than by the word *uncharitable*. And here I cannot but say somewhat of the marvelous consent of this Heathen man's Philosophy with the holy Scriptures. That it doth in many things agree with the sacred Word of God, any man that reads him will easily observe. But however, that in many it doth agree, I do not so much regard, as that it doth in the chiefest. In those things, I mean, which in the Scriptures are termed, τὰ μεγάλεια τῦ νόμυ in the Old Testament; and in the New, τὰ βαρύτερα τῦ νόμυ: of which kind especially are those two *great Commandments*, to love God with all our hearts, and our Neighbours as our selves. Which be the very things which in these books are most pressed and stood upon; as might appear by a number of passages, obvious enough to any man that reads him, or almost any part of him. And as our Saviour saith of those, that on them the Law and the Prophets do hang: so doth *Anton.* in some places seem to reduce all his Philosophy to these two very points: τί ἀρκεῖ (saith he in a place) τί δ' ἄλλο ἢ θεὸς μὲ σέβειν καὶ εὐφημεῖν, ἀνθρώπυς δ' εὐποιεῖν; *what will suffice thee*, as long as thou livest? *what else, but*

Hos. 8. 12. *Mat.* 23. 23

B. V. num. XXVII.

to

to worship and praise the gods, and to doe good unto men? and again, in another Book: ἐνὶ τέρπου καὶ προσαναπαύου, τῷ ἀπὸ πράξεως κοινωνικῆς μεταβαίνειν ἐπὶ πράξιν κοινωνικὴν, σὺν μνήμῃ θεοῦ. *Let the onely object of thy joy and content in this world be this, from one charitable action presently to pass unto another, God always remembred in all.* And in the same Book again; αἰδοῦ θεοὺς, σῶζε ἀνθρώπους· βραχὺς ὁ βίος, εἷς καρπὸς τῆς ἐπιγείου ζωῆς, διάθεσις ὁσία, καὶ πράξεις κοινωνικαί. *Fear the Gods, succour them that are in misery* [or, *intend the good and preservation of men:*] *this life is but short, and the onely fruit and comfort of this earthly life is, a holy disposition, and actions that are charitable.* In the same Book; ἓν ὧδε πολλοῦ ἄξιον, τὸ μετ' ἀληθείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης εὐμενῆ τοῖς ψεύσαις καὶ ἀδίκοις διαβιοῦν. *There is but one thing in this present life that is of great consequence, and by us much to be respected; for a man whilst he liveth, living according to justice and truth, kindly and lovingly to converse with false unrighteous men.* And again, as the Apostle doth particularly reduce all commandments to *Charity* which therefore he calls the *fulfilling of the Law*, as elsewhere it is called the *end of the Law* and the *bond of perfectness*: so doth *Antoninus* not onely often mention εὐποιΐαν εὐμένειαν, *&c.* (which I cannot better English than by the word *Charity*) as that which is all in all; but also for the same reason, by words (as already hath been intimated) which of themselves are proper and peculiar to either this one vertue, as πολιτικὸς, κοινωνικὸς, *&c.* or to the contrary vice, as ἀκοινώνητος, *&c.* (words which of themselves imply no more than *sociableness* or *unsociableness*; a *charitable* or *uncharitable* disposition,) he

B. VI. n. VI.

he doth include and comprehend all vertues and vices in general. And whereas I have mentioned the word πολιτικὸς as proper to signifie a *sociable*, or *charitable* disposition; of it self indeed, and as *Anton.* doth use it, it is so: howbeit it is not so used by all. For *Plato* (whom *Anton.* otherwise both in words and sentences doth studiously follow,) first taking the word more popularly, for one that beareth offices in the Common-wealth, and for an ambitious aspiring man; as *Anton.* doth extend that more proper signification of the word, to imply *an honest vertuous man* in general: so he (upon farther consequences and deductions from the present estate of that Common-wealth whereof he was a member,) that other more popular word, in general to express a *vitious ungodly man.* In a matter of such weight and consequence as this, which by Writers both divine and humane is made the very matter indeed and purpose of our lives and of all religion, I thought I ought to be the larger, to make the words fully understood; for sure I am they are oftentimes much mistaken.

19. *Bloud, bones, and a skin*] λέθρος καὶ ὀστάρια καὶ κροκύφαντος ἐκ νεύρων, φλεβίων, ἀρτηριῶν πληγμάτιον, &c. It is certain that κροκύφαντος (whereof the Latin word *crocufantia* in the 34. D. t. 2. *de auro & arg.* leg. 25. was made,) or κεκρύφαλος, was properly some *Peplus*, or coife used by women to cover their head and hairs; answerable (if not the very same) to that which by the Latins was called *reticulus* or *reticulum.* As for the words therefore, we might have thought that *Antoninus* here had alluded to that part of the body which

which the Latins usually call *omentum*, and by the Greeks is sometimes called γαγγαμὼν and σαγήνη, (a Fisher's Net properly;) as is observed by the Anatomists: and that these following words, ἐκ νεύρων, φλεβίων, ἀρτηριῶν πληγμάτιον, had been a farther explication of this *reticulus* or γαγγαμών· the reason of this Greek application being rendered by *Pollux*, because that (the *omentum*, scil. or ἐπίπλον) νεύρων ἐστὶ πλέγμα, καθάπερ, &c. and that the Anatomists do farther describe it, as consisting of a world of little nerves, veins and arteries. And by this, I farther grant, *Antoninus* might allude (and so include) to the bowels also, covered in some sort by his *omentum*, as the hairs divided into tresses, and winded up together (not much unlike the folding and twisting of the bowels in the belly,) were covered and kept in by this *reticulus*. Yet nevertheless why after general and principal parts, as *bloud* and *bones*, he should make such express mention either of the *omentum*, or (to extend it as far as may be) of the *belly* it self, more than of other parts, I know not. And therefore untill I be better satisfied, I rather understand this κροκύφαντος here of a more general *covering*, to wit, the skin of the body; which though by parts of less moment, yet wholly taken, is not onely the most apparent, but also may be reckoned as a principal similary part of the body; and so of one extraordinarily fallen in his flesh, we usually say in English, that he is nothing but *skin* and *bones*. Now if Anatomists say, that it is the opinion of the *vulgus*, that *ex venarum, arteriarum & nervorum extremitatibus dilatatis, & eorum inexplicabili texturâ generatur.*

Whe-

Whether it be so or no, I leave it to them to dispute.

Notes upon the second Book.

E*Very man's happiness depends from himself*] εὖ γὰρ ὁ βίος ἑκάστῳ· ἐπεὶ δέ σοι σχεδὸν δεδήνυσται μὴ αἰδεμένῃ σεαυτὴν, &c. The purpose and meaning of all this passage, I think, is apparent enough. If I thought it were not, I would refer the Reader to n. XIV. of this very Book, and sundry other places, where he handles the same matter more at large. As for those words εὖ βίος ἑκάστῳ, certainly somewhat must be supplied, to make the sense full: either ἑκάστῳ παρ' ἑαυτῷ, as we have translated it; or, ἑκάστῳ αἰδεμένῳ ἑαυτόν· which I think more probable, because *Antoninus* doth much affect (if I may use that word of him, and doe him no wrong) the simplicity of these repetitions, and that it is ordinary for Scribes (as is well known to all them that ever had to doe with MSS.) to slip over something, when they come to such repetitions. All this passage is thus translated (whether I speak properly or no, when I say *translated*, let the Reader judge:) by *Xylander*, *Ignominiâ teipsum affice, anime, contemne teipsum, inquam; ut enim honore teipsum afficias, non tibi præterea tempus suppetet. Vita enim unicuique id præbet, quæ tibi propemodum jam exacta est. Non igitur teipsum venerare, sed felicitatem tuam aliorum in animis repositam habe, &c.*

Bas. ed. p. 179.

2. *That intend not, and guide not by reason and discretion*] Τοὺς τοῖς τῆς ἰδίας ψυχῆς κινήμασι μὴ παρακο-

παρακολουθήσας, &c. Xyl. *qui verò ſui ipſius animi motibus non obſequitur, &c. motus non aſſequitur,* at leaſt, had been far more tolerable: παρακολουθεῖν is in *Antoninus* a word of great weight, and doth always import a due, right and rational apprehenſion of things: but it cannot always be tranſlated alike, though never but very fitly and properly uſed by him: κίνησις alſo and κινεῖσθαι, as τεῖναι and πρέπον, are proper Platonick words, by the right and full explication whereof much light might be given to many obſcure paſſages both of *Anton.* and of others.

3. *As after a vulgar ſenſe ſuch things*] ὡς ἄν τις κοινότερον τὰ τοιαῦτα συγκρίνοιτο, &c. Xyl. *ubi oſtendit communiorem ea inter ſe conferendi rationem, &c.* But they are *Antoninus*'s words of himſelf, who though he were not a profeſt Stoick, yet was ſo reſpective of them, that he would not tranſgreſs againſt their common Tenets and Opinions without ſome ſhort apologie for himſelf. Now all the World knows, that the Stoicks held, that *omnia peccata* were *aqualia*, and to compare things known and granted equal muſt needs be very abſurd. Therefore doth *Antoninus* by this ſhort Parentheſis here, from the rigour of their Decrees, appeal to more vulgar and popular judgments.

4. *As unable either to prevent, or better to order and diſpoſe*] μὴ δυναμένῳ, &c. a word (or blaſphemy rather) which moſt other Stoicks upon this or the like occaſion did not ſtick at. Whoſe errour therefore *Anton.* doth here modeſtly and obſcurely point at and correct. *Epictetus* (a man otherwiſe

wise so divine in his Writings, that some Christians I see, but upon weak grounds I think, have undertaken to prove him a Christian:) in *Arrian.* lib. 1. cap. 1. ὥσπερ οὖν ᾖ ἄξιον, τὸ κράτιστον ἁπάντων καὶ κυριεῦον οἱ θεοὶ μόνον ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐποίησαν τὴν χρῆσιν τῶν ὀρθῶν τῶν φαντασίαις· τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἄραγε ὅτι οὐκ ἤθελον; ἐγὼ μὲν δοκῶ ὅτι εἰ ἐδύναντο, κἀκεῖνα ἂν ἡμῖν ἐπέτρεψαν· ἀλλὰ πάντως οὐκ ἐδύναντο. you may reade more in him to the same purpose. So *Seneca*; *Mittamus animum ad ea quæ æterna sunt, miremur in sublime volitantes rerum omnium formas, Deúmque inter illa versantem & providentem, quemadmodum quæ immortalia facere* non potuit, *quia materia prohibebat, defendat à morte, ac ratione vitium corporis vincat. Epist.* 58. and *de Benef. lib.* 2. *cap.* 29. *Quicquid nobis negatum est, dari* non potuit.

3. *As for life therefore and death, honour and dishonour*] These words I would have the Reader, that is not much otherwise versed in the Stoicks, to take especial notice of, as the true ground of all their strange and unnatural Tenets and Paradoxes. That all temporal worldly blessings are common both to good and bad, they saw. That this, if there were no more in it than so, could not stand with God's justice and goodness, (which to deny is to deny that there is a God:) they saw likewise. Upon this ground (a ground that he stands much upon, and presseth as far as ever any Christian did,) *Plato*'s illation was, That after this life there must needs be a Judgment, when both good and bad should according to their deeds be rewarded. The Stoicks, as fully persuaded

as

as *Plato* was, that a God there is, and he a juſt and good God; and yet concerning the future eſtate of the dead, not ſo fully ſatisfied as he was; to maintain their belief againſt that common exception, could find no better way than to maintain, that all thoſe things that man uſually did either ſeek after or flee from, as either good or bad, were in themſelves and in very truth neither good nor bad, but altogether indifferent. So that whether a man was rich or poor, in health or in pain, long-lived or ſoon cut off, in honour or diſhonour; that all this was nothing at all to either his happineſs or unhappineſs, no not whilſt he lived, and by conſequent, that it was no argument againſt the goodneſs and juſtice of God, that theſe things were known and granted to happen unto all promiſcuouſly, whether good or bad. *Antoninus* doth elſewhere touch upon it again, as towards the end of the fourth, and about the beginning of the ninth Book. To him, though I intend brevity, yet for farther illuſtration of a point of that weight and moment, as hath been the occaſion of ſo many large volumes, I can doe no leſs than add *Epictetus* his words at the leaſt, out of his *Enchirid.* chapter, as I find him by ſome divided, 38. as by others, 29. Τῆς οὖν τοῦ θεοῦ εὐσεβείας ἴδιόν ἐστι τὸ κυριώτατον ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ὀρθὰς ὑπολήψεις περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν, ὡς ὄντων καὶ διοικούντων τὰ ὅλα καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, &c. *Know that in this eſpecially true piety towards the Gods doth conſiſt, that thou have right opinions concerning them: as, That they are, That with juſtice and equity they govern the whole world: That thou to this end wert ordained and appointed, to obey them, to ſubmit unto them, and willingly to follow them in all*

things, as proceeding all from him, and by him brought to pass, who is Reason and Understanding it self in the highest degree of excellency. So shalt thou never complain of the Gods, or accuse them as neglected and little cared for by them. But this cannot possibly be, except thou first give over all pursuit after those things which are not in our own power: and that on them onely which are in our power and wholly depend on our own wills, thou be fully persuaded, that all that is truly good or evil doth depend. For as for any other things, if thou shalt deem any of them good or evil, it must needs follow, that as thou dost either miss of those thou dost desire, or fall into those thou wouldst not, thou shalt not onely complain of them that are the cause, but hate them also. For this is natural unto every creature, as to shun and abhor all things hurtfull, both the things themselves, and their causes; so those that are profitable, both the things themselves, and their causes, to prosecute and highly to respect, &c.

See *Ant.* P. VI. n. n. XV. B. IX. n. I.

6. *From whose bare conceits and voices, honour and credit*] ὧν αἱ ὑπολήψεις καὶ αἱ φωναὶ, τὴν εὐδοξίαν. Τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν, &c. *quorum opiniones & voces gloriam. Quidnam est mors, &c.* So *Xylander* translates it, and marks it for an imperfect place. That a Verb, to make the sense full, must be supplied, I grant: but because without it the sense of the words may be apparent enough, it may very well be, that whatsoever it is that is to be supplied, was by *Anton.* himself omitted as not necessary. Now for the sense I must appeal to other like places: as *lib. III. n. IV.* towards the end; Δόξης δὲ οὐχὶ τῆς παρὰ πάντων ἀνθεκτέον,

ον, &c. *Moreover that honour and praise ought not generally, &c.* and again in the same Book, n. X. Μικρὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ μηκίστη ὑστεροσημία, &c. *And the greatest fame that can remain*, &c. In the fourth Book, num. III. towards the end, ἡ γῆ στιγμὴ, &c. *For the whole Earth is but as one point*, &c. But I will not heap all the passages he hath against the vanity of praise and applause. This in the sixth B. n. XV. comes very near: Τί οὖν τίμιον; τὸ κροτεῖσθαι; οὐχί· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ τὸ ὑπὸ γλωσσῶν κροτεῖσθαι· αἱ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν εὐφημίαι, κρότος γλωσσῶν. *What is it then that should be dear unto us*, &c. See also the last words of the same Book.

7. *And how that part of man is affected when it is said to be diffused*] καὶ ὅταν πῶς ἔχῃ διακίηται τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦτο μόριον. Xyland. *Præterea quomodo afficitur eo tactu pars illa.* I translated it as written διαχέηται· from the eighth Book towards the end, where he treats concerning the χύσις and διάχυσις of the mind and understanding. But it may be, it would fit the place better if it were καὶ ὅταν πῶς ἔχει ἢ διάκειται τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦτο μόριον. Where *Antoninus* himself did so by an (ἢ διάκειται) farther expound himself; or whether it be but a mere *glossema* proceeding from any other, I leave to others to judge.

8. *To the tendence of that spirit which is within him.*] πρὸς μόνῳ τῷ ἔνδον ἑαυτοῦ δαίμονι εἶναι, &c. I could not easily find a word either Latin or English, whereby to express this Δαίμων, here and elsewhere so often mentioned by *Antoninus*. That by

that word *Antoninus* doth intend a Deity, he himself doth sufficiently clear, not onely where he calls it ἀπορροίαν, and ἀποπασμάτιον τοῦ θεοῦ, but by other passages, where he plainly says of him that he is a God. But even for these passages sake (besides other reasons) could not I well translate it *God*: for so must I have made him say, not onely that *God* was a divine effluence, and a particle of *God*; but also that God was God; which would have been too gross and manifest a *tautologie*. The word *Genius* used by *Xylander*, however it might fit in some respects; and as it is used and interpreted by some ancients, comes nearest of any Latin word to *Antoninus* his meaning: yet certain it is, as out of *Apuleius* may appear, that it is against its proper signification that it is so used, and in regard of its more popular and ordinary use, there could not be any other more improper and contrary. For whereas there is nothing more ordinary among the Latins than these phrases, *Genio indulgere*, *genium curare*, *genium defraudare*, and the like, in which manner of speeches the word *Genius* is used as the best and greatest Motive to *Epicurean* mirth and jovialty; *Antoninus* doth always press his Δαίμων as the best and greatest motive, and obligation to all manner of temperance, sobriety, chastity, modesty, holiness and the like. Some will think perchance that I might have retained the word *Dæmon*. But seeing even in *Antoninus* his time, and before, that word, by means of the blessed Gospel of Christ, was already become so publickly odious to Latin ears, that *Apuleius* himself, an arrant Heathen, being to write περὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους Δαιμονίου, (which was *Plutarch's* title)

title) though he maintained the thing that it was not a *God*, but a direct *Dæmon*, of a nature far different and inferiour to the *Gods*, yet avoided the word as odious, and of purpoſe (as is well and at large obſerved by S. *Auguſtin*, *De Civitate Dei*, *lib.* 8. *cap.* 14.) intitled his Book, not, *de Dæmone*, but, *de Deo Socratis*: I ſhould have done *Anton.* great wrong, if I could not have fitted his excellent matter and purpoſe with a more plauſible word. Now for the word *Spirit*, which of all others I have made choice of, ſome will think, perchance, that I have made too bold with it, to put it, ſo ſacred a word, in a Heathen's mouth ſo often, and to make it ſo common a word with him, as it will be found by my Tranſlation. Although I could give a more direct and general anſwer both for *Antoninus* and my ſelf, if I would take occaſion here to fall on that ſubject: yet for brevities ſake, I will content my ſelf to require that of the Reader, which I think no reaſonable man can deny, that to expreſs an Heathen's meaning, I may be allowed words that have been uſed by Heathens. I think that of *Seneca* no man makes any queſtion, (notwithſtanding that ancient report and opinion of many concerning ſome Epiſtles that ſhould paſs between him and S. *Paul*, which S. *Hierome* and others ſpeak of;) but that he was a Heathen. His words are theſe, *Epiſt.* 41. *Propè eſt à te Deus: tecum eſt: intus eſt. Ita dico*, Lucili. Sacer *intra nos* Spiritus *ſedet*, *malorum bonorúmque noſtrorum obſervator & cuſtos: hic prout à nobis tractatus eſt, ita nos ipſe tractat. Bonus vir ſine Deo nemo eſt*, &c. Thus much of the word. Now concerning the thing it ſelf, how *Antoninus* came by

this Philosophy (so much by him in these his Books inculcated) of this inward spirit, and so to examine *Plato*'s and other ancients opinion concerning the same, or how near either he or any of them came to the truth, and so to heap together many passages, and to compare them with some like passages in the Scripture; is a thing which I my self have taken much pleasure in, and some others would perchance; but that would require far more scope than this place can afford me, and therefore I let it alone.

9. *With a kind of pity and compassion also*] ἔστι δὲ ὅτι καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ἐλεεινὰ, &c. The *Stoicks* would not allow ἔλεος, or *misericordia*, in a wise man. For they maintained that such a one was in continual joy. Now ἔλεος they defined to be *Ægritudinem animi ob alienarum miseriarum speciem*, or, *a grief of the mind for other mens supposed miseries.* As therefore the word implied *grief* and *sorrow*, they rejected it. But as for the effects of it, as *clemency*, *goodness*, and whatsoever it is that true compassion in the highest degree, for the relief and comfort of any distressed, would prompt a man unto, that they thought themselves bound unto as much as any, and proposed it (so they professed) as the main scope of their lives and actions. *Seneca* is very large upon this subject. The truth is, they would not have men to be men, but mere Gods. And whiles they thus went about to elevate this vertue, the crown of all vertues, to a higher pitch of divine purity and simplicity than humane nature was capable of; and to abstract from it, as it were, all that was human and fleshly; I fear they made many, who were

were not so capable of their distinctions and subtilties (such as you shall find in *Seneca* upon this subject) the less to regard that which nature otherwise, and to good purpose, had made them more capable of. Certain it is and by them confessed, that for this very thing, they commonly and their profession had a very hard report. This may be the occasion that *Antoninus* takes occasion to mention so often, and to commend τὴν φιλοστοργίαν, which if it be not the same, yet comes next to ἔλεος. Yet such respect did he bear unto the *Stoicks*, that he would not, we see here, use that word by them condemned without some qualification; not ἐλεεινὰ barely, but τρόπον τινὰ ἐλεεινά.

10. *That man can part with no life properly, save that little*] ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἄλλον ἀποβάλλει βίον, ἢ τοῦτον ὃν ζῇ, οὐδὲ ἄλλον ζῇ, ἢ ὃν ἀποβάλλει. Xyl. *Tamen recordandum tibi est, neminem aliam ab ea quam vivit vitam deponere, neque aliam deponere quam eam quam vivit:* so shall you find it in both the Editions.

11. *For those things are plain and apparent which*] δῆλα μὲν γὰρ τὰ πρὸς τὸν Κυνικὸν Μόνιμον λεγόμενα, δῆλον δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον, &c. Spoken unto *Monimus*, you must understand, by way of Dialogue, and philosophical conference; by persons introducted, and made to speak by *Monimus* himself. For that *Monimus* himself and no other must be conceived to be the Authour of those Writings both *sweet* and *profitable*, upon which *Anton.* doth here pass his judgment, may be gathered by what *Laertius* doth relate of him, whose words are, οὗτος μὲν ἐμβριθέστατος ἐγένετο, ὥστε δόξης μὲν καταφρονεῖν, πρὸς δὲ ἀλήθειαν παρορμᾷν· γέγραφε δὲ παίγνια σπουδῇ λεληθυίᾳ μεμιγμένα,

μένα, &c. *He was* (saith he) *marvellous, grave a[nd] serious; as in matter of honour and credit altogeth[er] careless, so after* Truth *very hot and vehement. H[e] did write some merry* Pleasant *Books, mixed with hid[den] and profitable seriousness.* That therefore o[f] *Monimus* his own Writings *Antoninus* is to be u[n]derstood, I think is apparent: but because wh[at] was the form of these Writings, whether the[y] were Dialogues or otherwise, is not certain, a[nd] that *Luertius* saith nothing of it; I could be we[ll] content that τὰ πρὸς Κυνικὸν Μόνιμον λεγόμενα we[re] more generally translated, *those things that are s[po]ken of in the Writings of* Monimus *the Cynick*, [if] the Greek would allow it; which I much dou[bt] of, though πρὸς for *apud* I know is ordinary.

And thus have I now, for reasons mention[ed] in the Preface, gone over the two first Book[s] not omitting wittingly any place that required e[i]ther light or cure. And because I presume t[he] Reader by this to be fully satisfied both conce[rn]ing my course that I have held in the translati[on] of this Book, and that it needed a new transla[ti]on: I will spare my self the labour to proce[ed] farther in the same kind; some few places, he[re] and there, (which would by no means be omi[t]ted) excepted. And to this end I will take [a] that remains together.

Curs[o]

Curſory Notes and Illuſtrations

UPON

The X. Books that remain.

B. IV. n. XXXIX. *Helice, Pompeii, Herculanum*] Concerning *Helice*, that may ſuffice that *Xylander* hath in his Notes. Of the ſudden ruine of the famous Town *Pompeii* by an Earthquake, you may reade in *Tacitus*, Ann. XV. *Seneca* Nat. Quæſt. *lib. 6. cap. 1. Tertullian* in his *Apologetic.* and elſewhere. *Herculanum* was very near *Pompeii*, as by *Pliny*, *Strabo*, *Pomp. Mela*, and others doth appear; by which neighbourhood it may be conceived that when the one did periſh, the other could not but ſuffer. And though otherwiſe of the ruine of it I find not much in any other Ancient beſides *Antoninus*, yet as much as I ſaid *Seneca* ſaith in the ſame place, where he ſpeaks of *Pompeii*; *Nam &* Herculanenſis *oppidi pars ruit, dubiéque ſtant etiam quæ relicta ſunt. Xylander* in his Notes upon this place refers us to another place of *Anton.* B. VIII. n. XXIX. where he by his Tranſlation makes *Antoninus* to mention the ſame *Pompeii* again. But there the words bearing either *Pompeiorum gens*, as *Xyl.* in his firſt Edition had rendred it; or *urbs Pompeii*, as it is in his ſecond: though I condemn not this latter, yet I have rather followed that former interpretation, for reaſons which upon a better opportunity I ſhall give more at large.

Ibid.

μίνιε, &c. *He was* (saith he) *marvellous, grave and serious; as in matter of honour and credit altogether careless, so after* Truth *very hot and vehement. He did write some merry* Pleasant *Books, mixed with hidden and profitable seriousness.* That therefore of *Monimus* his own Writings *Antoninus* is to be understood, I think is apparent: but because what was the form of these Writings, whether they were Dialogues or otherwise, is not certain, and that *Laertius* saith nothing of it; I could be well content that τὰ πρὸς Κυνικὸν Μόνιμον λεγόμενα were more generally translated, *those things that are spoken of in the Writings of* Monimus *the Cynick*, if the Greek would allow it; which I much doubt of, though πρὸς for *apud* I know is ordinary.

And thus have I now, for reasons mentioned in the Preface, gone over the two first Books, not omitting wittingly any place that required either light or cure. And because I presume the Reader by this to be fully satisfied both concerning my course that I have held in the translation of this Book, and that it needed a new translation: I will spare my self the labour to proceed farther in the same kind; some few places, here and there, (which would by no means be omitted) excepted. And to this end I will take all that remains together.

Cursory

Curſory Notes and Illuſtrations

UPON

The X. *Books that remain.*

B. IV. n. XXXIX. *Helice*, *Pompeii*, *Herculanum*] Concerning *Helice*, that may ſuffice that *Xylander* hath in his Notes. Of the ſudden ruine of the famous Town *Pompeii* by an Earthquake, you may reade in *Tacitus*, Ann. XV. *Seneca* Nat. Quæſt. *lib.6. cap.* 1. *Tertullian* in his *Apologetic.* and elſewhere. *Herculanum* was very near *Pompeii*, as by *Pliny*, *Strabo*, *Pomp. Mela*, and others doth appear; by which neighbourhood it may be conceived that when the one did periſh, the other could not but ſuffer. And though otherwiſe of the ruine of it I find not much in any other Ancient beſides *Antoninus*, yet as much as I ſaid *Seneca* ſaith in the ſame place, where he ſpeaks of *Pompeii*; *Nam &* Herculanenſis *oppidi pars ruit*, *dubiéque ſtant etiam quæ relicta ſunt.* *Xylander* in his Notes upon this place refers us to another place of *Anton.* B. VIII. n. XXIX. where he by his Tranſlation makes *Antoninus* to mention the ſame *Pompeii* again. But there the words bearing either *Pompeiorum gens*, as *Xyl.* in his firſt Edition had rendred it; or *urbs Pompeii*, as it is in his ſecond: though I condemn not this latter, yet I have rather followed that former interpretation, for reaſons which upon a better opportunity I ſhall give more at large.

Ibid.

Ibid. *That which but the other day was vile snivel*] The whole passage in the Greek (as it is printed) runs thus, Τὸ γὰρ ὅλα καταδῆν ἀεὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ὡς ἐφήμερα καὶ ἐυτελῆ, καὶ ἰχθὺς μὲ μυξάριον, αὔριον δὲ τάριχος· ἢ τίτρα, &c. The latter words (for the former he slips quite over) are thus translated by *Xylander*, *Bas. Edit.* 214. *& quod heri fuit piscis, cras erit salsamentum, aut cinis.* The Greek words, as they are printed, are not without fault; but the fault is neither great, nor hard to be discovered. In stead of τὸ γὰρ ὅλα, it must be corrected, τὸ γὰρ ὅλον· a phrase to this purpose often used by *Antoninus*; τὸ ὅλον πᾶν, τὸ σύνολον, and the like; which all signifie one thing. Now for μυξάριον, which by *Xylander* is translated *Piscis*; whether the Greek Dictionaries deceived him, or he them, I know not: but sure I am, that both he and they are much deceived, and that μυξάριον here, is a mere *diminutive* of μύξα, as it signifieth *mucus* or *mucor*; used again in the same sense (and there well translated by *Xylander*) by *Antoninus* himself in another passage of these his Books. They that are any thing versed in the Writings of Greek Stoicks, cannot but know, that it is their ordinary style to speak of all worldly things (the more emphatically to express their vileness and contemptible baseness) by *Diminutives*: to that end taking usually that liberty to themselves, as to coin new ones, where they find none ready coined to their hands. For examples whereof I need to send you no farther than to this our *Antoninus* in very many places of these his Books. The ground, as it seems by him, of *Xyl.* mistake, was by the word τάριχος here;

here; which becauſe in its more ordinary ſignification it ſignifies *ſalſamentum*, and *ſalſamentum* is moſt proper of Fiſhes; he concluded that μυξάριον muſt needs be a *Fiſh*, and thus, by a tranſlation rather of ſubſtances than of words, (which we might more properly call a Metamorphoſis) of a *man* he hath made a *fiſh*; and ſo hath it continued hitherto in all Greek Dictionaries that I have ſeen. As for the word πάριχος, that *Antoninus* may not be thought either the firſt, or onely, that ever uſed it in this ſenſe; I will produce but one paſſage out of *Lucian*, which I think will abundantly doe the deed. He therefore in his Diſcourſe *de Luctu*, towards the end, treating of the ſeveral ſorts of Burial uſed by ſundry Nations, hath theſe words; ὁ μὲν Ἕλλην (ſaith he) ἔκαιεν· ὁ δὲ Πέρσης ἔθαπτεν· ὁ δὲ Ἰνδὸς ὑάλῳ ἀλείφει· ὁ δὲ Σκύθης κατατίθεται· παρίχουσι δὲ οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι. *The Grecian did burn; the Perſian bury; The Indian doth anoint with Swines greaſe*; (the word in *Lucian* is ὑάλῳ, which muſt needs ſignifie either *Swines dung*, or, as *Eraſmus* doth render it, *adipem ſuillum*: but ſome learned men there be, who correct it, μυέλῳ, *medullâ*:) *the Scythian eat; and the Ægyptian powder* or *embalm*. When *Anton.* then ſaith, (either an *embalmed carcaſe or aſhes;*) he doth allude to the cuſtome of his days among the Romans, which was either to bury (the bodies of the richer ſort being firſt embalmed,) or to burn: though indeed the latter, through the increaſe of Chriſtians, began ſoon after *Anton.* his time to grow much out of uſe every where. Now they that *burned*, uſed to gather the relicks of the dead corpſe, conſiſting of bones and aſhes, and to lay them up in *Urnis*, *Ollis*, *Oſſuariis*;

in

in Pots, Urni, Crocks, and the like earthen veſſels made of purpoſe; and ſo to bury them. I would not note it (I muſt confeſs,) as a thing that I thought worth noting, (for I think there can be nothing more common:) but that I am glad to take this occaſion to impart unto the Reader a memorable curioſity in matter of antiquity, which by the learned Antiquaries beyond the Seas, I am ſure, would be much eſteemed. Some two or three miles beyond *Sittingborn* in *Kent*, Weſt, as you go to *London*, there is a little Village in the way called *Newington*. It hath not been my luck hitherto, in any either later Book or ancient Record, to find any thing concerning this Village worth the noting. All that I can ſay of it, is that the inhabitants ſhew a place, to which they ſay that in former times the water came, as indeed by many circumſtances it is very probable: and that *Milton* (a Town before the Conqueſt of great fame, and of very great antiquity) is not above two miles from it. About a quarter of a mile before you come to *Newington*, not much above a ſtone's caſt from the high way, on the right hand as you come from *Sittingborn*, there is a field, out of which, in a very little compaſs of ground, have been taken out by digging within theſe few years *Roman* Pots and *Urns*, almoſt of all ſizes and faſhions, and in number very many: ſome thouſands, I have been told upon the place; but many hundreds I am ſure I may ſay, and ſpeak within compaſs. And though ſo many have already been found and carried away, yet doth the field afford them ſtill (as I am told) plentifully enough now and then, according as you prove either ſkil-

ful

full or lucky in the digging. The figures of ſome of them I have here cauſed to be repreſented to the Reader.

The firſt and greateſt, with an Inſcription graven and cut in about the neck of it, *SEVERIANUS, &c.* was above a year ago by the pious and ingenious Vicar of that Pariſh, Mr. *Henry Dearing*, beſtowed upon me, which I keep as a great Treaſure: as alſo was the laſt not long after, with the cover of it over it, ſo ſeverally repreſented of purpoſe, that the form of either might the better appear. The words of the Inſcription of that firſt (as near as they could be imitated) are theſe:



In the writing of which words although ſomething may be obſerved not ordinary, as *Ola*, for *Olla*; and thoſe kind of *A.* and *L. &c.* yet is there nothing ſo ſingular, but a learned Antiquary, well verſed in *Gruter's Theſaurus* of Inſcriptions, will ſoon find Examples of it. As for the ſenſe and meaning of the words, though not ſo obvious perchance as might be wiſhed, yet muſt I (becauſe few words will not ſerve) ſuſpend my opinion till ſome fitter opportunity. That in the middle, with the Inſcription *COCCILLIM*, was by the means

means of a worthy friend, M. Dr. *Winſton*, (that great ornament of his Profeſſion,) procured unto me from the Right Honourable (for his worth and love to learning as well as by his place) *Richard*, Earl of *Portland*, Lord High Treaſurer of *England*, *&c.* whom, with ſome other rare Antiquities, it was ſent unto ſome years ago. I was deſirous to compare theſe that I had (for the Inſcriptions ſake eſpecially) with ſome others of the ſame kind. But I find this difference, that whereas mine were much periſhed and worn by age, ſuch was the brightneſs and ſmoothneſs of this middle, (of the cover of it I mean, which is of a red-coloured earth) as that it rather reſembled pure Coral than ordinary red earth: and as for the Letters of the Inſcription, that they were not, as mine, rudely graven in with the hand, but in the ſame mould, and at the ſame time when the cover it ſelf was formed, very artificially printed, or imboſſed rather: as by theſe figures that are repreſented you may in part perceive. Since that, when I paſſed laſt by *Newington* coming from *London*, among many other fragments of Antiquity, in Mr. *Dearing*'s garden, I found the pieces of juſt ſuch another Cover (but that the colour of it is nothing ſo freſh) with this Inſcription in the middle likewiſe, *PRISCIAN*. Now as the multitude of theſe *Newington* Urns (for I do not remember that ever ſo many in ſo narrow a compaſs of ground were found:) is obſervable; ſo is the manner of their lying in the ground. They that have been preſent often at their digging up, have obſerved, that where one great Urn is found, divers leſs veſſels are; ſome within

within the great, ſome about it: all covered either with a proper cover of the ſame earth and making as the pot it ſelf is; or more courſely, but very cloſely ſtopped up with other earth. Of all thoſe ſmall veſſels of what faſhion ſoever that are found either in or about theſe Urns, I know no other uſe (to ſatisfie in ſome part their curioſity that wonder at them when they ſee them) that was ordinary among the Romans, but either to contain ſome fragrant odoriferous liquour and durable confection; or that *libatio* of wine and milk that they uſed about their dead: or laſtly (not to ſpeak here of thoſe burning lamps that have been found in ſome ancient Urns and Monuments, which ſo many have largely written and diſputed of) to receive and preſerve the tears that were ſhed by the friends of the deceaſed for grief of their dead. As for the difference of the greater and the leſſer Urns, *Fabricius* in his *Roma*, and *Marlianus* in his topographycal deſcription of the ſame, are of opinion, that when Urns of different bigneſs are found in the ſame place, the greater were for the greater and richer, as the Maſters and *Patroni*; and the leſſer, for the poorer and inferiour, as the ſervants, and *clientes*. In things of this nature, which were, I mean, altogether arbitrary, there is no queſtion but different faſhions were uſed in different places: yea, and likely in the ſame place, as every man's particular conceit or humour ſerved him. And therefore it were hard to determine any thing as certainly and generally true. But as for theſe *N.* Urns, this ſeems to have been the cuſtome there uſed. One great Urn was appointed to contain the bones and aſhes of all

one, either houſhold or kindred. As often therefore as any of them died, ſo often had they recourſe unto the common Urn, which ſo often was uncovered. To prevent this, I find that the faſhion hath been in ſome places, to let in the aſhes through ſome holes made and fitted for that purpoſe. See *Gruter*, fol. 814. Now beſides the great and common Urn, it is likely that every particular perſon that died had ſome leſs Urn or Veſſel, particularly dedicated to his own memory; whereby both the number of the deceaſed, and the parties themſelves might the better be remembred. There might be alſo another uſe of theſe leſſer Pots, in my judgment very neceſſary, and that is, that by them the common great Urns might the better be known and diſcerned one from another; which being ſo near, in ſo ſmall a compaſs of ground, and not much unlike one another, might otherwiſe eaſily be miſtaken. And this is the more likely, becauſe of thoſe many hundreds that have been taken up of the leſſer ſort, ſcarce have there been found any of one and the ſame making. I hear not of any thing that hath hitherto been found in theſe *Newington* Urns beſides bones and aſhes; and ſometimes clear water. And ſo do I read of Urns or Earthen veſſels *plenis limpidiſſimâ aquâ*, that have been found elſewhere, as that which is mentioned in *Gruterus*, fol. 927. I doubt not but many would be glad (as well as I) to know certainly what this place hath formerly been. But alas! how ſhould we *(who are of yeſterday, and know nothing)* without the help of ancient Records, recall the memory of things forgotten ſo many 100 years ago? Thus much

much we may certainly enough conclude: Firſt, from the multitude of theſe Urns, that it was once a common-burying place for the Romans. Secondly, from the Hiſtory of the Romans in this land, that no Urn is there found, but is 1200 or 1300 years old, at the leaſt: ſo many ages of men have theſe poor earthen veſſels (of ſo much better clay for durance than humane bodies are,) outlaſted both the makers of them, and the perſons to whoſe memory they were conſecrated. Laſtly, from the place, which is upon an aſcent (and for a good way beyond, hilly,) not far from the Sea, and near the high way; we may affirm in all probability, that it was once the ſeat of a Roman ſtation. If any man can teach me more of it, I ſhall heartily thank him. Since this was written, I made another journey to the place, and ſpent ſome time there in digging, but with no ſucceſs. However, that I might not return home empty, the ſame Mr. *Dearing* gave me a piece of Urn, which hath this inſcription, FVL. LINVS.

B. V. n. XII. *But as for thoſe which by the vulgar are eſteemed good*] *Euripides* in one of his Tragedies had made one of the Actours to commend money upon the Stage in a tranſcendent manner, ſtyling it, among other things, κάνθρωπων ἀξίωμα βροτοῖς, *ingens generis humani bonum*, (as the words are tranſlated by *Seneca*) *the beſt gift of the Gods unto men; the principal good or happineſs of mankind.* At which and other like words the people took great offence, (I pray God there be no worſe people among Chriſtians) inſomuch that they roſe up together with great indignation, *Sen.* 115. Epiſt.

ready to thrust both the Actour and the Authour of such wicked lines off the stage: which they had done accordingly, had not *Euripides* himself presently stept in, and gently desired them, that they would have patience but a-while, to see what would be the end of this great admirer of gold and silver. To some such history or passage of ancient Poet, it must needs be that *Antoninus* doth here allude. In the next words also, it is as certain that he doth allude to some passage or other of ancient Comedy, where the Poet did scurrilously scoff at that paradox of the Stoicks, (so frequent in all their writings) That a wise man, though otherwise he was such an one as was ready to starve for want of food and cloathing, yet was even then the onely rich man of the world; and that all others, if unwise, though never so great in the world, were mere beggars. It doth much savour of *Aristophanes* his scurrilous wit. And indeed I remember that my Father in the Margin of his *Anton.* (which is now in our King's most Royal Library) had written right over this place *Locus Aristoph.* though I must confess, where to find it in *Aristophanes* I know not, nor have indeed at this time the leisure to seek it. But this is the way, and the onely way, to understand obscure places in this book: they that impute the obscurity of many such places to the translation, will be much deceived, I fear, when they come to reade the Greek. I remember a place of *Aristophanes* his *Plutus*, somewhat near this in sense, and may perchance give some light to it. There industrious *Poverty* pleading for her self very philosophically, and commending her condition, for that as she had no

Aristoph. Plut. Act. 2. Scen. 5.

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over-plus, neither did she want, (περιγίνεσθαι μηδὲν, μηδ' ἐπιλείπειν·) *Great happiness indeed*, replies Chremylus, *for a man to spare and labour all his life long, and when he dyes, not to leave so much after him as will bury him!* playing merrily upon the ambiguity of the word ἐπιλείπειν, which the Latin will not fitly express.

Ibid. n. XXI. *To live with the Gods*] Σὺ ζῆν θεοῖς· Thus it is in many places in the *infinitive*, not *imperative*. In many of these places I have rendred it (according to the Greek idiotism) by the *imperative*; as B. VI. n. 18. B. VII. n. 31, *&c.* In some I have of purpose retained the *infinitive*, because I conceived them rather hints and heads of meditations, collected out of several Authours by *Antoninus*, and compendiously thus by him entred into this his Book of *Memorandums*, (in which case I think the *infinitive*, as well in the English as in the Greek, is more proper) than precepts, or sayings of his own. That it is so in many I could easily shew, if I were to write a Comment upon the Book.

Ibid. num. XXIII. *Where there shall neither roarer be nor harlot*] ὅτε τραγῳδὸς, ὅτε πόρνη. I take these words to have been used proverbially by Philosophers, for a place free from all worldly trouble, molestation and distraction: in the same sense as that other Proverb, often used by *Tully*, *Ubi nec Pelopidarum nomen nec facta*; as where he saith, *Quin hinc ipse avolare cupio, & aliquo pervenire, ubi nec Pelopidarum nomen nec facta audiam,*

Epist. ad Fam. lib. VII. epist. 30. The word πραγμ-δεῖν, I am sure, is by *Antoninus* in divers places, and by other Philosophers often used, as a proper word to express the troubles, vexations and confusions of a worldly man's life: and as for πόρνη, that it is not improper for his purpose, may appear (not to alledge n. IX. of this very Book, where it is upon another occasion) from *Crates* his description of a Philosophical city; from which excluding all cares and tumultuousness, all violence, vice and wickedness, he hath among other things these words,

Εἰς ἣν οὔτε τις εἰσπλεῖ ἀνὴρ μῶρος παράσιτος,
Οὔτε λίχνος πόρνης ἐπαγαλλόμενος πυγῇσιν, &c.

To which Verses haply this passage of *Ant.* might have some reference. Against this Proverb, or common-saying used in the commendation of a retired and sequestred life, *Anton.* doth here reason and argue, as he doth elsewhere in many places: maintaining that there is no such necessity of avoiding mens company, to enjoy rest and tranquillity. See in the Table, *Solitariness.*

Ibid. n. XXIX. *For, alas! what is all this solemn decl.*] It is printed ἐπεί τοι γίνῃ καλῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμβόλων· which I did at first understand more generally (and therefore had made a section of it apart) *de forensibus negotiis.* Of which (those excepted which are for the maintenance of peace
Lib. 1. c. 9. and justice among men) that of Saint *Augustine* in his Confessions is for the most part most true: *Majorum nugæ, negotia vocantur; puerorum autem talia cùm sint, puniuntur à majoribus, &c.* But now

now that I have better considered of the place, I find a very plausible coherence of the words with the former; if we understand them more particularly of those funeral speeches and orations in commendation of the dead, usually performed among the Romans (in a place called the *Rostra*) with such solemnity, that *Polybius*, a very wise and grave Historian, attributes those many rare examples of valour and vertue among them, to this custome as much as to any thing. From whence by the way, I would have these words of *Antoninus*, Book IV. n. 16. receive some light, *viz.* *——but even to thee living what is thy praise? but onely for a secret and politick consideration, which we call,* οἰκονομίαν, *&c.* For that indeed is it which the Greek Philosophers properly call οἰκονομία, as hereafter perchance we may have occasion to shew more at large. *That being ended, saith Polybius, the dead,* μετὰ λοιπῆς κόσμου, *with the rest of the funeral pomp and preparations, is carried* πρὸς τοὺ καλουμένους ἐμβόλους, *to the place by them called* ἔμβολοι, or *Rostra, &c.* and some lines after: Then doth his son, if he have left any, or some one or other of his kin, ἀναβὰς ὅπι τοὺ ἐμβόλους, commemorate his vertues, and relate at large what brave things he did in his life, (if he did any,) and that so pathetically, that what properly is but the private loss of one, becomes by this means the publick grief and sorrow of all that are present. This then is that whereof among all Historians so frequent mention is made *pro rostris laudavit*, or *laudari*, which *Anton.* himself very formally according to the customs of his time performed, not onely unto his good Father *Antoninus* surnamed the *Religious*, *Polyb.* hist. l. 6. p. 495.

(as *Pausanias* doth interpret the word,) an Emperour, indeed for his goodness, clemency, prudence and other good parts, inferiour unto none but this his incomparable Son; but also to *Faustina* his wife, though none of the best.

B. VI. n. XXXVII. *As that vile and ridiculous verse*] *Chrysippus* his own words and *Plutarch*'s censure upon them you may reade in *Plutarch* περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν· whereby it appears that *Chrysippus* his word was not στίχος γελοῖος, as we have it here, but ἐπίγραμμα γελοῖον.

B. VII. n. XXXIX. *Of this mass of flesh that comp.*] It was in former Greek editions, περιτεθραμμένου· which would import, *pampered*, but that περιτέθεσθαι is not found in this sense. Περιτεθραμμένου therefore (*circumdati*, as *Xyl.* had expressed it in his translation) is the more warrantable reading of the two, (as may farther appear by collation of places, where we find περιτείμενον, used in the same sense:) and which we have exhibited in our Greek edition.

B. VIII. n. I. *Contrary to that perfection of life*] ἡ πρόληψις καὶ ἐπαγγελία τοῦ φιλοσόφου (saith *Epictetus* in *Arrianus*, lib. 4.) εἶναι ἀναμάρτητον· *The profession of a Philosopher is, not to sin:* and in the same chapter shall you find, φιλόσοφος ἀμαρτάνων, exploded, as implying a flat contradiction. And now here will I perform what in my Preface I did promise, for the more full and perfect explication of this word φιλόσοφος. That the immortality of the soul, and the reward of the

the good and bad after this Life, was never more ſtoutly maintained by any of all the Heathens, than by *Plato*, is full well known and acknowledged by all. But it is objected, that this ſound and true Tenet he by many odd fictions of his own, and ridiculous deſcriptions of the torments of the wicked after this Life, hath much corrupted and adulterated. One thing eſpecially, though by more objected againſt him, yet by one Greek Father ſpecially is much exaggerated; that in a place where he treateth of the reward of the juſt and unjuſt after this life, he ſhould there propoſe unto his *Philoſophers* as their beſt reward for their juſtice and piety, the *metempſychoſis* and tranſmutation of their ſouls into Bees and Ants and ſuch like: a thing ſo ſtrange and ridiculous even to conceive, that I cannot but wonder how they that could believe any ſuch thing of *Plato*, could in other places find in their hearts ſo highly to extoll, and ſo abſolutely to prefer him before all other Philoſophers that ever were. But as for his many relations and ſtrange deſcriptions both of the manner and place of torments after this life, I will not take upon me to excuſe him. Onely this I will ſay, that he profeſſing in ſo many places, that what he related in this kind, he neither believed himſelf, nor required of any that they ſhould believe; and that he was well content, that ſuch relations as theſe ſhould go for old womens tales, for that in very deed they were no better; and that all that he ſtood upon, was, That men might certainly be perſuaded that the ſoul was immortal, and that there was a reward for the juſt after this life, but as for the reſt, whether theſe very things or ſomewhat

Theodor. Serm. XI. Plat. in Phœd.

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equivalent were believed, untill they had more certain information was to him indifferent: I do not see, what could well be expected more from an Heathen. And he that shall compare those many descriptions of Hell and Purgatory, which are to be found in Books written many hundred years ago, with his, will certainly judge, that either *Plato* was not much amiss, or that many Christians have deserved far more blame than he. And I farther think that *Plato* might in this case with as much reason, to maintain among the vulgar an opinion of the immortality of the soul, and of a judgment after this life, make use of old womens tales; as the Angelical Doctour against some Fathers, who affirm the contrary, doth take upon him to maintain, that *ignis inferni ejusdem est speciei cum igne nostro*, because *Aristotle* hath written, that *omnis aqua omni aquæ est idem specie.* And as for that which *Plato* writes concerning the transformation of worldly carnal mens souls, according to *Pythagoras* doctrine; it is true, that *Pythagoras* and his opinions being in great esteem among the people, *Plato* not knowing himself what certainly to affirm of the manner of their punishment after their death, was very indifferent, whether this or that were believed, so somewhat were believed; and therefore proposes sometimes one opinion, sometimes another. But as for the reward of the just and godly, it is an intolerable mistake. For in that very place which is alledged, he plainly says that the true Philosophers after their death εἰς θεῶν γένος ἀφικνοῦνται, *are received into the communion and society of the Gods, and are transformed into their very natures.*

Supplem. 3. part. q. 97. Art. 6

tures. And though it cannot be doubted who they are that *Plato* calls Philoſophers, they being ſo often and ſo amply deſcribed by him; yet to make the caſe clearer, I will produce his deſcription of them in that very place: οἱ ἐρρωμένως φιλόσοφοι ἀπέχονται τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἁπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσιν, καὶ οὐ παραδιδόασιν αὐτοὺς αὐτές· ὅτε οἰκοφθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβούμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι· οὐδὲ ἂν ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας διαδότας, ὥσπερ οἱ φίλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἔπειτα ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν, &c. *All true Philoſophers abſtain from all carnal luſts and concupiſcences,* &c. *They fear not the ruine of their goods and houſes, nor poverty, as other ordinary men, and ſuch as are addicted to wealth and riches: they fear not the reproach and diſhonour of a private idle life, as they that hunt after honour and glory; for they purpoſely avoid all ſuch things,* &c. The ground (and yet no ground at all, had he been but looked upon,) of the miſtake, (as appears by them who have objected this unto him) is, that *Plato* ſetting down the ſeveral transformations of worldly men, according to their ſeveral diſpoſitions and emploiments during their life, ſaith that οἱ τὼ δημοπικώ τε καὶ πολιτικὼ ἀρετὼ ἐπιτηδεύκοτες, ὧν ἡ καλεῖται σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη —— εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνοῦνται πολιτικὸν καὶ ἥμερον γένος, ἴσως μελιττῶν, ἢ σφηκῶν, ἢ μυρμήκων, &c. by which words of οἱ τὼ δημοπικώ τε πολιτ. &c. he was miſtaken, as though he had meant them whom he uſually calls *Philoſophers,* which in many reſpects was a very groſs miſtake. For, firſt, as was ſaid in the Preface, it was not the love or exerciſe of vertue alone that made a *Philoſopher,* as they meant it; but the love:

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of vertue μετ' ἀναγκαίας: and so distinguished them from politick worldly men, who (not to speak of the vain-glorious,) often exercise justice and many other vertues, not out of any love to them, but because, as the times are, it may be most advantageous for them to shew themselves in their actions just and righteous. And from the *Epicureans*, who though they acknowledged not a divine providence, nor the immortality of the soul, and proposed unto themselves Pleasure as the onely end of their lives; yet maintained (most of them) that they that were φιλήδονοι, or, *lovers of pleasure*, must of necessity be φιλοδίκαιοι, or, *lovers of justice*; and that ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, or, *without vertue*, it was not possible for a man to live in true pleasure. And certain it is that the *Epicureans* have written as many excellent books to exhort men to vertue, and, for the most part, in the sight of the world lived as well as any of any other Sect: so that as it was said of the Stoicks (for they were most of them notable hypocrites) that they did λέγειν τὰ καλὰ, καὶ ποιεῖν τὰ αἰσχρὰ, of the *Epicureans* it was said, that they did δογματίζειν τὰ αἰσχρὰ, καὶ ποιεῖν τὰ καλά. Then it was farther to be observed, that *Plato* doth not say δικαιοσύνην absolutely, but, τὴν καλὴν δικαιοσύνην: nor ἀρετὴν absolutely, but, πολιτικὴν ἀρετήν: by which words he cannot be understood to mean others, than those whom in other places he calls πολιτικοὺς, men that interessed themselves in publick affairs and in the government of the commonwealth; of which kind of men he in many places, (as things then stood) maintained that they could not possibly be *Philosophers*: though otherwise (as all know) those Commonwealths he pro-

pronounced moſt happy, which were governed by them that were. But that which plainly puts all out of doubt, and makes the miſtake in a manner inexcuſable, is, that *Plato* after theſe words, preſently adds ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ· and in the words immediately following, ſets down thoſe that he calls *Philoſophers*, as men of a quite different Sect and Profeſſion; which they that object this place unto him confound with the former: and not they onely, but (which is very ſtrange, and in ſome ſort doth acquit thoſe ancient Chriſtians.) Heathens alſo, even the moſt learned; as *Alcinous* in his excellent Introduction to *Plato*'s Philoſophy, *cap.* 27. I think the Book it ſelf will juſtifie me, that I do the Authour of it no wrong, for making him a Heathen when he wrote it, whatſoever he became afterwards. For otherwiſe I am not ignorant, that ſome have made of this *Alcinous*, not a Chriſtian onely, but a Biſhop.

I am glad I have had occaſion here in this ſubject to do *Plato* ſomeright; a man, if ever Heathen was, (as *Plutarch* ſomewhere of *Socrates*) εἰς ἀρετὴν θεολήπτῳ· and I ſhall (when occaſion ſerves) as gladly doe it in many others, wherein he is as wrongfully miſtaken. However, that which hath now made me the more willing to ſay ſo much in his defence is, partly that our *Anton.* might the better be underſtood, as often as he uſeth theſe words *Philoſophy* and *Philoſophers*; and, partly that ſome paſſages of his, otherwiſe obſcure, compared with this of *Plato*, with that which hath been ſaid upon it, might be made plain and eaſie. See B. III. n. 17. B. VII. n. 37. B. IX. n. 28, *&c.* Neither will this interpretation of theſe words *Philoſopher*

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and *Philosophy*, onely be usefull in the reading of this *Antoninus* and other Heathens; but of ancient Fathers also, by whom they have been used in the same sense; but especially by Saint *Chrysostom*: as where he saith, that τὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπιτάθη μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ παρουσίαν, that a man is bound to a great deal more Philosophy since Christ, than they were under the Law; that the Philosophy of the Gospel is most perfect: and many such other speeches, which he useth almost in every page.

Ibid. n. XXXV. *What? are either Pantheas*] μήν νῦν παρακάθηται τῇ τοῦ κυρίου σορῷ Πάνθεια, &c. The story of *Pantheas* you have at large in *Xenophon*, where, if you reade it, it will easily appear, that either *Antoninus* his memory did here somewhat fail him, or that there is somewhat amiss in the Greek Copy. For κυρίου a learned man had corrected Κύρου· but that is as far or farther from the truth of the storie. You may for variety sake, if you please, reade the same storie in *Philostratus* also the Sophist.

B. X. n. X. *And applaud themselves for their valiant acts against the* Sarmatæ] Great was the glory of these wars, equalled by good Historians to the greatest conquests of the Romans. *Bellum quantum nulla unquam memoria fuit*, say some of them. And by the same Historians is all the honour and glory of these wars, next unto God, (whose providence in some particular passages of this expedition is acknowledged both by Heathens and Christians, to have been very extraordinary, and indeed miraculous, (See Note II. upon

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B. XI. n. III. *Violently and paſſionately ſet upon oppoſition, as Chriſtians are wont*,] G. μὴ κατὰ ψιλὴν παράταξιν, ὡς οἱ Χριστιανοὶ, ἀλλὰ λελογισμένως, καὶ σεμνῶς, *&c.* It was an errour of the Stoicks (forſaking herein the more ſound doctrine of ancienter Philoſophers, as *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and others,) that in ſome caſes it was not onely lawfull, but alſo laudable, for a man to make himſelf away.

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I do not find that our *Antoninus* doth any where absolutely and directly oppose this errour; but this I find, and any man may observe that shall reade him, that in many places he doth restrain the case with such limitations and restrictions, as might seem in some manner equivalent to a plain and direct opposition. However, I speak not this to excuse him, but that it shall be free for me or any man to judge him or his opinions, as they shall see occasion. The reason that moves me to take here more particular notice of his opinion in this point, than I do in many others of no less moment, is, partly, because *Antoninus*, though he often toucheth upon it, yet every where he doth it so briefly and obscurely, that his main drift and intention, I fear, will not so easily be discovered by many: and, partly, because I shall at once both remove from *Antoninus* the crime and imputation of being the Authour of a most heinous and foul slander concerning the Christians, and vindicate those primitive godly Christians innocency from the malice or ignorance of Heathenish tongues. *Antoninus* then, you must know, was of opinion that they were much to blame, who either *passionately* or *inconsiderately* (for to these two we may refer all his other exceptions by him inculcated in divers places:) did at any time part with their lives; and instead of these requireth and presseth often these two, *rationally*, and *calmly*, or *meekly*. For the first, Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν κατ' ἄνθρωπόν ὅτι λελογισμένον, μὴ ὁλοσχερῶς μηδ' ὠστικῶς μηδὲ ὑπερηφάνως πρὸς τὸ θάνατον ἔχειν, &c. *It is the part of a wise man*, &c. B. IX. n. III. μὴ καταφρονῶν, *not contemptibly*, or *scornfully*;

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μὴ ὀργιζόμενος, *not angrily*, or *passionately*, saith he elsewhere to the same purpose, and inculcates the word ἵλεως, *calmly*, and *meekly*, so often, that were it not so good a word as it is, hardly would any man have the patience to reade it so often as he repeats it. But much more shall we be induced to bear with *Antoninus* his many repetitions in this kind, if we farther consider, that all that he did aim at by all these words, was merely to take down the pride and haughty spirit of the common Stoicks of his days, and before. Many of whom both by their own practice, and by their doctrine and exhortations, did teach a man generally upon all occasions, but in matter of Death especially, rather to be desperately stout and resolute, than rationally and really wise: which made *Antoninus* in almost all his exhortations and instructions so carefully to inculcate *humility* and *a meek spirit*. Δὸς ὃ θέλεις, ἀπόλαβε ὃ θέλεις, τῇ πάντα διδούσῃ καὶ ἀπολαμβανούσῃ φύσει ὁ πεπαιδευμένος καὶ αἰδήμων λέγει· λέγει δὲ τοῦτο οὐ καταθρασυνόμενος, ἀλλὰ πειθαρχῶν μόνον καὶ εὐνοῶν αὐτῇ. *Give what thou wilt, and take away what thou wilt*, &c. Book X. num. XVI. They that are any thing acquainted with *Seneca*'s style and *genius* of writing, will easily make a Comment upon this. But not to go from this very subject of death that we are now upon, how does he set out his *Cato*, his great and almost onely pattern of wisedom? *Jam* (saith he) *non tantùm* Cæsari, *sed sibi iratus, nudas in vulnus manus egit, & generosum illum contemptorémque omnis potentiæ spiritum non emisit, sed ejecit*, &c. *Epist.* 24. Is this to dye like a Philosopher or a wise man, or rather like a desperate

wretch? If any man shall answer for *Sen.* that he wrote this as an Oratour rather than a Philosopher; I grant indeed that it was wit that he affected more than sound wisedom, (in this and many such passages, I mean:) but yet it is in the person of a Philosopher that he speaks it; and whether it were a good Oratour's part to adscribe such a passionate (that I say not desperate) and discontented end to such a perfect wise man as he would have *Cato* reputed, I leave to others to judge.

The other main condition that *Antoninus* doth generally stand upon (as hath been said) is, *rationally*, or, *not inconsiderately*. A man may undervalue life as well as overprize it. It was *Aristotle*'s opinion, that a man ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τὸν ἀρι- ἔχει πᾶς, the more vertuous he is, and the better furnished with all manner of rare perfections, the more unwilling he must needs be to die. And certainly according to truth and sound Philosophy, for a man to contemn life, and either in a mere bravado (as many Duellists and contentious persons often do,) to cast it away or otherwise easily and slightly, upon no grounds of sound reason and good ratiocination, to part with it, must needs be the highest degree of madness and mere brutishness that can be conceived. And on the other side, ὅταν ἔνι λόγος (as *Epictetus* upon this occasion speaketh,) *cùm exigit ratio*, or, *cùm ratio suadet*, (as *Seneca* in his Epistles,) when apparent reason doth induce us for some greater good (as either for a better life, or for the performance of some duty which in reason ought to be dearer unto us than life,) not to regard it, for a man then, through either fear of death or love

of this world, to linger and to draw back, is great baſeneſs, and greater folly. As for that *Antoninus* doth here alledge the Chriſtians as an example of that frenſie that he doth tax and reprove; the ground of it is, the fervent zeal of the primitive Chriſtians, whoſe love to Chriſt was ſuch, that they not onely were content to ſuffer for him, when they were called to it, but even ſo longed to die for him, that they could hardly by the Church-canons and diſcipline provided in that behalf be reſtrained from *offering themſelves* to death, and being their own accuſers and promoters. Inſomuch that in *Africa* at a certain time when they flocked by multitudes to the Inquiſitours or Judges, the Governour of that Province amazed, cried out, *O wretched creatures! if you muſt needs die, have you no halters or precipices at home?* as is recorded by *Tertull. ad Scap.* laſt Chapter. And though this courſe was by the better learned and more ſober Prelates inhibited and reſtrained; yet ſuch was commonly their conſtancy and their readineſs to death, whenſoever they were apprehended and condemned by their perſecutours, yea their joy and exultation ſuch, (*Deo gratias*, or, *God be praiſed*, was their common and ſolemn word, when their ſentence was read;) that that alone was ſufficient to amaze their enemies, and to make them think very ſtrangely of them. Neither indeed were the Chriſtians better known unto the Heathens by any other property than this, that they were a kind of people that did not regard their lives. Before *Antoninus*, *Arrianus* had already mentioned them upon the ſame occaſion. For *l.* 4. *c.* 7. περὶ ἀφοβίας, treating of an undaunted diſpoſi-

tion not capable of any fear or terrour, πῶς ἔχει τούτῳ τύραννος· φοβερός; ἢ ποῖοι ὁπλῖται; ἢ ποῖαι μάχαιραι αὐτῶν; εἶτα ὑπὸ μανίας μὴ δύνασθαί τι τῶν δεινῶν πρὸς ταῦτα, ἢ ὑπὸ ἔθους οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι· ὑπὸ λόγου δ' ἢ ἀποδείξεως οὐδεὶς δύναται, &c. *To him* (saith he) *that stands so affected, what Tyrant, what officers, what swords can be dreadfull? Or shall it be so that some through mere madness, others by use and custome, as the* Galilæans, *can be brought to that pass, that they shall fear nothing; and shall not reason and sound ratiocination*, &c. I know these words are somewhat otherwise interpreted by others, who refer both μανίαν and ἔθος to Christians; but if the whole passage be well considered, it will appear otherwise, especially if it be compared with *Seneca*'s last words of his *Epist.* 36. which are these, *Denique finem faciam: hoc unum adjecero, nec infantes, nec pueros, nec meos lapsos timere mortem; & esse turpissimum, si eam securitatem nobis ratio non præstat, ad quam stultitia perducit:* which words of *Seneca* I produce here the more willingly, because they may also serve to give light to another place of *Antoninus*, B. V. n. XVI. if any shall take pains to compare them. As for that *Arrianus* calls the Christians *Galilæans*, he doth but as many others did; as *Lucian* by name, (if he be the Authour of that Dialogue which goeth under his name:) and *Julian* the Apostate, as all men know. This readiness then and alacrity of these godly Christians to seal their profession with their bloud, so known and approved every where, was nevertheless so much mistaken and mis-interpreted, as that upon a supposition that it had no ground in

reason,

reason, (as *Antoninus* you see doth here alledge,) it was commonly termed by the Heathens pervicacy and obstinateness. *Obstinatio* indeed was the very word. *Illa ipsa obstinatio quam exprobratis*, saith *Tertull.* towards the end of his *Apologeticus*; and *ad Nationes, lib.* 1. *cap.* 18. *Reliquum Obstinationis in illo capitulo collocatis, quòd neque gladios, neque cruces, neque bestias vestras; non ignem, non tormenta, ob duritatem ac contemptum mortis animo recusemus*, &c. And before him *Pliny*, in his Epistle *de Christianis* written to *Trajanus* the Emperour, *Neque enim dubitabam, qualecunque esset quod faterentur, pervicaciam certe & inflexibilem* obstinationem *debere puniri. Seneca* also, though not of the Christians particularly, he yet in the same sense doth use the word *obstinatio*, in his 76. *Epist.* By which passages it doth appear how happily *Xylander*, professing what he doth in his Notes, did hit upon this word in his Translation, than which he could never have found a more fit and proper, had he sought never so long. But some Interpreters of *Tertull.* it seems did not well understand it in his *de Spectac.* first Chap. where he saith, *Sunt qui existiment Christianum, expeditum morti genus ad hanc Obstinationem abdicatione voluptatum erudiri*, &c. who note that *Tertull.* doth there use *Obstinatio* in a good sense for *Constantia*; whereas he useth it in no other sense than the Heathens did, that objected it unto them; and it is as from them that he speaks it, as if he said, *ad hanc quam nobis objicitis*, or, *exprobratis*, (as elsewhere) *obstinationem*, &c. The word παράταξις here used by *Anton.* will I think hardly be found in any other

Greek Authour in this sense, a word nevertheless (as all his are) as elegant and proper as may be; importing as much in things civil, as ἀντιπνοίστασις doth in things natural. That which S. *Basil* doth elegantly call τῆς ἀνθολκῆς ἀμετρίαν, is much to the same purpose. But S. *Nazianzen* will give us a very full and elegant interpretation of this word, which will also much conduce to the illustration of the matter that hath been spoken of. For in his first *Invective*, treating of the reasons why *Julian* would not set upon the Christians with open persecution, as former Emperours had done, which meant them not so ill as he did; he makes this to have been the cause of it, because *Julian* had observed, that the Christians the more they were persecuted, the more resolute and peremptory they did grow. For, as fire, saith he, exposed to a blustring wind, the more it is blown upon, the greater it grows; so is it with generous dispositions, the more they are opposed with force and violence, the more obstinate and peremptory is their resistence· φιλονικοτέρους γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς γενέσθαι βιαζομένους, καὶ ἀντιθέσειν τῇ τυραννίδι τὴν ὑπὲρ εὐσεβείας φιλοτιμίαν· φιλεῖ γὰρ τὰ γενναῖα φρονήματα πρὸς τὸ βίᾳ κρατοῦν αὐθαδιάζεσθαι, καὶ καθάπερ φλὸξ ὑπὸ ἀνέμου ῥιπιζομένη, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀναπτέσθαι, ὅσωπερ ἂν σφοδρότερον καταπνέηται. *Antoninus* doth use the words again, (but in the Verb there, as others use it also,) in the same sense, B. VIII. n. XLVI. speaking of the liberty of the will of man, Μέμνησο (saith he) ὅτι ἀκαταμάχητον γίνεται τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, ὅταν εἰς ἑαυτὸ συστραφὲν ἀρκεσθῇ ἑαυτῷ μὴ ποιοῦντι ὃ μὴ θέλει, κἂν ἀλόγως παρατάξηται, &c. *Remember that thy mind*, &c. And so doth the same *Nazianzen* in his second

Invective,

in his 2d *Invective*, ſpeaking of a reſolute and courageous Chriſtian Martyr, ἐκ τῆς φυγῆς ἐπάνεισι, (ſaith he) καὶ τῷ δήμῳ φέρων ἐκδίδωσι χρῆσθαι ὅ, τι βούλοιντο, καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ καιροῦ παρατάσσεται δυσκολίαν. *as one that had entred the liſt, as it were, to buckle and grapple with the preſent adverſities themſelves.*

Ibid. n. V. *After the Tragedie the Comœdia vetus was brought in.*] *Horace* in his *De Arte Poetica*, having immediately before ſpoken of *Æſchylus* the Tragick Poet, *Succeſſit vetus his Comœdia*, ſaith he, *non ſine multa Laude, ſed in vitium libertas excidit, & vim Dignam lege regi, &c.* They that have read learned *Heinſius* his elaborate Notes upon this place, will eaſily ſee what I aim at, by citing this place of *Horace*; and will acknowledge that *Horace* is much beholden to this place of *Anton*.

B. XII. n. IX. *Whatſoever doth happen.*] Τὸ ἑξῆς τῇ φύσει. Theſe words may alſo be referred to the former *paragraph*, or *number*; as in the Latin tranſlation is to be ſeen. But they fit this place ſo well too, that it is not eaſie to determine to which of the two they belong. Such diverſities may be obſerved in other places too; which ſome, raſhly, may deem over-ſights or repugnancies: but men of better judgment and skill will eaſily ſee what hath cauſed this variety. But in places of greateſt difficulty, I muſt referr the Reader to my Latin Notes.

F I N I S.

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FINIS.

Select Remarks
ON THE
MEDITATIONS
OF
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus,
THE
ROMAN EMPEROR.

Remarks upon the Title.

THE *Title* of this *Treatiſe* has been variouſly explain'd. The *Greek* Copy runs thus, *Twelve Books of the Emperor* Marcus Antoninus *to himſelf*, πρὸς ἑαυτόν. By which the wiſe *Emperor* means Nothing elſe, but that theſe Twelve *Books*, are a Collection of Familiar

Thoughts and Addreſſes, with which he entertain'd *himſelf*. For indeed, *Antoninus* ſpeaks to none but *himſelf* through the whole *Work*. And this Kind of Solitary Converſation, is a wholſome Diſcipline, Effectually curing the Diſtempers of the Mind. One cannot better repreſent *Antoninus*'s Practice, than by comparing it with what *Horace* us'd to do, as he ſays of himſelf:

—Neque enim, cum Lectulus aut me
Porticus excepit, deſum mihi. Rectius hoc eſt:
Hoc faciens vivam melius: ſic dulcis amicis
Occurram; hoc quidem non belle. Numquid (ego illi
Imprudens olivæ faciam ſimile? Hæc ego mecum
Compreſſis agito labris.—

For neither am I Alone or Idle, when Sitting or Walking. This is the beſt way, ſay I to my ſelf. In doing thus, I ſhall live Happier, and be more Agreeable to my Friends. I ſee ſome miſcarry, in this or that Courſe: Shall I be ſuch a Fool, as to tread in their Steps? Theſe are the Silent Diſcourſes, with which I entertain my ſelf. And this is exactly the ſame with *Antoninus*'s Cuſtom, during the few Hours he had of Leiſure from the Cares of the *Empire*. For, he paſs'd them away in Converſing with *himſelf*, writing down theſe *Soliloquies*, as *Memorandum's* and *Rules*, by which he might ſquare the Future Actions of his Life.

Remarks

Remarks upon Book I.

PAge 29. l. 11. *Of my Grandfather Verus* [*I have learn'd.*] This was *Annius Verus*, who had been Thrice *Conſul*, or *Governor* of *Rome*, and rais'd to the Dignity of a *Senator* by the Two *Cenſors*, *Titus* and *Veſpaſian*. *Antoninus* being very Young when his Father died, was brought up in the *Houſe* of this *Annius Verus*, his Grandfather. One Thing appears very Remarkable: Which is, That this *Emperor*, though of ſuch an *Ancient* and *Noble Family*, yet here mentions none but his Father, Grandfather and Great-Grandfather; taking no Notice of his other *Anceſtors*, of whom Men generally love to boaſt.

Ib. l. 25. *From the Fame and Memory of him that begot me.*] He was very Young, when his Father *Annius Verus* died, and cou'd ſcarce remember, that ever he ſaw him. But he cou'd not ſo eaſily forget the *Idea* of his Virtue, which ſerv'd as a Light to direct his Steps. *Annius Verus*, in this, receiv'd from his Son an Honour which few Children can give their Fathers: Becauſe few Fathers live ſo, as their Virtue may be a Pattern to their Children; tho' they can do nothing more Glorious, than thus to ſecure the Education of their Off-ſpring. For then that Saying of *Eccleſiaſticus* may be apply'd to them: *Mortuus eſt pater eorum, & quaſi non eſt mortuus.* Their

Father is dead, and yet he is as if he were not dead. Becauſe he ſurvives in ſuch Virtuous Sons.

Ib. l. 27. *Of my Mother to be Religious.*] In giving this Praiſe to his Mother, he excludes not his Father and Grandfather. But, as commonly a Mother has the Chief Hand in bringing up her Children: So it is her Part to plant in their Souls this Happy Principle of Piety, which is the Root of all other Virtues. The Mother of *Antoninus*, was *Domitia Calvilla Lucilla*, the Daughter of *Calviſius Tullus*, who had been Twice *Conſul.*

P. 30. l. 1. *To content my ſelf with a ſpare Diet, and to fly all ſuch Exceſs*, &c.] This Praiſe of his Mother, ſeems to be Equal, if not Greater than the Firſt. For there are few *Ladies* of *Quality*, who Educate not their Children Piouſly, altho' they have no other Reaſon for it, than purely to comply with Civility and the Faſhion. But there is ſcarce one that teaches 'em Frugality and Temperance. They all generally act like the Wife of *Strepſiades* in *Ariſtophanes*, who us'd to Careſs her Son with ſuch Diſcourſe as this: *My Son, when you become a Man, you muſt keep a gallant Equipage, wear Gold and Purple, make Horſe-Races and Triumphant Cavalcades through the City, like your Uncle* Megacles.

Ib. l. 3. *Of my Great-Grandfather.*] 'Tis a Queſtion, of which Great-Grandfather he ſpeaks, whether of his Father's Side, or Mother's. Some think, the Former; but without any

any Ground. For, the Firſt *Annius Verus*, Great-Grandfather of *Antoninus*, was dead long before this *Emperor* was of Age ſufficient to learn any Thing from him. Therefore it is more Probable, he ſpeaks of his Great Grandfather by his Mother's Side, *Catilius Severus*, who had Adopted him, and given him his Name.

Ib. l. 10. *Either of the Two great Factions of the Courſers in the Circus.*] The *Greek* Copy runs thus, *Not to be of any Party, whether the Green, the Blue, the Thracian, or the Purſuivant.* In the Chariot-Races, there were commonly Four Factions, the *White*, the *Red*, the *Green* and the *Blue*. And there were ſeveral Sorts of *Gladiators*, the *Thracians*, the *Mirmillions*, the *Samnites* and the *Purſuivants*, *Secutores*, &c.

Ib. l. 27. *Not to keep Coturnices or Quails for the Game.*] The *Romans* learn'd this *Superſtition* of the *Greeks*, who kept *Quails* to Fight together; by the Succeſs of which Battles, they judg'd of Future Events. See *Pollux*, Book IX. Chap. 7.

P. 31. l. 7. *That I did not fall into the Ambition of ordinary Sophiſts.*] The *Sophiſts* in thoſe Days, were as to *Philoſophy*, what our *Hereticks* and *Hypocrites* are at this Day in Matters of *Religion*: By a Falſe Appearance of *Science*, they deceiv'd the Simple. 'Tis againſt this Sort of *Philoſophers*, that *Socrates* ſo often argues in *Plato*.

Ib. l. 18. *Moreover, I have learn'd to write Letters, without any Affectation or Curioſity.*]

This Simplicity of Style, makes the Letters of *Antoninus* Admirable; as may be judg'd by those we find in his *Life*. *Philostratus* also says, That those who, in his Opinion, had the best Faculty of Writing *Letters* among the *Philosophers*, were *Tyaneus* and *Dion*; amongst the Great *Generals*, *Brutus*; and *Antoninus* among the *Emperors*. In whose *Letters*, besides the Exactness of his Familiar Style, one may observe a great Constancy of Sentiments from First to Last.

Ib. l. 31. *From Apollonius, true Liberty.*] This was *Apollonius* the *Philosopher* of *Chalcis*, whom *Antoninus Pius* sent for from *Athens*, to be the *Tutor* of our *Emperor*. And on whom *Demonax* put this *Jest*, when he saw him and his Scholars depart; *Behold* Jason *and his Argonauts:* Reproaching him, as if he went to enrich himself at the *Court*, as *Jason* sail'd to *Colchos* to get the *Golden Fleece*.

P. 32. l. 19. *Of Sextus, Mildness.*] This *Philosopher Sextus* was the Grand-Son of *Plutarch*; not *Sextus Empiricus*, the *Pyrrhonian*, as some think. For he was dead long before.

P. 33. l. 26. *Of Alexander the Platonick.*] This was, without doubt, *Alexander* of *Seleucia*, who was sent in *Embassy* from his *Country*, to the *Court* of *Antoninus Pius*, and whom *Marcus Antoninus* afterwards made his *Secretary* for the *Greek* Tongue. *Philostratus* has writ his *Life*. He was an Eloquent Man, but above all, he was admir'd for his Copiousness, and Facility of expressing himself. For as

soon

ſoon as he had made an *Oration*, he wou'd the next Moment, rehearſe it all again in other Terms. *Herod* the *Sophiſt*, for one only *Panegyrick* he receiv'd from him, gave him at once, Ten Slaves, Ten Horſes, Ten Secretaries (who had the Art of Writing in *Short-Hand*) Twenty Talents of Gold, with Abundance of Silver, and other Preſents.

Ib. l. 27. *Not often, nor without great Neceſſity to ſay or to write to any Man in a Letter,* I AM NOT AT LEISURE.] This Precept is Divine. The World wou'd be too Happy, if Men's true Encumbrances only hinder'd them from ſerving their Neighbours. But there is Nothing more Common, than for People who live at Eaſe, to pretend Impediments which they have not, when they are deſir'd to aſſiſt Another. Thus aggravating their Unkindneſs with a Lye.

Ib. l. 34. *Of Catulus.*] *Cinna Catulus*, a *Stoick Philoſopher.*

P. 34. l. 7. *From my Brother Severus.*] Some Criticks read it, *My Brother Verus.* But *Verus* was too Young, to teach *Antoninus* ſuch fine *Maxims*. It is more Probable, That *Antoninus* ſpeaks here of *Claudius Severus*, the *Peripatetick Philoſopher*: Whom he calls his Brother, becauſe of the Tenderneſs he had for him.

Ib. l. 9. *By whom alſo I came to the Knowledge of Thraſeas and Helvidius.*] It was *Severus*, who had recommended to him the *Hiſtory* of *Thraſeas Petus*, and his Son-in-Law

Helvidius. The First of which, *Nero* put to Death; and baniſh'd the Other, as *Tacitus* relates in the XVI. *Book* of his *Annals.*

Ib. l. 11. *Cato, Dio and Brutus.*] Whoſe *Lives* are writ by *Plutarch.* There is extant alſo a *Letter*, which *Plato* addreſs'd to this *Dio.*

Ib. l. 28. *From Claudius Maximus.*] *Claudius Maximus* was a *Stoick Philoſopher*, who died before *Antoninus* wrote this, as appears by the Sequel of this *Text*; and by the Third *Book*, where he ſays, *Secunda has bury'd her Husband Maximus.*

P. 35. l. 4. *Never to wonder at any Thing.*] See *Horace* Book I. Epiſt. 6. and what is remark'd there on this Happy Indifference.

Ib. l. 18. *In my Father, I obſerv'd his Meekneſs.*] He ſpeaks of *Antoninus Pius*, his Adoptive Father. This *Place* is perfectly Beautiful, and gives us a great Character of that *Prince.* It deſerves to be attentively and often read.

Ib. l. 32. *Neither abſolutely requiring of his Friends, that they ſhould wait on him at his ordinary Meals.*] This Paſſage has need of a *Comment*, to make it Intelligible to us in theſe Times, wherein the *Modes* of the *Court*, are different from what they were formerly: When the Greateſt Mark of Haughtineſs and Pride a *Prince* cou'd be Guilty of, was, to Eat Alone. This appear'd Inſupportable. But, the other Extreme into which they afterwards fell, was yet Greater. For thoſe who had

once

once receiv'd the Honour to ſit at the *Emperor*'s Table, durſt not be Abſent One *Meal*, without Permiſſion: And, to ask that, was to incur the *Prince*'s Diſpleaſure. *Antoninus Pius* was one of the Firſt, who obſerving that there was Nothing more Inhuman, than to turn this Honour into Slavery, excus'd his *Courtiers* and Friends from their Attendance at ſuch Times, and left 'em to their Liberty. *Marcus Antoninus* follow'd his Example, receiving his Friends to his Table, when they had a Mind to come, but not enjoyning it as a Duty.

Ib. l. 34. *Nor that they ſhould of Neceſſity, accompany him in his Journeys.*] *Marcus Antoninus* ſo well imitated this Indulgence, that he diſpens'd with *Galienus*, his beſt *Phyſician*, from following him in one of his *Expeditions* againſt the *Marcomans*, giving him Leave to tarry at *Rome*, according to his Deſire; as *Julian* tells us, in one of his *Treatiſes*.

P. 38 l. 13. *Never curious or ſollicitous, either about his Meat*, &c.] The *Greek* Expreſſion is Remarkable: *He was not Inventive as to Eating*, &c. That is, he did not employ his Time and Phancy, in Studying New *Ragoo's*. *Antoninus* here rallies ſome *Princes*, who being addicted to a Refin'd Sort of Gluttony, affect to ſurpaſs their *Cooks* themſelves, in the Art of making *Sawces*.

P. 39. l. 7. *A good Siſter.*] *Annia Corniſicia*, who was Married to *Quadratus*.

Ib. l. 18.

Ib. l. 28. *Such and such Torches and Statues.*] *Antoninus* ſpeaks here of *Statues*, which were Common in the *Palaces* of *Princes*, and *Great Lords*, holding Torches to give Light in the Night. This Sort of Magnificence, was very Ancient. For, *Homer* ſpeaks of it in *Book* VII. of his *Odyſſes*, deſcribing the *Palace* of *Alcinous*. *There were*, ſays he, *upon ſtately Pedeſtals, the Golden Statues of Children, which held Lamps in their Hands, to give Light to the Gueſts at Night.* This is that Paſſage which *Lucretius* has Tranſlated in *Book* I. of his Excellent *Poem*.

Si non aurea ſunt Juvenum Simulacra per Ædes
Lampadas igniferus manibus retinentia dextris,
Lumina Nocturnis Epulis ut ſuppeditentur.

Ib. l. 34. *That I have had ſuch a Brother.*] He ſpeaks of *Lucius Verus*, his Brother by *Adoption*, and with whom he ſhar'd the *Empire*. Whom, notwithſtanding his Debauchery and Vices, he lov'd to the laſt, and conceal'd his Faults, both while he was Living, and after his Death; as *Capitolinus* teſtifies.

P. 40. l. 4. *That I have got ingenuous Children.*] *Antoninus* had by his Wife *Fauſtina*, Three Sons, *Commodus*, *Verus* and *Antoninus*: And Three Daughters (ſome ſay Four) *Lucilla* and *Fadilla*. The Name of the other is not known. All theſe Children, were Fair and Well-ſhap'd. *Lucilla* was like her Mother,

ther, a Prodigy of Beauty: And *Commodus* was the Handſomeſt *Prince* in the World.

Ib. l. 32. *That my Body in ſuch a Life, has been able to hold out ſo long.*] In his Youth, he was very Strong and Vigorous. For, he fought in Armour, and kill'd the Greateſt Wild Boars when he went a-Hunting. But his great Application to *State*-Affairs and Study; his Auſterity and Abſtinence, made him ſo Infirm, that he had not a Moment of Health during his whole *Reign*. So the *Emperor Julian* repreſents him among the *Cæſars*, with Hollow Eyes, Meager Looks, and his Body like a *Skeleton*.

P. 41. l. 13. *That I have ſuch a Wife, ſo Obedient, ſo Loving, and ſo Ingenuous.*] *Antoninus* never knew the Irregular Conduct of his Wife. And this ought not to ſeem ſtrange, if we conſider on the One Side the Simplicity of *Antoninus*; and on the Other, the Cunning Wit of *Fauſtina*: Who had no leſs Addreſs than Beauty. And there is Nothing wherein Women can better Act their Part, than in the feign'd Demonſtrations of Love and Fidelity to their Husbands. *Julian* in his *Book* of the *Cæſars*, ſeems to juſtifie *Antoninus*'s Love to his Wife, by the Example of his *Predeceſſors*: But 'twas only to take an Occaſion from thence, to involve in his *Satyr*, the Wife of *Adrian*, *Veſpaſian*, and even of *Auguſtus* himſelf.

Ib. l. 14. *That I had choice of fit and able Men, to whom I might commit the bringing up*

of

of my Children.] *Herodian* obſerves in the Beginning of his *Hiſtory*, that the Principal Care of *Antoninus* was, to ſeek out Learned and Able Men for this Purpoſe. He made *Oneſicritus*, *Antiſtius*, *Capella*, *Attaius Sanctus* their *Tutors*, and gave them *Pitholaus* for their *Governour*.

Ib. l. 16. *That by Dreams I have received Help.*] There is Nothing more Common among the *Ancients*, than the Stories of Remedies Revealed to the Sick in their *Dreams*. *Ariſtides* declares the ſame of himſelf. *Syneſius* aſſures us, That by the Help of *Dreams*, he had eſcap'd very great Dangers. And 'tis well known what *Socrates* ſays of them.

Ib. l. 30. *Of the Gods and of Fortune.*] *Fortune* is not here taken for that *Blind Divinity*, of which all the World ſpeaks, and no Body knows any Thing. But it is the *Deſtiny*, or *Fatum* of the *Stoicks*; viz. the *Divine Providence*, which by its Eternal Foreſight, Regulates every Thing, and marks out its Time.

Ib l. 32. *In the Country of the Quadi at Granua.*] This was, without doubt, in one of *Antoninus*'s laſt *Expeditions*, after the Death of *Verus*. By which we may ſee, the Good Uſe this *Emperor* made of his Time, amidſt the Greateſt Difficulties, and even in the Sight of his Enemies.

Remarks

Remarks upon Book II.

PAge 45. l. 8. *Do, Soul, do; abuse and contemn thy self.*] This Expression is taken out of *Plato de Legibus*, Book V. where he says, *That no Man honours his Soul as he ought to do.* See the Observations on the same *Book, Chap.* 16.

Ib. l. 18. *Cease roving and wandring to and fro.*] *Ennius* has well express'd this roving Uneasiness:

Imus huc, hinc illuc: cum illuc ventum, ire (illinc lubet.
Incerte errat Animus, præter propter vita (vivitur.

We go hither and thither: and when we are in this Place, we have a Mind to go else-where. Our Mind roves at Random, and so our Life passes without any certain Design.

Ib. l. 25. *For not observing the State of another Man's Soul, scarce was ever any Man known to be Unhappy.*] To this may be apply'd that Verse of *Homer*, which *Socrates* had always in his Mouth:

Ὅττε τοὶ ἐν μεγάροισι, κακὸν τ' ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται.

That is, in the Sence of *Socrates*, *That whatsoever is Good or Evil for us, springs from within*

in our ſelves. And he made Uſe of this, to dehort Men from all *Unprofitable Sciences*, and *Vain Curioſities*, and to allure them to the *Study* of *Morality*, and the *Knowledge* of *themſelves.*

P. 46. l. 5. *Theophraſtus, where he compares Sin with Sin.*] Here *Antoninus* declares againſt the Equality of Sins, which thoſe of his *Sect* ſo obſtinately and ſo falſly aſſerted. But, this is not the only Thing wherein he diſſents from the *Primitive Stoicks.*

P. 47. l. 13. *Neither muſt we think that the Nature of the Univerſe.*] By *Nature*, he means that *Intelligent Spirit* which Governs the *World*, viz. *God.*

Ib. l. 15. *Or if not as ignorant of them, yet as unable either to prevent, or better to diſpoſe and order them.*] *Antoninus* here endeavours to confute certain *Philoſophers*, who maintain'd, *That Matter was ſo Weak and Corrupted, that God could not reſtore it to its Original State.*

P. 47. l. 17. *It cannot be, that ſhe through want either of Power or Skill.*] This Reaſon is very ſolid. For, either *God* cou'd not hinder this Diſorder; or, he was Ignorant of it. If he knew it not, he was Blind. If knowing it he wou'd not remedy it, he was Envious. And, if he cou'd not do it, he was Impotent. But, none of theſe can be ſaid, without a Horrid Sacrilege, and Deteſtable Blaſphemy.

P. 48. l. 18. *Now Death, it is not only a Work of Nature, but alſo conducing to Nature.*] For, the *World* is maintain'd by theſe *Changes:*

And

And we may properly ſay, *That we only Live by Death.* *Mortibus vivimus*, according to one of the *Ancients*.

P. 49. l. 13. *With a Kind of Pity and Compaſſion alſo.*] *Antoninus* here puts this Reſtriction, *a Kind of*, becauſe he would not too openly contradict the Opinion of the *Stoicks*, who held, That *Compaſſion* is a *Vice*.

P. 50. l. 15. *Monimus the Cynick.*] The *Diſciple* of *Diogenes* and *Crates*.

Ib. l. 17. *If that which is true and ſerious in them.*] The Wiſe *Emperor* adds this, to give an *Antidote* againſt the *Poiſon* that is ſpread through all the *Works* of *Monimus*.

Ib. l. 20. *A Man's Soul doth wrong and diſreſpect it ſelf*, &c.] Here *Antoninus* has Reſpect to what *Plato* ſays, *Book* V. *de Legibus*.

Ib. l. 32. *When ſhe doth diſſemble, and covertly and falſly, either doth or ſaith any Thing.*] The *Pagans* had more Regard to Truth, than many *Chriſtians*, who believe it is permitted them to uſe Fraud and Diſſimulation. *Cicero* ſays in his *Offices*, *Book* III. *Ex omni Vita Simulatio & Diſſimulatio tollenda eſt. Et Ratio igitur poſtulat, ne quid inſidioſè, ne quid ſimulatè, ne quid fallaciter.*

P. 51. l. 9. *And moſt ancient Commonwealth.*] This Paſſage, puts us in Mind of another excellent one in *Plutarch's Morals*; *That God who Created All, and is Almighty, Sovereignly Juſt, and a moſt Perfect Architect* (as *Pindar* ſays) *has built the World, as a City Common to Gods and Men, that they may live in it with Juſtice and Vertue.* Ib. l. 21.

Ib. l. 21. *One only Thing, Philosophy.*] *Philosophy* Properly taken, is Nothing but the *Knowledge* of Things *Divine* and *Human*, viz. *Religion.*

Ib. l. 32. *Death, as being Nothing else but the Resolution of those Elements.*] This was the Opinion of the *Platonists*, which they borrow'd from *Empedocles*, That the *Birth* and *Duration* of *Bodies*, was Nothing else, but the *Union*, and blending together of the *First Principles*; and that *Death* was Nothing else, but their *Separation*. And that as there is now no *New Creation* or *Production* of *Any Thing* out of *Nothing*; so neither does *Any Thing Perish*, or return to *Nothing*.

Remarks upon Book III.

PAge 54. l. 31. *Died afterwards all fill'd with Water within, and all bedaub'd with Dirt and Dung without.*] *Heraclitus* having a *Dropsie*, ask'd his *Physicians*, *Whether they cou'd cure him?* They answering him, *That they cou'd not*; he plac'd himself in a Hot *Dung-Hill* in the Sun, believing that the Heat of the *Dung-Hill*, wou'd dissipate the Watry Humour in his Body, which occasion'd his Distemper: But, this Remedy had not its desir'd Effect: For he dy'd in the *Dung-Hill*. *Antoninus* here gives him a sensible Touch for his Folly.

This

This *Philoſopher* amus'd himſelf in diſcourſing of the *Conflagration* of the *World*, a Thing far from the Purpoſe; yet ſaw not, that he was periſhing by an *Internal Deluge* of *Water*, of which he himſelf was the *Source*.

Ib. l. 33. *Lice kill'd Democritus*] *Antoninus* is the only Man, that thus relates the Death of *Democritus*. For, the Common Opinion is, that he kill'd himſelf, when he ſaw Old Age had weaken'd his Underſtanding.

Ib. l. 33. *Socrates, an other Sort of Vermin.*] He ſpeaks of the Accuſers of *Socrates*, and the People who put him to Death.

P. 55. l. 21 *That Part of himſelf which is Rational.*] That is, the *Underſtanding*, the *Soul*, which is all that thou haſt pure.

P. 56. l. 8. *A very Prieſt and Miniſter of the Gods.*] This Thought is Great and Noble, and might be Happily improv'd by *Chriſtians* at this Day.

P. 57. l. 19. *He therefore regards not ſuch Praiſe and Approbation, as proceeding from them, who cannot like and approve themſelves.*] This *Definition* of *Fooliſh* and *Vitious* Men, is very fine; viz. *They cannot pleaſe themſelves.* We may apply to them, what *Tyreſias* ſays to *Oedipus* in *Sophocles*, *Such Sort of People are Inſupportable to themſelves.* In a Word, *Vice* is an *Inteſtine Sedition*, or *Civil War* in the Soul, which perpetually haraſſes and fatigues a Man, not affording him a Moment of Reſt or Enjoyment.

P. 58. l. 1. *As one who needs neither the Oath*, &c.] The *Stoicks* hold, *That a wise Man ought to be believ'd, on his bare Word, without an Oath.* And the *Ancients* observe, That *Heraclitus* never *swore* but *Once*, in all his Life.

P. 60. l. 16. *In the Mind that is once truly disciplin'd and purg'd.*] To purge the *Passions*, among the *Stoicks*, signifies, *to root 'em quite out:* But *Aristotle*, when he talks of *purging* the *Passions*, means the Reducing 'em to a Mediocrity, so that they may be always subject to *Reason.*

Ib. l. 32. *To do nothing rashly.*] *Antoninus* in this, seems to recommend the Caution and Reservedness of the *Cyrenaick Philosophers*, who were never positive in asserting their Opinions, nor unadvis'd in their Actions, but both spoke and did all Things with Abundance of *Modesty* and *Hesitation.*

P. 61. l. 11. *Is by the Succession of silly Mortal Men preserv'd, who likewise shall shortly die.*] These Five or Six short Lines, give us an Admirable Lesson. There is so great a Quickness in them, that the Imagination it self can hardly keep pace with Sence. Therefore they deserve to be attentively reflected on.

P. 63. l. 2. *Thou shalt live happily.*] According to *Zeno*, *Plato* and *Aristotle*, to live Well, is to live Happily.

Ib. l. 6. *So have thou always thy Dogmata in a Readiness for the Knowledge of Things.*] This was the Method of the *Stoicks*. They taught their

their *Scholars*, to reduce all *Morality* into *Precepts* and *Maxims*, that they might always be ready when they had Occaſion for them.

Remarks upon Book IV.

PAge 68. l. 6. *The Things or Objects themſelves, reach not unto the Soul.*] *Antoninus* explains here a *Phyſical* Truth, as ſenſibly, as the Greateſt *Philoſopher* cou'd have done. For, it depends on us, to ſeparate our Thoughts from the Motions of our Blood and Spirits; the *Soul* having no farther Share in the Impreſſions made on the Brain by Outward Objects, than ſhe her ſelf pleaſes, by more or leſs reflecting on them.

Ibid. l. 17. *If to underſtand, and to be reaſonable, be common unto all Men.*] The *Conſequences*, which *Antoninus* heaps together in this *Chapter*, make up a *Demonſtration*, That the *Soul* is *Immaterial* and *Immortal*.

P. 70. l. 7. *As the Word Good is properly taken.*] For there is Nothing ſo commonly given, as the Name of a *Good Man*: It's become a Term of Civility and Cuſtom. We call a Man a *Good Man*, as we term him *Sir*, or *Maſter*: And as we name a Ship, *The Victorious*, *The Conquerour*, &c. before it have been at *Sea*. Yet this Title, *Good Man*, ought not to be made uſe of, but to diſtinguiſh the moſt ſincere Virtue.

Ib. l. 9. *Conceit no ſuch Things, as he that wrongeth thee conceiveth.*] The ſhorteſt and ſureſt Way to revenge us of our Enemies, is, to take from them the Pleaſure, of believing they have done us Ill.

P. 71. l. 8. *Will eſteem of thee no better, than of a mere Brute, and of an Ape.*] *Antoninus* makes a manifeſt Alluſion to the Words of *Ariſtotle*, in his *Politicks*, Book I. ἢ Θεὸς, ἢ θηρίον. Either a *God*, or a *Beaſt*. Meaning, that People are Incapable of obſerving a *Medium* in the Judgments they make of *Princes*: Either looking upon them as *Monſters*, or as *Gods*. *Antoninus* made this Reflection, no doubt, at a Time, when, by ſome extraordinary Regulations, he had diſcontented the *People*. Therefore he exhorts himſelf to remain ſtedfaſt and firm, not regarding the Murmurs of the *Vulgar*, who knew not their own Good.

Ib. l. 17. *Or to expreſs it in Agathon's Words.*] There were Two *Poets* of this Name; the One a *Tragedian*, the Other a *Comedian*. The Sentence which *Antoninus* rehearſes, is taken out of the Firſt, as he is introduc'd by *Plato*, ſpeaking in his *Banquet*.

P. 73. l. 1. *So the Souls after Death tranſferr'd into Air, after they have convers'd there awhile, are either by Way of Tranſmutation, or*, &c.] *Antoninus* here follows the Opinion of certain *Philoſophers*, who believ'd, That after Death the *Soul* retir'd into the *Air*, to be purg'd and cleans'd from the Stains ſhe had contracted in the *Body*; and that from thence, ſhe is Tranſlated

ſlated to *Heaven*, and re-united to the *Divinity* from whence ſhe ſprung.

P. 75. l. 17. *Either this World is a* Κόσμος, *or a comely Piece*, &c.] *Antoninus* here frames a *Dilemma* out of the Two Contrary Opinions of the *Stoicks* and *Epicureans*. Either the *World* was Form'd by *Providence*, or by the *Caſual* Jumbling of *Atoms*. Be it which way it will, it is ſtill Beautiful and full of Order. And this he proves, *à Minori ad Majus*, by the Symmetry of Parts in Man's Body.

P. 76. l. 20. *There is, who without ſo much as a Coat; and there is, who without ſo much as a Book, doth put Philoſophy in practice.*] *Antoninus* here overthrows the frivolous Excuſes, which Men commonly make, to palliate their Vicious Lives. For, Nakedneſs, Poverty, Sickneſs, Ignorance, *&c.* are the ſtrangeſt Motives to engage us in the Study of *Wiſdom* or *Philoſophy*.

Ib. l. 20. *Without ſo much as a Coat.*] As all the *Cynick Philoſophers*.

Ib. l. 21. *Without ſo much as a Book.*] *Antoninus* ſeems here to take Notice of what *Cleanthes* did, who wanting Money to buy either Books or Paper, writ the *Dogmata* of *Zeno* on Shells and Bones.

P. 77. l. 1. *Conſider in thy Mind for Example's Sake, the Times of Veſpaſian: Thou ſhalt ſee but the ſame Things.*] This is very Mortifying to vain Ambitious Men, who imagine, the Earth will always echo the Sound of their Name. Whereas all Names quickly become

Barbarous Words to Posterity, and Un-intelligible.

P. 78. l. 5. *Camillus, Cæso, Volesius, Leonnatus.*] Behold here a List of Names, which few know any Thing of without a *Comment*. *Camillus* drove the *Gauls* out of *Rome*. *Cæso* was One of the *Pillars* of the *Common-wealth*. *Volesius* is unknown. *Leonnatus* was one of the Principal Friends, and Chief *Generals* of *Alexander*, whose Kinsman he was.

P. 79. l. 5. *Whatsoever is, is but, as it were, the Seed of that which shall be.*] Thus our *Bodies* may be call'd the *Seed*, out of which, when we die, Worms and Serpents are Generated.

P. 80. l. 9. *Ever consider and think upon the World, as being but one living Substance, and having but one Soul.*] The *Stoicks* esteem'd the *World* to be one Great *Animal*, whereof *God* was the *Soul*. This Errour was apparently drawn from what they had read in the *Prophets*, *That God fills Heaven and Earth*. But they understood it wrong.

Ib. l. 23. *To suffer Change, can be no Hurt; as no Benefit it is, by Change to attain to Being.*] *Death* is no *Real Evil*, nor *Life* a *Real Good*, since they are Reciprocally the Cause of each other. Death produces New Lives; as New Lives spring up to die.

P. 81. l. 6. *For thou must consider the Things of the World, not as a loose Independent Number.*] This is an Excellent Comparison. For, Numbers are not connected one to another, but subsist

ſubſiſt Independent and Entire by themſelves. 3 has no Relation to 4 that follows it, or to 2 that goes before it. But the *Events* of the *World*, neceſſarily depend on their *Cauſes*.

Ib. l. 29. *And that we muſt not be as Children, who follow their Fathers Example.*] This Blind Obedience, Implicite Faith and Prepoſſeſſion, without True Knowledge, is always to be condemn'd.

P. 82. l. 11. *How many Phyſicians who once look'd ſo grim, and ſo tetrically ſhrunk their Brows on their Patients, are dead and gone themſelves.*] This *Emperour* reproaches more than once, the *Phyſicians* with their Vanity.

Ib. l. 13. *How many Aſtrologers.*] *Antoninus* plays upon the *Judicial Aſtrologers*. He thinks it a ſtrange Thing, that Men ſhould affect to be admir'd for foretelling the Deaths of others, who are born to die themſelves.

P. 84. l. 20. *Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus, Lepidus.*] All theſe were Perſons of a very long Life, yet dropt at laſt as well as others.

Remarks upon Book V.

PAge 85. l. 9. *In the Morning when thou findeſt thy ſelf unwilling to riſe.*] The *Greek* Word which we have Tranſlated, *the Morning*, ſignifies properly, *the Firſt Dawning*

of the Day. This was the Hour at which Labouring Men commonly roſe. The *Emperour* therefore ſtirs himſelf up by this Conſideration, That he was born to Labour as well as others, ſince 'tis the Unavoidable Condition of all Mortals.

P. 86. l. 29. *And let not the Reproach, or Report of ſome that may enſue upon it, ever deterr thee.*] Infamy ought not to deterr us from doing Good. *Seneca* has well expreſs'd this: *Æquiſſimo animo ad honeſtum Conſilium per mediam Infamiam tendam. Nemo mihi videtur pluris æſtimare virtutem, nemo illi eſſe magis devotus, quam qui boni viri Famam perdidit, ne Conſcientiam perderet.*

P. 87. l. 19. *No Man can admire thee for thy ſharp, acute Language, ſuch is thy Natural Diſability that way. Be it ſo.*] *Antoninus* labours here to prevent Men from falling into Deſpair, as they are wont to do, when they have not thoſe Glittering Qualities, which make Men admir'd by all the World. This Man's a Great *Poet*, That a Fine *Orator*, Another a Cunning *Stateſman*, a Fourth excells them all in the Quickneſs of his Phancy; and I have none of theſe Gifts. Such Kind of Reflections, are often the Occaſion of ſome Mens Deſpair. But, if we conſider the Ill Uſe, the beſt Qualify'd Men make of their *Parts*, there's no great Temptation to envy them, but rather to rejoyce in our ſelves; eſpecially, if we live according to *Reaſon*.

P. 88. l. 14

P. 88. l. 14. *Such there be, who when they have done a Good Turn to any, are ready to ſet them on the Score for it.*] This Diviſion of *Benefactours* into Three *Claſſes*, is Admirable. The Firſt and the moſt Numerous, is of thoſe who place to their Accounts the Good they have done for another, that they may be afterwards recompenc'd. And then their Good Deed is but a *Loan*, or rather an *Uſury*, as *Seneca* ſays, *Turpis Fœneratio eſt, Beneficium ferre.* The Second *Claſs* is of thoſe, who, though they expect not a Recompence, yet pride themſelves, and are as it were in an Extaſie, when they can ſay within themſelves, *I have ſo many Debtours, I have this Advantage of them, that they are oblig'd to me.* The Third *Claſſis*, and the Leaſt in Number, is of thoſe, who, forgetting the Good Offices they have already done, continue them daily, and add New Ones; ſtill ſtudying, how they may be ſerviceable to their Fellow Mortals, without reproaching any Man, or ſo much as reflecting Inwardly on what is paſt, with any Affectation, or ſecret Pride.

P. 89. l. 24. *Either we ſhould not pray at all, or more abſolutely and freely*] *Antoninus* commends the *Athenians*, becauſe their *Prayers* were General; and none Petition'd for his own *Private* Affairs, but for the *Publick* Good.

Ib. l. 28. *As we ſay commonly, the Phyſician has preſcrib'd to this Man Riding.*] *Antoninus* proves here, that all the Evils which happen to us, are either a *Medicine* for the *Sick*, or an *Exerciſe* for the *Sound*. P. 90. l. 18.

P. 90. l. 18. *So is the Destiny of particular Causes and Events, one General one, of the same Nature that particular Causes are.*] *Antoninus* explains here what *Destiny* is, *Nihil aliud est Fatum, quam Series implexa Causarum.* So *Plato* defin'd *Destiny, A Law proceeding from God.* This is the *Divine Reason* or *Wisdom*, which Nothing can disorder or violate.

P. 91. l. 19. *Because the good Success and perfect Welfare, and indeed the very Continuance of him that is the Administrator of the Whole, doth depend on it.*] This *Consequence* is drawn from the Errour of the *Stoicks*, who esteeming *God* as the *Soul* of the *Universe*, held that he was enclos'd in *Matter*, and subject to Corruption, Dissolution and Alteration.

lb. l. 32. *Be not discontented, be not disheartned, be not out of Hope, if often it succeed not.*] *Antoninus* endeavours to support Men under the Discouragements they meet with, when even their Attempts to live Virtuously are sometimes baffled. As often as we fall, we ought to rise with more Courage, like the *Giant Anteus* in the *Fable*, who as often as he fell to the Earth, drew fresh Vigour and Strength from it.

P. 93. l. 3. *As for the Things of the World, their true Nature is in a Manner so involv'd with Obscurity.*] *Antoninus*'s Aim is, to make Men see their Errour, when they place their Chief Happiness in Science, Pleasure, Riches, and the Things of the World. For, Science is Nothing but Obscurity and Folly: Riches and Plea-

Pleasures, the Dotage and Infirmity of the Mind. In a Word, all the Enjoyments of the World, are but a Burthen and Grief.

Ib. l. 13. *Such as may be in the Power and Possession of some Abominable loose Liver, of some common Strumpet, of some notorious Oppressour and Extortioner.*] *Antoninus* here gives us a sure Rule, whereby to distinguish true Felicity, from that which is fasly esteemed such. For, who will set any Value on, or be fond of that which for the most part falls to the Share of Wicked Men?

P. 94. l. 24. *He is well contented to hear, that what is spoken by the Comedian, is but familiarly and popularly spoken.*] He means this Verse of *Aristophanes.*

Ἀλλ' ἐν καθαρῷ πῦ τις αὐχέσας τύχοι.

P. 96. l. 32. *But thou may'st live at the Court: there then also may'st thou live well and happily.*] *Antoninus* here anticipates the vain Pretences which *Courtiers* ordinarily make for their Liberty, as it is at this Day. How many are there, who liv'd very virtuously in a private Condition; yet, as soon as they come to the *Court*, give the Reins to their Passions, and fall into a Thousand Debaucheries, purely for Fashion's Sake? And they excuse it by saying, *The Court is not like the City, or the Country: When we are at* Rome, *we must live like Romans. He that will be singular there, makes himself Ridiculous. Therefore it is Necessary to*

swim

swim with the Stream. These are the frivolous Excuſes, with which ſuch Men commonly think to palliate their Vices.

P. 97. l. 19. *Neither doth any thing happen to any Man, which in the ordinary Courſe of Nature, as Natural to him doth not happen.*] *Antoninus* recommends Patience under Calamities, with very forcible Reaſons. In Regard, Nothing happens to us, which *Nature* does not enable us to ſupport; and, that many ſuffer ſuch Things without being concern'd; and, the greateſt Part of Men endure much more only in Oſtentation and Vanity.

P. 98. l. 5. *After one Conſideration, Man is neareſt unto us,*&c.] He teaches us here, what Sentiments we ought to have of Ill Men. As their Vices hinder 'em not from being Men, we ſhou'd always have Charity for 'em. And as they are Wicked, they deſerve at worſt, but our Indifference. We ſhou'd value 'em at the ſame Rate, as we do the Wind, the Sun or the Rain: Which though they may hinder us from doing ſome Important Buſineſs, yet cannot reach our Intention and Deſign.

P. 100. l. 25. *To live with the Gods.*] This is that which the *Scripture* calls, *Walking with God:* As when it ſays of *Enoch*, *Et ambulavit cum Deo.* The meaning is, he was always Obedient to the *Divine* Conduct.

P. 101. l. 30. *That Rational Eſſence, by which the Univerſe is grounded, is for Community and Society.*] *God* has not made any Man only for

for his own Sake: *Nemo ſibi natus:* We are born to ſerve *God*, our Friends and the Publick.

P. 102. l. 8. *How haſt thou carried thy ſelf hitherto towards the Gods? towards thy Parents*, &c.] It is a pity that *Antoninus* did not here add, *his Subjects.* For, a Good *Prince* ought no leſs to examine his Conduct toward his *Subjects*, than toward his *Relations*, *Friends* and *Domeſticks.* But, to be ſure, he thought on 'em, though he does not expreſly mention 'em.

P. 103. l. 21. *An Extinction, or a Tranſlation.*] An *Extinction*, if the *Soul* be Nothing elſe but a Kind of *Fire*, which is quench'd when we die: or a *Tranſlation*, if the *Soul* be *Immortal*, and after *Death* returns to its *Source*, according to the *Doctrine* of the *Stoicks.*

Ib. l. 34. *Theſe two Things be common to the Souls, as of God, ſo of Men, and of every Reaſonable Creature.*] He makes this laſt Diſtinction, *and of every Reaſonable Creature*, becauſe the *Philoſophers* rank'd *Heroes* and *Dæmons* between *God* and *Man.*

P. 104. l. 8. *If this that makes my Friend to lament, neither be my wicked Act*, &c.] Among the moſt Tragical Accidents that happen either to us or our Friends, none ought to trouble us, but thoſe which proceed from our own Fault. Then indeed we ought to mourn: But otherwiſe to be Indifferent. This is the right Sentiment of the *Stoicks.*

Remarks

Remarks upon Book VI.

PAge 105. l. 9. *The Matter it ſelf of which the Univerſe doth conſiſt, is of it ſelf very tractable and pliable.*] *Antoninus*, in this Place, corrects the Extravagant Opinion of ſome *Stoicks*, who maintain'd, That *God* finds *Matter* Untractable and Stubborn: And that in Regard it was Eternal, and Increated as well as he, therefore his Power over it is limited. A *Blaſphemy*, which has been ſufficiently refuted by the *Fathers*.

P. 106. l. 4. *And either they ſhall be reſolv'd by Way of Exhalation.*] Here he contemplates *Matter*, under the Two different Notions the *Philoſophers* had of it. Some affirm'd it to be *One* and *Simple*, and that the Four *Elements* were only compounded of its different Parts. Others held, that the Four *Elements* were ſo many diſtinct Original Kinds of *Matter*.

Ib. l. 15. *The beſt Kind of Revenge.*] This *Maxim* is taken from *Diogenes*; who being ask'd by one, *What he ſhou'd do to be reveng'd of his Enemy*, anſwer'd, *Thou muſt become an Honeſt Man.*

Ib. l. 29. *Either this Univerſe is a mere confuſed Maſs.*] By this he means, that which ſoever of the Two Celebrated Opinions be true, either that of the *Epicureans*, who aſcribe the Origin and Conſervation of the *World* to *Chance*, or that of the *Stoicks*, who attri-

attribute it to Providence, Men ought to expect Death patiently, without deſiring or fearing it.

P. 107. l. 12. *Whenſoever by ſome preſent hard occurrences thou art conſtrained to be, as it were, troubled and vexed.*] When a Man goes out of himſelf to be reveng'd on the Objects that vex him, he puts his *Soul* out of *Tune*, and ſpoils its *Conſort* with the *Soul* of the *World*, yet cannot accompliſh his Aim. For, both the *Soul* of the *World*, and all Things govern'd by it, keep on quietly in performing their Regular Functions.

Ib. l. 22. *If it were that thou hadſt at one time both a Step-Mother and a Natural Mother living.*] Men now-a-days invert the Order of *Antoninus*, whilſt they make the *Court* their *Mother*, and *Philoſophy* or *Religion* their *Step-Dame*.

P. 108. l. 6. *This purple Robe but Sheeps hair.*] *A Philoſopher* once told a Young Man, who was very proud of his Rich Garments, *That they were but the caſt Rags of a Sheep.*

Ib. l. 27. *See what Crates pronounceth concerning Xenocrates himſelf.*] *Xenocrates* affected Gravity, to a *Proverb*. But *Crates* ridicul'd him and demonſtrated, *That all his Preciſeneſs, was only Pride and Oſtentation.*

Ib. l. 32. *Merely natural, or naturally affected and qualify'd, as Stones, Wood, Figs, Vines, Olives.*] *Antonimus* here follows the Method of Ancient *Philoſophers*, who divided all *Beings* into Things Inanimate, Senſible, and Ratio-

Rational. And, of *Rational* Beings, or *Men*, he eſtabliſhes Two Sorts, One *Mechanick*, the Other *Divine*. As for the Firſt, he allows them no Part in that *Soul*, which renders Men entirely Noble and Great.

P. 110. l. 18. *For the Praiſes of many Tongues, is in effect no better than the clattering of ſo many Tongues.*] He alludes to a Saying of *Euripides*, who in *Hecuba* calls Fame and Praiſes, but the Clattering of Tongues.

Ib. l. 33. *What elſe doth the Education of Children, and all learned Profeſſions tend unto?*] Our Education aims not to make us Good and Wiſe, but Learned. We are taught at *School*, how to decline the Word [*Virtus*] but we learn not how to practiſe *Virtue*.

P. 111. l. 25. *Under, above, and about, are the Motions of the Elements; but the Motion of Virtue, is none of thoſe Motions.*] It is the Property of *Virtue*, not to yield to Difficulties, as the *Elements* do, but from them to draw Occaſions of Strength and Reſolution. We may ſay of *Virtue*, what *Horace* ſaid of *Gold*,

——*Perrumpere amat Saxa potentior*
Ictu fulmineo.

Ib. l. 31. *Who can chuſe but wonder at them?*] There is no Greater Injuſtice nor more Ridiculous Vanity, than for Man through Envy to deny their *Cotemporaries*, of whoſe Virtue they are Eye-witneſſes, the Praiſes which they expect of their *Poſterity*, whom they ſhall never ſee, nor be ſeen by them.

P. 112. l. 8.

P. 112. l. 8. *Whatſoever in general thou canſt conceive poſſible and proper unto any Man, think that very poſſible unto thee alſo.*] The Intention of *Antoninus* is, to ſuppreſs the Effeminate Suggeſtions of his Sences, which wou'd inſinuate, That the *Maxims* of the *Stoicks* were too Rigid; ever whiſpering, *Nimis dura præcipiunt.* We often take the Liberty to condemn ſome Examples of Virtue, calling them Extravagant Actions, or the like, becauſe our Cowardiſe makes them appear beyond our Strength: Whereas, we only want Reſolution, to do as Great, or Greater Things our ſelves.

Ib. l. 12. *Suppoſe that at the Palæſtra, or Fencing-School, ſome Body hath all torn thee with his Nails.*] This *World* is a *Theatre*, or *Field* of *Exerciſe*; but Men's *Paſſions* turn it into a *Campagne* of *Blood* and *Slaughter.*

P. 113. l. 27. *Conſider how many different things, whether they concern our Bodies or our Souls, in a Moment of Time come to paſs in every one of us.*] The Force of this Argument lies here, That if Men attentively conſider'd the Prodigies of Thought, Memory, Imagination, Judgment, Diſcourſe, and all the other Faculties and Operations of their own *Souls*, with the Admirable Mechaniſm and Contrivance of their *Bodies*, they wou'd ceaſe to wonder at any Thing *without* 'em; ſince all is the Effect of Infinite and Eternal Reaſon.

P. 114. l. 1. *If any ſhould put this queſtion unto thee, how this Word* Antoninus *is written.*] As the *Name* of *Antoninus* ſubſiſts no longer,

if *One Letter* be missing; so in keeping the *Law*, if we neglect *One Precept*, we are Guilty of Violating the *Whole*. This is the *Emperor's* Meaning.

Ib. l. 33. *If in this kind of Life thy Body be able to hold out, it is a Shame that thy Soul should faint first and give over.*] The *Body* seems In defatigable in the Pursuit of what is Necessary to its Conservation and Happiness; but the *Soul* soon Faints in the Race of *Virtue*.

P. 115. l. 1. *Take heed lest (of a Philosopher) thou become a (mere) Cæsar in time.*] As if he had said, *Take heed lest thou Cæsarise*, reflecting on the Tyranny of the Primitive *Cæsars*.

P. 117. l 3. *Neither doth she busie her self about any, but those that are present; for as for future and passed Operations.*] The Time *Past* cannot be recall'd; The *Future* is Uncertain, and out of our Power. We ought therefore only to take Care of the *Present*.

Ib. l. 20. *Dost thou not see, how even those that profess Mechanick Arts, though in some Respect they be no better than mere Idiots, yet they stick close to the Course of their Trade*] *Antoninus's* Meaning is, That as a *Tradesman* always observes the *Rules* of his *Art*, without regarding the Impertinent Corrections of Busy-Bodies and Ignorant People: So ought a Philosopher or Wise-Man, to persevere in the Road of Virtue, without being mov'd at the Censures, or Contradictions of Fools and Vicious Persons.

Ib. l. 25.

Ib. l. 25. *And is it not a grievous Thing that an Architect or a Phyſician, ſhall reſpect the Courſe and Myſteries of their Profeſſion.*] One wou'd wonder, that *Antoninus* here joyns *Phyſicians* (who were eſteem'd Equal to the *Gods*, and whoſe *Science* was ſaid to deſcend from *Heaven*,) with *Architects*, who are but *Mechanicks*. But this is owing to the Contempt, which both the *Stoicks* and *Platoniſts* practis'd toward the Body, and all Employments that related to it. Accounting all Arts Baſe and Unworthy, in Reſpect of *Moral Philoſophy*, and the *Science* of *Divine Things*.

P. 118. l. 8. *The dreadful Hiatus of a gaping Lion, and all Poiſon, and all hurtful Things.*] That which ſeems to us either Hurtful or of no Uſe, at leaſt helps to compoſe the Beauty of the *Univerſe*. And, for ought we know, may have ſome Virtue to which we are Strangers. Some *Authors* have taken much Pains, to deſcribe the Profit and Perfections of Aſhes and Dung-Hills.

Ib. l. 24. *For one thing is conſequent unto another by local Motion, by natural conſpiration and agreement, and by ſubſtantial Union.*] *Antoninus* here refutes the Opinions of the *Epicureans* concerning a *Vacuum*.

Ib. l. 33. *An Inſtrument, a Tool, an Utenſil, whatſoever it be, if it be fit for the Purpoſe it was made for, it is as it ſhould be, though he perchance that made and fitted it be out of ſight and gone.*] If the *Works* of a skilful *Artiſt* continue in their Perfections, to ſerve the Ends

ſor which they were made, even after they are remov'd at a great Diſtance from him that made 'em; queſtionleſs, the *Works* of *Nature* are always ſerviceable, and anſwer the Intention of their *Author*; ſince they have this Advantage of the other, That *Nature* is never abſent from any of her Productions, but is perpetually acting within them. It follows therefore, that Man, who is the moſt Perfect *Work* of *Nature*, muſt needs be Happy, ſo long as he obeys the *Laws* of his *Nature*, and ſubmits to the *Will* of *God*, whom the *Stoicks* call the *Univerſal Nature*, or *Soul* of the *World*.

P. 120. l. 4. *As I think Heraclitus in a place ſpeaketh of them that ſleep, that even they do work in their Kind, and do confer to the General Operations of the World.*] For, Sleep being one of the Actions of *Nature*, muſt needs be directed to ſome End.

Ib. l. 11. *For of ſuch alſo did the World ſtand in Need.*] This was the Sence of *Chryſippus*, when he ſaid, *Vice is not Abſolutely Unprofitable in the World, for it ſerves as a Teſt to diſtinguiſh Virtue.* A Truth which is only cavill'd at by *Plutarch*, becauſe he underſtood it not.

Ib. l. 21. *That vile and ridiculous Verſe (which Chryſippus in a place doth mention) is a part of the Comedy.*] Here are the very Words of *Chryſippus*, As *Comedies* have ſometimes Ridiculous Verſes and Ralleries, good for Nothing of themſelves, yet Graceful enough in a *Poem*;

Poem; ſo *Vice* is certainly Ridiculous, and to be condemn'd in it ſelf, yet it contributes to the Beauty and Order of the *Univerſe*. And *Plutarch* made a Wrong Inference, when he ſaid, *If Vice be Uſeful in the World, then 'tis not an Enemy to God.*

Ib. l. 24. *Doth either the Sun take upon him to do that which belongs to the Rain.*] As all the *Celeſtial* Bodies differ one from another, and have various Offices, without claſhing or interfering; ſo very Man ought to be content with his own Station, and perform his Duty, without entrenching on anothers. A proper Check to Ambition and Envy.

Ib. l. 25. *Or his Son Æſculapius that which unto the Earth doth properly belong?*] *Æſculapius* is here taken for *Serpentarius* or *Ophiochus*, a *Conſtellation* of Seventeen Stars above *Scorpio*. The *Poets* feign'd, that he was the Son of *Apollo*, whom *Jupiter* had plac'd among the Stars. *Marcellus Palingenius Stellatus*, aſſigns to this *Conſtellation* Eighteen Stars; Perhaps, for the Sake of his Verſe. He places it in *Virgo*. But how that can conſiſt with what he ſays afterwards, that it Sets when *Gemini* Riſes, is left to the *Aſtronomers* Deciſion.

Ib. l. 33. *If ſo be that the Gods have deliberated in particular, of thoſe things which ſhould happen unto me.*] His Meaning is, that if there were only a General *Providence*, which did not extend to take Care of Men's Particular Affairs, yet we ought to be Reſign'd, and Compliant to that Univerſal Order and Con-

duct, which *God* has eſtabliſh'd for the Preſervation of the World. Since the Intereſt and Welfare of the Whole Body, is to be preferr'd to that of any Particular Member.

P. 121. l. 15. *For then let us neither Sacrifice, nor Pray, nor reſpect our Oaths, neither let us any more uſe any of thoſe things*] This Paſſage is directly levell'd at *Atheiſts*, who in denying a *God*, contradict themſelves, while they frequently call on his Name; equally Profane in their Prayers and Curſes.

P. 122. l. 17. *As the ordinary Shews of the Theatre, and of othe ſuch Places, when thou art preſented with them*, &c.] We may ſay of Life, what Young *Pliny* ſaid of the *Races* in the *Circus*, *Nihil novum, nihil varium, quod non ſemel ſpectaſſe ſufficiat.*

Ib. l. 24. *When then will there be an End?*] This Kind of abrupt Interrogation, was Common among the *Stoicks*. *Seneca* uſes it often; as in this noted Place, *Faſtidio illis eſſe cœpit vita, & ipſe mundus, & ſubit illud tabidarum deliciarum, quouſque eadem? Life and the World it ſelf were Nauſeous to them. And in the Bitterneſs which attended thoſe Contagious Pleaſures, they frequently cry'd out, How long ſhall we be cloy'd with theſe fulſom Delights?*

Ib. l. 30. *Philoſtio.*] A famous *Comedian* in *Socrates*'s Time. As for *Phœbus* and *Origanion*, 'tis not certainly known who they were.

P. 123. l. 3. *Eudoxus.*] *Eudoxus* the *Cnidian*, a great *Aſtrologer*, expert *Geometrician*, famous *Phyſician*, and renowned *Lawyer*, in the Time

Time of *Plato*, and of *Dionyſius* the Tyrant.

Ib. *Hipparchus.*] A Celebrated *Mathematician*, who liv'd in the Time of *Ptolomæus Philadelphus.*

Ib. *Archimedes.*] Another Incomparable *Mathematician*, who when *Syracuſe* was taken by Storm, and the Souldiers ruſhed into his Cloſet, where he was buſy in drawing ſome *Geometrical* Scheme, ſaid to them, Let me make an End of this Figure before I die. But the *Barbarians* kill'd him out of Hand. He was wont to ſay, That if he could fix his *Engines* on any other Place ſave the *Earth*, he could move this *Globe* out of its *Vortex.*

P. 124. l. 6. *Let us do our beſt Endeavours to perſuade them; but however, if Reaſon and Juſtice lead thee to it, do it, though they be never ſo much againſt it.*] When we can perſuade others to live according to Reaſon, we do a good Work. But when we cannot ſo far prevail, we ought to take Care, that neither their pernicious Counſels nor Examples tempt us to Vice.

Ib. l. 18. *The ambitious ſuppoſeth another Man's Act to be his own Happineſs.*] For he places his Happineſs in Fame and Applauſe, which always depend on others.

P. 125. l. 26. *To them that are ſick of the Jaundies, Honey ſeems bitter.*] *Antoninus* means, that when we repreſent to our ſelves outward Accidents as Inſupportable, 'tis only our Opinion makes them ſo: As the Overflowing of

the *Gall*, renders whatever we Eat or Drink *bitter* to us, though in it ſelf it be *ſweet*. *Vitiato ſtomacho omnia amara.*

Remarks upon Book VII.

PAge 126. l. 14. *What is Wickedneſs? It is that which many times, and often thou haſt already ſeen, and known in the World.*] *Antoninus* would prevent this Complaint, which the greater part of Men make, when ſome great Injury is done them: *I never ſaw ſuch a thing; the like was never ſeen.* Expreſſions which flow from an incens'd Imagination, that will give no time to reflect. That which appears ſo extraordinary, is not at all ſo. All Ages have ſeen it, and there are Examples thereof in all Places: They ſhall be allowed to complain thereof if they can find, I ſay not an Age, but a Year, or a Month, wherein that does not happen.

P. 127. l. 1. *Which continually to ſtir up and revive is in thy power.*] Seeing there is nothing new under the Sun, and all things are at all times the ſame, we can renew our whole Life by renewing and bringing under our review, the things that have happened in our own time; for they are the ſame that we ſhall ſee afterwards.

Ib. l. 18.

Ib. l. 18. *Publick ſhews and ſolemnities with much pomp and vanity, Stage-plays.*] The *Stoicks* condemn all vain Aſſemblies and Shews, as Things which corrupt Manners, by raiſing the Paſſions.

Ib. l. 20. *A Bone thrown to a company of hungry Currs.*] All theſe Compariſons are very Expreſſive. As Bones thrown among Dogs makes them Fight, ſo publick Shews are often the Seeds of Hatred and Diviſion.

P. 128. l. 15. *If it be not, and that otherwiſe it belong not to me particularly as a private Duty, I will either give it over, or leave it to ſome other that can better effect it.*] Either things are our Duty, or they are not. If they be, we muſt do them as we can, either by our ſelves or with the Aſſiſtance of others; and if they be not, at leaſt if we be not certain that we have that genius that is neceſſary to ſucceed therein, we ought to leave them to thoſe who can better acquit themſelves. There is no Rule more wiſe, and yet leſs obſerv'd. Men generally abandon the Duties that belong to their Profeſſion and Character, and undertake thoſe things that are without the Compaſs of their Duty; and which makes them yet the more inexcuſable, they do ſo when they have not any of thoſe Qualities that are neceſſary to perform their Undertakings, ſo as the Publick may be profited.

Ib. l. 30 *Be not therefore aſhamed, whenſoever thou muſt uſe the help of others.*] Provided

ded, we do our Duty, it is no matter whether we be assisted, or do it by our selves.

P. 129. l. 8. *Let not things future trouble thee.*] Nothing is more foolish than thus to prevent our Miseries by fear. Sufficient to the Day is the Evil thereof.

P. 130. l. 7. *To a reasonable Creature, the same Action is both according to Nature, and according to Reason.*] According to the *Stoicks* Nature is God himself, for they acknowledged not the Corruption of Nature, nor original Sin.

Ib. l. 17. *But if thou shalt say, I am wise, or a Part, thou dost not yet love Men from thy Heart.*] This Distinction is perfectly good; one cannot be a Member of a Body unless he be a Part thereof; but one may be a Part without being a Member. A Man then who regards himself only as a Part of the Society, considers himself alone, and as separable from the Rest, without suffering any Harm; as a Letter of the Alphabet may be separated from the other Letters, and subsist alone and entire.

P. 131. l. 3. *As if either Gold, or the Emerald, or Purple.*] This Comparison is not forc'd. If we will, all the Powers of the World are no more able to hinder us from being good Men, than to make Gold not to be Gold, and Purple not to be Purple, *&c.*

P. 132. l. 1. *What is Happiness, but a good Dæmon, or Spirit?*] That is to say, the Happiness of a Man is nothing else but his Soul well disposed.

Ib. l. 12.

Ib. l. 12. *Is any Man ſo fooliſh as to fear Change?*] Change is the moſt Ancient Law of the World. By it we live, and the Univerſe ſubſiſts. Nothing therefore ſhould be more familiar to us. But we are ſo unjuſt, that after we have profited by the Changes of others, we are unwilling that they ſhould profit by ours.

P. 133. l. 29. *The Nature of the Univerſe, of the common Subſtance of all Things, as it were of Wax, hath now perchance formed a Horſe.*] Nature ſerves it ſelf of the ſame Matter to form all Living Creatures, a Man as well as an Horſe; and in this reſpect, *Solomon* hath well ſaid, *eſt æqua utriuſque conditio.* This Truth is odious to Men, and their Pride eaſily perſwades them, that Nature hath formed them of the fineſt Matter.

P. 134. l. 4. *As for Diſſolution, if it be no grievous thing to the Cheſt or Trunk to be joined together; why ſhould it be more grievous to be put aſunder?*] This is the Conſequence of the Principle he had laid down, That Nature forms all Things of the ſame Matter; and as Matter is inſenſible, it no more ſuffers when it is diſunited, than when it is join'd together; and this is true as to Matter. But ſince in us, it is the Soul that is ſenſible, it is no Comfort to us in our Miſeries, to know that Matter is inſenſible. The Conſequence were true, if we could ſeparate the Soul and remove it from the Matter, as we can the Liquor of a Bottle, which were to be broken in pieces. The *Stoicks* carried their *Impoſſibility* too far.

P. 136. l. 18.

P. 136. l. 18. *And as concerning Pain, that that which is intolerable is soon ended by Death; and that which holds long must needs be tolerable.*] The *Epicureans* as well as the *Stoicks* made use of this Argument.

P. 137. l. 4. *Out of Plato.*] *Antoninus*, when he read, made Collections of all that he found fit for his Use.

Ib. l. 12. *Out of Antisthenes.*] *Plutarch* attributes it to *Alexander*. If it be his, he ought to be more honoured for it, than the Conquest of the *Indies*.

Ib. l. 21. *It will but little avail thee, to turn thine Anger and Indignation upon the things themselves that have fallen cross unto thee.*] The Passage is taken from *Euripides*. *Epictetus* gives the Reason why it is so ordinary for Men to be angry at Accidents. He tells us it's a bad Habit sucked in with the Milk, and learn'd from Nurses, who beat the Floor upon which the Child falls, that he may forbear to cry.

Ib. l. 25. *Our Life is reaped like a ripe Ear of Corn.*] This also is taken from *Euripides*: As Ears of Corn grow that they may be reaped; so Men are born to die. And as it wou'd be against the Course of Nature for an Ear of Corn not to be reaped; so would it be a Curse to a Man to continue always in this Life; says *Epictetus*.

Ib. l. 27. *But if so be that I and my Children are neglected by the Gods, there is some Reason even for that.*] It is a Passage of some Tragick

gick Poet, where an unhappy Father ſays, with entire Reſignation to the Will of God, That if God had neglected him and his Children, he was perſwaded he had Reaſon to do ſo, and that this Forgetfulneſs of God was but an Effect of his Juſtice, and a Token of his Goodneſs.

Ib. l. 29. *As long as Right and Equity is on my Side.*] This is out of *Ariſtophanes*, who ſays to the *Athenians*, Let *Creon* uſe his utmoſt Endeavours to avenge himſelf of me and deſtroy me, yet Honeſty and Right are for me; they always fight for me. *Antoninus* had marked this Paſſage, as a moſt profitable and uſeful Leſſon; for how comfortable is it, in all the troubleſome Accidents that befall us, to be able to ſay, Right and Equity are on my Side?

Ib. l. 31. *Not to lament with them.*] The *Stoicks* are reproach'd with making Compaſſion a Vice, and ſaying that their wiſe Man was without Pity. But theſe Philoſophers were too wiſe to pretend to extinguiſh in Men ſo natural a Sentiment, which pours ſo healthful and precious Balm upon the Miſeries of this Life. Their Deſign was only to keep it within Bounds. They would only hinder us from troubling our ſelves with ſlight and falſe Appearances of Evil.

Ib l. 32. *Out of Plato.*] This is taken out of the Apology of *Socrates*, p. 28.

P. 138. l. 26. *To look about, and with the Eyes to follow the Courſe of the Stars, as though thou wouldeſt*

wouldeſt run with them.] *Antoninus* exhorts us to a Contemplation of the Stars that is accompanied with Reflections, which lead us to imitate theſe luminous Beings, which abiding always in their Poſts, obey their Creator, and ſeem to enlighten us only that they may teach us to imitate them. Such a Contemplation will help to purge away the Droſs and Filth of this our earthly Life, as *Antoninus* ſays; for it's the Property of our Thoughts to make us reſemble their Objects.

P. 139. l. 31. *With Meats and Drinks, and divers Charms, they ſeek to divert the Chanel, that they might not die.*] This is from *Euripides*, who ridicules thoſe who are ſo glew'd to this Life, that they dream of nothing elſe but the Means of preſerving it; and for this End, are exceſſively and ſuperſtitiouſly careful about their Meat and Drink: But all is to no purpoſe. *Antoninus* noted this Paſſage, that he might keep himſelf from falling into a Fault ſo diſhonourable to Man. If Life were to be ſold, a vertuous Man would not buy it with Cares ſo ſervile and ſo baſe. What Care can one have of his Soul, when he is employed ſo much about the Body?

P. 140. l. 3. *He hath a ſtronger Body, and is a better Wreſtler than I. What then?*] We ought not to be afflicted or aſhamed when we are overcome by others in things that are not in our Power. Another is ſtronger, more Eloquent, more Knowing; what's that to me, if he be not more Vertuous or more juſt?

P. 144. l. 11.

P. 144. l. 11. *Take heed leaſt at any time thou ſtand ſo affected, though towards unnatural Evil Men, as ordinary Men are commonly one towards another.*] We muſt love the Wicked, and content our ſelves to hate their Wickedneſs. The Cruelty of others does not excuſe ours. Nothing can be more Chriſtian than this Maxim.

Ib. l. 19. *That he watched in the* Pagus *more aſſiduouſly.*] Never Man was more patient in Labours, nor more reſolute in Dangers than *Socrates*: But this is not ſufficient to make a Man Great.

Ib. l. 20. *That being commanded to fetch innocent Salaminius, he refuſed to do it.*] *Socrates* had the Courage to diſobey the Command of the thirty Tyrants, who were at that Time Maſters of the Republick of *Athens*. But to be great it ſuffices not to have perform'd an Action of this Nature; for wicked Men have often done as much from Motives that had nothing Praiſe-worthy or great in them.

P. 145. l. 16. *For it is a Thing very poſſible, that a Man ſhould be a very Divine Man, and yet be altogether unknown.*] This is a great Truth which deſerves our utmoſt Attention. *Antoninus* labours to guard himſelf againſt that falſe but common Opinion, that to be an extraordinary and divine Perſon, one muſt make a great Noiſe in the World, and live in Glory and Pomp; nothing is more falſe, as this wiſe Emperour confeſſes. The moſt divine Perſons are thoſe who have been moſt hid, and the

Life

Life of Jesus Christ is a clear and solid Proof of this. At *Athens* the only Altar consecrated to the true God, was that which was consecrated to the unknown God.

Ib l. 20. *Although thou dost despair, that thou shalt ever be good, either Logician or Naturalists.*] It is no shame at all to be without those Qualities which do not depend upon us; and it's a great shame to be without those Vertues which depend upon us, and which God hath, as it were, planted in our hearts. But such is our Blindness, we despise those and esteem these.

P. 147. l. 3. *A very ridiculous Thing it is, that any Man should dispense with Vice and Wickedness in himself, which is in his Power to restrain, and go about to suppress it in others, which is altogether impossible.*] This is what *Epictetus* well expresseth: Thou canst not be an *Hercules* to purge the Earth of Monsters, nor a *Theseus* to purge *Attica* of them: But thou may'st purge thy self of the Monsters that are in thee. Instead of driving out a *Procrustes*, and a *Scyron*, you may drive from your Heart Sadness, Fear, Desires, Envy, Malice, Softness, Intemperance, *&c.*

Ib. l. 14. *When thou hast done well, and another is benefited by thy Action, must thou like a very Fool look for a third thing besides.*] *Antoninus* says well, *like a Fool*; for there is no greater Folly than to be fond of Reputation, which depends not upon us, makes no Part of the Essence of Good, and is none of its Characters. Ib. l. 26.

Ib. l. 26. *The Nature of the Univerſe did once certainly deliberate*, &c.] *Antoninus* would ſay, That ſeeing God hath Created the World, it is He that Upholds and Preſerves it by his Providence. Whence it neceſſarily follows, Either that He extends his Care generally over All, even the minuteſt Things, as the *Stoicks* maintain'd, and we believe; Or, that neglecting the leſſer Things, according to the Sentiment of *Epicurus*, he reſerv'd only the principal and more perfect Things for his own Government. Now if either of theſe Propoſitions be true, I ought to be in quiet, for I am certainly in the Number of thoſe which are God's care.

Remarks upon Book VIII.

PAg. 148. l. 6. *This alſo, among other things, may ſerve to keep thee from Vain-glory*, &c.] The Reputation *Antoninus* had got of being a great Philoſopher was a moſt dangerous Snare; for had he hearkned but a little to Self-love, he wou'd have ſuffered himſelf to be charm'd into a good opinion of himſelf, which commonly undoes Men; but eſpecially Princes. To avoid this Rock, he tells himſelf that it is not in his power to be a true Philoſopher; for to deſerve this Title, one muſt paſs his Life in this Profeſſion, and nothing Foreign muſt

ever ſhare the Love he hath for this Science; to which, *Antoninus* knew, he had long been a Stranger, and whoſe important Charge did not ſuffer him to aſpire after this Glory: That therefore he ought to renounce the Reputation that was not due to him, and without loſing his time in long Speculations, which require the whole Man, to be ſatisfied to live according to Nature; that is to ſay, to be Maſter of his Paſſions, to do good, avoid evil, and obey God's Commands in all things, which is the End of true Philoſophy, at which it's in our power to arrive. This is the Sence of this Paragraph, *Happy are they who can examine themſelves without flattery.*

P. 149. l. 29. *Alexander, Caius, Pompeius; what are theſe to Diogenes, Heraclitus, and Socrates?*] *Alexander*, *Cæſar* and *Pompey*, thoſe Great Men, are placed beneath thoſe three Philoſophers, who were the Laughing-ſtock of the People; and that by an Emperor, who could judge thereof better than another, and from whoſe Judgment there lies no Appeal.

P. 150. l. 5. *What they have done, they will do, although thou ſhouldeſt hang thy ſelf.*] *Antoninus* ſpeaks thus to himſelf, to keep himſelf from being provok'd with ſomething the People or the Souldiers had done.

P. 152. l. 7. *Repentance is an inward and ſelf-reprehenſion for the neglect or omiſſion of ſomewhat that was profitable.*] *Antoninus*'s reaſoning here is admirable; it cannot be more ſolidly prov'd that Pleaſure is not a Good. No ho-

neſt

neſt Man ever repented that he had neglected a Pleaſure; nay, ſo far is he from repenting for this neglect, that he will praiſe and think himſelf happy on that account. He had prov'd before, that nothing can be a Good, when the neglect thereof is a conſiderable Good, and generally acknowledged to be ſo.

P. 153. l. 25. *Remember, that to change thy mind*, &c.] Moſt Men entertain this pernicious Prejudice, that when they have ſaid or reſolv'd any thing, it's a ſhame to change their Mind, and yield to the better advice and light of others. *Antoninus* gives here an excellent Antidote againſt the mortal Poiſon of ſhame and falſe glory; and proves, That when we change our Counſels, the Action is wholly ours, ſince it is our Spirit alone which judges of the truth of the thing propos'd, and chuſes it.

P. 154. l. 28. *As one that toſſeth up a Ball*, &c.] As a Gameſter at Tennis aims not only to ſtrike the Ball, but to ſtrike it to that place whether it ſhould and he would have it go; even ſo God, who, as *Plautus* ſaith, holds us in his hands as Balls; looks not only to our Birth, but to our Duration and End. We ought not then to trouble our ſelves. God knows well what he will do with us. The beſt Gameſter may miſs his mark; but God never takes falſe meaſures, he fails not of accompliſhing his deſigns; ſo nothing can befall us that is contrary to God's Will.

P. 155. l. 4. *Turn it about that thou may'ſt behold it, behold it the worſt ſide upwards*, &c.] As when we would clean a Garment, we turn it; ſo muſt we do by our Body, to ſee clearly in what ſtate it is, in ſickneſs, in old age, in the acts of debauchery. That which ſuggeſted to *Antoninus* this Idea, was the Wile which, they ſay, the Sea Hedge-hog uſeth; when it hath ſwallowed the Hook, it turns it ſelf, as we turn our Pockets; and thus putting the inner-ſide outmoſt, rids it ſelf of the Hook which lets go its hold. We can do by the ſtrength and agility of our Spirit, what the Hedge-hog does by the ſtrength and agility of its Body.

Ib. l. 15. *Nor ſcarce of any one conſtantly.*] Among thoſe who praiſe us, there is ſcarce one, who after he has examined what he ſaid, doth accord with himſelf, and does not often believe the contrary. Men commonly praiſe not but out of Civility, Cuſtom or Intereſt. This may well cure the Pride and Vanity we have in being praiſed.

Ib. l. 22. *Moſt juſtly have theſe things happened unto thee*] Thus *Antoninus* ſpeaks to himſelf, according to his cuſtom, upon ſome miſery that had befallen him, for which he only blames his ſlow advances in the way of Vertue, and careleſneſs in making himſelf a more perfect and honeſt Man. For, as St. *Jerome* ſays, *Perfectum eſſe nolle, delinquere eſt.* It's a Sin not to deſire to be perfect.

Ib. l. 26.

Ib. l. 26. *Shall I doe it? I will; ſo the end of my action be to doe good unto men.*] *Antoninus* had this Principle deeply engraven in his Heart, *To ſubmit to God and to do good to Men.*

Ib. l. 34. *This bathing, what is it?*] When we examine each thing particularly, there is not one, even of thoſe that are moſt agreeable, which may not make us loath our ſelves. This is the Scope of this Maxim of *Antoninus*, where he examines the Bath, which was the delight of the *Romans*; witneſs that word which a great Man put upon the door of his Baths: *Et voluptati plurimum & ſaluti*, for pleaſure and health. How profitable are ſuch Examinations? but few are capable of them.

P. 156. l. 9. *Lucilla buried Verus; then was Lucilla her ſelf buried by others.*] He ſpeaks of his Daughter *Lucilla*, whom he had given in Marriage to the Emperor *Verus*. This paſſage proves that this Collection of Maxims was writ in the latter years of *Antoninus*'s Life.

Ib. l. 11. *Epitunchanus, Diotimus.*] Neither *Diotimus* nor *Epitunchanus* are known: The latter is named in the Inſcriptions of the Tombs, but we know no more of him.

Ib. l. 15. *Celer.*] *Caninius Celer*, a famous Orator, whom *Adrian* made Tutor to *Antoninus* and *Verus*.

Ib. l. 23. *Others ſoon turned into Fables*, &c.] The Names of the greateſt Men grow out of date by degrees, and at laſt have no place but

in Fables, which Men do not read nor regard.

P. 157. l. 27. *It is in my power to keep out of this my Soul, all Wickedneſs*, &c.] With the Aſſiſtance of God.

Ib. l. 33. *Thy power, that Nature hath given thee.*] Nature, *i. e.* God.

P. 158. l. 12. *Areus.*] The Philoſopher *Areus* was in high Eſteem at *Auguſtus's* Court, who had been his Scholar.

P. 160. l. 17. *The Nature of the Univerſe, as it hath imparted almoſt all her other Faculties*, &c.] Nothing can be greater than this Thought, that as God hath communicated almoſt all his other Faculties to our Soul: for he hath given her his Spirituality, his Immortality, and a part of his other Qualities and Lights, (and he ſaith *Almoſt*, becauſe he has given neither his Eternal Eſſence, nor Perfections,) he hath alſo communicated to her the Power of drawing Aid and Advantage from every thing that doth oppoſe her; as God turns to his own Ends whatſoever ſeems to oppoſe his Providence.

P. 161. l. 12. *Neither that which is future, nor that which is paſt, can hurt thee; but that only which is preſent*, &c.] For the one is no more, and the other is not as yet. Nay, the remembrance of paſt Calamities has more of delight than trouble. One can truly ſuffer only what is preſent, as *Cicero* ſays in his firſt Book *de Finibus. Corpore nil niſi quod præſens eſt & adeſt ſentire poſſumus.* And, in effect, the preſent is but a Point;

Point; and that which makes it ſeem ſo conſiderable, is, that we don't intirely ſeparate from it the time paſt, and to come.

Ib. l. 19. *Are either Pantheas or Pergamus abiding to this day by their Maſter's Tombs?*] One of the great Honours paid to Princes after their Death, was, That their chief Friends ſpent Days and Nights upon their Tombs, which they beſprinkled with their Tears. *Antoninus* here condemns this Superſtition. But his principal deſign is to ſhew, That it's ridiculous for a Prince to be proud of all theſe Honours, ſeeing he will have no ſhare in them; and ſuppoſe he ſhould, and that they could make him joyfull, yet thoſe who pay them being Mortals, he muſt at length be depriv'd of them. So that to examine the matter thorowly, we find only Miſery therein. This is the true Sence of *Antoninus*.

Ib. *Pantheas or Pergamus.*] *Pergamus* was the Free-man of the Emperor *Verus*; and *Pantheas* was the fair Maid he brought from *Ionia* to *Rome*, whom he firſt made Free, and then made her his Miſtreſs. She came to ſuch a height of Fortune, that ſhe had Guards and all the Train of a Princeſs. *Lucian* gives us her Portraicture in his Book of *Images*; and ſhe has been miſtaken for his Empreſs.

Ib. l. 34. *In the whole Conſtitution of a Man, I ſee not any Vertue contrary to Juſtice.*] When of two Contraries, the one is a Vertue, the other muſt neceſſarily be a Vice. Now it's evident, that there is no Vertue oppos'd to

Juſtice, and that Temperance is a Vertue contrary to Pleaſure: therefore Pleaſure is a Vice, and Juſtice and Temperance are Vertues. This is an irreſiſtible Demonſtration.

P. 162 l. 9. *Yea, but I am not Reaſon.*] 'Tis the ordinary Anſwer of thoſe who would excuſe their Effeminacy and Faint-heartedneſs, to ſay, *My Soul is ſo mingled with the Body, that nothing can hinder me from ſharing in all its Miſeries.* *Antonimus* very well anſwers this.

P. 163. l. 6. *If once round*, &c.] *Antoninus* here alludes to a certain Verſe of *Empedocles*, who maintains, That Roundneſs is the moſt perfect and durable Figure; and this Sentiment is explained at large in *Plato*'s *Timæus*, Book XII. Hence *Horace* ſaith, *Sat.* 7. *Book* II. ſpeaking of a Free-man,

—Et in ſeipſo totus teres atque rotundus,
Externi ne quid valeat per leve morari.

P. 164. l. 7. *Nothing can happen unto thee, which is not incidental to thee as thou art a man.*] Of all that can happen to a Man, there is nothing but what is an humane accident, that is, a thing that is not ſtrange to the Nature of Man, but proportion'd to it. If it be proportion'd to it, then it is not inſupportable, and it's a ſhame to yield to it. This were an unqueſtionable Truth, if humane Nature were ſo perfect as the *Stoicks* fanſied; but Sin hath ſo diſabled it, that we may ſay the leaſt accident can overcome it, if God give not ſtrength to reſiſt. Ib. l. 29.

Ib. l. 29. *Let it not grieve thee then, if it be not thy fault that the thing is not performed.*] When we are going to do good, if an external Cauſe hinder us from accompliſhing it, our labour is not loſt, our good will is taken for the effect.

P. 165. l. 22. *Keep thy ſelf to the firſt (bare and naked) apprehenſions of things, as they preſent themſelves unto thee, and add not unto them.*] This is a moſt wiſe Precept. God ſends us all that befalls us, but we expound every thing, and take it by the worſt handle; all the uneaſineſs and trouble we find in it, is from our ſelves; and 'tis this the *Stoicks* condemn. They would have us to content our ſelves to look upon an object as it is in it ſelf, and as it preſents it ſelf at firſt, without adding any thing thereto, and believing the report of our imagination, which diſguiſeth it to us.

P. 166. l. 2. *Or rather add unto them; but as one that underſtandeth the true nature of all things that happen in the World.*] This check is wonderfull. *My Son is ſick*, inſtead of adding to this firſt Object, *He ſhall die, I'm undone, I can live no longer*; add, But as one that underſtands the cauſes of all things. *He is mortal; God only lent him to me; 'tis he that asks him again; he is maſter of him; he may take him when he pleaſes; his Will be done, and not mine.*

Ib. l. 9. *What ſervie theſe things for in the World?*] *Antoninus* reprehends the folly of the greater part, who condemn every thing, whoſe

uſe

uſe they don't underſtand, and ask, What ſerve theſe things for in the World? But inſtead of amuſing himſelf with tedious enquiries into the uſe of things, he is content to ſhew in general that all that appears to us moſt unprofitable, is, as the reſt, the matter that Nature makes uſe of to produce all the Works that proceed from her.

P. 167. l. 9. *As a Fountain of ſweet and clear Water*, &c.] This is a very good compariſon. As a Fountain ſends forth clear and pure Water, and diſſipates the filth that is thrown into it; ſo muſt Men always perform good actions, whatever obſtacles oppoſe them, and muſt overcome evil with their good.

P. 169. l. 30. *Either then teach them better, or bear with them.*] If we teach them, we make them better; if we ſuffer or bear with them, we make our ſelves better.

Ib. l. 32. *The motion of the Mind is not as the motion of a Dart.*] *Antoninus* would here prevent the impatiences, into which we often fall in the exerciſes of our Mind; we would go forthwith ſtraight to our mark, and by this Precipitation, inſtead of approaching nearer, we are the farther removed from it. It belongs to an Arrow to go ſtraight to the place which we aim at: It miſſeth its hit, if it go aſide but a little. But our Spirit cannot, and ought not to go ſo directly. We muſt conſider the Objects that border upon that we would know; we muſt turn about them to examine all their Parts. This circular Motion

tion is not leſs ſtraight than that of the Arrow. The Example of *Plato* makes this eaſie to be conceiv'd. In moſt of his Dialogues, he ſeems forthwith to go from his Deſign by the frequent Digreſſions he makes, but at laſt one is aſtoniſhed to ſee that which ſeem'd ſo remote from his Deſign, ſo marvellouſly conducing to it, and that the Truths which he here and there explain'd, being gather'd together, make and finiſh his Demonſtrations, which would not have been ſo certain, if he had gone directly to them.

Remarks upon Book IX.

PAge 170. l. 11. *He that is unjuſt, is alſo impious.*] This is a great Truth which God reveal'd to the Heathens, making them know that there is no Injuſtice which is not alſo an Impiety. When we ſpeak evil of our Neighbours, neglect to relieve the Poor and Needy, miſemploy our Time and Talents; theſe are ſo many Impieties, becauſe they are ſo many Injuſtices. *Marcus Antoninus* was more religious than the moſt part of Chriſtians at this Day, who make not Impiety to conſiſt in ſo many Things.

Ib. l. ult.

Ib. l. ult. *But he that lyeth against his Will, in that he disagreeth from the Nature of the Universe*, &c.] Although we have so much Complacency in a voluntary Lye, that we easily allow it, yet a Pagan Philosopher is perswaded, that an involuntary Lye is an Impiety, and proves it by irrefragable Reasons. *Antoninus* says, that God having given to Man, Free-will, with all the Lights that are necessary to know the Fundamental Truths which he hath established, and which as so many Torches illuminate the Universe, his Ignorance cannot be accounted involuntary; it is purely the Effect of his Choice, he hath slighted the Helps God hath given him, and by this Contempt is justly fall'n into that Blindness, which hinders him to discern Truth from Errour. What Light is in a Pagan Philosopher!

P. 173. l. 2. *Thou must not in Matter of Death carry thy self scornfully, but*, &c.] Death being one of the Functions of Nature, we must do by it as with all other things, patiently expect it without Desire or Fear.

P. 174. l. 7. *What a Toil is it for thee to live with men, whose Course of Life is so different from thine, thou seest*, &c.] *Antoninus* speaks not here of a difference or contrariety in things indifferent, which always occasion so many Debates among Men; but in things Essential, as are Just and Unjust, Good and Bad: Nothing should make us more out of Conceit with Life than those Contradictions. *So that we have occasion to say, Hasten thee, I pray, O Death; lest*

leſt I alſo in time forget my ſelf; that is to ſay, leſt the depraved Opinions of others ſhould ſeduce me, and I ſhould ſuffer my ſelf to be hurried away with the Torrent. For as the Authour of the Book of Wiſdom ſays, the Charm of Wickedneſs is great; it eaſily ſtifles Good, *&c.* It is by the particular Favour of God, that we reſiſt ſo many pernicious Examples.

Ib. l. 14. *He alſo that omitteth ſomething, is ſometimes unjuſt.*] For Man is not born only not to do evil, but to do good, as our Saviour teacheth us by the Parable of the Man, who having received one Talent went and hid it in the Earth.

Ib. l. 30. *Whatſoever partakes of ſome common thing*, &c.] *Antoninus* proves here, that all Beings have a natural Inclination to unite with their like; only Man rebells againſt this general Law of Nature, endeavours to break its Bonds, and contemns the Union which it inſpires.

P. 175. l. 29. *As the Stars and Planets*, &c.] Though the Stars be far remov'd and ſeparated one from another, they are in ſome Manner united by their Functions; they are ſo far united as they are conſtant in their Courſe, and the Manner how they declare the Glory of their Creatour.

P. 176. l. 19. *Though by Cuſtom, the Word it ſelf is in a Manner become proper unto the Vine, yet*, &c.] *Antoninus* believed he was the firſt that uſed the Expreſſion of *Bearing Fruit* in a Figu-

Figurative Sence; for otherwiſe he had not made this Apology: and this ſeems to prove that he had never read the Books of Holy Scripture, where nothing is more common than this Expreſſion.

Ib. l. 28. *Remember that for this Uſe* [*to bear with them patiently*] *was Mildneſs and Goodneſs granted unto thee.*] For if there were no wicked Perſons, Mildneſs and Goodneſs would be unprofitable Vertues.

P. 177. l. 1. *And mighteſt thou not be ſo too? or tell me, what doth hinder thee?*] This Argument is more preſſing than it ſeems; for no Man, in what State ſoever he be, can give a reaſonable Excuſe to hinder him from having Mildneſs and Goodneſs.

Ib. l. 4. *Labour not as one* (*to whom it is appointed to be*) *wretched.*] That is to ſay, complaining always, as if your Labour were above your Strength; for nothing is more unworthy a Vertuous Man.

Ib. l. 5. *Nor as one that either would be pitied or admired.*] For moſt commonly thoſe who practiſe the greateſt Auſterities, do it only to be ſeen of Men. *Plato* ſaid very well one day to ſome Perſons that admired the Patience of *Diogenes*, and pitied him becauſe he had bath'd in Icy Water: *If you would pity him, only withdraw your ſelves and ſee him no more.* Regard them no more, and they will be no more ſuch Enemies to themſelves.

P. 178. l. 21.

P. 178. l. 21. *Every Change from one Age to another is a Kind of Death.*] As the Spring is the Death of the Winter; the Summer of that, and the Winter of the Summer; ſo is it in the Seaſons of Life. That which follows is the Death of that which preceeds. Infancy dies when we enter upon Youth; This ends when Manhood begins; and Old age is the laſt Breath of perfect Age. Have you felt, as *S. Jerome* ſays in one of his Letters, all theſe different Paſſages from one State to another; for this is properly to die? Why then, after having paſſed through ſo many Deaths, ſhall we fear the laſt?

P. 179. l. 15. *As thou thy ſelf (whoever thou art) wert made for the Perfection*, &c.] This Principle is admirable. As it is not allowed to a Man to be ſeparated one Moment only from the Society, no more is he allowed to perform any Action which is not a Duty of the Civil Life. All that he does without this View, and for another End, are not only unprofitable but criminal, and he ſhall give an Account of them one Day before God. This perfectly agrees with theſe Words of Jeſus Chriſt: *I ſay unto you, that at the Day of Judgment, Men ſhall give an Account of every Idle Word they ſhall ſpeak.*

P. 180. l. 22. *And the Gods themſelves*, &c.] Since God himſelf, who is more offended than thou, ceaſeth not to be kind to the Wicked, why refuſeſt thou to do ſo?

Ib. l. 25.

Ib. l. 25. *By Dreams and Oracles.*] He had ſpoken already of Dreams. As for Oracles, it is certain *Antoninus* gave great Faith to them, and his Superſtition did almoſt coſt him one Day the Ruine of his Affairs, in a Combat which he loſt.

P. 182. l. 4. *For without a Change of Opinions*, &c.] This Paſſage is very remarkable. Princes can expect but a forc'd and intereſs'd Obedience from them who have not ſound Opinions; that is to ſay, who confound juſt and unjuſt, and underſtand not their Duty. So *Socrates* ſome where proves, That the more a Man is inſtructed, the more ſubmiſſively he obeys his lawful Prince. Though there were no other Intereſt but this, it ſhould oblige Princes to favour Learning, which is one of the moſt ſolid Supports of Greatneſs.

Ib. l. 9. *Go to now, and tell me of Alexander and Philippus, and Demetrius Phalereus.*] The Sophiſts *Antoninus* Diſputes againſt did cite theſe Examples, and repreſent *Alexander*, &c. as great Men, who always obſerv'd a certain Gravity before the People, and knew how to reconcile Policy with Religion: *Antoninus* would not ſearch into this Matter out of reſpect to theſe great Names; it ſatisfies him to ſay, that they know themſelves, whether they were ſuch Perſons, as they deſired to appear, and their Actions ſuitable to their Gravity; for Gravity may be falſe, but Juſtice is never ſo.

Ib. l. 15.

Ib. l. 15. *The Effect of true Philoſophy is, unaffected Simplicity and Modeſty.*] See the Character of *Antoninus* in two Words. He looks upon proud Gravity as a Work of a Prince, who makes Religion yield to Policy; and on the contrary, he looks upon Simplicity and Modeſty as the true Character of a Prince, who ſubjects Policy to Religion. He was not then of their Opinion who maintain, That the Affairs of State have more bold Precepts, and that the Rules of Religion are unfit and dangerous for them.

P. 184. l. 19. *Among ſo many Deities.*] The *Stoicks* believed that there was one God, only the Creator and Lord of all things, yet they eſtabliſh'd many Inferiour Deities, more or leſs perfect, as the Spirit of the firſt Being was more or leſs communicated to them.

Ib. l. 21. *Is the World to inceſſant Woes and Miſeries for ever condemned?*] This cannot be. God could not create any thing with a Deſign to render it miſerable.

Ib. l. 23. *How baſe and putrid every common Matter is? Duſt, Water,* &c.] *Antoninus* would have us make ſuch Examinations, that we may learn to contemn every thing that periſhes and is mortal.

P. 185. l. 4. *Thy life it ſelf is ſome ſuch thing too.*] It comes from Corruption, is maintain'd by Corruption, and ends by Corruption. How is it then, that we are ſo wedded to ſuch a Corrupt thing?

Ib. l. 19. *If he hath ſinned, his is the Harm, not mine. But perchance he hath not.*] It is ſo difficult to judge the Actions of our Neighbours with Safety, that the ſureſt way is not to judge them at all, leſt we ſhould make raſh Judgments. Therefore Our Lord ſays, *Judge not, that ye be not judged*, Matt. 7. 1. Why judgeſt thou thy Brother, who perhaps is more innocent than thou?

P. 186. l. 27. *And as for the Gods, who hath told thee that they cannot help us even in thoſe things that they have put in our own Power?*] *Antoninus* acknowledges and avouches clearly, That although God by giving us Free-will, hath given us the Means of doing good, yet he ceaſes not to aſſiſt us. And this new Aid deſtroys not at all the Liberty of the Will: For by the Sweetneſs of his efficacious Inſpirations, he determines our Hearts without neceſſitating them, ſeeing he always leaves in them the Liberty of Choice.

Ib. l. 30. *Whether it be ſo or no, thou ſhalt ſoon perceive, if thou wilt but try thy ſelf and pray.*] *Antoninus* knew well enough that God could not deny his good Spirit, to thoſe that asked him; as our Lord ſays, *Luke* 11. 13. *How much more ſhall your heavenly Father give his Holy Spirit to them that ask him?*

P 187 l. 7. *In my Sickneſs (ſaith Epicurus of himſelf) my Diſcourſes were not*, &c.] Nothing is more common than the Fault which *Epicurus* here condemns. In the leaſt Maladies, men can ſpeak of nothing but their Sickneſs; they are

are ſo ſtruck with it, that they ſpeak thereof a long time after they are cured. What Weakneſs and Ignorance! If ſuch Converſations ſeem'd unbecoming and unworthy to *Epicurus*, ought they not much more to appear ſo to a Chriſtian?

P. 188. l. 1. *It is common to all Trades and Profeſſions to mind and intend that only which now they are about, and the Inſtrument whereby they work.*] It belongs to us to ſee whether we have our Being in this World, to ſeek after the Health of our Body, or that of our Soul. This Enquiry is ſoon made; we ought to do no more but act agreeably to the Views we ſhould have, and to the End which is propos'd to us, and to make uſe of thoſe Means only which can bring us to it.

Remarks upon Book X.

PAge 191. l. 13. *As one who is altogether governed by Nature, let it be thy Care to obſerve what it is, that thy Nature requires.*] This is an Excellent Rule to teach us to diſtinguiſh what is permitted, from what is forbidden; nothing is forbidden but what is hurtful to the Nature of the Animal, or that of the Reaſonable Soul. All the Reſt is lawful and permitted.

Ib. l. 33. *It will soon make an End of thee, and it self at the same Time end with thee.*] It was one of the greateſt Conſolations the *Pagans* had in the moſt Violent Torments, to hope they would be ſhort. Chriſtians have more ſolid Comforts; for they are aſſured that the Evils of this Life, will work for them an Eternal Weight of Glory.

P. 192. l. 18. *Either the Atoms, or a Nature.*] That is to ſay, either Chance or Providence.

P. 193. l. 25. *All Parts of the World,* &c.] All Parts of the World are made to corrupt and periſh; whether Univerſal Nature has condemn'd them to this, or they tend thereto of themſelves by the Law of their Conſtitution. Now let either of the two be true, Death cannot be an Evil, and it is Folly to complain of it; for on the one ſide, Nature could not have made the World to render it miſerable; and on the other, the Diſſolution of Beings is not more contrary nor hurtful than their Union, becauſe they return only into their firſt Principles; and that which we call Periſhing, is nothing but a Change, to ſpeak properly. Birth and Death are but Changes.

P. 194. l. 32. *And this Univerſe, either after a certain Period of Time, to be conſumed by Fire.*] The Academick and Sceptick Philoſophers having, it ſeems, read in Holy Scripture, That the Fire ſhould conſume the World, and that there would be afterwards new Heavens, and a new Earth; and not comprehending the

the Marvellous Conſequences of theſe Truths, explain'd them according to their different Fancies. The one imagin'd that after the World had been many Times renewed by Fire, it ſhould at laſt be conſumed by it; and the others, that it is Eternally renewed after the ſame Manner; and that after every Burning, which they look upon as an Expiatory Fire, the ſame things ſhould return as they were before. That *Socrates*, for Example, ſhould ariſe, and be accuſed by *Anytus* and *Melitus*, and condemn'd by the ſame Judges. This is the *Idea* they had from the Doctrine of the Reſurrection of the Dead ill underſtood.

P. 195. l. 4. *All this that thou now art*, &c.] For all that we have of Matter in us, runs away and gives place to new Matter, which continues and ſuſtains our Beings; ſo that the Body we had ſometimes ago, is not that which we have to Day.

Ib. l. 15. *But ſuppoſe, that that ſhould ſtill cleave unto thee never ſo cloſe.*] In Regard this Opinion, That we have no more the ſame Body which we had at our Birth, ſeems at firſt View hard and incredible. *Antoninus* ſuppoſes the contrary; becauſe this Suppoſition no ways deſtroys the Truths he had taught. For although we have the ſame Body our Mother gave us, it will be ſtill true to ſay, That it ſubſiſts only by the Change of new Matter, which is daily added to the Firſt, and that both the one and the other ſhould be finally altered and changed by Death,

which reduces them to their firſt Principles.

Ib. l. 20. *Now that thou haſt taken theſe Names unto thee of Good, Modeſt, True,* &c.] There is a ſtrange Contradiction in Men. It is in their Power to take juſtly the greateſt Names and to keep them, and they will not do it. It is not in their Power to oblige others to give them theſe Names; and though they could, this would not be a ſure Mark that they had them, or that they deſerved them, and yet they purſue this with the greateſt Earneſtneſs.

P. 197. l. 16. *Is not that we ſhould flatter the Gods, but that we ſhould become like unto them.*] Nothing can be ſaid better. To flatter God is to offer Sacrifices to him, to ſing forth his Praiſes, and to ask Pardon of our Faults without amending them: For this is to treat God like a Child, whom we amuſe with falſe Shews, and fair Words. To pleaſe God we muſt reſemble him, and be *Transform'd into his Image*, as St. *Paul* ſpeaks, 2 *Cor.* 3. 18.

Ib. l. 27. *Toys and Fooleries (at home;) Wars,* &c.] Any one of theſe things is enough to make us loſe God, when we are not cloſely united to him. But when this Union is perfect, *Nothing can ſeparate from his Love; nor Death, nor Life, nor Angels,* &c. *Rom.* 8. 38, 39.

P. 198. l. 14. *Not apparent indeed; but not concealed.*] *Antoninus* here proves two moſt important Truths; the Firſt, That the Pleaſure

ſure which the Knowledge of things gives, is not pure nor entire, when this Knowledge does not produce Actions that are agreeable thereto; and the other, That this Pleaſure ought not to be eſteem'd by what appears outwardly, for this does not conſtitute its Eſſence; that which is inward makes its Value. Thoſe then who eſtabliſh'd this Maxim, *That all our Knowledge is nothing, if others know not that we have it*, were but vain Men who ſought out of themſelves that which they could not find within, and knew not the Nature of that Pleaſure, which Underſtanding gives. It is ſecret, but it is ſo much the more pure, and more ſenſible.

Ib. l. 33. *For theſe alſo (theſe famous Souldiers and warlike Men) if thou doſt look into their Minds and Opinions, what do they for the moſt part but hunt after Prey?*] *Antoninus* here ridicules the ſpecious Pretexts Men give to their Inclinations. The Hunter ſays, he goes only to the Chaſe for Exerciſe, and to accuſtom himſelf to Labour; the Angler loves not fiſhing but for his Recreation, and to improve the Art he uſes in trepanning the moſt crafty and wary Fiſhes; and the Officer ſays, that he goes not to War but for Glory, and to ſerve his Prince and Country. This Emperour aſſures us that nothing is more falſe, and that, could we penetrate into their Thoughts, and know by what Motives they are acted, we ſhould ſee that the greater part love Hunting, Fiſhing, or War onely

for the Sake of their Lusts, and that both the one and the others are Robbers and Murtherers, as the *Scythians* answered *Alexander*: *Thou who boastest that thou art come to exterminate Robbers, art the greatest Robber on Earth.* By the same Reason, an Ancient Philosopher called Hunting an Injustice, and the Mother of Cruelty. If we could penetrate into the Opinions of Men, we should often find this Spirit of Murther and Robbery in the most Just and Holy Employs.

P. 199. l. 29. *What use is there of Suspicion at all?* &c.] Nothing is more dangerous to Men, and especially to Princes, than Irresolution; which is the Effect of an unprofitable and superstitious Foresight. If we see what is to be done, we ought to do it without looking farther; and if we do not, we must take Counsel of others. Those Suspicions, *But this will come to pass, But that will come to pass*, are foreign to the thing, and ought to be rejected. The Irresolution which makes us neglect a just thing, doth us more Harm than all the Inconveniencies we foresee, though they should all come to pass together, could do.

P. 200. l. 15. *Merry and yet Grave*, &c.] This is a precious Truth, which *Antoninus* teacheth us in two Words. The Transports of Joy and Excessive Laughter, are never found together with Reason. The Joy and Mirth, which Reason accompanies always, are inseparable from Gravity or *Severity*, if we may make use of this Term; to express that admirable

mirable word of *Seneca*, *Severa res eſt verum gaudium*, *True joy is a ſevere thing*; that is to ſay, grave and ſerious.

Ib. l. 28. *That ſuch and ſuch upon their Beds, and ſuch at their Board.*] If we could ask the Table and Cabinet of theſe publick Cenſurers, and the Lamp which enlightens their Chambers could alſo ſpeak, we ſhould diſcover an infinity of things, whereby we might be avenged of their Pride, and ſee how unbecoming it is for them to judge others.

Ib. l. 31. *What Theſts and Rapines they commit*, &c.] This Thought ſeems to me perfectly good. They who inſolently aſſume to themſelves the Right of blaming or praiſing Men, live upon Robbery: for beſides, that they erect to themſelves a Tribunal that belongs not to them, and raiſe their Reputation upon the Ruines of their Neighbours, they rob God of the chief of his Rights, and judge the Law. The Scripture it ſelf calls it Robbery when a Creature makes it ſelf equal to God. Now this judging Men, is to make our ſelves equal to God, nay to exalt our ſelves above him.

P. 201. l. 16. *If they cannot bear with me, let them kill me.*] *Antoninus* had, without doubt, before his Eyes the excellent paſſage of *Plato*, where *Socrates* ſpeaks of the Contradiction which Juſtice meets with from Men, and where he affirms it to be ſo ſtrong, that if Sovereign Juſtice ſhould appear in the World under an humane Figure, Men could not ſuffer it, but would deliver it to a ſhamefull and cruel Death.

Ib. l. 20.

Ib. l. 20. *Make it not any longer a matter of dispute*, &c.] This was the common fault of Philosophers, especially the *Stoicks*; they spent their time in disputing what was the definition of a good Man. *Antoninus*, weary of these Disputes, says admirably, That we should spend no more time in disputing what a good Man is, but in becoming such; but to dispute is not to become such. On the contrary, Heat and Animosity, the inseparable Sisters of a dispute, may set us at a greater distance from this State, but can never put us in it.

P. 202. l. 13. *How base and slavish, but a little while ago, they were fain to be*, &c.] *Antoninus* here shews, that we may oftentimes say to those that would domineer over us what *Davus* saith to *Horace* in the 7th Satyr of his second Book:

Tune mihi Dominus, rerum imperiis, hominumq;
Tot, tantisq; minor? quem ter vindicta quaterq;
Imposita haud unquam miserâ formidine privet?

Art thou my Master, thou whom so many different Things and Men hold in subjection? Thou, whom all the Ceremonies of the Prætors, a hundred times reiterated, can never make free from Fear?

Ib. l. 21. *And then it is best when she doth send it.*] This is said in Refutation of their Opinion, who say, That a thing may be profitable for the future, and troublesome for the present. *Antoninus* maintains, That it is profitable

ſitable from the very moment Nature gives it, which never gives any thing but when ſhe ought.

Ib. l. 23. *The Earth (ſaith the Poet) doth often long after the Rain*, &c.] Theſe are Verſes of *Euripides*, related by *Ariſtotle* in the firſt Chapter of the VIII. of his Morals. And upon them *Antoninus* makes this following Reflection.

Ib. l. 28. *With thine affections ſhall mine concur, O World.*] For ſince the World loves all that comes to paſs, 'tis an Injuſtice for a part not to love what the whole loves.

Ib. l. 31. *Now that the World doth love*, &c.] *Antoninus* here ſeems to fall into the Error of the *Stoicks*, whoſe Arguments oftentimes were but a play upon words. This Greek and Latin manner of ſpeaking, *This loves to be*, ſignifies only, *This uſes to be*. So *Antoninus*'s Argument is not very ſtrong. Yet in his Defence we may ſay, that this expreſſion, *This loves to be*, ſignifies, *This uſeth to be*; only, becauſe that which is moſt delightfull and agreeable to the World, is that which happens oftenеſt.

P. 203. l. 2. *Which Plato ſaith of his Philoſopher*, &c.] This is in *Theætetus*, in the admirable Dialogue, where *Socrates* compares the advantages which Men of Fortunes have above Philoſophers, with thoſe which Philoſophers have above Men of Fortunes; and where he ſays, *That the Philoſopher, becauſe of his ſmall experience in affairs, will always appear*

as

so ignorant and clownish as a Shepherd; for although he live in a Town in the midst of his fellow-citizens, yet he is there, as he were in a Park of Sheep upon the top of a Mountain. *Antoninus* makes use of this passage only to draw this Consequence from it, That seeing the Wise find the Delights of a Mountain amidst the Tumults of the City, all the World might do so too as well as they.

P. 204. l. 4. *The Law is every Man's master.*] The Law; that is to say, God, who is the Living and Eternal Law. Therefore *Plato* says, That the Law is the God of the Wise.

P. 206. l. 16. *When thou seest Satyro,* &c.] *Satyro* or *Satyrion*, *Euphrates*, *Alciphron*, *Xenophon*, were Philosophers co-temporary with *Antoninus*. And therefore *Euphrates* cannot be he whose Elogy *Pliny* made in the 16th Epistle of his first Book; for he was dead before *Antoninus* came into the World, *Adrian* having allowed him to take Poison, because of his Old Age and a desperate Sickness with which he was taken. This was undoubtedly one of his Sons. We have at this day Epistles that bear the Name of *Alciphron*.

Ib. l. 22. *And so every one, some one or other that,* &c.] To remember the Frailty of humane Things, it seems sufficient to think upon those who were before us, and are now dead; but as we love our selves, and what relates to us, more than all things else, the likeness which they who liv'd before us have with us, and with those who live in our own time, touches

touches us more, and makes a deeper impreſſion upon our Spirit. This is the ground of this Maxim.

Ib. l. 30. *That whatſoever is once changed, ſhall never be again as long as the World endureth*] Though the *Stoicks* were perſwaded that Nature always, at leaſt many times, renews the World, and that by a kind of Reſurrection, as appears by this paſſage of *Chryſippus* in his Book of Providence; *This being ſo, it is manifeſt that it is not impoſſible that after our death, by the revolution of certain periods of time, we ſhould be raiſed to the ſame ſhape which now we have.* They aſſerted nevertheleſs, that the ſame things ſhould not return, but things fully like them. For example, that the ſame *Socrates* ſhould not return, but one exactly reſembling him.

P. 209. l. 2. *Elſe muſt he of neceſſity, whoever he be that meets with any of them, become worſe than he was before.*] If things could hurt us againſt our will and conſent, no perſon could keep himſelf from wickedneſs. But they hurt us not but in ſo far as we give them liberty, by ſuffering them to rule our Opinions.

Ib. l. 7. *Man (if he make that good uſe of them that he ſhould) is rather the better and more praiſe-worthy for any of thoſe kind of hindrances, than otherwiſe.* For theſe Adverſities are as the Fire which purifies the cold. A Man by their means becomes more venerable, and as it were ſacred; and we may

ſay

ſay of him as *Florus* doth of *Marius*: *Redit ab Africa Marius clade major, ſiquidem carcer, catenæ, fuga, exiliave horrificaverunt dignitatem.* *Marius* returns from *Africa* more great by his Miſeries, for his Priſon, his Chains, his Flight, his Baniſhment rais'd his Dignity, by inſpiring Men with Sentiments of ſacred Dread for him.

Ib. l. 14. *But none of theſe Caſualties or external Hindrances do hurt the Law.*] The Law, that is to ſay, the Order which God hath eſtabliſh'd for the Government of the World; the Beauty of this Order cannot be diſturb'd by Miſeries and Calamities, ſeeing, on the contrary, they are in the hands of God inſtruments of his Goodneſs and Juſtice, and come only for the proving of the Good and chaſtiſement of the Wicked. This reaſoning of *Antoninus* is ſublime and excellent.

P. 211. l. 10. *He did not otherwiſe trouble us much*, &c.] This is the true Character of a vertuous Man: he condemns the Vices without touching their Perſons; *Inſectatur vitia non homines; non caſtigat errantes, ſed emendat.* *Plin.* Book I. Epiſt. 10.

Remarks

Remarks upon Book XI.

PAg. 213. l. 1. *The natural Properties and Privileges of a reaſonable Soul are, That ſhe ſeeth her ſelf*, &c.] It is not with the Soul, as it is with the Eye of the Body, which cannot ſee it ſelf but in a Mirrour; for the Soul ſees it ſelf, and knows it ſelf in it ſelf. But on the other ſide, it hath no advantage of the Eyes: For as the Eyes cannot ſee, but when they are enlightned by an external Light; no more can the Soul ſee, if not illuminated by the eternal Light.

Ib. l. 4. *Can order and compoſe her ſelf*, &c.] This the Body cannot do; a proof that it's a Being very different.

Ib. l. 21. *She compaſſeth the whole World*, &c.] All the Philoſophers made uſe of this Argument to prove the Spirituality and Immortality of the Soul. In effect, if it were not Spiritual and Immortal, it were not capable of thoſe Properties God hath communicated to it; as to penetrate into the Heavens and the Abyſs of the Earth, to meaſure Eternity, *&c.* Properties which Matter can never receive.

P. 214. l. 9. *And to regard nothing ſo much as her ſelf.*] Among all Creatures, nothing ought to be ſo precious to us as our Souls. When we eſteem it leſs than Corporeal and Earthly

Earthly Objects, we plunge it into their Nothing; but when we Exalt it above All, we unite it to God, and it reigns with him over All things.

Ib. l. 22. *Thou shalt easily contemn, if thou shalt divide the harmonious voice*, &c.] This Argument of *Antoninus* is certainly good. To elude the force thereof, some will say, That the Beauty of Musick consists not in the separated Tones, but in the Relation that they have one with another, and in the proportion of the Motions; whence results an harmony, more or less perfect, as this proportion approaches more or less to the Unity it would represent: As the Beauty of Verse lies not in the Syllables which we pronounce one after another, but in the whole, which strikes and delights us. How true soever this Objection is, it destroys not the Reasoning of this Emperour. For it is still evident, that the Beauty of Musick, as that of Poesy, and all other Beauties which affect our Senses, are but imperfect, and are not beautifull but by their relation either to Time or Place; and being composed of Fugitive Parts, which cannot subsist altogether, they but imperfectly represent the true Unity and Sovereign Equality, which is the only Model of Beauty. They therefore who have the Eyes of their Understanding accustomed to this primitive Beauty, will easily observe this Precept of *Antoninus*, and contemn all inferiour and transitory Beauties which depend upon Place and

and Time, and are entirely included in them. But at the ſame time we muſt affirm, That Muſick is one of the leaſt imperfect of this lower Order; and that it is a conſiderable fault not to know and love it to a certain degree.

Ib. l. 28. *Beſide vertue, and thoſe things that proceed from vertue.*] For Vertue and vertuous Actions being purely ſpiritual Beauties, do more perfectly than all others repreſent that Truth and Unity which produces them.

P. 215. l. 6. *Not from an obſtinate and peremptory reſolution of the Mind, violently and paſſionately ſet upon oppoſition, (as Chriſtians are wont.)*] The Conſtancy and Reſolution of Chriſtians, who chus'd rather to die than ſacrifice to Idols, and adore the Statues of the Emperours, was termed Folly and Stubbornneſs by the *Pagans*; as is evident from *Tertullian*'s Apology. And *Pliny* the younger calls it *obſtinacy, inflexible ſtubbornneſs, and madneſs.* But when did *Antoninus*, who never Perſecuted the *Chriſtians*, make this Maxim? For by his way of ſpeaking one would think that he had ſeen Martyrs every day; and yet after he was Emperour, there was none in the places where he was. It was, without doubt, after that the Rage of the *Pagans*, awaked by the Liberty of Civil Wars, had ſacrificed many *Chriſtians* to their Fury in *Aſia*, and the *Gauls*. The Conſtancy of thoſe Martyrs, whereof he was

inform'd by such as blacken'd it, gave him occasion to make this Reflection, That it is happy to contemn Death, provided that this Contempt be the fruit of Judgment and Reason, and not the effect of a blind Stubbornness: And the Maxim is true and certain, but the Application thereof is false, as are all Applications that Men make according to false Prejudices. There was Reason in this Constancy of the Martyrs; but this Reason was more than Humane, which the *Pagans* were not capable to perceive.

Ib. l. 10. *And Gravity.*] To do a thing with Gravity, is to do it according to the Rules of Decency, with Courage, without Precipitation and without Dulness, when necessity requires, and with reference to the profit of our Neighbour. Now the *Christians* were accused for running upon Death without necessity. Wherefore those blinded Philosophers believ'd this Action was destitute of this Gravity, wherewith they would have all humane Actions accompanied. For to do a thing without Necessity, is to Sin against all those Rules: this is to act by Caprice or Lightness. But what greater Necessity, than for *Christian* Souldiers to expose themselves to a Death that render'd all the Devil's Artifices ineffectual, and by destroying his Empire, augmented that of the Blessed Jesus.

Ib. l. 25. *Tragedies were at first brought in and instituted, to put Men in mind of worldly*

Chances

Chances and Caſualties.] In the beginning; that is to ſay, when Tragedy and Comedy were intermix'd, it was a Clowniſh and Country-diverſion, deſign'd to make Men merry and idle, rather than to teach them Courage and Vertue. *Antoninus* ſpeaks here only of Tragedy perfect; for of this alone it can be ſaid, That it was brought in to teach Men to ſupport with Courage all the Caſualties of Life. For it is hard to think our ſelves ſo unhappy and unfortunate, when we come from ſeeing a *Telephus*, a *Philoctetes*, an *Oreſtes*, an *Oedipus*, &c.

Ib. l. 33. *Even they that cry out ſo mournfully Io Cithæron, muſt bear them (for all their cries) as well as others.*] This is an Exclamation in *Oedipus*, who ſays in the Tragedy of *Sophocles*: *O Cithæron! why did you receive me? or why, after you had receiv'd me, did you not let me periſh, that Men might never ſee from whence I was come?* All theſe Exclamations do not eaſe us under our Preſſures. Thus Tragedy teaches us, That it is unprofitable to complain.

P. 216. l. 11., *After the Tragedy, the Comœdia Vetus, or ancient Comedy was brought in.*] Upon all that *Antoninus* ſays here concerning the ancient and new Comedy, ſee the Remarks upon *Horace*, *De arte Poetica*, from the 281 Verſe.

Succeſſit vetus his Comœdia, non ſine multâ
Laude.

The old Comedy with great Succeſs ſucceeded to this Tragedy of *Theſpis* and *Æſchylus*.

Ib. l. 18. *After theſe, what were either the Media, or Nova Comædia admitted for?*] The Ancient Comedy continued, until *Lyſander* had made himſelf Maſter of *Athens*. The *Media* from *Lyſander* to *Alexander* the Great; and the New is that which we have at this Day.

P. 217. l. 17. *To grow together like Fellow-branches (in Matter of good Correſpondence and Affection,) but not in Matter of Opinions.*] People have always ſo unſafe Opinions of Juſtice, Religion, and of God, that though the bond of Charity unites us with them, and makes of all Men but as it were one Tree, our Spirit ceaſes not to be free, and to retain an Independency and Superiority, which keeps it from ſubjecting its Thoughts and Opinions to thoſe of the People; otherwiſe the ſame Charity which unites and binds us together, ſhould become a Mortal Poiſon to our Souls.

P. 218. l. 1. *It is not poſſible that any Nature ſhould be inferiour unto Art, ſince that all Arts imitate Nature.*] Seeing all Arts make the things that are leſs perfect, for the Sake of the more perfect, it is certain that Univerſal Nature, which is the Model of all Arts, does ſo likewiſe; and this hath produc'd Juſtice. For what doth Juſtice? It brings things leſs perfect under the Government, and Obedience of thoſe that are more perfect.

Ib. l. 12.

Ib. l. 12. *For Juſtice cannot be preſerv'd, if either we ſettle our Minds*, &c.] This is a neceſſary Conſequence of the former Principle, That things leſs perfect are for the Sake of the more perfect: For we cannot preferr the leſs perfect to others, without violating this Order, which is ſo wiſely eſtabliſh'd.

P. 218. l. 24. *Then is the Soul (as Empedocles doth liken it) like unto a Sphere, or Globe*, &c.] When a round Body is enlighten'd, the Swellings and Sinkings that are in it cauſe Obſcurity, by hindering the Light to ſpread it ſelf equally, and illuminate all the Parts of the Body. It is ſo with the Soul, when ſhe is equal and round in her ſelf, ſhe receives equally thorough all that Light God is pleas'd to illuminate her with. But when Vice has made Inequalities, they neceſſarily hinder the Courſe of this Heavenly Light, and plunge her into profound Darkneſs.

Ib. l. 30. *Whereby ſhe doth ſee and behold the true Nature, both of that of the Univerſe, and her own in particular.*] As the Soul is not its own Light, ſhe cannot ſee the Truth of things, or underſtand her own Eſſence and Exiſtence, but in the Univerſal Reaſon, by the Light which God is pleaſed to illuminate her with.

P. 219. l. 9. *Such as was that famous Phocion, if ſo be that he did not diſſemble.*] *Phocion* being condemn'd to die with four of his Friends, while the Poiſon was a preparing, one ask'd him what he ſhould ſay to his Son in his Name? he anſwer'd, *That I command him never to*

think of repaying the Athenians, *this Cup of Love they present me.* And when all the Poiſon that was pounded was ſpent by the four that drank firſt, there remain'd none for *Phocion.* The Executioner who furniſh'd it ſaid, he would pound no more, unleſs he were pay'd for it. *Phocion* call'd one of his Friends, and ſaid to him, *I pray you give this Man a little Money which he asks us, seeing that one cannot die at* Athens *for nought.* If theſe two Words were ſpoken ſincerely, the Death of *Phocion* was ſuch as *Antoninus* requires; for could any thing be more charitable, than to take for a Mark of Love and Good-will, the Poiſon that was preſented to him, and to forbid his Son to remember it? And what better Advice could he give than to adverti ſe them, that it was a horrible Shame to ſuffer Priſoners to pay for the Poiſon they made them drink? But *Antoninus* knew very well, that theſe two Words were moſt ſtinging Jeers againſt the *Athenians*, and the Effect of Anger and Spite: Now Raillery and Spite ſhould be baniſh'd from this laſt Action of our Lives, where there ought to be nothing but what is moſt grave and ſerious.

P. 221. l. 31. *With that Pride and Self-conceit they do them.*] There is nothing ſhows more the Ignorance and Slavery of Men, than the Inſolence and Vanity wherewith they commit the moſt horrible Things, and violate that which is moſt Sacred. The moſt Ignorant are the moſt Proud.

P. 222. l. 6. *Therefore are they grieved whenſoever they hear themſelves charged, either of Injuſtice or Unlawfulneſs.*] For Injuſtice and Unthankfulneſs preſuppoſe the Choice of the Spirit, and a Determination of the Will; and as Men are not unjuſt and unthankful, but by Ignorance and in Spight of themſelves, they cannot acknowledge themſelves ſuch, and conſequently believe they are wrong'd, when they are accus'd of theſe Vices.

Ib. l. 11. *That thou thy ſelf doſt trangreſs in many Things, and art even ſuch another as they are.*] This Confeſſion of *Antoninus* is full of an Humility, becoming Chriſtianity. Our own Sins muſt oblige us to pardon others; and the Sins of others not to pardon our ſelves. But unhappily we daily reverſe this Order.

Ib. l. 18. *That whether they have ſinned or no, thou doſt not underſtand perfectly.*] Some Actions ſeem to be Sins, and are not, being done for a Deſign we know not, and for a conceal'd Profit. And therefore, ſeeing to know an Action thoroughly, we muſt know all the Circumſtances thereof, and all the Views Men had when they did it, it is the ſureſt and wiſeſt Part not to judge thereof. The Truth of this made a great Man of our Age ſay, *That there is an Infinity of Actions that ſeem ridiculous, the hidden Reaſons whereof are nevertheleſs moſt wiſe and ſolid.*

P. 224. l. 5. *And begin one Day, whilſt thou art yet alive, to be a Man indeed.*] That is to

say, to have Mildness and Humanity, which is the true Character of Men.

Ib. l. 7. *But on the other Side thou must take heed, as much to flatter them as to be angry with them.*] As the Mildness and Humanity *Antoninus* had recommended, might throw Men into a loose Complacency and Flattery; for Men can hardly observe a Mean, but by shunning one Vice fall commonly into the contrary: He warns us, that Flattery is as pernicious as harshness, and that both equally destroy Society, though by very different ways.

P. 225. l. 14. *What Portion soever, either of Air or Fire, there be in thee,* &c.] This reasoning is perfectly good and solid. The Elements whereof we are compos'd, forget their Inclination to obey the Master of the World, and keep the Post that is assign'd them, though it be contrary to their Nature. Reason, which ought to be more obedient, than those material and corruptible Principles, onely endeavours to shake off the Yoke, and revolts against this general Law, though nothing be impos'd that is hard, and contrary to its Constitution. If it be said, that God hath left the Elements only the Power of Obedience, but he hath given the Liberty of Choice to Reason: This makes our Injustice the more appear. God hath exempted our Soul from the Necessity of obeying him by constraint, that she may obey out of Love, and be rewarded for it. And instead

of

of acknowledging ſo great a Benefit by an entire and perfect Submiſſion, ſhe turns this Advantage into a fearful Rebellion.

P. 226. l. 22. *Cannot poſſibly be one and the ſelf-ſame Man always.*] We are only what our Actions are, and conſequently are ſo many different Men, as we do different and contrary Actions.

P. 227. l. 5. *Remember the Fable of the Country-Mouſe*, &c.] *Antoninus* would have us meditate on this Fable, that we may learn to contemn the Riches and Tumults of the City, and imitate the Prudence of the Country-Mouſe, that preferr'd its Beans and Quiet to all the Plenty and Delicacies of the City-Mouſe. See the VI. *Satyr* of the Second Book of *Horace*.

Ib. l. 8. *Socrates was wont to call the common Conceits and Opinions of Men, the common Lamiæ, or Bugbears of the World*, &c.] *Socrates* ſays ſo from the *Idea's* People have of Death, Shame, Baniſhment, and all that is called Evil. Hear them ſpeak only, and you'll find what they ſay, perfectly reſembles the Stories which they make of certain Women, who devour Children.

Ib. l. 12. *The Lacedæmonians, at their publick Spectacula, were wont to appoint Seats and Forms for their Strangers in the Shadow.*] This was the Difference betwixt the *Athenians* and *Lacedæmonians*; the *Athenians* ſpake better concerning what is good and honeſt, and the *Lacedæmonians* practis'd better. But what *Antoninus*

nius says here of the Respect they had for Hospitality, is not to be understood of the first Times of this Common-wealth: For *Lycurgus* had forbid to receive Strangers into the City, lest Vice should creep in with them. It is rather to be understood of Strangers, who had submitted to the *Lacenick* Discipline, and to whom *Lycurgus* had appointed Portions in the Distribution he made of the Lands, on this Condition, that they could neither sell nor alienate them.

Ib. l. 23. *That a Man should always have in his Mind some one or other of the Ancient Worthies.*] *Seneca* says, this was the Word of *Epicurus*. It is an Excellent Precept: If none be so vicious as to dare to sin before a Witness; what shall they be when they have chosen a Witness of an approved and acknowledg'd Vertue?

Ib. l. 25. *The Pythagoreans were wont*, &c.] This is not the onely thing, the Platonists took from the *Pythagoreans*. See the Remarks upon the VII. Book.

P. 228. l. 3. *And what he said to his Fellows and Friends*, &c.] *Xantippe*, *Socrates*'s Wife, was very troublesome and untoward. One Day she cloath'd her self with her Husband's Garments, and went to a publick Show. *Socrates* missing his Cloths, girt himself with a Skin. His Friends finding him in this Condition, advised him to beat his Wife when she return'd. *Very well*, answer'd *Socrates*; *That while we are clawing one another, each of*

you

you may cry, *Courage* Socrates, *Courage*, Xantippe. *Antoninus* would have this Anſwer always before our Eyes, that we accuſtom our ſelves to think, That it is ridiculous to give the publick ſuch Extravagant Scenes, as make us the Objects of their Laughter. But if this, that *Socrates* ſaid to his Friends be remarkable, what he ſaid to his Wife is not leſs ſo; for he ſaid no more to her but, *Thou ſeeſt at leaſt, that thou wenteſt not to the publick Show to ſee, but to be ſeen.*

Ib. l. 6. *In Matter of Writing or Reading, thou muſt needs be taught before thou canſt do either.*] Nothing is more common, than to ſee Men pretend to teach others, what they know not themſelves, and have never learned. But this is not ſo ſurprizing, as to ſee People putting themſelves in the Hands of ſuch Ignorants, and placing an entire Confidence in them. This brings to my Mind the Saying of *Antiſthenes*, to the *Athenians*, in an Aſſembly, where they had named ſome Generals. When *Antiſthenes* Vote was ask'd; *I counſel you*, ſaid he to them, *Maſters, to command that Aſſes ſhould become Horſes.* And as the *Athenians* ridicul'd his Anſwer, becauſe that was impoſſible; *Why may not this be, Maſters*, continued he, *ſeeing your Decrees can make Generals of theſe Men, that have no Experience?*

Ib. l. 14. *My Heart ſmiled within me. They will accuſe even Vertue it ſelf*, &c.] *Antoninus* here joins a Verſe of *Heſiod*, with a Verſe of

of *Homer*; and he says very wisely, that when he sees these distracted Philosophers, who assert, that Vertue is but a vain Name, and *Chimæra*; instead of answering them, he laughs at their Folly.

P. 229. l. 3. *Of the Free-will there is no Thief or Robber.*] This Free-will which cannot be forc'd, is the Gift of God, which none can take from us but himself, and which he never takes so long as we submit to him. *Rom.* 8. 37.

Ib. l. 14. *It is not about ordinary petty Matters, &c.*] Our whole Life is an Exercise, a continual Combat; the Prize of the Victory, is Wisdom; and that of a Defeat, Folly: There is a *Medium*.

Ib. l. 24. *Because we have them already.*] This renders Men's Evil incurable. They are perswaded they have a reasonable Soul, and this suffices them. Instead of labouring to make it such, by purging them from Vice, they sleep in mortal Security.

Ib. l. 25. *What then do ye so strive and contend between you?*] Dissention is the Daughter of Ignorance and Passion, and a mortal Enemy to Reason.

Remarks

Remarks upon Book XII.

PAge 230. l. 3. *Whatſoever thou doſt hereafter aſpire unto, thou mayſt even now enjoy*, &c.] To procure Happineſs and Tranquility we traverſe Sea and Land; what Trouble and Labour do we undergo? What unprofitable Cares have we? For that which we ſeek is within us. If we do not envy and voluntarily deprive our ſelves of it, we ſhall find it without ſo much ado. An infallible Mean to obtain it, is to diſpoſe of the preſent Time well.

Ib. l. 28. *Worthy of the World from which thou hadſt thy Beginning.*] That is to ſay, worthy of God, in the Language of the *Stoicks*.

P. 231. l. 7. *For with his ſimple and pure Underſtand he pierceth*, &c.] This is remarkable. *Antoninus* would have us underſtand, That as the Spirit of God does only communicate it ſelf to Objects of the ſame nature with himſelf; that is to ſay, Spiritual and Immortal, and that he dwells not with Matter; ſo our Soul ought to do the ſame, and not be delighted but with Things that are of the ſame nature with it ſelf; for by this means ſhe will always be united with the Divinity whence it had its Original: It will love nothing but Vertue, and deſpiſe every thing elſe. This is a great Thought.

P. 232. l. 20.

P. 232. l. 20. *That every Man loving himself best, should more regard other Men's opinions concerning himself than his own.*] Self-love inclines to the quite contrary. There is a Contradiction in this that cannot be explain'd: Men are more afraid of their Reputation than of their Conscience.

P. 232. l. 2. *And those Men, when once they are dead, should never be restored to life, but be extinct for ever.*] The Philosophers, that denied the Immortality of the Soul, reproach'd God, by saying, That 'twas in vain to serve him during their Life, seeing he suffer'd them at last to die for ever. *Antoninus* refutes this Opinion, and at the same time silences his own Imagination, which never fail'd to suggest Scruples to him upon this Point. But as he was not able to demonstrate the Immortality of the Soul and the Truth of the Resurrection, whereof he had only confus'd Idea's, because he had not div'd into the true Source, nor known the true Light which only can enlighten us, he takes that side which appears to him most just and most holy; that is to say, That what ever God has ordain'd to Men after their Death, he has done nothing but what is becoming his Goodness and Justice. This Paragraph is very excellent, and shews not so much the Incredulity and Doubtfulness of *Antoninus*, as his Confidence in the Goodness of God, and entire Submission to his Orders.

Ib. l. 7.

Ib. 17. *For certainly it was possible, had it been more just so.*] The Reasonableness of a Resurrection, and a Life after this, is solemnly prov'd in the Writings of the Evangelists and Apostles, seeing it is a Consequence from the Justice of God, which ought to Punish the Wicked, and Reward the Good. And its Possibility is manifest by the very Principles of *Antonimus*. What would his Faith have been, had he known the Force and Extent of all the Truths which are drawn from these Principles?

Ib. 18. *And had it been according to Nature, the Nature of the Universe would easily have born it.*] *Antonimus* acknowledges nothing impossible in the Resurrection of the Dead; and in this he differs not from the rest of his Sect. So when St. *Paul* spoke of the Resurrection before the *Epicureans* and *Stoicks*, St. *Luke* says, *Some mocked, and others said, We will hear thee another time concerning this matter.* Those that mocked were the *Epicureans*, and those that remitted him to another time were the *Stoicks*, whose Sentiments were not so remote from what St. *Paul* Preach'd to them, as those of the other Philosophers. The same Saint was so assured, that there was nothing against Nature in this Opinion; That in the Discourse he made before *Agrippa* and *Festus*, he confidently asks them, *Acts* 26. 8. *Why should it be thought a thing incredible to you, that God should raise again the Dead?* What a shame is it now a-days for a great

many

many *Chriſtians* to doubt more of the Reſurrection than the very *Pagans* themſelves?

Ib. l. 10. *But now, becauſe it is not ſo, (if ſo be that it be not ſo indeed) be therefore*, &c.] *Antoninus* does not receive this as true; and without deciding any thing, only ſays, That though the Juſt ſhould die for ever, God ſhould not ceaſe to be Juſt. What an Idea had he of the Juſtice of God? and what Confidence in him?

Ib. l. 15. *Were not the Gods both juſt and good in the higheſt degree, thou durſt not thus reaſon with them.*] That God ſuffers us daily to argue with him, and to demand the reaſon of his Conduct, is, Becauſe he is Sovereignly Juſt and Good, and knows that his Ways are right, and that he will be victorious always when we take the liberty to judge of his Procedures: *Ut vincas cum judicatur*, Pſ. 51. 4.

Ib. l. 23. *For the left hand, we ſee, which for the moſt part lieth idle*, &c.] The *Peripateticks* taught, That the Right hand was naturally ſtronger and cleverer than the Left. But the *Platoniſts* ridicul'd this Opinion, and aſſerted, That the two Hands, the two Feet, and all other Parts, Right and Left, are equal; and if we have one Hand or Foot ſtronger, that this proceeds from Uſe, or ſometimes from the Careleſneſs of our Nurſes. The *Stoicks* were of the Opinion of the *Platoniſts*, as appears by this Paſſage. And *Antoninus* makes

makes uſe of this Argument to prove that there is nothing which Cuſtom cannot make familiar to us.

P. 224. l. 11. *As for the uſe of the Dogmata, thou muſt carry thy ſelf in the practice of them, rather like unto a Pancratiaſtes, &c.*] As nothing but our Opinions deceives and ſeduces us, we ſhould always be on our Guard againſt them, and fight them with our utmoſt Power. But in this Combat we muſt not reſemble the Gladiator, who hath only ſtrange Arms: for he hath no ſooner loſt them than he is kill'd. We muſt reſemble the Wreſtler, who comes armed with his own Weapons; that is to ſay, his own Arm. If we ſerve our ſelves of ſtrange Weapons againſt our Opinions, we ſhall be quickly defeated; whereas if we employ our Natural Arms, that is to ſay, the Arms of our Underſtanding, we are aſſured of over-coming always.

Ib. l. 24. *And ſhould Truth, and Righteouſneſs, and Temperance ceaſe to ſhine in thee whilſt thou haſt any Being?*] We are living Lamps; if we ſuffer our Light to be put out, it is our own fault; for it is in our Power to maintain it by the means of Charity and Good Works.

P. 237. l. 3. *Take thine Opinion away, and then as a Ship that hath ſtricken in within the Arms and Mouth of the Harbour.*] Our Opinions are the Winds which toſs us; let us baniſh them, and we ſhall be as thoſe that have

doubled a Cape. When they approach it, they are the sport of the Winds; but they have no sooner doubled it, but the same Cape is a Covert to them from the Tempest.

Ib. l. 22, *Sometimes of particular Nature, as when a Man dyeth old; but of Nature in general however,*] *Antoninus* doth not oppose Particular Nature to Universal Nature; this were contrary to his Principles and to the Truth. His design is to confute this Error, which makes us say when Children die, *They die before their time*; and that they who kill themselves, *prevent the Day of their Death.* This Language is false: No Man dies but in the time which is given him; and it is Universal Nature which measures and distributes Time to every Man as it pleases; to some more, to others less: And as those who die of Old Age are very rare; *Antoninus* says, That it is Particular Nature which regulates their Course; that is to say, that Universal Nature hath made an Exception to its own Rule, and 'tis this Exception which he calls a Particular Nature: For, in effect, those People live as if they were conducted by a Nature different from that which puts Limits to the Life of other Men: but this is one and the same Nature; that is to say, God.

P. 238 l. 31. *The infinite both greatness and variety of things aereal, and things celestial.*] The *Platonists* and *Stoicks* believ'd that the Air and the Ethereal Region were Peopled with an infinite

infinite number of Inhabitants, whom they call *Damons*; whereof ſome were viſible, ſome inviſible, and yet all mortal.

P. 239. l. 3. *Theſe be the things that we are ſo proud and puffed up for.*] Since all humane Affairs are but Diſorder and Confuſion, and there is nothing upon Earth, in the Air and the Ethereal Region, which is not of the ſame Nature, and ſubject to the ſame Laws; What can make Men ſo proud? what ground is there for this Vanity? they have more reaſon to ſigh to ſee themſelves engaged in this Torrent of Corruption and Miſery.

P. 240. l. 8. *Tiberius at Capreæ*, &c.] The Example of *Tiberius* makes it probable, That all they that are here mentioned with him, retired to the Country to lead the ſame life there, that he led at *Capreæ*, where he plunged himſelf into all ſorts of infamous debauchery, and created a new Officer of his Houſe, whom he called *Maſter of Pleaſures*.

Ib. l. 25. *That even to the very eye they are in ſome manner viſible.*] For God is manifeſted enough by his Works, as St. *Paul* ſays, *Rom.* 1. 20.

Ib. l. 27. *Neither have I ever ſeen my own Soul, and yet I reſpect and honour it.*] When we examine the Qualities and Properties of Matter, we cannot doubt of the Exiſtence of our own Soul; we ſee it more clearly than we ſee our Body. Even ſo, when we examine the

Nature and Qualities of the Soul, we muſt neceſſarily either wilfully blind our ſelves, or be convinced of the Exiſtence of God: For God is above the Soul, as the Soul is above Matter, and both the one and the other are moſt ſenſible and viſible by their Effects.

P. 241. l. 9. *There is but one Light of the Sun*, &c.] *Antoninus* here proves, That the Love of our Neighbour is ſo natural, that we muſt do Violence to the Soul, when we ſtop its Inclination to this kind of Union; and his Proof is ſtrong and ſolid.

Ib. l. 16. *So is there but one common intellectual Soul*, &c.] For the *Stoicks* believ'd that Souls were Parts of the Deity. But though this be falſe in their Sence, it is nevertheleſs true to ſay, That all Souls are of one and the ſame Nature; and this is ſufficient for the Conſequence *Antoninus* would draw from it.

Ib. l. 26. *What is the preſent Eſtate of my Underſtanding?*] How often ſhould we bluſh if we often propoſed this Queſtion to our ſelves?

Ib. l. 27. *For herein lieth all indeed.*] This is not the Principal, but the All; and yet our Soul, inſtead of being occupied wholly about her ſelf, is only concern'd about the Body.

Ib. l. ult.

Ib. l. ult. *They who eſteemed Pleaſure to be Happineſs, and Pain Miſery, did nevertheleſs contemn Death.*] Certainly this is one of the ſtrongeſt Reaſons to make us deſpiſe Death, for it is a clear Proof that theſe Perſons were perſwaded that Death is not an Evil. *Antoninus* ſpeaks here of *Epicurus*, who deſpis'd Death, and ſaid it was neither for the Living nor the Dead: For when one lives, he dies not; and when he is dead, he is not. All Good and Evil conſiſts in Opinion: It is therefore of it ſelf neither Good nor Evil.

P. 243. l. 5. *To him, to whom whether his actions be many or few, ſo they be all good, is all one.*] And ſo it ſhould be to all the World; for, as has been prov'd elſewhere, we are not rewarded according to the Number, but the Quality of our Actions.

Ib. l. 10. *O Man! as a Citizen thou haſt lived and converſed in this great City.*] He conſiders the World as a City, whereof all other Cities are but the Inns and Houſes.

Ib. l. 17. *Not a Tyrant, not an unjuſt Judge; but the ſame Nature, that brought thee in, doth now ſend thee out of the World.*] For no Tyrant nor unjuſt Judge hath this Power, if it be not given them of God. So it is always God who diſpoſes of us as he pleaſes.

Ib. l. 30

Ib. l. 30. *Go thy ways then well-pleased and contented: For so is he that dismisseth thee.*] It is in our Power to find God Merciful and Propitious at the last Hour. For he is so to such as repent, and die in his Fear and Love.

F I N I S.

ERRATA.

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